In the domestic military-historical literature, the question of the morale of the Japanese army during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 has not been studied in detail. We were interested in the question - what was the morale of the Japanese 3rd Army during the siege of the fortress of Port Arthur? The article is based on documents (intelligence reports, questionnaires of prisoners, intercepted letters, intelligence reports and other materials from the headquarters of the Kwantung fortified region, Port Arthur fortress, 4th and 7th East Siberian rifle divisions), evidence of foreign correspondents and military attaché to the army M. Nogi, as well as literature.
Long before the war, the Japanese General Staff had all the necessary information about the state of the Port Arthur fortress and its garrison. The Japanese knew very well that the beginning of the war found Port Arthur unprepared: instead of the projected 25 long-term coastal batteries, only 9 were ready (in addition, 12 temporary ones were built). The situation was even worse on the land defense front, where out of 6 forts, 5 fortifications and 5 long-term batteries were ready, and even then not completely, 3 forts, 3 fortifications and 3 batteries.
The fortress garrison consisted of the 7th East Siberian Rifle Division (12,421 bayonets), the 15th East Siberian Rifle Regiment (2243 bayonets) and the 3rd and 7th reserve battalions (1352 bayonets). The approaches to Port Arthur, the Kwantung Peninsula and the Jingzhou position were defended by the detachment of Major General A. V. Fock as part of the 4th East Siberian Rifle Division without one regiment (6076 bayonets) and the 5th East Siberian Rifle Regiment (2174 bayonets). Port Arthur also had about 10,000 sailors, gunners and non-combatants. Thus, the forces defending the Kwantung fortified area were approaching 35,000 people.
The number of cartridges and shells, as well as the quartermaster supplies were extremely limited.
Under these conditions, the capture of the cut off and blockaded fortress seemed to the Japanese command a quick and easy task. In this opinion, he was also strengthened by the successful actions of the Japanese fleet, which, despite heavy losses, achieved dominance at sea. In accordance with such bright prospects, the Japanese command began a systematic processing of public opinion and the armed forces, convincing them through the press, theater and through oral propaganda that the capture of Port Arthur was a matter of several weeks.
At the end of April 1904, Japanese troops landed on the Liaodong Peninsula. In battles on May 26 and 27, the Japanese captured the Jingzhou position and invaded the Kwantung Peninsula. Under the pressure of superior enemy forces, the 4th East Siberian Rifle Division withdrew to the fortress. The energetic and talented General RI Kondratenko took over the general leadership of the land defense of Port Arthur.
In the opinion of the commander of the Japanese 3rd Army, General M. Noga, the moment has come when one blow can capture the fortress. However, the Japanese headquarters in their calculations did not take into account one extremely important factor: the heroism and valor of Russian soldiers and sailors - about which all attacks of the many times superior Japanese forces crashed.
On the night of August 10, 1904, the Japanese launched an offensive against the eastern front of the land defense of Port Arthur - from the Wolf Hills to Dagushan. By the morning, the complete failure of these attacks became clear, and the Japanese retreated to their original position.
Attacks resumed on the night of 14 August. This time, the efforts of the Japanese were aimed at capturing the Corner Mountain and the Panlunshan foothills. The 1st Infantry Division, without achieving any success, lost 1,134 people in a few hours and retreated in disarray. The 15th Takasaki Infantry Regiment was almost completely destroyed. And on this day, the Japanese failed to break through the main defense line of the fortress.
On the morning of August 19, a new assault on Uglovoy Mountain began. At the same time, hurricane fire was opened on the northern and eastern fronts of the land defense of the fortress. Attacking Mount Corner, the 1st reserve brigade lost 55 officers and 1562 soldiers on August 20. On the night of August 21st, a battalion of the 22nd Infantry Regiment was completely killed in the assault on the Liter B battery; The 1st Brigade of the 1st Infantry Division under Mount Dlinnaya, according to an official Japanese source, "suffered a terrible defeat." The same fate befell the 44th regiment of the 11th division, which attacked Fort No. 3, and the 6th brigade of the 9th division (from the last in the 7th regiment 208 people out of 2700 survived, and in the 35th regiment 240 people survived).
The valiant defenders of Port Arthur repulsed all enemy attacks and more than once went over to crushing counterattacks.
By the night of August 22, it became clear to General M. Nogi and his staff that the chances of success were very problematic. And yet, on the night of August 23, it was decided to make a last decisive attempt to capture the land fortifications of Port Arthur. All reserves were thrown into the attack. However, at the moment of the greatest tension, the nerves of the Japanese soldiers could not stand it. A significant event took place. Here is what an English war correspondent writes about him: “At the most critical moment, the 8th (Osaka) regiment refused to march and leave the sheltered trenches of West Banrusan … force the regiment out of the trenches. Then some of the officers, pissed off from themselves, seeing that no compulsion helps, drew their sabers and hacked to death many soldiers, but where admonition did not work, punishment could not help."
