The armament of strategic importance for the Israel Defense Forces is undoubtedly the Iron Dome anti-missile system. The advanced high-energy radar with AFAR EL / M-2084 manufactured by Elta Systems, as well as the Tamir medium-range anti-aircraft missiles, can intercept unguided rockets (URS) MLRS of the BM-21 Grad and BM-27 Uragan types at ranges of about 70 km, as well as large-caliber 120-mm and 152-mm mortar and artillery shells at a distance of about 40-60 km. In addition, the list of targets of the Iron Dome complex includes complex aeroballistic targets, anti-radar missiles and all types of combat aircraft. Operating at frequencies of 2-4 GHz of the decimeter S-band, the EL / M-2048 multifunctional radar is capable of detecting a target with an EPR of the order of 0.015 m2 (152-mm artillery shell) at a distance of 100 km, and a 220-mm unguided missile 9M27F / K ("Hurricane") with RCS of about 0, 035 m2 - at a distance of about 125 km. The energy capacity of this radar is significantly higher than that of most of the known counter-battery radars for artillery reconnaissance, and advanced high-performance computing means make it possible to minimize the detection time and "capture for accurate auto-tracking" of enemy launching shells. The reaction time of the complex is no more than 1 s.
ON THE EFFICIENCY OF THE IRON DOME ANTI-MISSION COMPLEX: NOT EVERYTHING IS PERFECT
Opinions about the effectiveness of the "Iron Dome" in combat conditions vary widely from one source to another. For example, experts close to the manufacturer of the Iron Dome and the Israeli Ministry of Defense claim that the efficiency of the complex is about 90%, which was partially confirmed during Operation Cloud Pillar, when the first modification of the Iron Dome Block I complex intercepted 421 of 1,198 Palestinian unguided rockets, including various modifications of Qassams, Grads and Fajras. If you trust the Israeli military, most of the Palestinian air attack weapons that did not threaten Israeli cities and “went into milk” were not intercepted by the Iron Dome due to the relatively high cost of the Tamir missiles ($ 62,000 per unit), which explains 35% of intercepted Palestinian missiles. In other words, only 525 missiles posed a threat to the country's military and civilian targets, while 673 “went into milk” (approximate figures). Other sources (both Israeli and Palestinian) provide diametrically opposed information.
For example, representatives of the Palestinian-serial paramilitary unit Al-Quds Brigade, which today, together with the government forces of Syria, Hezbollah, Syrian militias and the Russian Aerospace Forces participate in the anti-terrorist operation in the province of Aleppo, in the spring of 2014 presented a new "Handicraft" and quite effective tactical MLRS with a caliber of 107 mm. The range of the system does not exceed 8 km, but the effective scattering surface is no more than 0.01 m2, which is a very serious interference for the radar detection and guidance of the Iron Dome complex. In practice, this was confirmed during the strike operation "retaliation" for the murder of 3 activists of the Al-Quds unit by IDF soldiers on March 11, 2014. Then in the direction of Israel from the "partisan" launchers were fired 130 unguided rockets of the "Quds" type, 60 of which crossed the border and fell on Israeli territory. Only three homemade rockets were intercepted by Tamir rockets. Perhaps, knowing the safe flight path of Palestinian missiles, the calculation of the "Iron Dome" saved expensive "Tamirs." at least inexplicable.
Another fact that testifies far not in favor of the "Iron Dome" is its huge "dead zone" (the distance from the battalion to the closest line of possible use of missiles), amounting to 4.5 km. This suggests that if a light unguided projectile of the S-8 type with a B-8M1 launcher adapted for ground use from a distance of 2.5-5 km is used against the Iron Dome complex, the complex will be defenseless. Not only foreign amateurs and experts in the field of aerospace, but also local experts talk about a huge "dead zone". For example, Nathan Faber, a doctor in the field of anti-missile defense of the Technion of Haifa, argued that Tamir anti-aircraft missiles have low capabilities to intercept enemy missiles and shells at a distance of up to 15 km. Obviously, he meant targets that are already directly on the approach section of the trajectory (below 5 km). As you know, even for such long-range missile defense systems as the S-400 Triumph (with a vertical launch method for 48N6E2 and 9M96E2 missiles), the "dead zone" does not exceed 2-3 km. What then is the reason for such a large "dead zone" at the "Iron Dome", launching "Tamir" at an angle of 75-80 degrees?
