The defeat near Moscow forced Hitler in early 1942 to look for new approaches in the strategic planning of the war against the USSR. The goal of the summer offensive of German troops on the eastern front in 1942 was set out in the secret directive of the German high command No. 41, approved by Hitler on April 5, 1942. The German troops, it was indicated in that directive, were to “… re-seize the initiative and impose their will on the enemy ". The main secret of Hitler's directive was the direction of the main attack of the German troops. In 1942, the main blow was planned to be delivered in the southern sector of the Soviet-German front with the aim of destroying the enemy west of the Don River, in order to then capture the oil-bearing regions in the Caucasus and cross the passes over the Caucasian ridge. This was Hitler's new strategic decision - to deprive the Red Army of its food and industrial base, as well as cut off the supply of petroleum products. In Berlin, the operation to seize the southern regions of the USSR was codenamed "Blau".
In general, the implementation of this grandiose military plan was to drastically reduce the military and economic capabilities of the USSR and radically weaken the resistance of the Red Army troops.
The plan for Operation Blau complemented the concept of a strategic offensive in the Caucasus, which received its code name - Operation Edelweiss.
During the implementation of Operation Blau, the German command also planned to seize Stalingrad and cut off the transfer of military and other cargo along the Volga. To create the preconditions for the successful implementation of such a plan, it was supposed to clear the Crimea and the Kerch Peninsula from Soviet troops and seize Sevastopol.
Hitler hoped that in 1942 Germany would be able to draw Japan and Turkey into the war against the USSR, which would contribute to the final defeat of the Soviet troops.
"Red Chapel" obstructed the activities of military intelligence
In preparation for Operation Blau, Hitler ordered the German counterintelligence command to intensify the identification and destruction of Soviet intelligence officers operating in Germany and in the territories of states occupied by German troops. To this end, the German special services have developed Operation Red Chapel. It was to be held simultaneously in Germany, Belgium, Bulgaria, Italy, France, Switzerland and Sweden. The purpose of the operation is to identify and destroy the Soviet intelligence network of agents. That is why the code name of the German counterintelligence operation was appropriate - "Red Chapel".
During the active measures of the German counterintelligence, Soviet military intelligence officers Leopold Trepper, Anatoly Gurevich, Konstantin Efremov, Alexander Makarov, Johann Wenzel, Arnold Schnee and others were identified and arrested. In Berlin, the head of the Soviet military intelligence agent group Ilse Stebe, who was listed in the Center under the pseudonym "Alta", was arrested. During the arrests carried out by the Gestapo in Berlin, the Alta's assistants, Baron Rudolf von Shelia, who worked in the German Foreign Ministry and transmitted valuable military-political intelligence information to I. Stebe, journalist Karl Helfrik, her closest associate, and others, were seized. agents of the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army (RU GSh KA).
As a result of active measures carried out by the German counterintelligence, the agents "Sergeant Major" and "Corsican", who collaborated with the foreign intelligence of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD), were also identified and arrested.
In 1942 the German intelligence services dealt a serious blow to the agent network of Soviet intelligence. In general, German counterintelligence managed to arrest about 100 people working for Soviet intelligence. After a closed military tribunal, 46 of them were sentenced to death and the rest to long prison terms. Ilse Stebe ("Alta"), one of the most valuable sources of Soviet military intelligence, was also sentenced to death by guillotine. Ilse Stebe did not betray her assistants during interrogations and even under torture by the Gestapo.
Unable to withstand the force of the executioners of the Gestapo, some intelligence officers under duress agreed to play a radio game with the Center. The purpose of the radio game is to transmit to Moscow disinformation information about the military plans of the German command, as well as a deliberate attempt to split the relations between the USSR and the allies in the anti-Hitler coalition, weakening their interaction on the eve of the German offensive on the southern flank of the Soviet-German front.
The vigorous activity of the German counterintelligence service in 1942 significantly hampered the activities of the foreign residencies of the Soviet military intelligence. The difficult working conditions in which the scouts found themselves affected the quantity and quality of information obtained about the enemy. The supply of valuable materials to the Center, which were necessary for a correct understanding of the strategic situation on the Soviet-German front, decreased. At the same time, the Center has sharply increased the demand for military and military-political information of a strategic nature. The General Staff of the Red Army developed its strategic plans for waging a war against Germany, and it was impossible to do this without intelligence information.
The political leadership of the USSR also found itself in a difficult situation, which did not fully take into account the information about the enemy that was obtained by military intelligence. Supreme Commander-in-Chief I. V. On January 10, 1942, Stalin signed a directive letter addressed to the Soviet military leaders, in which he defined the tasks of the Red Army troops. The letter, in particular, stated: “… After the Red Army had sufficiently exhausted the German fascist troops, it launched a counteroffensive and drove the Nazi invaders westward. … Our task is not to give the Germans a respite and drive them to the west without stopping, to force them to spend their reserves even before spring … and thus ensure the complete defeat of Hitler's troops in 1942 ….