Fermentation quickly spread to neighboring parts. The 18th reserve brigade sent to pacify was powerless to do anything. This forced the Japanese command to stop the assault. The insurgent troops were withdrawn from the front, withdrawn to the rear and surrounded by gendarmerie and artillery. Then the cleaning of the personnel began: some of the soldiers were executed, some were sent to Dalny as a coolie, the rest were drilled for several weeks under the scorching August sun (12-14 hours a day) and then sent to the front line. The 8th Osaka Regiment was disbanded and removed from the lists of the Japanese army.
But, despite these measures, fermentation in the troops of M. Noga continued. Beginning on August 26, Russian intelligence agencies began to receive numerous data from various sources about the deterioration of the morale of the 3rd Army units. Here are some of these messages.
August, 26th. “The mood of the Japanese is very bad due to enormous losses and extreme food shortages. Very little rice or corn is obtained. Earlier, before the assault, the Japanese were in a good mood, they walked briskly, importantly, and they considered the capture of Arthur easy and quick. Now they look the most miserable, there are a lot of sick people, their faces are thin, sad. The shoes are completely worn out. Many have pain in their legs. The sight of the mass of corpses, of which 10-15 thousand were collected and burned near the village of Cuizyatun, especially strongly affects the Japanese."
By September 6, the mood of the Japanese troops deteriorated even more. The headquarters of the Port Arthur fortress, based on many reports, stated that "Japanese soldiers do not want to fight."
8 September. “The mood of the Japanese troops is bad. One officer led his company to attack and waved a saber; they did not follow him, he turned around and wanted to hit the soldier with his saber, but the soldiers lifted him on bayonets and turned back."
On September 11, the headquarters of the Port Arthur Fortress drew up a reconnaissance report, which stated: “Recently, Japanese soldiers have shown massive disobedience to their officers, especially when the latter forced them to storm the Port Arthur batteries, since the outcome of such assaults was death without any business use. And when Japanese officers used coercive measures, there were cases of murder of some officers of lower ranks. Another reason for the displeasure of the Japanese soldiers is poor food and non-salary payments. Thus, in August 1904, after the first serious battle, the fighting efficiency and morale of the 3rd Army dropped sharply.
In mid-September, the Japanese command transferred fresh troops to Port Arthur and carried out a number of measures to improve the spirit of the army. Convinced by bitter experience of the inaccessibility of the eastern front of the land defense of the fortress, the Japanese command decided to conduct a new attack against the weaker - the northwestern front. And from 19 to 23 September 1904, the Japanese unsuccessfully stormed the northwestern front. Mount Vysokaya became the object of the most violent attacks. The small defenders of Vysokaya with bayonets and hand grenades repulsed all Japanese attacks and inflicted huge losses on the enemy. According to official Japanese data, of the 22 companies that attacked Vysokaya, 318 people survived. From the 15th regiment, 70 people survived, from the 5th companies of the 15th reserve regiment - 120 people, from the 7th companies of the 17th reserve regiment - 60 and from the sapper detachment - 8 people.
On September 29, in the intelligence report of Port Arthur's headquarters, it was written: “The use of hand bombs by the Russians in battles caused panic on the Japanese … In the last assault on Arthur, the Japanese had high hopes for complete success, but were bitterly disappointed in their expectations. During the last assaults, the Japanese lost 15,000 people (and at least half were killed). " Shortly thereafter, a letter found on the killed Japanese officer was delivered to the fortress headquarters, in which he asked "that the reports to the emperor indicate a smaller number of killed and wounded." The officer also wrote: “I heard that the Shenbao newspaper has a map with a detailed designation of the Port Arthur batteries; it would be nice to have it. The Japanese trenches moved close to the Port Arthur batteries one verst of distance. There were a lot of people killed during the fighting. It would be necessary to send new soldiers who have not yet been in battle; moreover, strong, courageous people should be sent so that Port Arthur can be taken as soon as possible. as if on a flat road, they would enter the city, but it turned out the other way around, and now they just slammed into a pit. Four carts with money were received and the money was distributed to the bravest for their deeds."
In October - November 1904, the Japanese more than once undertook fierce assaults on Port Arthur fortifications, but, as E. Bartlett, quoted above, points out, "the soldiers were greatly disappointed by the insignificance of the results achieved." The following letter, found on a dead soldier of the 19th Infantry Regiment of the 9th Division, is very indicative of the mood of the Japanese soldiers of this period. “Life and food,” he wrote home, “are difficult. The enemy is fighting more and more brutally and courageously. The place that we have captured and where the advance detachment is, is terribly bombarded by the enemy day and night, but, fortunately, it is safe for me. Hostile shells and bullets fall like rain at night."