The fact is that in the development of the Tamir anti-missile, more emphasis was placed not on super-maneuverable qualities, but on the adjusted (verified) optimization of the dispersion of warhead fragments for the most effective destruction of the target, as well as on an advanced laser fuse with additional optoelectronic sensors, which contribute to the timely detonation of the warhead. As a result, the Tamir missile defense system did not receive either a gas-dynamic declination system (gas-jet planes in the solid propellant rocket nozzle channel), or a gas-dynamic “belt” with transverse control engine nozzles (DPU) for a quick approach to the target immediately after launch. Only nasal aerodynamic rudders are responsible for maneuverability, forming a "canard" pattern. Naturally, only aerodynamic controls will not allow an actively accelerating interceptor missile to reach targets within a radius of 3 or 5 km in hundredths of a second. For this purpose, the 9M331 anti-aircraft missiles of the Tor-M1 complex have bow gas generators for leaning towards the target after launch, which have reduced the “dead zone” to only 1 km; the presence of such devices at "Tamir" is not reported. Let's move on to the topic of selling complexes to Azerbaijan.
"ISKANDERS-E" IN ARMENIAN ARMS - THE BEST CONTAINING FACTOR FOR BAKU
The first information regarding the sale of the complex to Azerbaijan was published by the Baku news agency 1news.az on October 7, 2016, with reference to the deputy of the National Assembly of Azerbaijan, Yevda Abramov. Confirmation followed on December 17, 2016 from the APA news agency with reference to the Minister of Defense Industry of the country Yaver Jamalov. The contract for the purchase of the "Iron Dome" was signed directly between the Ministry of Defense of Azerbaijan and the Israel Defense Ministry's arms export department "SIBAT". Thus, the South Caucasian republic becomes the first official foreign buyer of this tactical missile defense system.
Rumors about the preparation of this contract have been circulating on the sidelines of Azerbaijani departments for more than one year. And there is no doubt that Baku will continue to arrange acts of aggression and provocation in the Nagorno-Karabakh region, as it was in early April 2016 during the Four-Day War, but now it also wants to hide its servicemen under the “anti-missile umbrella” "The" Iron Dome ". The continuation of the previous strategy of Azerbaijan on the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic can be said by the same little stroke with the extradition of Ramil Safarov, an Azerbaijani serviceman who, while taking English courses in Hungary, hacked an Armenian serviceman with an ax, after which he received the rank of major from President I. Aliyev, worthy of cash reward and new living space. The contract for the "Iron Dome" was accelerated by another important event - the supply of operational-tactical missile systems "Iskander-E" for the Armenian Armed Forces. The transfer of the most modern OTRKs in the world took place within the framework of an export credit provided to Armenia for the purchase of Russian weapons in the amount of about $ 200 million. For the first time, the complexes were demonstrated on September 16, 2016 at the rehearsal of the parade in Yerevan in honor of the 25th anniversary of the republic's independence, which caused sharp indignation from Baku. On the same day, President Aliyev held a service meeting with the participation of high-ranking officials of the law enforcement agencies, where further tactics of possible hostilities in the NKR were developed, including the delivery of rocket and artillery strikes against key strategic targets in Armenia. Only, judging by what is happening, they do not think about Armenia's membership in the CSTO and other shortcomings of the "salvific" "Iron Dome" in Baku.
ACHIEVING EXCELLENCE OVER ARMENIA IN NKR CONDITIONS WILL REMAIN A FANTASTIC DREAM BAKU
Today, the basis of Azerbaijan's air defense missile defense system is: 3 divisions of the S-300PMU-2 Favorit air defense system (16 launchers and 112 48N6E2 missiles were purchased), 1 division (battery) of the Barak-8 air defense system of Israeli production with 75 missiles, 18 self-propelled firing installations type 9A310M1-2 (SAM "Buk-M1 / 2"), 8 self-propelled complexes "Tor-M2E", the same number of Belarusian T-38 "Stilet", as well as Israeli SAM "Spyder-SR". Let's assess the combat potential of this layered air / missile defense system. The above funds will be enough to only partially block the airspace over the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic. If only one S-300PMU-2 division with 6-8 launchers is involved (Baku will not be able to allocate more divisions in the NKR direction due to the need to maintain air defense over strategically important objects in the central regions of Azerbaijan and on the Caspian Sea coast), the airspace over the NKR will be partially controlled. Difficult terrain will not allow controlling heights up to 1.5-2.5 km, even if the low-altitude detector (NVO) 76N6 and the universal tower 40V6M for the 30N6E2 radar are used. A similar situation is developing with the Azerbaijani "Buks" and "Baraks-8".