The Red Army could not yet drive the German troops westward without respite in the spring of 1942. Moreover, the enemy was still very strong.
In the summer of 1942, the Headquarters of the Supreme Command (VGK) and the General Staff of the Red Army made a mistake in assessing the plans of the German command. The headquarters of the Supreme Command assumed that Hitler would again direct the main efforts of his troops to the capture of the Soviet capital. This point of view was adhered to by I. V. Stalin. Hitler had other plans.
It is well known that any strategic decisions are preceded by intense intelligence work, which obtains the information necessary for assessing the situation and making decisions. What happened in the spring of 1942? What information about the plans of the German command at the beginning of 1942 were able to obtain the residency of the Soviet military intelligence? How was this information taken into account by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief and members of the Supreme Command Headquarters?
Reliable information about the plans of the German command was obtained
Despite the active measures of the German counterintelligence carried out within the framework of Operation Red Chapel, and the loss of part of its agent network by the Soviet military intelligence, the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army managed to preserve important sources of information in the capitals of a number of European states. In the spring of 1942, the residencies of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army (GRU GSh KA) continued to operate in Geneva, London, Rome, Sofia and Stockholm. Their activities were led by residents Sandor Rado ("Dora"), Ivan Sklyarov ("Brion"), Nikolai Nikitushev ("Akasto") and other scouts. In Great Britain and Italy, illegal stations "Dubois", "Sonya" and "Phoenix" also operated, which also had agents capable of obtaining valuable information of a military and military-political nature.
This information, as evidenced by archival documents, correctly reflected the plans of the German command in the summer campaign of 1942. An important feature of the reports of military intelligence officers during this period was that they obtained information about the specific actions of the German command on the eastern front even before Hitler signed Directive No. 41. that is, at the stage of the formation of the strategic plan of the German command.
The first report on where Hitler plans to conduct a summer offensive on the eastern front arrived at the Center on March 3, 1942. Scout Major A. F. Sizov ("Eduard") reported from London that Germany was planning to "launch an offensive in the direction of the Caucasus." Sizov's report contradicted what I. V. Stalin and the Supreme Command Headquarters. Moscow was preparing to repel a new German offensive against the Soviet capital.
Major General Sizov Alexander Fedorovich, Soviet military attaché to the governments of the allied states in London during the Great Patriotic War, during the Battle of Stalingrad - Major
The reliability of intelligence information is verified in various ways. One of them is the comparison of information obtained by different sources. By comparing such information obtained in London, Geneva and Berlin, one can draw conclusions about their reliability. Following this rule, the Center could not help but notice that the report of Major A. F. Sizov is confirmed by the information received by the GRU General Staff of the KA from the resident of the Soviet military intelligence Sandor Rado, who was operating in Switzerland.
On March 12, Sandor Rado reported to the Center that the main forces of the Germans would be directed against the southern wing of the eastern front with the task of reaching the border of the Volga River and the Caucasus in order to cut off the Red Army and the population of central Russia from the oil and grain regions. Comparing the reports of Sh. Rado and A. F. Sizov, the Center prepared a special message "On Germany's plans for 1942", which was sent to the members of the Supreme Command Headquarters and the General Staff. The special message indicated that in 1942 Germany would launch an offensive in the direction of the Caucasus.
In the spring of 1942, the illegal residency of the Soviet military intelligence, headed by Sandor Rado, was active in intelligence activities. Valuable agents who had connections in the headquarters of the Wehrmacht, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other government agencies of Germany were involved in cooperation. These sources in the Center were listed under the pseudonyms "Long", "Louise", "Luci", "Olga", "Sisi" and "Taylor". The Dora station had three independent radio stations operating in different cities: Bern, Geneva and Lausanne. This made it possible to successfully mask the broadcasts of radio operators, which deprived the enemy's counterintelligence of the possibility of their direction finding and establishing locations. Despite the efforts of the German counterintelligence, which achieved success in Belgium, France and Germany itself, the Dora station continued to conduct successful work in obtaining intelligence information. On average, the radio operators of Sandor Rado transmitted from 3 to 5 radiograms to the Center every day. At the Center, Rado's reports received high marks and were used to prepare reports sent to the highest political leadership of the USSR and the command of the Red Army.
In the summer of 1942, resident S. Rado sent information to Moscow on a wide range of military and military-political problems. He reported to the Center on the volume of production by the German military industry of aircraft, tanks, artillery pieces, on the transfer of enemy military units to the southern sector of the Soviet-German front, on the relationship among the top military leaders of the German armed forces.
