Looking through the Syrian and Middle Eastern and Western information resources late in the evening of February 21, it was hard to believe my eyes when the news block of the online tactical map syria.liveuamap.com appeared the first reports about the arrival of a pair of 5th generation Su multifunctional super-maneuverable fighters at the Syrian Khmeimim airbase. -57 (T-50 PAK-FA). The vehicles touched the airbase's GDP during an air escort from one of the Su-35S multipurpose fighters, which was clearly visible in a video published by the Syrian observer Wael al-Husseini on his Twitter page. As it later became known thanks to the online resource for monitoring aircraft with active ADS-B transponders "Flightradar24", the PAK-FA and Su-35 were led by the Tu-154B-2 passenger aircraft.
Completely new multi-role fighters of the next generation, completely new, "not tested" in hostile airspace, are quite unexpectedly deployed to the most unpredictable Syrian theater of military operations, saturated with an impressive number of ground and airborne electronic and radar reconnaissance assets. So, near the airspace controlled by the air defense-missile defense of the Syrian Armed Forces on the borders of the Euphrates and northern provinces, AWACS Boeing 737AEW & C "Peace Eagle" aircraft of the Turkish Air Force and E-3G of the US Air Force, capable of bearing air targets with an EPR of 3 sq. m at a depth of up to 280 - 350 km. From the southern air direction, the Syrian sky is partially "pressed" by Israeli CAEW aircraft equipped with active phased antenna arrays of the EL / W-2085 radar from the Elta company integrated into the fuselage.
Consequently, the reinforcement of the Syrian air wing of the Russian Aerospace Forces with the standard Su-30SM and Su-34 with an effective reflective surface of 12 and 3 square meters. m, respectively, "sighted" air reconnaissance means of the enemy will be almost impossible to surprise or "intimidate", especially when the AIM-120C-7 and AIM-120D air-to-air missiles have been adopted by the coalition fighters, posing a threat to our vehicles at a distance 130 - 160 km. Another thing is the Su-57, which are machines of a completely different kind. And do not rush to judge the combat potential of our air wing only by the number of Su-57 deployed to Khmeimim. An extremely important role here will be played by the parameters of the airborne electronic equipment of the two PAK-FAs that arrived in Syria, as well as their small radar signature, which will become a significant obstacle to detection both by the airborne radar of the enemy AN / APG-80 fighters on the Israeli F-16I, and from using radar systems MESA and AN / APY-2, installed on Turkish and US AWACS.
Based on the tabular data of the Paralay source, where the calculated effective scattering surface of the Su-57 is from 0.2 to 0.4 sq. m, we can conclude that our advanced fighters will be detected at a distance of 100 - 150 km by the above Turkish and American RLDN means, and therefore it will be extremely difficult to establish observation of the vehicles, especially when, in addition to the Su-57, the A2 / AD air zone will also be patrolled and Su-30SM / Su-35S, carrying containers for individual (L-265M10) and group protection "Khibiny" on hangers. We conclude that the Su-57, performing air operations over the central territories of Syria, will be virtually impossible to detect by enemy airborne radar systems, while the pilots will be able to test some avionics in a tactical situation close to combat, taking into account the complex network-centric theater of operations … Why not all, but some of them?
The fact is that in addition to taking into account the use of ground-based and airborne early warning radars by the enemy, operating mainly in the L (D) - and S-bands, it is necessary to remember about the presence of passive radar complexes. These include: onboard radiation warning stations AN / ALR-67 (V) 3 (aboard the Super Hornets), the world's most advanced SPO AN / ALR-94 (as part of the F-22A Raptor ", Consisting of more than 30 highly sensitive passive radar sensors), as well as antenna posts with a passive RTR station" KORAL-ED ", which are part of the Turkish five-element self-propelled electronic warfare system" KORAL ". The aforementioned multi-frequency electronic reconnaissance systems operate in the frequency range from 500 to 40,000 MHz and are capable of bearing even weak sources of electromagnetic radiation, and then save their frequency profile in the register of radio-emitting objects. This, in turn, imposes significant restrictions on testing the N036 "Belka" on-board radar system in active mode (in order to avoid familiarizing the enemy with the operating modes of the PAK-FA radar in combat conditions).
