Battle of Saint-Priva - Gravelotte

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Battle of Saint-Priva - Gravelotte
Battle of Saint-Priva - Gravelotte

Video: Battle of Saint-Priva - Gravelotte

Video: Battle of Saint-Priva - Gravelotte
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On August 16, 1870, Prussian forces bound the French army at the Battle of Mars-la-Tour. The French troops, falling into the encirclement, were forced to retreat several kilometers north of the battlefield, thereby driving themselves into an even greater trap. In two days, the Germans received large reinforcements and prepared to give the Rhine French army a decisive battle. This time the Prussians had an advantage in strength: about 180 thousand soldiers against 140 thousand French. After a stubborn battle, the French retreated to Metz and were surrounded there by a numerically superior enemy army. Thus, France lost its main army. On October 27, Bazin, together with his army, surrendered.

Preparing for battle

The corps of the 2nd Army, not participating in the battle of Mar-la-Tour, continued their advance towards the Meuse. On the left wing, the vanguard of the 4th corps was moved to Tul. This French fortress covered a railway important for further operations. The fortress had a small garrison and it was planned to take it on the move. However, it was not possible to take the fortress on the move. Field artillery was unable to breach the stone-protected bastions, and wide ditches made a quick assault impossible. It was also not possible to break the gate to enter the fortress. As a result, the immediate assault on Tul was abandoned.

On the morning of August 16, at Pont-à-Muson, the army's headquarters received news that the 3rd Corps was in a serious battle and that the 10th and 11th Corps had gone to their aid. It became obvious that the French had no way of retreat, but it was to be expected that they would take serious measures to break through. Therefore, the 12th corps was instructed to advance to Mars-la-Tour, and the 7th and 8th corps were to be ready at the Roots and Ars on the Moselle. In addition, the headquarters of the 2nd Army sent the order to the Guards Corps immediately to march towards Mars-la-Tour. The execution of these orders was facilitated by the initiative of the corps commanders themselves, who received news of the battle. By August 18, the Prussian command concentrated the forces of 7 corps (7th, 8th, 9th, 3rd, 10th, 12th and Guards) and 3 cavalry divisions of the 1st and 2nd armies.

At dawn on August 17, French outposts were stationed all the way from Brueville to Rezonville. The reports of the Prussian cavalry were contradictory: it was impossible to understand whether the French were concentrating at Metz or retreating along both still free roads through Etain and Brie. However, there was no preparation for the offensive. As a result, it became clear that on August 17, the French troops had not yet begun their retreat. In fact, the French were preparing for the defense, they dug trenches, trenches all night from 17 to 18 August, and in every possible way strengthened their defensive positions. In addition, they occupied the village of Saint-Privat, which had many tall stone buildings.

The Prussian command prepared two offensive plans: 1) in both, the left wing was supposed to advance in a northerly direction to the nearest retreat route through Doncourt still open to the French. In the event of a withdrawal of the French army, they should be immediately attacked and delayed until the right wing was suitable for support; 2) If it became clear that the French remained at Metz, then the left wing would have to make an entry to the east and cover their position from the north, while the right wing would bind the enemy in battle. The peculiarity of this battle was the fact that both opponents fought with a turned front, having no connection with their communications. The French army was now facing France, and the Prussian - to Germany. As a consequence, the results of victory or defeat could be of more serious importance. Moreover, the French troops still had the advantage that they had a powerful fortress and its means as a base.

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Painting by German battle painter Karl Röchling "Attack at Gravelot"

The French Marshal Bazin considered it inappropriate to retreat to Verdun, since the Germans were already very close to his flank, and decided to concentrate his forces on a position near Metz, which he considered practically impregnable. This position was represented by the ridge of heights, accompanying the Châtel valley from the west. The wide slope facing the enemy was gentle, and the short and steep return slope provided cover for the reserves. The ridge of these heights from Roncourt to Rotheriel for more than 1 1/2 miles was occupied by the 6th, 4th, 3rd and 2nd corps. One brigade of the 5th Corps was stationed at Saint-Rufin in the Moselle Valley, cavalry behind both flanks. The Guards Corps was left in reserve at Plapeville. The defense was best prepared on the left flank: rifle trenches were quickly dug in front of the 2nd and 3rd corps, batteries and communications were arranged, and the individual courtyards lying ahead were turned into small forts. On the right flank, the situation was worse. The 6th Corps did not have an entrenching tool and was unable to build strong field fortifications. However, here the French had powerful strongholds of Saint-Privat and Amanwyler.