Sandor Rado, head of the Dora residency in Switzerland
Agent "Luci" obtained extremely valuable information about the enemy and the operational plans of the German command. The German Rudolf Ressler acted under this pseudonym. A journalist by profession, a participant in the First World War, Ressler, after the Nazis came to power, left Germany and settled in Switzerland. While living in Geneva, he maintained contacts with influential persons in Berlin, maintained contacts with them and received valuable information of a military and military-political nature. This information Ressler in 1939-1944. transferred to the Swiss intelligence "Bureau X". In the first half of 1942, exactly at the time when Hitler was preparing for a new general offensive on the eastern front, Ressler met the anti-fascist Christian Schneider, who maintained close relations with Rachel Dubendorfer, who was a member of Sandor Rado's reconnaissance group. During the very first meetings with Ressler, Rachel Dubendorfer realized that Ressler had extremely valuable information about the military plans of the German command. Ressler began to transmit this information to Schneider and Dubendorfer, who reported it to Sandor Rado. It was from Ressler that the first information came that Hitler plans to change the war plan against the USSR and intends to launch a decisive offensive on the southern flank of the Soviet-German front, to seize the Rostov Region, Krasnodar and Stavropol Territories, as well as the Crimea and the Caucasus.
Resident of the GRU General Staff of the Spacecraft in London, Major A. F. Sizov, acting under the guise of the post of Soviet military attaché to the governments of the allied states, on March 3, 1942, also informed the Center that the German command was preparing an offensive in the direction of the Caucasus, where “… the main effort is foreseen in the direction of Stalingrad and a minor one - on Rostov and, besides, through the Crimea to Maikop”.
In March-April 1942, the words "southern flank" and "Caucasus" were encountered quite often in the reports of military intelligence officers. The information received from the scouts was carefully analyzed at the Center, checked and after that, in the form of special messages, it was sent to the members of the Supreme Command Headquarters and the Chief of the General Staff. Some of these reports were sent personally to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief.
In the spring of 1942, information was received from the heads of foreign military intelligence stations about the foreign policy efforts of the German leadership aimed at drawing Japan and Turkey into the war against the USSR. The Center received similar information from the intelligence officers A. F. Sizova, I. A. Sklyarova and N. I. Nikitusheva.
In early March 1942, for example, a resident of the GRU GSh KA in Turkey obtained a copy of a report from the Bulgarian military attaché in Ankara, which was sent to Sofia. It reported that the new offensive of the German troops on the eastern front “… will not have the character of lightning speed, but will be carried out slowly in order to achieve success. The Turks fear that the Soviet fleet will try to escape through the Bosphorus. The following measures will be taken against this:
1. As soon as the German offensive begins, the Turks will begin to regroup their forces, concentrating them in the Caucasus and the Black Sea.
2. From the same moment, the orientation of Turkey's policy towards Germany will begin."
Further, the Bulgarian military attaché reported to his leadership: “… The Turks do not expect pressure to fight either side until July or August. By this time they think that Hitler will achieve victory, and they will openly go over to the side of Germany ….
This report from a military intelligence resident, received by the Center on March 5, 1942, was sent to the members of the Supreme Command Headquarters and the State Defense Committee (GKO) at the direction of the head of the GRU General Staff of the Spacecraft. The Turkish government was biding its time. The failure of the Red Army in the hostilities of the summer campaign of 1942 could provoke a military action by Turkey against the USSR.
On March 15, a military intelligence source in London, who was listed in the Center under the operational pseudonym "Dolly", informed the head of the GRU General Staff of the Spacecraft about the content of the conversations between German Foreign Minister I. Ribbentrop and the Japanese Ambassador to Berlin, General H. Oshima, which took place on 18, 22 and 23 February 1942In these conversations, Ribbentrop informed the Japanese ambassador that for the German command “… in 1942 the southern sector of the Eastern Front will be of paramount importance. It is there that the offensive will begin, and the battle will unfold to the north."
Thus, in March-April 1942, the residents of Soviet military intelligence obtained and sent to the Center evidence that a new general offensive by German troops on the eastern front would be undertaken in the direction of the Caucasus and Stalingrad, and that the German leadership was trying hard to involve in the war against the USSR Japan and Turkey.
Having summarized all the information received from foreign residencies, the command of the GRU General Staff of the SC in a special message No. 137474 sent to the GKO on March 18, 1942, announced that the center of gravity of the spring offensive of the Germans would be shifted to the southern sector of the front (Rostov - Maikop - Baku). The conclusions of the special message stated: "Germany is preparing for a decisive offensive on the Eastern Front, which will unfold first in the southern sector and subsequently spread to the north."
How did the top political leadership of the USSR react to messages from military intelligence?
First, in accordance with the instructions of I. V. Stalin, after the defeat of the Germans in the battle of Moscow, the issue of the transition of the Red Army troops to the offensive was considered. In the General Staff, the capabilities of the Red Army troops were assessed more modestly. Chief of the General Staff B. M. Shaposhnikov, assessing the results of the Soviet counteroffensive after the defeat of the Germans in the battle of Moscow, believed that in 1942 along the entire front, the Red Army troops should not “… drive them west without stopping”, but go over to strategic defense.