Obviously, 4 AFAR stations of the Belka onboard radar will be tested in the passive mode of reconnaissance of enemy radio-emitting targets, for example, those working for transmitting tactical information exchange terminals via radio channel Link-4A and Link-11 / TADIL-A installed on AWACS aircraft
Peace Eagle, Link-16 terminals (aboard F-16C Block 50+), as well as emitting devices stationed on ground and air units. This method of using the Belka airborne radar system in Syrian airspace will help adapt the Su-57 fighter's armament control system not only to perform air superiority operations and strike ground targets, but also to conduct strategic aerial reconnaissance without revealing its own location. … This technique of using the 5th generation F-22A "Raptor" fighters has been used for several years by the flight personnel of the US Air Force both over Iraq and over the Syrian Arab Republic, as stated in March 2016 by the dean of the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Research, General Retired US Air Force Lieutenant David Deptula.
It is worth noting that the 5th generation PAK-FA multifunctional fighters, as well as the Raptors with their AN / ALR-94 passive reconnaissance systems, will have very serious advantages in reconnaissance of surface radio-emitting objects in the passive mode due to the presence of as part of the "Belka" of two AFAR side-looking stations N036B-1-1L and N036B-1-B. This design makes it possible for the Su-57 to run parallel to the line of contact with the enemy for a long period of time, eliminating the need to turn the field of view to the scanned area by performing maneuvers (the same technique is used by all ground reconnaissance aircraft / UAVs with side-looking radars: from the Tu-214R and E-8C to RQ-4B "Global Hawk"). Working in the active mode (for radiation), the N036B-1-1L / B give the Su-57 pilot the opportunity to "look" at 45 - 60 ° into the rear hemisphere, which is an unaffordable luxury for the F-22A due to the lack of a mechanical drive for turning the airborne radar cloth AN / APG-77. But let us remind you that the active mode of the radars included in the "Belka" will not be used up to the regional and global conflict (the "Raptors" do not use it either).
A number of restrictions will also be imposed on the active modes of operation of the onboard communication complex (including voice and telecode information exchange) C-111-N, synchronized with the AIST-50 antenna-feeder system. Despite the fact that this complex has much in common with the C-108 onboard information exchange complex of the Su-35S fighter (including the use of a pseudo-random frequency tuning mode with a frequency of about 156 hops per second), its use for transmission in the current tactical situation in the Syrian theater hostilities are fraught with the opening of the location of the "broadcasting" Su-57 with further decryption and analysis of the pilot's negotiations with the allied command post. For these purposes, the US Air Force has an RTR / RER aircraft such as the RC-135V / W "Rivet Joint", on board of which there is a well-known 85000 / ES-182 MUCELS electronic reconnaissance station operating in the frequency range from 0.04 to 17, 25 GHz. Depending on the radio horizon, meteorological conditions and interference conditions, the bladed and whip antennas of the MUCELS complex are capable of intercepting signals from the enemy's communications equipment at a distance of 500 to 900 - 1000 km, after which about ten professional cryptologists-linguists on board are puzzled over them. " Rivet Joint ".
Based on this, it is not difficult to understand that it is possible to test the C-111-N over Syria only under the following conditions: flight at low altitude (outside the coverage area of the RER "KPRAL-ED" stations outside the radio horizon and other ground-based enemy radio reconnaissance systems), with 100% confidence in the absence of Rivet Joints in the next 600 kilometers, as well as at low and medium power of the terminal transmitter, while the maximum is about 200 watts. At this point, one of the reasons why the second A-50U radar patrol and guidance aircraft arrived at the Khmeimim airbase becomes clear. Before the Su-57 test flights over Syria, one of the Mainstays will be used to detect any potentially dangerous airborne reconnaissance aircraft of the NATO and Israeli forces approaching Syrian airspace from four operational directions. The only vehicles that can penetrate deep enough into Syrian airspace and remain unnoticed for a long time are the F-22A "Raptor", which are deployed at the Al-Dhafra airbase (Saudi Arabia) as part of the 95th US Air Force Expeditionary Squadron, as well as F-35I "Adir" Hel Haavir, stationed at the Nevatim airbase (Israel).
