On the mountain passes of the North Caucasus. Military scouts of Captain I. Rudnev on a combat mission. Photo from the archive of the "Voeninform" Agency of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation
In the summer of 1942, the situation on the Soviet-German front was characterized by a number of complex strategic and tactical circumstances of a military and military-political nature. The allies of the USSR in the anti-Hitler coalition, the United States and Great Britain, delayed the opening of a second front in Europe. The uncertainty of the situation was aggravated by the preparation of the Turkish and Japanese governments to enter the war against the Soviet Union on the side of Germany. The command of the German armed forces after the failure of Operation Typhoon, whose main goal was to capture Moscow, developed new guidelines for waging war on the eastern front. The essence of these instructions was to demonstrate the threat of a new strike in the Moscow direction, which was supposed to cover the main operations of the German troops on the southern flank of the Soviet-German front. Hitler decided to invade the North Caucasus.
The initial plan of mastering the resources of the North Caucasus was considered by the German command in the summer of 1941 and was concretized in a document called "Operation from the North Caucasus region through the Caucasus ridge and Northwestern Iran in order to master the Ravanduz and Khinagan passes in the Iranian-Iraqi direction." Planning the seizure of the North Caucasus, the German command was preparing not only to take advantage of the rich resources of this region, but also to extend German influence over the entire Transcaucasia and even the Middle East with its oil reserves. However, in 1941, Hitler failed to start implementing the idea of seizing the North Caucasus. The Blitzkrieg failed, and Operation Typhoon, which envisioned the capture of Moscow, also failed.
To radically change the situation on the eastern front, the German command needed new plans that could bring victory in the war against the USSR. Therefore, in the summer of 1942, Hitler ordered the development of a plan to seize the North Caucasus. The Fuehrer believed that in any development of events on the eastern front, the seizure of the North Caucasus would significantly limit the provision of the Red Army with oil products and foodstuffs, and also interrupt the supply of military materials from the United States and Great Britain along the southern route to the USSR, which arrived through the territory of Iran. The reduction in economic opportunities was supposed, as, apparently, in Berlin believed, to deprive the Soviet Union of the prospects for waging wars against Germany.
Planning the seizure of the Caucasus, Hitler wanted to take advantage of the unique opportunity presented to him in the summer of 1942. It consisted in the fact that the United States and Great Britain did not fulfill their obligations to open a second front in Europe, which allowed the German command to concentrate the maximum number of troops on the Soviet-German front and aim them at capturing the Caucasus, after which it was planned to launch a second strike in the Moscow direction.
Following the instructions of the Fuehrer, Hitler's generals in July 1942 completed the development of an operation plan to seize the Caucasus and reported it to Hitler at the Werewolf headquarters near Vinnitsa. On July 23, 1942, the Fuehrer signed Directive No. 45. It stated: “During the campaign, which lasted less than three weeks, the great tasks set by me for the southern wing of the Eastern Front were basically fulfilled. Only a small force of Tymoshenko's armies managed to escape the encirclement and reach the southern bank of the river. Don. It should be considered that they will be strengthened by the troops stationed in the Caucasus."
The directive outlined the immediate tasks of the German troops. In it, in particular, it was indicated that the immediate task of the ground forces of Army Group "A" was to encircle and destroy enemy forces that had gone beyond the Don in the area south and southeast of Rostov. For this, the mobile formations of the ground forces were ordered to advance in the general direction to the south-west, to Tikhoretsk from the bridgeheads, which had to be created in the area of the settlements of Konstantinovskaya and Tsimlyanskaya. The infantry, jaeger and mountain rifle divisions were ordered to cross the Don in the Rostov region, the advanced units were tasked with cutting the Tikhoretsk - Stalingrad railway line …
After the destruction of the Red Army troops south of the Don, the main task of Army Group A was to capture the entire eastern coast of the Black Sea, capture the Black Sea ports and eliminate the Black Sea Fleet.
The second group, in which, by order of Hitler, mountain rifle regiments and jaeger divisions were assembled, were ordered to cross the Kuban and seize the hill on which Maikop and Armavir were located.
Other mobile units of German troops were to seize the Grozny region and, with part of their forces, cut the Ossetian Military and Georgian Military Highways. Then, with an offensive along the coast of the Caspian Sea, German generals planned to capture Baku. The operation of Army Group "A" to capture the Caucasus was codenamed "Edelweiss".
Army Group "B" was tasked with organizing defense along the banks of the Don, advancing on Stalingrad, crushing the forces that were forming there, occupying the city and closing the isthmus between the Volga and the Don. Army Group B's operations were codenamed Fischreicher.
In clause 4 of Hitler's directive of July 23, 1942, it was stated: "When developing plans based on this directive and transferring it to other authorities, as well as when issuing orders and orders related to it, be guided by … the order of July 12 to keep secrets." These instructions meant that the development of all operational documents and the transfer of troops for the capture of the Caucasus had to be carried out by all the staffs involved in conditions of special secrecy.
So, in conditions of increased secrecy, an operation was planned to seize the North Caucasus.
Hitler's directive with a plan for Operation Edelweiss was delivered to the headquarters of Field Marshal V. List, which was stationed in Stalino (now Donetsk, Ukraine), on July 25, 1942.
Don't give the Germans a break …
Extraordinary events took place in Moscow in the spring of 1942. There was still no information about Operation Edelweiss at the Headquarters of the Supreme Command (VGK). But after the elite German divisions were driven back from Moscow, I. V. Stalin and his aides believed that German troops could be driven out of the territory of the Soviet Union and victory achieved in 1942.
