160 years ago, on October 25, 1854, between the allied forces of England, France and Turkey, and the Russian troops, the Battle of Balaklava took place. This battle went down in history in connection with several memorable moments. So, in this battle, thanks to the mistakes of the British command, the color of the English aristocracy (light cavalry brigade) died. The battle was not decisive. Russian troops were unable to defeat the British camp and disrupt the supply of the allied army. The allies were forced to finally abandon the assault on Sevastopol, and went over to a long-term siege.
Background
After the first bombing of Sevastopol on October 5 (17), 1854 (the first bombing of Sevastopol), the allied command was indecisive for some time. The allies continued, not sparing shells, shelling the Sevastopol fortifications, but they did this without a clear readiness to start an assault by a certain date.
French commander François Canrobert understood that there was no time to waste. On the one hand, winter was approaching, when the army would have to take a more serious approach to the issue of life in the field and the problem of supplying troops by sea would arise. On the other hand, it was easy to make plans in Paris over a cup of tea or a glass of wine. The Battle of the Alma (Battle of the Alma) and the first bombardment of Sevastopol showed that the Russians are magnificent warriors and there will not be an easy walk in the Crimea. What to decide on?
Canrober didn't know what to do. Go to the storming of Sevastopol or go out in search of Menshikov's army. He even traveled to Balaklava, where the British were camped, to consult with the British commander Lord Raglan, who was even less of a strategist than the French general. Lord Raglan was accustomed to obeying Saint Arno (the former Allied commander) and did not take the initiative.
In the meantime, both armies were reinforced. Even before the bombing of Sevastopol, the French army was reinforced by the 5th Infantry Division of Lavallian and the cavalry brigade of d'Alonville, which had been transferred by sea. On October 18, Bazin's brigade arrived. As a result, the number of the French army increased to 50 thousand bayonets and sabers. The British also received reinforcements, and the number of their expeditionary army increased to 35 thousand people.
The Russian army also increased significantly. From September 19 to October 9 (October 1-21) arrived: 12th Infantry Division under the command of Lieutenant General Liprandi with 4 artillery batteries; Butyrsky infantry regiment from the 17th division with one battery; reserve battalions of the Minsk and Volyn regiments, the 4th rifle battalion; 2nd Line Reserve Black Sea Battalion; General Ryzhov's Consolidated Brigade (2nd Hussar and 2nd Ulan Marching Regiments); Donskoy number 53 and the Ural Cossack regiments. In total, 24 battalions, 12 squadrons and 12 hundred with 56 guns arrived. In addition, Lieutenant General Korf's reserve Uhlan division, with two horse batteries, was sent to Evpatoria. As a result, the strength of the Russian army increased to 65 thousand bayonets and sabers. The arrival of the 10th and 11th divisions was also expected, which increased the Russian forces to 85-90 thousand soldiers.
This could lead to the parity of the armies of Menshikov and Kanrober with Raglan, or even some superiority of the Russian troops. In addition, the allies could find themselves between two fires - the garrison of Sevastopol and the seriously fortified army of Menshikov. The allied army, which was besieging Sevastopol, significantly extended its order. It was especially convenient for the Russian troops to operate from Chorgun in the direction of Balaklava, where the Turkish and British troops were located. The benefits of such a blow prompted the Russian commander, Alexander Menshikov, to launch an offensive on Balaklava, without waiting for the arrival of new divisions.
Drawing by Roger Fenton. Attack of a light cavalry brigade, 25 October 1854
Enemy camp. Allied forces
If the "capital" of the French army in the Crimea was the town of Kamysh, built on the shores of Kamyshovaya Bay, then the main base of the British was in Balaklava. A small, mostly inhabited by Greeks, settlement during the war turned into a bustling European city. Guns, ammunition, tools and even wood were delivered from England (firewood was also supplied to the French from Varna). Huge warehouse-shops appeared in the city, an embankment was built, even a railway was built to the port. To supply the troops, artesian wells were pierced, and a water supply system was equipped. Warships and transport ships were constantly stationed in the bay. The aristocrats did not forget about small joys - there were several yachts in the bay where officers could rest and drink wine. Among them was the yacht "Dryad" of Lord James Cardigan, the commander of the light cavalry.
Balaklava was defended by a double line of fortifications. The internal line of defense (closest to the city) consisted of several artillery batteries. They were connected by a continuous trench. The right flank of the line rested against the inaccessible mountain Spilia, and the line itself extended to the road that led from Balaklava through the Traktirny bridge to Simferopol. The outer line of defense ran along the heights that separated the Balaklava valley from the valley of the Black River. Six redoubts were equipped here (according to other sources, five redoubts). Right-flank redoubt No. 1 was located at a height, at a distance of about two versts to the north-west of the village of Komary. The rest of the redoubts were located to the left of the first, along the heights, partly along the Vorontsov road, partly in front of the village of Kadikoy (Kadikoy). Redoubt No. 1 was armed with three fortress guns, No. 2 - 2 guns, No. 3 and 4 - 3 guns each, No. 5 - 5 guns. These fortifications were small and did not create an interconnected defense. At the forefront of the Russian offensive were four redoubts No. 1-4.