The former have an effective reflective surface of 0.05 - 0.07 sq. m and can be detected by the modernized radar system of the A-50U aircraft at a distance of no more than 100 - 120 km, the F-35I with an RCS of 0.2 sq. m - 160 km. Consequently, these vehicles retain the ability to detect the Su-57 on duty in the Syrian airspace through the integrated optoelectronic systems for detecting heat-contrast targets (torches of missiles, and turbojet engines in afterburner mode) AN / AAR-56 MLD ("Missile Launch Detection"), as well as AN / AAQ-37 DAS. These complexes are represented by an aperture of 4 and 6 high-resolution infrared sensors distributed over the airframe of fighters, capable of detecting heat-emitting targets at a distance of several tens to several hundred kilometers, and are capable of detecting "torches" from the nozzles of a round cross-sections of AL-41F1 bypass turbojet engines.
But even if the Raptor is able to approach the Su-57 at a distance of direction finding by infrared sensors with further covert tracking, it will not be able to transmit information about the detected object to the air command post (the same AWACS), since its Link- 16 works exclusively on receiving tactical information, which is implemented for greater stealth of the vehicle. Recall that for the exchange of information about the tactical situation on the Raptors, a highly secure individual radio channel IFDL (Intra-Flight Data Link) is used, which is not intended for interfacing with other tactical radio channels of the Link-16 and TTNT types.
At the end of 2017, these shortcomings of the F-22A "Raptor" were reported by the information publication "Aviation Week" with reference to the anonymous commander of the US Air Force, who complained that upon the discovery of the Su-30SM and Su-35S the Russian Aerospace Forces over the Euphrates bed for CP notification has to use not a data transmission channel, but a classic digital radio station with scrambling and frequency hopping modes. Moreover, he expressed dissatisfaction with the fact that it is almost impossible to detect Russian vehicles at night, since there are no highly specialized advanced optoelectronic devices on board for detecting and capturing a VC with a small infrared signature. Recall that AN / AAR-56 is effective only in detecting highly contrasting thermal targets, which include solid propellant rocket motors, as well as jet engines in afterburner mode. The AAR-56 is capable of detecting the jet engines of tactical fighters at maximum mode only within the limits of visual visibility. American pilots are strictly forbidden to turn on AN / APG-77 radars to prevent "autopsy" by our electronic reconnaissance means.
Russian Su-57s, on the other hand, are equipped with an OLS-50M optoelectronic complex, which is more adapted to the detection and tracking of fighter and bomber targets in terms of radiation from a jet stream, not only in afterburner mode, but also at maximum. The complex is an analogue of the OLS-35 installed on the Su-35S and has similar technical characteristics. In particular, the detection range of an F-35A-type target in the afterburner mode can exceed 100 km to the rear hemisphere (ZPS) and 45 km to the front hemisphere (FPS), when the infrared signature of the jet stream is partially overlapped by the airframe projection. In addition to the direction finding of air heat-contrast targets, the OLS-50M is capable of detecting, tracking and capturing surface targets in the middle infrared range (3-5 microns). This OLPK is located in front of the cockpit canopy and has a modular design, consisting of: an optical-mechanical unit (BOM-35), an information conversion unit (BOI-35), as well as a power supply / control unit for a laser rangefinder-target designator (BPUL-35); the latter is capable of measuring the range to targets, as well as illuminating them for tactical missiles with a semi-active laser seeker at a distance of up to 30 km. Convection air cooling of the working elements determines the high operational life of the OLS-50M, and the modularity of the design - the improved maintainability in wartime.