A large number of closely located mountain ranges and hills greatly facilitate the task of "hacking" even the most powerful missile defense systems, which can be easily performed by the Armenian Su-25 attack aircraft, as well as the tactical aviation of the Russian Aerospace Forces, deployed to the Gyumri airbase as part of aid to the allied republic. From this we draw an unambiguous conclusion - the expensive "Three hundredths", "Buks" and "Baraks", which are of strategic importance for Baku, will not pull together on the Nagorno-Karabakh theater of military operations. In addition, the most complex wooded landscape of the NKR mountain ranges, where the Azerbaijani Armed Forces will not be able to find many plain strips more than 100 meters wide, convenient for the operational advance of troops, will not allow even such compact self-propelled anti-aircraft missile systems such as Tor-M2E to travel around the terrain. or "Spyder-SR". And there won't be much sense from the "Spyder-SR" against low-altitude targets, because the minimum target height for this complex is limited to 20 meters, while many modern air attack weapons approach the target at lower altitudes (from 7 to 15 m).
The mobile short-range air defense system "Spyder-SR" also has positive features: versions of the "Derby" and "Python-5" guided air combat missiles are used as anti-aircraft guided missiles. One BM-launcher contains a quad module for 2 Derby missiles and 2 Python missiles. The first has an initial speed of 1000 m / s, and is also capable of maneuvering with overloads of up to 50 units, these figures are higher than that of the 9M331 SAM of the Tor-M1 complex. Anti-aircraft missile "Derby" is equipped with an active radar seeker, so that even in poor meteorological conditions, the missile can immediately after launching to capture an air target without the help of the EL / M-2106NG "ATAR-3D" radar for detection and targeting, the operator can turn off the radar and, without opening their positions, expect a successful interception. Radio command guidance in the Tor-M1 air defense missile system, in poor meteorological conditions, requires constant operation of the guidance radar, up to the destruction of the target, which can reveal its own positions for enemy electronic reconnaissance means.
The Python-5 rocket has even more outstanding parameters. First, the Python-5 is the only short-range interceptor missile that uses a bispectral optoelectronic homing head simultaneously with a long-wave infrared channel (8-13 microns) and a television channel (aiming at a target's silhouette). It ensures the destruction of heat-contrast air targets, small-sized "cold" objects (UAVs of territorial and positional reconnaissance), artillery shells and guided aerial bombs. The missile has the highest flight performance achieved by using the largest, in the practice of military rocketry, destabilizers, large nose aerodynamic rudders, as well as a gas-dynamic control system of the interceptor or gas-jet type. The overload limit of the Python-5 design is estimated by the Rafael development company at 70 units, and the pumping angle of the coordinator is at 75-90 degrees. The maximum missile speed is also the highest among all known melee airborne missile systems (about 4100 km / h). The dual-mode solid propellant rocket engine has a period of operation of 22 s (4 s in acceleration mode and 18 s in cruising mode): this indicates the possibility of using the thrust vector deflection system in all parts of the flight trajectory. The only drawback of the rocket is the lack of a short-wavelength range (3-5 microns) of the seeker, which creates problems with the introduction of an operation mode for ground targets.
Azerbaijani military units will be able to use "Spiders" and "Torahs" exclusively on small highways, which will make the process of their detection with the help of Tu-214R ORTR aircraft even easier. As for the "Three hundredths", "Baraks", "Buks" and "Iron Dome", the main stakes are made on them in the formation of an echeloned air defense line of the forward fortified areas of the Azerbaijani Armed Forces, located several tens of kilometers from the border of the NKR. At a distance of 40-60 km from the active area of the theater of military operations, the Armenian Armed Forces do not have the ability to suppress Azerbaijani motorized rifle brigades and strong points with the help of the Grad MLRS; barrel artillery (203-mm self-propelled guns "Pion"). To defend precisely against such artillery, Azerbaijan purchased the Iron Doom tactical anti-missile system: in fact, many NURS (as in the case of the Grad) will not have to be intercepted, and the defense will be sufficient. According to the sources, 4x20 Iron Doom launchers were purchased with 80 Tamir interceptor missiles ready for launch.
