In Soviet historiography, it was believed that the war with Japan was a disgrace for tsarist Russia and a prerequisite for the first Russian revolution. That the Japanese Empire defeated the huge Russian Empire because of the incompetent Russian military-political elite and the superiority of the Japanese in military art, technology and management. In modern Russia, a myth has been created that the main reasons for the defeat are external forces (England and the USA), the Russian liberal public, dissatisfied with the war, and revolutionaries who plunged the empire into turmoil and did not allow the country to win. In Japan, the myth of "Russian aggression" and a "preemptive strike" against Russia has been created.
Japanese "truth"
The Japanese view of war is well illustrated in Japanese feature films. The pinnacle of Japanese propaganda is the film "Emperor Meiji and the Russo-Japanese War." The Japanese immediately name the "reason" for the war: it turns out, it is "Russian aggression"! The Russian Empire stretches out its paws to Manchuria and prepares to invade Japan! For a significant part of the time, the government and public opinion put pressure on the emperor, who supposedly does not want to fight and hopes for a compromise to the last. The emperor has no choice but to start a preventive war against the "Russian aggressors". It is interesting that after the collapse of the USSR, a myth with similar motives is actively spreading in Western Europe. They say that the damned Bolsheviks, led by “bloody Stalin,” planned the seizure of Europe, but Hitler prevented him, who struck a preemptive blow to the USSR.
Thus, it is not the Japanese Empire that is to blame for the war, which attacked the Russian fleet without declaring war, but imperialist Russia, which is preparing the seizure of Japan. The evidence is the advancement of Russian troops in Northeast China, the construction of the Chinese Eastern Railway and Port Arthur.
The war itself is shown poorly. A lot of pathos, Japanese patriotism. Most of the attention is paid to the Battle of Liaoyang. At the same time, a stereotype was created, which can be noted in subsequent works: Japanese soldiers selflessly storm well-prepared Russian positions and die in masses from the fire of Russian machine guns. The number of machine guns is fantastic. However, all the same, the Japanese troops are heroically victorious. The battles for Port Arthur are shown in the same spirit, only the attacks take place in winter. The scheme is the same: the Japanese attack in waves, climb under machine guns (monstrous losses in the spirit of "corpses filled up"), drag guns to the heights and win thanks to dedication and high morale. As a result, they finish off Rozhdestvensky's squadron in the Tsushima battle. Russia is humiliatingly signing the peace. The Japanese people rejoice and celebrate, the emperor mourns for the fallen. Although in reality the Japanese, deceived by their propaganda about the ease of victory and screaming that “the Russians will pay for everything,” and seeing how small were the successes that cost such huge human and material sacrifices, they staged riots and riots. The Japanese authorities had to "tighten the screws." But the popular propaganda is silent about this.
In 1969, the film "The Battle of the Sea of Japan" was released, which, in fact, repeats in the main "Emperor Meiji". Only the emphasis is placed not on the land theater, but on the maritime theater. The film tells about the preparation and course of the Tsushima naval battle against the background of the general course of the war. The beginning is almost the same: against the background of a map of Manchuria, the announcer pompously talks about how the European great powers brought troops to China to protect their embassies during the boxer uprising, but only Russia left them and began to build up. They say that the penetration of Russians into Manchuria threatened the national interests of Japan. Not a word is said about Japan's aggressive aggressive policy in China and Korea. Further, as according to the worked out scheme, a meeting with the emperor, the decision to inflict a preemptive strike on Russia, before it became too strong in the Far East. Not a word about the role of England and the United States, as well as the fact that Japan played the role of a "battering ram" of the West, squeezing the Russians out of the Far East.
The battle scenes are practically unchanged. The Japanese again bravely attack the Russian positions, they are mowed down from machine guns. They didn't even sew uniforms for the Russians (in the film "Emperor Meiji" the Russians were in blue uniforms and hats a la Cossacks). Russian soldiers here wear the same Japanese uniform as everyone else, only Japanese with yellow distinctions, and Russians with red ones. By the way, the Russian flag does not exist in this version of the story. Its role is performed exclusively by the St. Andrew's flag. Japanese suicide attacks on the fortifications of Port Arthur are shown again. Tsushima battle. Also introduced into the film is a secondary line with the Japanese intelligence officer Akashi, a big fan of Russian culture. The role of the Japanese special services in the war and revolution in Russia is shown crudely. Like Akashi's meeting with the Russian revolutionaries in the person of a bearded man in a leather jacket with the surname Seryak. The revolutionary accepts Japanese gold. Lenin is also mentioned as a Japanese agent. Akashi was meant to be the Japanese military attaché in Russia, Colonel Motojiro Akashi, who really gave money to the Socialist-Revolutionaries and national separatists.
Another similar "masterpiece" of Japanese propaganda is the film "Height 203" (1980). Another lie about Russia's preparation for an attack on Japan. Allegedly, the Russians began expansion into Manchuria and Korea in order to rob them, and then go to Japan. Therefore, Japan had to break into Manchuria in order to protect the empire's doorstep from the greedy northern neighbor. The "best fortress in the world" Port Arthur was greatly exaggerated, again there were a lot of machine guns (after one and a half meters, there were not so many of them in the entire Russian army). Shown are grenades, which then, especially incendiary, were not. The Russians have a gray-blue uniform again. Again, Japanese commanders bombard the Russian positions with bodies. In general, the film is weak, there is a lot of blood and corpses, there is little truth.
Thus, the Japanese, in the spirit of Hollywood, have built a very definite picture. The "peace-loving" Japanese, not sparing their lives, reflect the expansion of the "polar bears" into Manchuria, "defend" Japan.
