In the history of all countries and peoples, there are some kind of fatal or bifurcation points that largely determine the course of history. Sometimes these points are visible with the naked eye, for example, the notorious "choice of faith" by the Kiev prince Vladimir Svyatoslavich. Some, however, remain unnoticed by many. For example, what can you say about January 8, 1894? Meanwhile, on that day, the Russian Emperor Alexander III and French President Sadi Carnot ratified the military convention signed earlier (August 27, 1892) by the chiefs of the general staffs of Russia and France (N. Obruchev and R. Boisdefrom).
Friends and enemies
The traditional vector of Russian politics, by an unexpected strong-willed decision of the emperor, suddenly changed by 180 degrees. Now the enemies of Russia inevitably became the closest neighbors - Germany, and Austria-Hungary, which for many years were hers, albeit not very good and reliable, but, nevertheless, friends and allies. Austria-Hungary, as we remember, in alliance with Russia fought many times against the Ottoman Empire, and remained neutral during the Crimean War, tragic for Russia. In Prussia, which became the "nucleus" of a united Germany, since the Napoleonic Wars there was a kind of cult of Russia, and the tradition of kissing the hands of the Russian emperor was observed by German generals until the beginning of World War I. Prussia was the only relatively friendly state to Russia during the Crimean War, Germany during the Russo-Japanese War.
To make matters worse, the British Empire, its most terrible and implacable enemy for centuries, was now becoming a hypocritical ally of Russia. British politicians have always viewed Russia as a barbaric country, the only raison d'être of which was the supply of cheap raw materials and the war for British interests. Paul I, who dared to challenge London, was killed for English money by Russian aristocrats corrupted by the reign of Catherine II. His eldest son, Alexander I, did not leave the will of London, and, contrary to the interests of Russia, obediently shed Russian blood in the fields of Europe. Another son of the murdered emperor, Nicholas I, who dared to allow himself a little independence, was punished by the Crimean War and humiliating defeat - and then fear literally paralyzed the rulers of Russia for many years: Bismarck openly called the foreign policy actions of Alexander II and A. M. Gorchakov's "policy of the scared."
The paradox was that, despite the continuous foreign policy pressure from Great Britain, it was always more profitable for Russia to have her as an enemy who constantly, but not very much, does harm on the outskirts (remember the well-known saying of those years - "An Englishwoman shits") than a "friend", ready to drink all her blood under the pretext of fulfilling "allied obligations" to London.
World War I in Russia: war without tasks and goals
Nicholas II, the weak and mediocre son of the "peacemaker" Alexander III, who ascended the throne on November 1, 1894 (October 20, old style), continued his father's international policy.
Russia was sick, its society was split, the country was torn apart by social contradictions, and P. Stolypin was absolutely right when he spoke about the disastrous nature of any upheavals and the need for decades of rest. The defeat in the Russo-Japanese War (the main reason for which was the stupidity and greed of the emperor's closest relatives) was one of the reasons for the two revolutions, and, it seemed, should have also become a warning against such adventures in the future. Alas, Nicholas II did not understand anything and did not learn anything. In August 1914, he allowed the Russian Empire to be drawn into a large and fatal war for the interests of Great Britain, always hostile to Russia, which openly relied on the Russian "cannon fodder" of France and Serbia, a state that then almost openly practiced terrorism at the state level.
One often hears that a war with Germany was inevitable, because having dealt with France, Wilhelm would certainly have crushed Russia without allies. In my opinion, this thesis is highly dubious. Russia and Germany in those years simply did not have any irreconcilable contradictions and real reasons for the war. Schlieffen's plan provided for the rapid defeat of France with the subsequent regrouping of troops to repel the offensive, which had completed its mobilization of the Russian army - but did not at all imply a mandatory offensive deep into Russian territory. The main enemy of the German politicians of those years was not even France, but Great Britain, while Russia was seen as a natural ally, and already in November 1914, the ruling circles of Germany began to consider options for concluding a separate peace with our country - according to the Bolshevik scenario: without annexations and indemnities … Supporters of rapprochement with Russia were the chief of the German General Staff E. von Falkenhain, Grand Admiral A. von Tirpitz, Reich Chancellor T. von Bethmann-Hollweg, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Gottlieb von Jagov, as well as Hindenburg and Ludendorff. But a country dependent on foreign creditors does not have its own interests, and there is no independent foreign policy - Nicholas II refused to negotiate both in 1915 and in 1916. And thus he signed the verdict for himself and the Russian Empire.