I. V. Stalin and G. K. Zhukov agreed with the need for a transition to strategic defense, but proposed to conduct several offensive operations. Ultimately, a compromise solution was worked out - as the main type of actions of the Red Army for the summer of 1942, strategic defense was adopted, supplemented, in accordance with the recommendations of I. V. Stalin, private offensive operations.
Secondly, the decision to conduct several offensive operations and strengthen the central section of the Soviet-German front, where a new offensive by German troops on Moscow was expected in the summer of 1942, were made in accordance with the instructions of I. V. Stalin. These instructions were built without taking into account intelligence information obtained by military intelligence officers.
At the beginning of the summer of 1942, military intelligence officers obtained new information, which also revealed the plan of the German command and concretized it.
On July 1, 1942, military attaché Colonel N. I. Nikitushev, who was operating in Stockholm, reported to the Center: “… The Swedish headquarters believes that the main German offensive has begun in Ukraine. The plan of the Germans was to break through the Kursk-Kharkov defense line with the development of an offensive across the Don to Stalingrad on the Volga. Then the establishment of a barrier in the northeast and the continuation of the offensive with fresh forces to the south through Rostov-on-Don to the Caucasus."
Information obtained by N. I. Nikitushev, were also reported to the members of the Supreme Command Headquarters.
Colonel Nikitushev Nikolai Ivanovich, military attaché in Sweden during the Great Patriotic War
Reliable information about the enemy was obtained by agents of Sh. Rado - "Long", "Louise", "Luci" and others. This information was reliable and was fully confirmed during the German offensive that unfolded in the summer of 1942.
The headquarters of the Supreme Command, based on the information of the GRU General Staff of the Spacecraft, could make strategic decisions, taking into account the attack planned by Hitler in the direction of the southern flank of the Soviet-German front. However, the decisions of the Soviet Supreme Command were based on the forecasts of I. V. Stalin that the German command would deliver the main blow in the direction of Moscow. Stalin's delusion arose on the basis of other information available at the Supreme Command Headquarters about the plans of the German command. At that time, the headquarters of the German Army Group "Center", at the direction of the High Command of the Wehrmacht's ground forces, developed a disinformation operation codenamed "Kremlin". For ordinary performers, it looked like a real plan for an attack on Moscow. Provided for the regrouping and transfer of troops, the redeployment of headquarters and command posts, the supply of ferry facilities to water barriers. The headquarters of the 3rd Panzer Army was redeployed from the left wing of Army Group Center to the Gzhatsk area. It was here that the army was supposed to advance according to the plan of Operation Kremlin. Aerial photo reconnaissance of the Moscow defensive positions, the outskirts of Moscow, the area to the east of the Soviet capital was intensified.
Plans for Moscow and other large cities located in the offensive zone of Army Group Center were sent out from July 10 to the regimental headquarters, which increased the likelihood of information leakage. All the disinformation measures of the German command were closely linked with the preparation and implementation of Operation Blau. So, in the zone of the 2nd tank and 4th armies, they were supposed to reach a climax on June 23, and in the zone of the 3rd tank and 9th armies - on June 28.
The actions of the German command were carried out with a certain degree of camouflage, which gave them a certain degree of credibility. Apparently, it was this information that seemed more reliable to Stalin. This conclusion suggests itself because Stalin believed that the main blow in the 1942 summer campaign would be delivered by German troops in the direction of the Soviet capital. As a result, the defense of Moscow was strengthened, and the southern flank of the Soviet-German front was poorly prepared to repel a major German offensive. This mistake led to the emergence in 1942 of an extremely difficult situation on the southern flank of the Soviet-German front.
Marshal of the Soviet Union A. M. Vasilevsky wrote about this in his memoirs: “The reasonable data of our intelligence about the preparation of the main attack in the south were not taken into account. Less forces were allocated in the southwest direction than in the west."
General of the Army S. M. Shtemenko, who believed that “… in the summer of 1942, the enemy's plan to seize the Caucasus was also revealed quite quickly. But this time, too, the Soviet command did not have the opportunity to ensure decisive actions to defeat the advancing enemy grouping in a short time."
The above facts indicate that the foreign bodies of the GRU General Staff of the Spacecraft in the spring of 1942 obtained reliable information that reflected the plans of the German command. However, they were not taken into account by the Soviet leadership. As a result, in June 1942, the Supreme Command Headquarters was forced to take urgent measures that were supposed to restrain the advance of the German troops and prevent them from seizing Stalingrad. In particular, the Stalingrad Front was urgently formed on the southern flank. August 27, 1942 I. V. Stalin signed a decree appointing G. K. Zhukov First Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR.
During this period of the war, it was important to have reliable information about the plans of the leaders of Japan and Turkey, who could enter the war against the USSR on the side of Germany.