There is an optical-electronic "filling" of the Su-57 and the station for detecting attacking missiles and countermeasures 101KS "Atoll", which is familiar to fighters of generations "4 ++" and "5", designed by specialists of JSC "Production Association" Ural Optical and Mechanical Plant "from Yekaterinburg. The product is a conceptual analogue of the Raptor SOAP AN / AAR-56 and the DAS lightning system and is represented by a distributed aperture of:
working in the ultraviolet range; products are capable of detecting sources of thermal radiation of both rocket engines and jet engines of enemy aircraft, after which the coordinates can be transferred to the Su-57 armament control system; the first pair of 101KS-U / 02 modules is installed on the lower surface of the nose of the fuselage and operates along the lower hemisphere, the second pair of modules - on the upper surface of the tail spinner and processes the upper hemisphere; single modules 101KS-U / 01 scan lateral hemispheres and are placed on the sides of the gargrot; total number of UV sensors - 6 units;
suppressing the operation of infrared homing heads for attacking missiles (AIM-9L / X Block II, "IRIS-T" or "MICA-IR") and located under the cockpit, as well as on the upper surface of the gargrot; unfortunately, the complex is not present on all experimental machines;
operating in the infrared / TV range and designed for more confident low-altitude piloting of the vehicle in the mode of overcoming enemy air defense (without using the onboard radar).
An additional element of the Su-57 onboard optoelectronic equipment is the 101KS-N suspended container sighting and navigation system, designed to work on objects in the lower hemisphere, mainly ground and surface. The product operates in television and infrared sighting channels and is capable of detecting and identifying targets of the "tank" type at a distance of more than 35 km due to the use of optical zoom in combination with a high resolution. A laser rangefinder-target designator is also integrated, capable of issuing target designation to air-to-ground missiles Kh-38MLE, as well as Kh-29L and Kh-25ML, launched from pendants of other carriers. The exact parameters of this complex have not been disclosed today, but we can say for sure that they roughly correspond to such container complexes as the modernized American Lantirn-ER or the Turkish AselPOD.
Using all of the above passive sensors for navigation, reconnaissance and target designation in covert mode, the Su-57 will be able to obtain a lot of tactical information valuable for the command of the Russian group in the SAR without the need to transfer such a large vehicle as the Tu-214R. More importantly, the transfer of the latter through neutral airspace over the Caspian Sea is instantly recorded by modern radar air defense systems of Azerbaijan, the main of which can be considered Ukrainian radar detectors of the decimeter range 80K6 "Pelican" and Israeli radars EL / M-2080 "Green Pine", information which instantly appears on the table at Hulusi Akar and Erdogan. The latter immediately notify the controlled cells "Tahrir al-Sham" and the FSA about the imminent start of comprehensive air control, for example, the same "Idlib viper". Naturally, rebels and other militants from the "green enclave" instantly turn off all sorts of preparatory measures for one or another military operation against the government forces of Syria.
As a result, the command of the Russian Aerospace Forces and the Syrian Armed Forces are losing a lot of valuable information, which could later be used to plan an effective range of countermeasures. It will be extremely difficult for the enemy to determine the exact moment of reconnaissance by the forces of a pair of Su-57s, especially at night, while vehicles may appear both near Idlib captured by militants, and near the Euphrates channel, so that "hot heads" from the Central Command of the Armed Forces The United States thought well before covering up Syrian army units, Syrian militias and other friendly forces with the cannon artillery of the Ganships and HIMARS.
Indeed, with the help of the OLS-50M, promising Su-57 fighters can not only observe the enemy without revealing their location, but also quietly launch RVV-SD air combat missiles from the inner-fuselage weapon compartments. One thing is certain - it is not by chance, two days after the arrival of the first pair of Su-57s, Syrian sources reported the appearance of a couple of similar machines over Khmeimim. In addition to the need to test the above-described PAK-FA avionics modules in close combat conditions (for accelerated launch into a series of fully adapted vehicles), as well as to contain the US Air Force's activity over Deir ez-Zor, the deployment of additional 2 fighters in the Syrian theater of operations may have a second goal related to the recent statements by French President Emmanuel Macron and US Permanent Representative to the UN Nikki Haley about the readiness of their regimes to use military force against strategically important facilities of the Syrian Arab Army. The arguments for such plans, as usual, are trivial: "the use of chemical weapons" and the delivery of "merciless strikes" on Eastern Ghouta, from where missile strikes by the "Free Syrian Army" are regularly launched against Damascus.