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Battle of Saint-Priva - Gravelotte

On the morning of August 18, the Prussian troops began to move. According to Moltke's plan, which advised to find the main forces of the enemy and put pressure on them, the German army moved forward. At noon, the battle began in the center at Verneville, where the 9th Corps was advancing. Taking comfortable positions, the French troops fired at the German soldiers with Chasspot rifles from a distance of 1200 m, out of the actual fire of their needle guns. German troops formed in the field, open to the eyes of French soldiers, and suffered losses not only from artillery, but also from rifle fire even before entering the battle. As a result, the German troops suffered serious losses. Particularly affected by the German artillery, which moved to the forefront.

About 2 hours. In the afternoon, the Hessian division arrived to the aid of the 9th corps. She moved to the left into position on both sides of the railway five batteries, which somewhat distracted the concentric fire of the French. This made it possible to pull back part of the 9th corps artillery for regrouping. In addition, the artillery of the 3rd and the guards corps arrived to the aid of the 9th corps. Thus, in front of Verneville and up to Saint-El, an artillery fist of 130 guns was formed, which fought with visible success against the French artillery. The 3rd Corps arrived at Verneville, and the 3rd Guards Brigade arrived in Gabonville, which significantly strengthened the center of the German army.

The main forces of the Guards Corps are already about 2 o'clock. in the afternoon we approached Saint-El. However, the corps commander Pappé found that, making an entry to the east, he did not go to the right wing of the French army that was to be covered, but, on the contrary, himself exposes his left flank to the attack of the French who occupied Saint-Marie. This is a village with very solid urban-type buildings, it was necessary to take before further movement. After the artillery of the Saxon corps arrived, about 3 o'clock. 30 minutes. Prussian and Saxon battalions rushed into the village from the south, west and north. The French garrison was driven out, having lost several hundred prisoners. Attempts by French troops to recapture the lost position were repelled.

In the center, the 9th corps managed to seize the Champenois farm and gain a foothold there, but all attempts to advance further by separate battalions and companies against the closed front of the French army could not be successful. Thus, by 5 o'clock. In the evenings in the center, the active battle completely ceased, the artillery only from time to time exchanged shots.

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German field battery of Krupp cannons at the Battle of Gravelotte - Saint Privat. These guns helped the Prussians well in battle, suppressing the fire of enemy artillery and destroying the houses in which the French soldiers were hiding.

On the right German flank, the artillery of the 7th and 8th corps (16 batteries) began the battle in positions to the right and left of Gravelot. The French were pushed back from the eastern slope of the Mansa valley and the German artillery group, which had grown to 20 batteries, acted strongly against the main position of the enemy. Many French batteries were suppressed. About 3 hours. the hamlet of Saint-Hubert, lying directly in front of the main position of the French army and turned into a strong stronghold, was taken by storm, despite heavy French fire. However, further movement across the open field failed and led to large losses of the Prussian troops. Only on the far right wing of the German army did the 26th brigade take Jycy and secured the army's communications from Metz. However, the brigade was unable to cross the deep Roseriel Valley. Thus, the advanced units of the French army were driven back, their forward strongholds fell and burned. The French artillery seemed suppressed.

At about 4 o'clock, the commander of the 1st Army, General Karl Friedrich von Steinmetz, ordered to continue the offensive. Four batteries, and behind them, the 1st Cavalry Division, moved forward in a defile east of Gravelot. However, the Prussians came under concentrated gun and artillery fire and, having suffered heavy losses, retreated. After that, the French troops launched a counterattack and drove back the Prussian units. Only the introduction of fresh German units into battle forced the French to return to their main position. Attempts by the Prussian troops to launch a new offensive across the plateau, devoid of shelter, were unsuccessful. By 5 o'clock there was a break in hostilities, when the exhausted troops of both sides settled down and rested.