The most surprising thing was that Russia in World War I, in fact, had no clear goals and objectives, except for the desire to fulfill the notorious "allied obligations" and to protect the weak, but cocky Balkan "brothers". But on October 29-30, 1914, the Turkish-German squadron fired at Odessa, Sevastopol, Feodosia and Novorossiysk.
Dreams of the Straits
Now, after the Ottoman Empire entered the war, Russian would-be patriots could indulge in fruitless dreams of the much-desired Black Sea straits. These dreams were fruitless because there was no reason to believe that here, too, the British would not repeat the successful trick with Malta, which they captured from Napoleon, but did not give it to the "rightful owners" - the Knights-John, nor to their ally, Paul I, who became the master of this order. And in this case, the stakes were much higher: it was not about the Mediterranean island, but about the strategic straits, which could be controlled by the throat of Russia. Such regions do not donate, and do not voluntarily leave (the Strait of Gibraltar, despite the constant protests of Spain, "allied" to London, is still under British control).
W. Churchill and the "Dardanelles question"
Plans for an operation to capture the Dardanelles were considered by the British Defense Committee back in 1906. Now, with the outbreak of World War I, the British had a real opportunity for such an operation - under the pretext of helping Russia. And already on September 1, 1914 (before the Ottoman Empire entered the war), the First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill held a meeting at which the "Dardanelles question" was considered.
On November 3 of the same year, the Anglo-French squadron shelled the outer fortifications of the Dardanelles. French ships attacked the forts of Orcania and Qum-Kale, the British battlecruisers Indomitable and Indefatigable struck the forts of Helles and Sedd el-Bar. One of the British shells hit the main powder magazine at Fort Sedd el-Bar, causing a powerful explosion.
It was simply impossible for the allies to act more foolishly: having neither a military action plan, nor the necessary forces to carry out a further operation, they clearly indicated their intentions, giving Turkey time to prepare for defense. The Turks got it right: by the end of 1914, they managed to carry out significant work to strengthen their positions in the Gallipoli area, deploying the 3rd Army Corps of Essad Pasha there. They were greatly assisted by German officers sent as instructors. Stationary coastal forts were modernized, torpedo stations and mobile artillery batteries were created, 10 rows of minefields and anti-submarine nets were installed in the sea. Turkish ships in the Sea of Marmara were ready to support the defense of the straits with their artillery, and in the event of a breakthrough by enemy ships, they were ready to attack them in the central part of the strait.
Meanwhile, the British were very worried about the possibility of an attack on Egypt and the Suez Canal. Traditional hopes were pinned on the British palace coup, which they planned to organize in Constantinople. But W. Churchill, believing that the best defense of Egypt would be a preemptive operation on the coast of Turkey itself, suggested attacking Gallipoli. In addition, the Russian command itself gave the British an excuse to seize the Dardanelles so desired by Russia: the British and French in early January 1915 asked Russia to intensify the actions of its army on the Eastern Front. The Russian headquarters agreed on the condition that the allies would hold a large demonstration in the Straits region - in order to divert the attention of the Turks from the Caucasian front. Instead of a "demonstration", the British decided to carry out a large-scale operation to seize the Straits - under the plausible pretext of "helping the Russian allies." When the Russian would-be strategists realized it, it was too late, the British stubbornly avoided discussing the question of the future status of the Straits. Only when it finally became clear that the Dardanelles operation had failed did London "generously" agree to the future annexation of Constantinople to Russia. They were not going to fulfill this promise under any circumstances, and no doubt they would have found a reason for this very easily. In an extreme case, a “color revolution” like the February one would be organized:
“The February revolution took place thanks to a conspiracy between the British and the liberal bourgeoisie. The inspiration was Ambassador Buchanan, the technical executor was Guchkov , - Captain de Maleycy, a representative of the intelligence of the General Staff of France, wrote about those events without the slightest hesitation.
What an irony of fate: now we must be grateful to the selfless soldiers and officers of Turkey (a country that was then at war with us) for the courage with which they repulsed the attack of the "allies" on the Dardanelles. Otherwise, there would now be a British naval base in the straits, which would block them for Russia at any convenient (and even not very convenient) case.