Initially, Operation Blau was supposed to begin on June 23, but due to the protracted hostilities in the Sevastopol region, German troops launched an offensive on June 28, broke through the defenses and broke through to Voronezh. After large losses I. V. Stalin drew attention to the reports of military intelligence, in which it was reported that Japan was increasing the efforts of its troops in the Pacific basin and did not intend to enter the war against the USSR in the near future. This information formed the basis for the decision of the Supreme Command Headquarters on the transfer in July 1942 from the Far East of 10–12 divisions to the west to the Supreme Command reserve. For the second time during the Great Patriotic War, information obtained by military intelligence,formed the basis for the decision to transfer the Far Eastern formations to the Soviet-German front to strengthen the troops of the Red Army. Intelligence information about the plans of the Japanese command turned out to be reliable in 1942, which allowed the Headquarters to urgently strengthen the southern flank of the Soviet-German front.
Other urgent decisions were made to strengthen the defense of Stalingrad, the formation of strategic reserves and the planning of operations, which made it possible to achieve a turning point in the Battle of Stalingrad. But this turning point was achieved at the expense of extraordinary efforts and at the cost of great losses.
The tasks have been completed
During the defensive stage of the Battle of Stalingrad (July 17 - November 18, 1942) and during the preparation of the Soviet counteroffensive, foreign military intelligence stations were solving a wide range of tasks. Among them were:
revealing the plans of the use by the German command of the armed forces of the allies (Bulgaria, Hungary, Italy, Romania, Slovakia) on the Soviet-German front;
obtaining information about the progress of mobilization in Germany and the attitude of the population towards it;
obtaining information about the preparation of German troops for chemical warfare;
The GRU GSh KA was supposed to regularly report to the Supreme Command Headquarters about the losses of the German army on the eastern front in personnel and military equipment, as well as the results of the bombing of military facilities in Germany.
To solve these and other reconnaissance tasks, the command of the GRU General Staff of the Spacecraft planned to actively use the existing foreign residencies of military intelligence, as well as to send several reconnaissance groups and individual scouts into Germany to organize reconnaissance in Berlin, Vienna, Hamburg, Cologne, Leipzig, Munich and other cities of Germany. … Responsible for the fulfillment of these tasks was the senior assistant to the head of the German department of the GRU, military engineer 2nd rank K. B. Leontiev, employees of the department captain M. I. Polyakova and senior lieutenant V. V. Bochkarev. It was also planned to reestablish communication with the GRU General Staff space station in Berlin, which was led by I. Stebe ("Alta"). The center did not know that the German counterintelligence was conducting Operation Red Chapel and had already arrested a significant part of the intelligence officers who were part of the military intelligence network in Europe. Therefore, the Center planned to restore communication with the intelligence officers I. Wenzel, K. Efremov, G. Robinson.
In 1942, the military intelligence stations "Akasto", "Brion", "Dora", "Wand", "Zhores", "Zeus", "Nak", "Omega", "Sonya", "Edward" and others continued to operate. …
A significant contribution to the defeat of German troops at Stalingrad was made by the Dora strategic intelligence agency and its leader, Sandor Rado. In January - October 1942 Rado sent 800 encrypted radio messages to the Center (about 1,100 sheets of text). During the period of the Soviet counteroffensive during the Battle of Stalingrad (November 1942 - March 1943), Rado sent about 750 more radiograms to the Center. Thus, in 1942 - the first quarter of 1943. S. Rado sent 1550 reports to the Center.
The main feature of the Dora station was the acquisition of proactive information about the enemy. The Dora station provided timely responses to the Center's inquiries about the rear defensive lines of the Germans southwest of Stalingrad, about reserves in the rear of the Eastern Front, about the plans of the German command in connection with the offensive of the Red Army at Stalingrad.
During the Battle of Stalingrad, the military intelligence station "Brion" was active in London. The activities of this station were directed by Major General of Tank Forces I. A. Sklyarov. In 1942 Sklyarov sent reports to the Center in 1344. In January-February 1943, the Center received another 174 reports from Sklyarov. Thus, in the second period of the Great Patriotic War, only the "Brion" residence sent 1518 reports to the Center. Most of the reports of Major General I. A. Sklyarov were used by the command of the GRU General Staff of the SC for reports to the members of the Supreme Command Headquarters.
Major General of Tank Forces Ivan Andreevich Sklyarov, Head of the Brion Residency in London
During the Battle of Stalingrad, Lieutenant Colonel I. M. Kozlov ("Bilton") was in charge of the valuable source "Dolly", who served in the British military department. Dolly had access to the intercepted and decrypted radio messages from the German High Command and the Japanese ambassador in Berlin and other classified documents. Dolly's information was very valuable and consistently received high marks at the Center.
During 1942 "Dolly" monthly transferred to the Soviet intelligence officer I. M. Kozlov from 20 to 28 German radio messages decoded by the British about Ribbentrop's negotiations with the Japanese, Hungarian and Romanian ambassadors, instructions from the General Staff of the German ground forces to the commanders of units on the Stalingrad front, Goering's orders to the command of the German air army, which supported Paulus's army.
The reports of Dolly's source were often reported by the chief of military intelligence to I. V. Stalin, G. K. Zhukov and A. M. Vasilevsky.