At this time, the Prussian king Wilhelm with his staff went to the army and ordered the 1st army to launch a new offensive and handed over to General Steinmetz the 2nd corps, which had just arrived after a long march. The French command to help the attacked 2nd corps put forward a division of guards voltigeurs (light infantry). The artillery was also strengthened. As a result, the Prussians were met with strong rifle and artillery fire, which literally devastated their ranks in open areas. Then the French themselves went on the offensive with thick rifle lines and pushed back small parts of the Germans, who were lying in the open field and lost their commanders, back to the edge of the forest. But this French counterstrike was stopped. A fresh Pomeranian 2nd corps arrived, which had not yet participated in the battles. True, it was better in the coming twilight to hold back the fresh troops and use them the next day. So, the Pomeranians repulsed the French counterattack, but they themselves had no success in the offensive, the battalions of the 2nd corps were partially disorganized by the turmoil among the units of the 1st army already in battle. The onset of darkness halted the battle. The fire stopped completely at about 10 o'clock.

Thus, on the right German flank, despite the bravery of the German troops and their heavy losses, the French could only be driven out of the forward fortifications, it was not possible to wedge into their main line. The left wing of the French army was practically impregnable in nature and fortifications.

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"Last patrons". Painting by French artist Alphonse de Neuville

Fight in the Saint-Privat area. On the German left wing, the fighting also took on a fierce character. At about 5 o'clock in the afternoon, the guards made an attempt to storm the village of Saint-Privat. However, the troops of the Guards Corps ran into the positions of the 4th and 6th French corps. The strongholds of this front, Saint-Privat and Amanwyler, were almost not yet shelled by the German batteries, which were still fully occupied with the fight against French artillery outside the villages. In front of the main French line, located along the crest of heights, behind hedges and low stone walls, were numerous rifle chains. Behind them was the village of Saint-Privat, with its massive stone houses similar to a castle. Therefore, the open plain in front of the French front was well shot. As a result, the Prussian troops suffered heavy losses. In the course of half an hour, five battalions lost all of them, the rest of the battalions lost most of their officers, especially senior commanders. Thousands of dead and wounded marked the trail of the Prussian battalions.

However, the Prussian Guard advanced despite bloody losses. Senior officers were replaced by junior lieutenants and warrant officers. The Prussians drove the French out of the forward fortifications. At 7 o'clock the Prussians reached Amanwyler and Saint-Privat at a distance of 600-800 meters. In places near steep slopes and in rifle trenches cleaned by the French, exhausted troops stop to take a breath. With the help of the 12 guard batteries that arrived in time, the Germans staunchly repulsed the counterattacks of the French cavalry and infantry. Having suffered heavy losses, having two French corps directly in front of them, the Prussian troops had a very difficult time before reinforcements arrived. Only by 7 o'clock. in the evening, two Saxon infantry brigades arrived at the scene of the battle; the other two were gathering at Roncourt, where artillery had fired at this village for a long time.

Upon receiving news that the Germans were striving to embrace its right wing deeper and deeper, Marshal Bazin at 3 o'clock in the afternoon ordered the Guards Grenadier Division of Picard, concentrated at Plapeville, to go there. This reinforcement had not yet arrived when Marshal Canrobert, fearing even greater pressure from the Prussians, decided to concentrate his forces more closely around the Saint-Privy stronghold. The retreat from Roncourt was to be covered by a weak rearguard. Therefore, the Saxons did not meet the strong expected resistance at Roncourt. After a light battle, the Saxons, together with the companies of the extreme left wing of the guard, took the village. Then part of the Saxons turned from the direction to Roncourt to the right, and moved to the aid of the guards directly to Saint-Priv.