In this configuration, the "Iron Dome" can repel full volleys of about 4 or 5 combat vehicles of the MLRS "Smerch", as well as various modifications of the 203-mm shells of the "Pion" a couple of tens of kilometers from the defended object. But this only applies to NURS approaching the anti-missile battery, when the interception occurs in the front hemisphere (PPS). When the "Iron Dome" passes at least one high-speed supersonic NURS, the "Tamirs" will no longer be able to intercept it in pursuit (into the rear hemisphere). A very negative feature of Tamir interceptor missiles is their relatively low maximum speed, which is about 2600 km / h, while most MLRS missiles have a speed of 3-4M. The greatest efficiency of "Tamirov" is achieved exclusively when intercepting targets on counter-intersecting trajectories.
MAIN DISADVANTAGES OF THE "IRON DOME" AND THE AZERBAIJANI ADMISSION IN GENERAL
One of the most important qualities of the Iron Dome complex is the ability to work in the role of a tactical missile attack warning system (EWS). This function is assigned to the EL / M-2084 radar, which can detect a 300-mm 9M55F unguided missile at a range of about 110 km. Thus, the operators of the complex can not only intercept some of these shells, but also notify the forward units of an imminent attack by rocket artillery, so that the latter have time to move from open areas to shelters. This multifunctional radar also has a not very good feature, which we did not discuss at the beginning of the article. The EL / M-2084 station has an extremely small viewing area in the elevation plane, which is only 40 degrees. This is absolutely insufficient to intercept aeroballistic and gliding means of air attack, which "approach" (dive) to the target at angles of 50 degrees or more from the stratosphere. In simpler terms, over the "Iron Dome" battalion, a "dead zone funnel" with an angle of 100 degrees is formed, through which you can easily destroy the base of the system - the EL / M-2084 radar. Moreover, in order to get to this "funnel", the enemy's air attack does not need to initially climb 35 km, because the Israeli brainchild has another drawback - the maximum height of the targets hit, which is about 12 km (this is the height of most types of tactical aircraft).
Now we have also identified the fact that at the moment of an intensive and well-thought-out anti-radar air operation of the enemy, the battery of the Iron Dome anti-missile system will not hold out on its own for a long time; and this requires the involvement of a pair of Buk-M1-2 or Triumph divisions (to eliminate the "funnel"). In fact, the Israelis, in the process of designing the complex, were not taught the weak points of the Egyptian air defense systems "Cube", which have similar funnels of "dead zones" through which Hel Haavir often managed to very successfully destroy the self-propelled detection and destruction radars 1С91. For comparison, I will give you the dimensions of the "funnels" of our complexes: all modifications of the "Tori" have only 52 degrees, the same for the multifunctional radar 30N6E (the elevation zones of these complexes are from 0 to 64 degrees). The "funnels" of the "Three hundred" are not so small, but in order to painlessly penetrate them, the enemy aircraft must initially fly around it even higher than the maximum height of the S-300PM1 target, which is about 35 - 45 km.
Now let us discuss the most painful issue for the General Staff of the Azerbaijani Armed Forces - the availability of Iskander-E operational-tactical missile systems in Armenia. Baku's fears on this score are far from groundless. After all, the realities are such that all the air defense systems in Azerbaijan's armament do not have the ability to resist the Iskander. Let's start with the main object of our today's review - the Iron Dome complex.
As we have already seen, its Tamir anti-missiles are equipped only with aerodynamic controls in the bow of the hull. Consequently, the maximum overloads realized by the rocket barely reach 40G; this is quite enough to intercept rocket and artillery shells flying along flat, coupled and mounted trajectories, especially since these shells do not perform complex anti-aircraft maneuvers that complicate the process of interception for the guidance and control systems of the Tamir missile. Another thing is the 9M723-1 / K5 operational-tactical ballistic missile (OTBR) of the Iskander-E / M complex. Its radar signature corresponds to a 122-mm artillery shell (0.015 m2), but this is no longer just an uncontrollable "blank", but an actively maneuvering "smart" high-precision object. The 9M723K5 rocket dives at the target at an angle of about 80 degrees, which creates huge problems for the detection and "capture" of the "Iron Dome" and S-300PMU-2 radar systems, the ballistic missile "enters" the funnel of the "dead zone" from a height of 50 km … Even if the guidance radar EL / M-2084 ("Iron Dome") and 30N6E2 (S-300PMU-2) can detect and escort it at a distance of 80-110 km, it will not be easy to intercept it even if the Azerbaijani anti-aircraft - missile battalions will overlap each other with the funnels of "dead zones".