Why Russia lost the war
The main reason is that Japan was ready for war, but Russia was not. After the intervention of Russia and other European powers in the Sino-Japanese War, when Japan was deprived of a significant part of the fruits of its victory, and the Russians acquired Liaodong and Port Arthur, Japanese propaganda turned Russia into the main enemy of the Empire of the Rising Sun. Japanese pride was humiliated, the whole country, from schoolchildren to the emperor, understood that this issue could be resolved only by force of arms. And the whole empire began to feverishly prepare for war with Russia. At the same time, Japan entered into an alliance with Britain in 1902 and enlisted the political, financial and material support of the United States. England and the United States wanted to drive the Russians out of the Far East. Japan acted as their "battering ram". At the same time, the Western financial oligarchy financed the Russian revolutionary movement, that is, the blow was prepared from outside (Japan) and from within ("the fifth column").
The Japanese were a warrior nation, samurai. The ancient military tradition, upbringing, the whole way of life were aimed at developing an ardent love for the motherland and the emperor. The high level of education facilitated military training, gave competent soldiers and sailors. There was a system of military education, the cultivation of the military elite. The Japanese elite were national, strong-willed, disciplined, energetic, decisive, ready for anything for the sake of the interests of the empire. A broad initiative was cultivated.
In the period 1898-1903. The West helped the Japanese Empire create a first-class armored fleet, re-equip and train the army according to advanced European standards (German school). All this completely escaped the attention of Russian intelligence and diplomacy. Japan was ready to deploy 520,000 fighters - young, well-trained, armed and fanatically loyal to the emperor. The officers knew very well the future theater of military operations - Korea, Manchuria and Liaodong, where they had already fought in 1894, and which they studied perfectly. In fact, in China, the Japanese have already rehearsed how they will fight the Russians: a surprise attack, the defeat and isolation of the fleet, the conquest of supremacy at sea, the landing of an amphibious army and the capture of Port Arthur. And in St. Petersburg all this was missed, being sure that the Japanese "macaques" (as they were contemptuously called in the highest salons of St. Petersburg) would not dare to attack the powerful Russian Empire.
Japanese intelligence, including secret societies working for the empire, was the best in Asia. She knew perfectly well the situation in China, Munchuria, Korea and the Russian Far East. Japanese intelligence even established contacts with the Russian revolutionary underground, the "fifth" column, and financed the First Russian Revolution. The Japanese General Staff was created on the model of the German one and has well mastered German doctrines and methods, both positive and negative. It is worth noting that the Japanese generals used German skills, but without initiative, imagination, if Suvorov-type commanders were in the place of cautious Russian generals, the Japanese would have had a very bad time. The Japanese have studied well the experience of the Eastern (Crimean) War of 1853-1856. and the Turkish campaign of 1877, and came to the conclusion that in the person of the Russian army they would not meet an outstanding enemy. The capabilities of the Siberian Railway were underestimated by the Japanese - the Japanese General Staff believed that the Russians would not have time to concentrate more than 150 thousand soldiers in Manchuria in less than 6 months. They considered it possible to pass one infantry division per month and three pairs of military echelons per day, and were three times mistaken.
That is, the Japanese command proceeded from two "facts": the Russian troops are of low quality and they are few in number. In the calculation of the Russian army, the Japanese General Staff made a mistake at the beginning of the war by half, then by three. At the end of the war, the Russian troops already had a double superiority. The Japanese escaped complete defeat and destruction on the mainland only because of the passivity of the Russian command, which had forgotten how to fight in Suvorov style. It was only due to poor management that our army did not win a victory in Manchuria.
The Russian army and navy paid in blood for the mediocre policy of St. Petersburg
These mistakes (as well as the mistakes of the Japanese generals already during the war itself) could become fatal for Japan if it were for Russia's fantastic unpreparedness for a war in the Far East. Petersburg and Russian society were infected with pacifism; they did not believe in a big war since the time of the Hague Conference in the Far East, did not seriously think. The Ministry of War, headed by Kuropatkin, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Finance, that there will be no war with Japan, so there is no need to allocate additional forces and resources to strengthen the defense capability of the Far Eastern borders. Seers like Admiral Makarov were not taken seriously, they were considered eccentrics. All attention and forces, as before, were concentrated on the western border.
Japan's strength was seriously underestimated. The past qualitative changes in the Japanese armed forces were missed. At first, it was even believed that the troops of the Amur District alone would cope with the Japanese. Then, in case of war, it was decided to reinforce them with reserve corps from the Siberian and Kazan districts, and, finally, better corps from the Kiev and Moscow districts. Port Arthur was not prepared for a long-term defense, a powerful fortified area was not created in the narrowest part of the Liaodong Peninsula. The fleet was weakened by the division of forces: the cruisers were based in Vladivostok, and the main forces - battleships and a mine flotilla, were transferred to Port Arthur. The new base was shallow and completely unequipped, there were no docks and workshops, and minor damage could immobilize the battleships. The Russian generals since the wars with Napoleon, and as the Eastern and Turkish wars well showed, have seriously degraded. Lost initiative, decisiveness, became passive and fearful. They were generals of peace, not war.
The underestimation of the enemy played a role in the failure of Russian diplomacy. The Russian Foreign Ministry dragged out negotiations with Japan on the division of spheres of influence in the Far East. Japan was not considered a great power and was not taken seriously. Therefore, when Tokyo notified our government of the severance of diplomatic relations, Petersburg did not even understand that this was a war and that it was necessary to bring the army and navy to full combat readiness. And the attack of the Japanese destroyers of the Russian squadron in Port Arthur was a shock for St. Petersburg. As a result, the Russian army and navy paid in great blood for the unsuccessful policy of St. Petersburg in Asia.