The concentrated fire of 24 German batteries wreaked havoc on Saint-Privat. Many houses were engulfed in flames or collapsed from grenades falling into them. The French decided to fight to the death, defending this important stronghold. French batteries north and south of the village, as well as rifle lines, held back the advance of the Prussians and Saxons. However, the Germans stubbornly moved forward, inflicting bayonet strikes or firing rapid fire, although they suffered serious losses. Finally, with the support of the arriving detachments of the 10th corps, the last assault was made. The French defended themselves with the greatest stubbornness, despite the burning houses, until, being surrounded, they were forced at 8 o'clock. lay down arms. About 2 thousand people were captured.

The defeated parts of the 6th French corps withdrew to the Moselle valley. At this time, the French Guards Grenadier Division approached and deployed east of Amanville, along with the army's artillery reserve. German artillery entered the battle with the enemy, the exchange of fire continued until dark. French 4th Corps also retreated with short counterattacks. It came to hand-to-hand combat with the attacking battalions of the right wing of the guard and the left wing of the 9th corps.

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Painting by Ernst Zimmer "Attack of the 9th Battalion of Saxon Jaegers"

Outcomes

Both sides were of approximately equal strength. The German army had about 180 thousand soldiers with 726 guns. The French fielded about 130-140 thousand people with 450 guns. But in the Metz area there were additional forces, which increased the French army to more than 180 thousand people. At the same time, the French occupied well-fortified positions, especially on the left flank. But during the battle at Saint-Priva, Bazin did not appear on the battlefield, practically did not give the necessary orders or reinforcements, did not introduce artillery and other reserves into the business, leaving the battle to take its course. As a result, the battle was lost by the French, despite the exceptional heroism and staunchness of the French soldiers.

The Prussian army somewhat pressed the French on its right flank and in the center, but was unable to break through the heavily fortified main position of the French army in the Gravelotte area. On the left German flank, the Saxons and the Prussian Guards were able, after a fierce battle, to capture the strong stronghold of Saint-Privat. This battle, as well as the 12th Corps' outflanking movement, threatened to envelop the French right flank. The French, frightened of losing contact with Metz, began to retreat to him. In the battle of Saint-Privat - Gravelot, the German artillery was especially distinguished, which suppressed the French batteries and actively supported the attacks of their infantry. The French lost in this battle about 13 thousand people, the Germans - more than 20 thousand soldiers, including 899 officers.

The battles at Mars-la-Tour and at Saint-Privat were of strategic importance, as they completed the defeat of the Rhine French army. “Although the threat of such a final catastrophe had been evident for several days,” Engels wrote on August 20, under the fresh impression of the five-day battles that took place on August 14-18 in the vicinity of Metz, “it is still difficult to imagine that it actually happened. The reality has surpassed all expectations … The military power of France seems to be completely destroyed … We cannot yet assess the political results of this huge catastrophe. We can only marvel at its size and surprise, and admire how the French troops endured it."

Retreating to Metz, the French troops were blocked there and lost the opportunity to actively fight to defend the country. The German command did not initially plan to blockade Metz with large forces. It was supposed to attack Paris past the fortress, limiting oneself to observing it, appointing a reserve division for this. However, completely different forces were required to blockade an entire army. For taxation of Metz, a separate army was formed under the command of Friedrich-Karl, made up of the 1st, 7th and 8th corps of the former 1st army and from the 2nd, 3rd, 9th and 10th corps. 2nd Army, then from the reserve division and 3 cavalry divisions, a total of 150 thousand people.

Guards, 4th and 12th corps, as well as 5th and 6th cavalry divisions formed a special Maas army with a force of 138 thousand people. The Meuse and the 3rd Army, numbering 223,000 men, were assigned to an offensive against the new French army that was being formed at Chalon.

It is worth noting that the blockaded German army was weaker than the blocked enemy. French troops numbered 190-200 thousand people. However, the French were demoralized. And their attempts to break through the enemy's defenses were poorly organized, were conducted by separate detachments, and were not crowned with success. By mid-October, the French army besieged at Metz was running out of food. October 27, 1870 Bazin, along with his entire large army, surrendered.

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"Cemetery at Saint-Privat". Alphonse de Neuville

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