First, official sources say that the S-300PMU-2 (30N6E2 and 64N6E) radar systems have a target EPR limit of 0.02 m2, and the 9M723K5 OTBR has approximately the same or even lower radar signature. Secondly, at the final stage of the trajectory, the rocket performs intensive anti-aircraft maneuvers with an overload of up to 30 units, which requires interceptor missiles to maneuver with 2.5 times greater overloads (at least 62-65 units). Anti-aircraft missiles 48N6E2, "Tamir" are constructively designed for overloads of only about 40 units, and the upgraded SAM type 9M317 of the "Buk-M1-2" complex - no more than 25-27 units, which does not bring Azerbaijani calculations one step closer to success in intercepting Iskander-E missiles. Thirdly, the hypersonic flight speed of the 9M723K5 operational-tactical ballistic missile, depending on the target range, fluctuates between 2100 - 2600 m / s, which is far beyond the maximum speed limits of the targets of the S-300PS air defense missile system, "Iron Dome", as well as Buk-M1-2. Imagine 8 9M723K5 missiles rushing towards defended targets from a height of 50 km at an angle of 80-85 degrees. The flight time (at a speed of 8-8, 8M) from the top point of the trajectory will be about 19.5 s, while the missiles also “wildly” maneuver, having a radar signature slightly more than that of an average bird. The Azerbaijani crew of the Triumph air defense missile system will only dream of intercepting such a product, and there is absolutely nothing Baku can do about it.
WHY GEORGIA CHOSE SAMP-T SAMPLES?
The Georgian Defense Ministry has distinguished itself with a more thought-out strategy of countering our Iskander-E. While in the spring of 2014, the Azerbaijani Ministry of Defense refused the offer of the French side to conclude a contract with Eurosam for the purchase of several divisions of the SAMP-T anti-aircraft missile system, the Georgian department immediately began to consider the tempting offer. Georgians have repeatedly expressed concern over the deployment of our Iskander-M complexes in South Ossetia. So, on December 23, 2015, the then Minister of Defense of Georgia Tina Khidasheli, called the deployment of our OTRKs in the South Ossetian settlement of Java "a threat of a regional scale, as well as a huge challenge for the entire South Caucasus," obviously referring to Turkey and Azerbaijan. At the moment, there has been no information on the arrival of SAMP-T kits in Georgia, but the fulfillment of the contract may follow at any time.
A very important reason why the Iskander-M must be on alert in the Southern Military District and in the Caucasus is not only Baku's aggressive actions towards the NKR and Armenia, but also Georgia's strategic partnership with NATO, as well as directly with USA. Official Tbilisi, which continues to consider the military strategies of returning South Ossetia and Abkhazia, whose populations have been subjected to genocide by Georgia for many years, is slowly and surely turning the country into a NATO operational and strategic foothold for control of the southern regions of the Russian Federation. The basis of this bridgehead is the Vaziani military base located near Tbilisi. Since 2015, this military facility has acquired strategic importance for Georgia and NATO: it hosted the first joint military exercises of the Georgian Armed Forces with the multinational composition of the North Atlantic Alliance under the name "Agile Spirit-2015" ("Agile Spirit-2015"). The second, most extensive, maneuvers took place from 11 to 26 May 2016 as part of the Noble Partner exercise. Then, for the first time in history, American main battle tanks M1A2 "Abrams", as well as BMP M2 "Bradley" were deployed almost to the "gates" of the Southern Military District of Russia. The US Army units in Europe received a unique opportunity to test their equipment on the lands of the Caucasus, which is another alarming sign. The contingent that took part in those exercises was represented by 1,300 troops from Georgia, the United States and the United Kingdom.
The last exercise at the Vaziani base, called "Georgia-NATO-2016", took place from 10 to 20 November 2016. Their goal was a general check and development of the level of coordination between various military units of such countries of the alliance as the USA, Great Britain, Bulgaria, Belgium, the Netherlands, Lithuania and Latvia, as well as Slovenia, Macedonia, Hungary and Romania. In addition to NATO officers, there were also officers of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, who, after a complete defeat in the confrontation with the People's Militia Corps of the LDNR (Armed Forces of Novorossiya), are obviously preparing to act as cannon fodder of the NATO bloc in any escalation associated with the participation of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. The level of importance of these exercises for the alliance is evidenced by such an important fact as the inclusion of the NATO Ground Forces Command (LANDCOM) in the territory that is still outside the military-political bloc. The Caucasian theater of military operations is becoming a very important frontier for NATO's operational-strategic blockade of Russia in the southern direction.