The garrison of Balaklava and two lines of fortifications was 4, 5 thousand detachment (about 1 thousand Turks and 3.5 thousand English). More than 1,000 British sailors occupied Balaklava and the near line of fortifications. The 93rd Scottish Infantry Regiment (650 soldiers) and a disabled team (100 people) in front of the village of Kadikoy, to the left of the Simferopol road. The British cavalry was located to the left of Kadikoy. The cavalry was commanded by Major General Count George Lucan. The British cavalry (1,500 sabers) included a heavy brigade of Brigadier General James Scarlett (Skerlett) - 4th and 5th Guards Regiments, 1st, 2nd and 6th Dragoon Regiments (10 squadrons in total, about 800 people). The heavy brigade was located closer to the village of Kadikoy. Next was the light brigade under the command of Major General Lord James Cardigan. It consisted of the 4th, 8th, 11th, 13th hussar and 17th lancers regiments (10 squadrons, about 700 people). The light cavalry was considered an elite part of the army, the offspring of the most noble families in England served in it.
The advanced redoubts were occupied by Turkish troops (more than 1,000 people). In each redoubt there were approximately 200-250 Turks and several English artillerymen. The British commanders were contemptuous of the Turks, in fact, they also treated their ordinary soldiers. In the English army, officers were a special caste, arrogant, arrogant and devoid of imagination, poorly mastering new methods of combat (therefore, French officers did not respect the British). The British used Turkish soldiers as labor, porters, and also deployed in dangerous areas. The British assessed their combat effectiveness as very low, so the task of the Ottomans was to take the first blow and stay in the redoubts until help arrived.
However, the British did not take into account the fact that the Turkish command was not going to send the most combat-ready units to the Crimea. The best forces of the Turkish army were concentrated in the Danube direction under the command of Omer Pasha. And if the French turned the Ottomans into beasts of burden, the British still wanted them to defend the most dangerous areas well, to be cannon fodder. The Turks were turned into a forward detachment, which was supposed to stop the Russians and defend the English camp and warehouses in Balaklava. At the same time, the Turks were fed on a leftover principle, they were beaten to death for the slightest offense (the system of savage punishments in the British army and navy was very developed), did not communicate with them, and even their officers were despised, they were not put at a common table. The Ottomans for the British were second-class people. They treated them with whips and sticks.
Photo by Roger Fenton. British warship at the pier in Balaklava Bay. 1855
Photo by Roger Fenton. British and Turkish military camp in the valley near Balaklava. 1855
Russian forces. Operation plan
Menshikov did not believe in the possibility of saving Sevastopol, but under pressure from the high command decided to hold a demonstration, trying to disrupt enemy communications near Balaklava. Petersburg closely followed the situation in Crimea. Tsar Nicholas did not even allow the thought of surrendering Sevastopol, encouraged Menshikov in his letters, instructed him to maintain morale in the troops.
In early October, Russian troops began to concentrate on the Chorgun direction. At dawn on October 2 (14), a detachment of Lieutenant Colonel Rakovich (3 battalions, two hundred Cossacks, 4 guns) occupied the village of Chorgun. The next day, Rakovich's detachment established contact with the Consolidated Uhlan Regiment under the command of Colonel Yeropkin, who was sent to monitor the enemy in the Baydar Valley. Then the 1st brigade of the 12th infantry division with the 1st Ural Cossack regiment under the command of Major General Semyakin 6-7 (18-19) arrived at Chorgun, reconnaissance of the enemy positions was carried out.
On October 11 (23), 16 thous. a detachment under the command of the deputy commander-in-chief of the Russian troops in the Crimea, Lieutenant-General Pavel Liprandi. The Chorgun detachment included 17 battalions, 20 squadrons, 10 hundred and 64 guns.
The British decided to attack at dawn on October 13 (25), 1853. Russian troops were to attack the enemy in three columns. On the left flank, a column was advancing under the command of Major General Gribbe - three reinforced battalions, 6 squadrons, one hundred and 10 guns. The left wing was supposed to go along the gorge, which led to the Baydar Valley, and then turn onto the road to Komary and occupy this village. The middle column was led by Major General Semyakin. It consisted of two separate groups. The left group under the command of Semyakin himself consisted of 5 battalions with 10 guns. The right group under the command of Major General Levutsky, it consisted of 3 battalions with 8 guns. In general, the middle column advanced in the general direction of Kadikoy. On the right flank, a column was advancing under the command of Colonel Scuderi. It consisted of 4 battalions, 4 hundred and 8 guns. The right flank was to advance in the direction of the third redoubt.