A bit of geography
The Dardanelles is a long (about 70 km) strait between the Gallipoli Peninsula and the coast of Asia Minor. In three places, it narrows significantly, sometimes up to 1200 meters. The terrain on the shores of the strait is heavily rugged, there are hills. Thus, the Dardanelles by their very nature are ideally prepared to defend against the enemy from the sea.
On the other hand, in the immediate vicinity of the entrance, there are three islands (Imbros, Tenedos and Lemnos) that can be used as a base for landing units.
The first phase of the Allied operation in the Dardanelles
The operation in the Dardanelles began on February 19, 1915 (a little later than planned).
The Allied fleet consisted of 80 ships, including the battleship Queen Elisabeth, 16 battleships, the battle cruiser Inflexible, 5 light cruisers, 22 destroyers, 24 minesweepers, 9 submarines, air transport and a hospital ship. If we take into account the auxiliary ships, the total number of ships taking part in the operation will increase to 119.
The French squadron also included the Russian cruiser Askold, which had previously operated against German raiders in the Indian Ocean.
The result of shelling Turkish forts was unsatisfactory. Admiral Sackville Karden had to admit:
“The result of the actions on February 19 showed firsthand that the effect of the bombing from distant positions on modern earthen forts is insignificant. There were many hits with ordinary 12-inch shells into the forts, but when the ships approached, guns from all four forts opened fire again.
But on February 25, the situation seemed to have changed for the better. Long-range large-caliber naval artillery still suppressed the stationary Turkish forts, and the minesweepers began to work with the minefields. Admiral Cardin sent a message to London that in two weeks he would be able to occupy Constantinople. As a result, prices for grain even dropped in Chicago (large quantities were expected to come from southern regions of Russia). However, when the allied ships tried to enter the strait, the mortars and field howitzers of the Turks, hidden behind the hills, entered into action. An unpleasant surprise was the mobile batteries put forward to the shore, which quickly changed their positions. Having lost several ships from artillery fire and in minefields, the Anglo-French ships were forced to withdraw.
The next breakthrough attempt was made on March 18, 1915. Ships of the Russian Black Sea Fleet at that time, in order to distract the enemy's attention, fired at other Turkish ports. The results were disappointing for the allies: three ships sank (the French battleship Bouvet, the British Ocean and Irresistible), and received some serious damage.
On this day, the Turkish corporal Koca Seyit, who became a national hero in Turkey, performed his feat. He alone managed to bring three shells from the 240mm cannon that destroyed the British battleship Ocean.
After the war, Seyit did not even manage to lift such a projectile: “When they (the British) break through again, I will lift it,” he told reporters.
British Admiral John Fisher commented on the outcome of the battle with the phrase:
"Our fleet in the Dardanelles resembles a defrocked monk who intends to rape a virgin … One has long forgotten how to do it, and the other also has a dagger behind a corsage!"
A little scurrilous, but very self-critical, isn't it?
Admiral Cardin, declared to be responsible for the failure of this operation, was removed from office. He was replaced by John de Robeck.
Gallipoli operation of Great Britain and France
Having failed at sea, the allied command set about preparing for a land operation. The island of Lemnos (located 70 km from the entrance to the Dardanelles) was chosen as the base of the landing troops, to which about 80,000 soldiers were hastily delivered.
The French (who were mainly represented by units from Senegal) decided to attack the forts of Qum-Kale and Orcania on the Asian coast of the strait. Their landing (April 25, 1915) was carried out by the Russian cruiser Askold and the French Jeanne d'Arc. "Askold", in contrast to the French ship, which received a shell in the bow artillery tower, was not damaged by enemy fire. However, the Russian sailors who drove the landing boats suffered losses: four were killed, nine were injured. The Senegalese (about 3000 people) at first managed to capture two villages, taking about 500 prisoners, but after the approach of the Turkish reserves, they were forced to go on the defensive, and then evacuate. In this case, one of the companies was captured.
The British, on the other hand, chose the European coast of the strait - the Gallipoli Peninsula (90 km long, 17 kilometers wide, located in the European part of Turkey between the Dardanelles straits and the Saros Gulf in the Aegean Sea) as the landing site for the land units. In addition to the British units themselves, Australian, New Zealand, Canadian and Indian military units were also supposed to storm the Turkish positions.
They were joined by volunteers from Greece and even the "Zion detachment of mule drivers" (Jews, many of whom were emigrants from Russia). On the area chosen for the landing of the troops there were few roads (moreover, bad ones), but many hills and ravines, moreover, the heights dominating the terrain were occupied by the Turks. But the British self-confidently believed that the "wild natives" would not withstand the onslaught of their well-armed and disciplined troops.