Against this background, the reason for such a high interest of Tbilisi in the purchase of SAMP-T anti-aircraft missile systems, the anti-aircraft guided missiles of which have much higher anti-missile qualities than the slow Tamir interceptors, is perfectly clear. If we compare the Israeli "Iron Dome" with the European "SAMP-T", then in their tactical and technical characteristics one can immediately notice a radically different purpose. The Iron Dome is designed for early detection of unguided and corrected missiles, and then destroying them using a properly optimized flight zone of the Tamir interceptor missile fragments. For maximum fire performance (target channel) of the Iron Dome complex, the EL / M-2084 radar is used, capable of tracking up to 200 targets of the NURS or artillery shell type or 1200 aerodynamic targets, as well as active radar homing, which allows launching into the air up to several dozen expensive Tamir interceptor missiles.
"SAMP-T" is a completely different air defense system, possessing pronounced anti-missile qualities inherent in the best anti-missile systems of the XXI century. First, it is the Arabel multifunctional AFAR radar. Operating in the centimeter X-band (frequency 8-12 GHz and wavelength from 2.5 to 3.75 cm), the station has a significantly higher accuracy than the decimeter Israeli EL / M-2084. Despite the fact that the Arabel's range indicators are about 3.5-4 times worse (the “fighter” is detected from 70-100 km, and the inconspicuous OTBR - 25-35 km), this does not prevent it from effectively aiming at 16 air targets the same number of Aster-30 anti-aircraft guided missiles. At the same time, the station can simultaneously link 130 routes of aerodynamic or ballistic targets.
One of the most important characteristics of the Arabel radar, which puts the entire complex one step higher in the autonomy of the performed anti-missile missions, is the scanning zone of the airspace in elevation from -5 to +90 degrees! The radar is absolutely "cured" of the typical technological problem of the presence of a "dead zone" funnel in the upper hemisphere. And this suggests that the operators of the SAMP-T complex will detect a 9M723K5 OTBR approaching almost at a right angle of the Iskander-M complex at an altitude of about 20-25 km, about 8-11 seconds will remain for the Aster-30 missile launch. … Considering that one SAMP-T battery can launch 8 Aster-30 missiles in 10 seconds with an interval of 1.25 s, plus another three to five seconds for target detection, approximately 3 interceptor missiles have the ability to enter the intercept trajectory "Iskander", in this case can be achieved from 1 to 2 hits, which may well become a breakthrough for modern anti-missile systems.
Here, between Aster-30 and our 9M723 Iskander OTBR, relative parity can actually be established, allowing the former to intercept the latter in some cases. Today, only a few interceptor missiles have such capabilities, which include: 9M96E / E2 (S-400 Triumph) and ERINT (Patriot PAC-3). All these missiles have an impulse gas-dynamic control system, which is denoted by the abbreviation DPU (transverse control engines). Applied to "Aster-30", in the French manner PIF-PAF (Pilotage en Force-Pilotage Aerodinamique Fort). Gas-dynamic "belt" "Aster-30" is represented by a 4-nozzle solid-fuel gas generator, where each nozzle produces a thrust of 750 kgf at the time of maneuvers. The nozzle channels are built into the developed planes of the cruciform wings so that the jet stream of combustion products is extended far beyond the air flow approaching the tail aerodynamic rudders. The gas-dynamic "belt" is located in the center of mass of the 2nd (combat) stage of the missile defense system, which contributes to the most efficient movement in space during interception.
The Aster-30 missile has a maximum overload limit of 62-65 units, which is significantly higher than that of the 48N6E missiles of the S-300PM1 or MIM-104C complex, this makes it possible to implement the most important anti-missile principle of kinetic destruction of a target by a direct hit to-kill . In addition, it is known that the SAMP-T complex (with a modification of the Aster-30 Block I missile defense system) is adapted to intercept operational-tactical ballistic missiles with a range of up to 600 km and flight speeds of up to 3000 m / s.
The high accuracy of hitting targets "Aster-30" is also ensured by the high-frequency active radar seeker of the AD4A type. It operates at the high frequencies of the centimeter J-band (10-20 GHz) and is capable of “capturing” a fighter-type target at a distance of about 35 km. A similar seeker is installed on the MICA-EM guided medium-range air combat missile. The pulse-Doppler type of this seeker, in combination with a slotted antenna array, has many advantages, including a large target detection range against the background of the underlying (sea or earth) surfaces. The development companies Dassault Electronique and GEC-Marconi built the AD4A around a modern high-performance element base with a large number of Doppler filters that effectively track small targets against the background of natural and artificial electronic interference.