In 1942, the GRU GSh KA prepared and sent 102 special messages to the top political leadership of the USSR and the command of the Red Army in Europe, 83 in Asia, 25 in America and 12 in Africa. Due to the arrests of a number of residents of the Soviet military intelligence by the German counterintelligence, the total volume of special messages in Europe in 1942 compared with 1941 decreased by 32 messages (in 1941, 134 special messages were prepared in Europe in the General Staff of the General Staff of the KA).
On the eve and in the course of the Battle of Stalingrad, the radio intelligence of the GRU GSh KA achieved significant success. During this period of time, three main stages were distinguished in its activity:
conducting radio intelligence during the defensive battle of the Battle of Stalingrad (mid-July - first half of November 1942);
conducting radio reconnaissance during the Soviet counteroffensive and the defeat of the enemy in the Stalingrad region (second half of November 1942 - early February 1943).
During the period of the retreat of the Soviet troops, the radio intelligence of the GRU General Staff of the Spacecraft found itself in an extremely difficult situation, since it had to operate in a complex and rapidly changing combat situation. Therefore, by the beginning of the German troops' transition to the offensive, no information had been obtained about the creation by the German command of three shock groupings of German fascist troops: the 2nd field and 4th tank armies - to strike in the Voronezh direction; The 6th Field Army, reinforced with tank formations, to strike in the Stalingrad direction; 1st tank and 17th field armies - to strike in the North Caucasus.
According to the expert assessment of one of the leading specialists in the field of domestic radio intelligence, a participant in the Great Patriotic War, Lieutenant General P. S. Shmyrev, radio intelligence during this period of the war did not reveal the direction of the main attacks of the German troops and could not adequately reveal the reorganization carried out by the enemy, which affected the division of Army Group South into two Army Groups A and B. In the course of the rapidly developing German tank offensive, the front-line radio intelligence units controlled the radio communication system of the German army poorly at the operational level, and at the tactical level (division - regiment) were completely excluded from observation. It is therefore no coincidence that there is not a word about radio intelligence in the report prepared by the headquarters of the Southwestern Front on the state of affairs at the front, which was presented by I. V. Stalin on July 9, 1942 by the front commander Marshal of the Soviet Union S. K. Tymoshenko. The conclusions of the report indicated: “… From everything observed by military intelligence and according to aviation data, it follows that the enemy is directing all his tank forces and motorized infantry to the southeast, apparently pursuing the goal of overwhelming the 28th and 38th armies of the front holding the defensive line, and thus threatens with the withdrawal of their groupings to the deep rear of the Southwestern and Southern fronts."
Failures in the activities of radio intelligence during the German offensive in the Stalingrad direction forced the GRU radio intelligence department to take additional measures to monitor the interaction of German headquarters by radio. Front radio divisions began to be located at a distance of 40-50 km from the front line, which made it possible to monitor the divisional radio networks of the Germans. Other measures were taken, which made it possible to significantly improve the intelligence activity of the front-line radio intelligence units and organize a better analysis and generalization of the intelligence information they received.
By the beginning of the defensive period of the Battle of Stalingrad, the 394th and 561st radio divisions of the Stalingrad front had already fully opened and began continuous monitoring of the radio communications of Army Group B and the 6th field and 4th tank armies that were part of it. By the beginning of the Soviet counteroffensive, radio intelligence had exposed the grouping of German troops and their allies in front of the Southwestern, Don and Stalingrad fronts. In the course of the counteroffensive, the fronts' radio intelligence provided sufficient coverage of the state and activities of the enemy troops, and revealed the preparation of their counterattacks and the transfer of reserves.
The direct control of radio intelligence in the Battle of Stalingrad was carried out by the chiefs of the radio intelligence departments of the front headquarters N. M. Lazarev, I. A. Zeitlin, as well as the commanders of the radio intelligence units K. M. Gudkov, I. A. Lobyshev, T. F. Lyakh, N. A. Matveev. Two radio divisions OSNAZ (394th and 561st) were awarded the Orders of the Red Banner for the successful conduct of enemy reconnaissance.
In 1942, officers of the decryption service of military intelligence discovered the principle of operation of the German encryption machine "Enigma" and began to read German radio messages encrypted with its help. In the GRU, special mechanisms were designed to speed up the decryption process. The decoded telegrams of the enemy made it possible to establish the deployment of more than 100 headquarters of the German army formations, the numbering of 200 separate battalions, other units and subunits of the Wehrmacht. After the opening of the Abwehr ciphers (German military intelligence and counterintelligence), it became possible to obtain information about the activities of hundreds of German agents in the rear areas of the Red Army. In general, the decryption service of the GRU disclosed in 1942 the main German and Japanese cipher systems for combined arms, police and diplomatic ciphers, 75 ciphers of German intelligence, more than 220 keys to them, more than 50 thousand German cipher telegrams were read.