The main blow of the British was directed at Cape Helles (the tip of the Gallipoli Peninsula).
The Australians and New Zealanders (Australian and New Zealand Army Corps - ANZAC) were to attack from the west, their target was Cape Gaba Tepe.
The British offensive was preceded by a half-hour bombardment of the coast and attacks by aircraft located on the island of Tenedos. Then the landing operation began. Three battalions of the 29th Infantry Division were embarked on a converted coal miner, River Clyde. Other formations, consisting of three infantry companies and a platoon of marines, were to reach the coast in large boats, which were led by tugs (eight tugs, each of them drove four boats). The Turks very successfully covered these tugs and boats with field guns and machine guns. Almost all of them were destroyed. The position of the units following on the coal miner turned out to be slightly better: the ship managed to land on the shore and the disembarkation began over the bridges imposed on the boats taken with them.
The first two companies of the attackers were literally "mowed down" by enemy fire, but the soldiers of the third, also suffering losses, managed to dig in. The paratroopers, who had already entered the bridges, but did not have time to disembark, were carried away by them to the Helles Peninsula and were killed by fire from Turkish machine guns. As a result, at the cost of the loss of 17 thousand people, the allies were able to occupy two bridgeheads (up to 5 kilometers deep), which were named ANZAC and Helles.
This date - April 25, is now a national holiday in Australia and New Zealand. Previously, it was called "ANZAC Day", but now, after World War II, it is Remembrance Day.
It was not possible to develop success, the Turks pulled up their reserves, and the landing units were forced to go on the defensive. Their situation became especially difficult after the German submarine U-21 on May 25, 1915 sank the British battleship Triumph, and 26 - the battleship Majestic. As a result, the ships were withdrawn to the Mudross Bay, and the troops on the shore were left without artillery support. Both the British and the Turks increased the size of their armies, but neither one nor the other could achieve a decisive advantage.
Gallipoli Peninsula, city of Eceabat, Military Historical Park: positions of Turkish and British troops
It was in the battles for the Gallipoli Peninsula that the star of the army officer Mustafa Kemal Pasha, who will go down in history, under the name of Kemal Ataturk, rose. All over Turkey then his words were transmitted to the soldiers before the next attack on the Australians: "I do not order you to attack, I order you to die!"
As a result, the 57th Regiment of the 19th Turkish Division was killed almost completely, but held its position.
In August 1915, another one, Suvla, was captured to the north of the ANZAK bridgehead.
The day of August 7, 1915, when the 8th and 10th Australian Cavalry Regiments were thrown into a hopeless attack on Turkish positions and suffered huge losses (their soldiers were involved as infantrymen), became a landmark for this country. On the one hand, this is the black date of the calendar, but on the other hand, they say that it was on this day that the Australian nation was born. The loss of hundreds (and in general, thousands) of young men for sparsely populated Australia was shocking, and the image of an arrogant English officer sending Australians to die became a cliche in the national consciousness.
Field Marshal Herbert Kitchener, who visited Gallipoli in November 1915, called the Maxim machine guns "the devil's tool" (the Turks used the German MG.08).
In total, stubborn but fruitless battles on these bridgeheads went on for 259 days. British troops were unable to advance deep into the peninsula.
End of the Gallipoli operation and the evacuation of troops
As a result, it was decided to terminate the Gallipoli operation. On December 18-19, 1915, British troops were evacuated from the ANZAC and Suvla bridgeheads.
Unlike combat operations, the evacuation was well organized, with almost no casualties. And on January 9, 1916, the last soldiers left the southernmost bridgehead - Helles.
Winston Churchill, the initiator of the Dardanelles (Gallipoli) operation, was forced to resign from the post of First Lord of the Admiralty. This plunged him into a state of deep depression: “I am a goner,” he said then.
Disappointing results
The total losses of the allies were enormous: about 252 thousand people were killed and wounded (in total, 489 thousand soldiers and officers took part in the battles). The British losses themselves amounted to about half of them, the losses of the ANZAC corps - about 30 thousand people. Also, the allies lost 6 battleships. The Turkish army lost about 186 thousand killed, wounded and died from disease.
The defeat in the Dardanelles operation was a heavy blow to the military reputation of the British army and navy. Largely because of the failure of the allies in this adventure, Bulgaria entered World War I on the side of the Central Powers.