A great influence on the political and moral state of the soldiers of the 3rd Army was the letters from the homeland that penetrated into the army, despite the most severe military censorship. Their authors complained about the deteriorating economic situation and openly expressed their dissatisfaction with the war. So, in a letter addressed to a private in the 7th company of the 1st infantry regiment, there are the following words: "The Japanese people suffer greatly from extortions associated with the war, and therefore the number of people who want peace is increasing."Of great interest for characterizing the mood of the Japanese army during the November assaults of Port Arthur is the following letter found in the possession of an officer of the 25th regiment: “On November 21 I received your letter. Yesterday, while I was on duty at the Chzhang-lingzi station, from where the sick and wounded were sent to the Tsinn-ni field hospital, 7 wounded lower ranks of the 19th regiment of the 9th division were brought from the center. According to one of them, our front line approaches the enemy's closest - 20 meters and the farthest - 50 meters, so that even the enemy's conversation can be heard. It is quiet during the day, but the battle is going on at night. Really awful. If our infantry approaches, the enemy showered them with a hail of shells, which inflict great damage on us, incapacitating many killed and wounded. In any case, Russian soldiers really fight bravely, forgetting about death … On November 21, at night, the enemy was illuminating with a searchlight and interfering with us a lot. Due to the fact that the enemy fires up to 600 bullets per minute, and especially thanks to their rapid-fire guns, our losses are great. For example, in one of the companies of the 19th regiment out of 200 people, 15 - 16 people remained. In view of the fact that the company suffers terrible losses, it is replenished for the eighth time, and now it consists of almost 100 people, the whole 19th regiment has about 1000 people … 7th division is preparing for battle."
Almost all foreign correspondents, as well as Russian participants in the defense of Port Arthur, indicate that in November 1904 such a phenomenon as fraternization with Russian soldiers developed widely in the Japanese army. The diary of the captain of the Kwantung fortress artillery A. N. Lyupov says the following about this: “The Japanese, now imbued with full respect for our soldier, very often, without weapons, crawl out of the trenches and give a pen. There are conversations and there is a mutual treat of sake and cigarettes. Ours are treated only with tobacco."
The result of all these phenomena was a sharp drop in the combat effectiveness of the Japanese troops at Port Arthur. In November and December 1904, assaults, as a rule, were carried out by fresh, newly arrived troops of the 7th Infantry Division, and the veterans had to be driven into battle with officer sabers.
A sad hopelessness reigned in the ranks of the Japanese 3rd Army, the capture of Port Arthur was considered by the soldiers to be absolutely impossible - and the surrender on January 2, 1905 of the fortress, which had not exhausted all means of defense, was a real gift for the Japanese. The betrayal of A. M. Stoessel rendered a great service to the Japanese command and largely predetermined the favorable outcome of the war for Japan.
There is every reason to believe that if the siege of the fortress had lasted another 1, 5 - 2 months, then a number of massive anti-war actions would have taken place in the 3rd Army. Direct evidence of this is the fact that the 17th artillery regiment was withdrawn from the front in November 1904 and sent to the north - precisely as a result of the unrest that took place in this regiment. The following facts are also indirect evidence. As you know, in the battle of Mukden, the troops of M. Noga's army were assigned a number of important tasks on the right and left flanks of the formation of the Japanese troops. The captured Japanese soldiers reported the following interesting information regarding what happened on the right flank: “Mountain guns, placed across the Shahe River, opened fire on their own soldiers to stop the units retreating after repelled attacks and to raise exhausted troops to new and new attacks with their guns..
Regarding the 7th division, operating on the left flank, the intelligence directorate of the commander-in-chief of the Manchurian armies on March 13, 1905 reported the following: “The regiments of the 7th division, half destroyed in the November assaults near Port Arthur, were replenished with senior reservists and even old men from the island Ieddo, that is, from the place of permanent quarters of the division. The prisoners of this division showed that they did not want to go to war and that many of them, having got into a fierce battle, fell to the ground, pretended to be dead and surrendered."
By the way, the further history of the 7th division, considered one of the best in the Japanese army, confirms that its weak morale was not accidental. During the Civil War, the 7th division, along with the 12th, 3rd and other divisions, participated in the intervention in the Far East. As in the rest of the interventionist troops, there was fermentation in its ranks, characterizing which, it would be appropriate to recall the following statement of V. I. Lenin: “For three years there were armies on the territory of Russia: English, French, Japanese …, then only decay in the French troops, which began with fermentation among the British and Japanese."
"Port Arthur Syndrome" affected the 7th Division and later. Already the first battles on Khalkhin Gol, in which the Japanese 7th and 23rd Infantry Divisions were defeated, allowed the Soviet-Mongolian command on July 14, 1939 to draw the following conclusion about their combat effectiveness: “The fact that these divisions are so easily tolerated defeat is explained by the fact that the elements of decay begin to penetrate deeply into the Japanese infantry, as a result of which the Japanese command is often forced to throw these units into the attack while drunk."
It was in the battles of Port Arthur that a crack in the notorious "unity of the spirit of the Japanese imperial army" was revealed - and it was revealed thanks to the courage and resilience of the Russian soldier.