On November 29, 1942, 14 officers of the GRU GSh KA decryption service were presented to government awards. Colonel F. P. Malyshev, Lieutenant Colonel A. A. Tyumenev and captain A. F. Yatsenko were nominated for the Order of the Red Banner; Major I. I. Ukhanov, military engineers of the 3rd rank M. S. Odnorobov and A. I. Baranov, captain A. I. Shmelev - to be awarded the Order of the Red Star. Other specialists of the military intelligence decryption service were also awarded.
At the end of 1942, the decryption service of the GRU GSh KA was transferred to the NKVD, where a single cryptographic service was formed.
CA MO RF. F. 23. Op. 7567. D.1. LL. 48-49. The mailing list is indicated: “T. Stalin, t. Vasilevsky, t. Antonov"
Special message
Chief of the GRU
Of the General Staff of the Red Army
IN AND. Stalin.
November 29, 1942
Top secret
TO THE PEOPLE'S DEFENSE COMMISSIONER OF THE UNION OF THE SSR
Comrade S T A L I N U
Radio intelligence and decryption service of the Red Army during the Patriotic War achieved great success.
The radio intelligence units provided the decryption services of the Red Army and the NKVD of the USSR with materials for intercepting open and encrypted telegrams from the enemy and neighboring countries.
The direction finding of the German army's radio stations yielded valuable information about the enemy groupings, actions and intentions, and the Japanese army grouping in the Far East was revealed.
The decryption service of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army has uncovered the main German and Japanese cipher systems for combined arms, police and diplomatic ciphers, 75 ciphers of German intelligence, over 220 keys to them, more than 50,000 German cipher telegrams alone were read.
According to the cipher telegrams read, the location of over a hundred headquarters of the German army formations was established, the numbering of two hundred separate battalions and other fascist units was revealed; valuable information has been obtained about the combat effectiveness of our partisans in the territory occupied by the Germans.
Information has been obtained on the activities of anti-Soviet groups, over 100 German agents in the USSR and up to 500 traitors to the Motherland who joined the German intelligence service.
It was also established that the German agents managed to obtain information about two hundred of our units and formations, about the relocation of factories and plants of our industry. All these materials were timely reported to the High Command and the NKVD for action.
The scientific group of the Directorate identified the possibility of decrypting German telegrams, encrypted with the Enigma typewriter, and began to design mechanisms that accelerate the decryption.
Transferring the radio reconnaissance and decryption services to the General Staff of the Red Army and the NKVD organs of the USSR, I ask for your instructions on nominating the best commanders and employees of the 3rd Directorate of the Chief Directorate of the Red Army for the Government awards, who have done a great and valuable work in strengthening the country's defense.
Appendix: List of commanders and employees of the 3rd Department
HEAD OF KA, presented for government awards.
Chief of the Main Intelligence
Red Army Directorate
Divisional Commissioner (Illichiv)
"_" November 1942
In 1942, military intelligence also made mistakes. On the one hand, the Supreme Command Headquarters ignored the information of the GRU General Staff of the Spacecraft about the impending German offensive in the southern direction of the Soviet-German front, which led to the failure of Soviet offensive operations in the Crimea and the Kharkov region. On the other hand, foreign bodies of Soviet military intelligence failed to obtain documentary materials that revealed the plans of the German command for the summer campaign of 1942.
In general, the forces of foreign and operational intelligence of the GRU General Staff of the Spacecraft were able to identify the composition of the German group and the intended nature of its actions.
On July 15, 1942, the information department of the GRU prepared a message "Evaluation of the enemy in front of the front of the USSR", in which the following conclusion was made: "The southern group of armies will strive to reach the river. Don and after a series of operations will pursue the goal of separating our Southwestern Front from the Southern Front, under the cover of the river. Don enter Stalingrad, with the further task of turning to the North Caucasus."
The offensive of the German troops, which began on June 28, forced the Soviet troops to retreat to the Volga and suffer heavy losses. The intelligence departments of the headquarters of the Bryansk, Southwestern and Southern fronts were unable to organize effective reconnaissance and obtain information about the intentions of the German command. The scouts were unable to establish the composition of the enemy's strike groups and the beginning of his offensive.
In the course of a dynamically changing situation, reliable information about the enemy was obtained by military intelligence officers and reconnaissance aviation pilots. Military intelligence officers, senior lieutenant I. M. Poznyak, captains
A. G. Popov, N. F. Yaskov and others.
Military intelligence officer Lieutenant Colonel Poznyak Ivan Mikhailovich, during the Battle of Stalingrad - senior lieutenant
Nevertheless, the Supreme Command Headquarters, which made a mistake in assessing the strategic situation, expressed dissatisfaction with the activities of military intelligence on the eve of the Battle of Stalingrad. Chief of military intelligence, Major General A. P. Panfilov was removed from office on August 25, 1942 and sent to the active army as deputy commander of the 3rd Panzer Army. Perhaps the appointment of Panfilov to the new position was due to the fact that the Polish formations, for the formation of which on the territory of the USSR he was responsible, refused to fight along with the Red Army against the German troops. Subsequently, Panfilov became a Hero of the Soviet Union, and the GRU General Staff of the KA was temporarily headed by the military commissar of the GRU, Lieutenant General I. I. Ilyichev, who began to take urgent measures aimed at increasing the effectiveness of the activities of all military intelligence agencies. It was found that while simultaneously directing the activities of strategic, operational and tactical intelligence, the officers of the Center do not always successfully and efficiently solve the current numerous operational tasks. It was required to study the experience of intelligence activities in 1941-1942, and on its basis to take new measures that were to increase the effectiveness of all activities of the GRU General Staff of the Red Army.