The cavalry under the command of Lieutenant General Ryzhov - 14 squadrons and 6 hundred, 2 horse batteries, had to cross the Black River, line up in columns and wait for Liprandi's command. One battalion and one battery remained in reserve. In addition, the Liprandi detachment could have been assisted by 5 thousand. detachment under the command of Major General Zhabokritsky. It consisted of about 8 battalions, 2 squadrons, 2 hundred and 14 guns. A detachment of Zhabokritsky was sent to assist Liprandi and cover him from the side facing the French army, where the troops of General Pierre Bosquet were stationed. Zhabokritsky's detachment was sent to the right of the Vorontsovskaya road, to Fedyukhiny heights.
Lieutenant General Pavel Petrovich Liprandi. Commander of the Russian detachment in the Battle of Balaklava
The beginning of the battle
The battle began early in the morning. Even at night, the Russian columns began to move. The British noticed the movement of Russian troops and pushed all the cavalry to redoubt No. 4. However, the Russian troops did not attack, but only limited themselves to a demonstration.
The Turks, who were sitting in their redoubts, did not expect a blow and could not offer serious resistance. At six o'clock Levutsky's detachment reached the Kadikoy heights and opened artillery fire on redoubts No. 2 and 3. At the same time, General Gribbe, having forced out the enemy posts from the village of Komary, opened artillery fire on redoubt No. 1. Under the cover of artillery fire and riflemen, General Semyakin threw in the attack Azov regiment. Company columns of the first line, by order of the regiment commander Kridener, rushed into a bayonet attack and, despite stubborn resistance from the Turks, took redoubt No. 1. Most of the redoubt garrison was killed, the rest fled in panic. Three guns were captured.
At this time, the rangers of the Odessa and Ukrainian regiments attacked redoubts No. 2, 3 and 4. The Ottomans wavered and fled, abandoning their guns, ammunition, entrenching tools, all the property that was in the redoubts. The Russian cavalry pursued the enemy and some of the Turks were killed during the flight, and the rest carried off their feet in complete horror. Redoubt No. 4 was located at a considerable distance from the Russian positions, so the guns that were there were riveted, the carriages were damaged, the guns themselves were thrown from the mountain, and the fortifications were demolished.
I must say that the troubles for the Turks did not end there. When they reached the city, the British literally took them with bayonets. The Ottomans were not allowed to enter the city and began to beat them, accusing them of cowardice. Some of the Ottomans were killed or beaten by the British, the other part was included in the 93rd Scottish Infantry Regiment.
The shooting at the Balaklava Heights alarmed the allied command. French General Pierre Bosquet, who had previously noted in battles in Algeria and in the battle on the Alma, immediately dispatched the Vinua brigade from the 1st Division to the Balaklava Valley, followed by a brigade of African equestrian rangers under the command of General d'Alonville, who distinguished themselves in the fight with the Algerian tribes. For his part, the British commander Lord Raglan sent for the 1st and 4th Divisions. At this time, while the reinforcements were marching, the 93rd Scottish regiment took up defenses in front of the village of Kadikoy. On the left flank were a hundred disabled people, on the right, several hundred surviving Ottomans. The British cavalry took up positions to the left, behind Redoubt No. 4.
After the occupation of the redoubts, at about ten o'clock in the morning, General Liprandi ordered Ryzhov, with a hussar brigade and an Ural regiment with 16 guns, to descend into the valley and attack the English artillery park near the village of Kadikoy. Apparently, during the reconnaissance, a part of the field camp of the English light cavalry brigade was mistaken for an enemy artillery park. Having reached the object of the attack, the Russian cavalry found, instead of the cavalry park, the units of the heavy cavalry brigade of James Scarlett. This meeting, as noted by the contemporaries of this battle and researchers, was a surprise for the Russians and the British. Since the rugged terrain obscured the movement of the cavalry. In the course of a short but fierce battle, the British retreated. After the war, Lieutenant General Ryzhov and a participant in this cavalry battle, officer of the Ingermanland Hussar Regiment, Staff Captain Arbuzov, noted the uniqueness of this cavalry clash: rarely such masses of cavalry were cut with equal ferocity on the battlefields.
However, General Ryzhov, believing that his task had been completed, did not develop success, and diverted his forces to their original positions. The English dragoons tried to pursue the Russian cavalry, but were met with friendly volleys of Russian riflemen and retreated. The results of this cavalry battle remained uncertain, so each side attributed the victory to itself.
Source: Tarle E. V. Crimean War