During the Battle of Stalingrad and, especially, at its final stage, military intelligence established the composition and approximate number of enemy troops that were surrounded. In a special message prepared by the Military Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff and reported by V. I. Stalin and A. I. Antonov, it was indicated: “The units of the 4th and 6th German armies under the command of General of the Panzer Troops Paulus are surrounded, as part of the 11th, 8th, 51st and two tank corps, 22 divisions in total, of which - 15, TD - 3, MD - 3, CD - 1. The entire encircled group has: people - 75-80 thousand, field guns - 850, anti-tank guns - 600, tanks - 400.
The composition of the group was revealed quite accurately, but the number of the encircled enemy troops was much larger and amounted to 250-300 thousand people.
In general, at the final stage of the Battle of Stalingrad, foreign and operational intelligence agencies acted quite effectively, providing the Supreme Command Headquarters and front commanders with reliable information about the enemy.
The intelligence departments of the headquarters of the fronts that took part in the Battle of Stalingrad were commanded by Colonel A. I. Kaminsky, since October 1942 Major General A. S. Rogov (Southwestern Front), Major General I. V. Vinogradov (Stalingrad Front) Major General M. A. Kochetkov (Don Front).
During the Battle of Stalingrad, the intelligence departments of the Southern (head of the intelligence department, Major General N. V. Sherstnev), North Caucasian (head of the intelligence department, Colonel V. M. Kapalkin) and Transcaucasian (head of the intelligence department, Colonel A. I.) military districts, as well as intelligence agencies of the Black Sea Fleet (head of the intelligence department, Major General D. B. Namgaladze), Azov (head of the intelligence department, captain 1st rank K. A. Barkhotkin) and the Caspian (head of the intelligence department, Colonel NS Frumkin) flotillas. They provided timely support to the command of the fronts, which took measures to disrupt Operation Edelweiss, during which the German command planned to seize the Caucasus and its oil regions.
Major General Nikolai Sherstnev, Head of the Intelligence Division of the Southern Front Headquarters
Major General Namgaladze Dmitry Bagratovich, head of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the Black Sea Fleet
At the end of 1942, due to the growing need for reliable intelligence information about the enemy, the need to timely take into account the multifaceted development of the situation in Europe, the Far East and Africa, as well as in order to objectively assess the actions of the Anglo-Americans, the Supreme Command Headquarters decided to strengthen the foreign (strategic) agent intelligence of the USSR People's Commissariat of Defense.
In October 1942 g.the next reorganization of the military intelligence system was carried out. On October 25, 1942, the USSR People's Commissar of Defense signed order No. 00232 on the reorganization of the GRU General Staff of the Spacecraft, which provided for the separation of the GRU from the General Staff and the subordination of the strategic intelligence intelligence to the USSR People's Commissar of Defense. The GRU was responsible for organizing foreign intelligence. As part of the GRU spacecraft, three directorates were formed: intelligence intelligence abroad, intelligence intelligence in the territory occupied by German troops, and information.
In accordance with this order, military intelligence, all intelligence departments of the headquarters of the fronts and armies were withdrawn from the subordination of the chief of the GRU.
To direct the activities of military intelligence in the General Staff, the Military Intelligence Directorate was created, which was prohibited from conducting agent intelligence. For this purpose, it was proposed to create operational groups on the fronts, to use the capabilities of the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement to cover their activities.
In practice, however, this reorganization of the military intelligence system did not bring significant improvements in its activities. Front headquarters, due to the lack of intelligence intelligence subordinate to them, could not receive proactive and reliable information about the enemy from sources operating in its operational depth. The command of the GRU spacecraft also failed to ensure that the information received from sources operating in the territories occupied by the enemy was quickly brought to the headquarters of the fronts. These control flaws began to negatively affect the planning and organization of hostilities. Thus, at the end of 1942 there was a need for another reorganization of the military intelligence system.
On the whole, in 1942, Soviet military intelligence fulfilled the tasks assigned to it, acquired multifaceted work experience, unique in its content and courageous solution of complex problems, on which the course and outcome of the grandiose battle that unfolded between the Volga and the Don depended.
The Stalingrad battle of military intelligence is unique in that during this tense period of the Great Patriotic War, the GRU General Staff of the KA, as always, reported reliable information about the enemy to the top political leadership of the USSR and the command of the Red Army, although this information often contradicted the personal assessments of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief.