On January 10, 1942, Stalin signed a directive letter addressed to the Soviet military leaders. The intentions of the enemy and the tasks of the Red Army troops in that letter were defined as follows: “… After the Red Army had sufficiently exhausted the German fascist troops, it launched a counteroffensive and drove the German invaders westward.
In order to delay our advance, the Germans went over to the defensive and began to build defensive lines with trenches, barriers, and field fortifications. Thus, the Germans expect to delay our offensive until spring, so that in the spring, having mustered their forces, they again go on the offensive against the Red Army. The Germans, therefore, want to gain time and gain a respite.
Our task is not to give the Germans this respite, to drive them to the west without stopping, to force them to use up their reserves even before spring, when we will have large new reserves, and the Germans will have no more reserves, and thus ensure, the complete defeat of the Nazi troops in 1942”.
"Not to give the Germans a break and drive them westward without stopping" was desirable, but practically unrealistic. The war required accurate calculations, reliable intelligence and well-reasoned decisions. Moreover, the Supreme Command Headquarters did not have sufficient reserves at the beginning of 1942, therefore, the Red Army was simply unable to “ensure the complete defeat of Hitler's troops in 1942”. However, no one dared to object to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief.
In the spring of 1942, the General Staff of the Red Army received reports from military intelligence about Hitler's new plans to wage war on the eastern front with particular concern. These reports contradicted Stalin's directives and indicated that Nazi Germany did not intend to defend itself, but, on the contrary, was preparing for a new major offensive.
What were the GRU residents reporting about?
Residents of Soviet military intelligence operating in Ankara, Geneva, London, Stockholm and Tokyo reported to the Center that Hitler was preparing troops for a new major offensive. Residents of the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army reported to the Center on the material and human reserves of Nazi Germany, on the efforts of the German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop, who, following Hitler's instructions, sought to involve Japan and Turkey in the war against the USSR. The appearance of these states on the side of Germany would undoubtedly strengthen the German coalition and could change the situation on the Soviet-German front in favor of Germany. If the Soviet Union had to fight simultaneously on three fronts (in the Far East - against Japan, in the south - against Turkey and on the Soviet-German front - against Germany and its allies), it is difficult to imagine how 1942 would have ended for the Soviet Union.
Residents of Soviet military intelligence in January - March 1942 reported to the Center that the German command was planning to stop the advance of the Red Army and launch a counteroffensive in order to achieve decisive success on the southern flank of the Soviet-German front.
In January - March 1942, the words "southern flank of the Soviet-German front" and "Caucasus" were often encountered in the reports of military intelligence residents. The idea of Hitler's new strategic plan in the war against the USSR in 1942 was gradually revealed by Soviet intelligence officers. It became clear that Hitler, having lost the possibility of capturing Moscow, decided to demonstrate the threat of a new offensive against the Soviet capital, but in fact - to capture Stalingrad, cut off the Red Army from the sources of Caucasian oil, deprive it of food reserves coming from the southern regions of the country along the Volga, and cut off the supply of military aid to the Soviet Union from the United States and Britain through Iranian territory.
Information received from the residents of military intelligence in the Center indicated that Hitler planned to use new weapons and military equipment on the eastern front, apply new methods of warfare, and send military formations staffed by German intelligence from various Soviet prisoners of war to the eastern front. nationalities. Sorting out this stream of numerous intelligence reports was not easy. But the Intelligence Directorate already knew how to extract and process the information obtained in a qualified manner.
Major A. Sizov, a resident of military intelligence, operating in London, at the beginning of 1942 informed the Center that he had received reliable information from a trusted source, according to which “… the plan of the German offensive to the east foresees two directions:
An attack on Leningrad to reinforce Finland and break communication with the White Sea (stopping the supply of military supplies from England and the United States, that is, disrupting military assistance from the allies to the Soviet Union. - V. L.);
An offensive to the Caucasus, where the main effort is foreseen in the direction of Stalingrad and a secondary one to Rostov, and in addition, through the Crimea to Maikop …
The main goal of the offensive is to capture the Volga along its entire length ….
Further, Sizov, who was listed in the Center under the pseudonym "Eduard", reported that, according to the source, the Germans have "… on the eastern front 80 divisions, of which 25 are tank divisions. These divisions did not take part in the winter offensive."
According to an agent who was associated with authoritative circles in Germany, had confidential contacts in the General Staff of the Wehrmacht, the German command planned to launch an offensive on April 10-15.
Another source of military intelligence operating in Sofia reported to the Center on February 11, 1942: “… The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bulgaria reported that the Germans asked Bulgaria to occupy the southeastern part of Yugoslavia, since the Germans did not have enough forces to have garrisons throughout the country … He believes that the Russian offensive will be exhausted by the spring and that the German counteroffensive in the spring will be successful …”.
Soviet military intelligence learned the content of a report from a Bulgarian military attaché accredited in Ankara. The Bulgarian military representative in Ankara reported to Sofia on March 2, 1942:
Germany will begin its offensive on the eastern front against the USSR between April 15 and May 1.
The offensive will not have a lightning-fast character, but will be carried out slowly with the aim of achieving success.
The Turks fear that the Soviet fleet will try to escape through the Bosphorus. The following measures will be taken against this:
As soon as the German offensive begins, the Turks will begin to regroup their forces, concentrating them in the Caucasus and the Black Sea.
From the same moment, the orientation of Turkey's policy towards Germany will begin …"
The report of the military intelligence resident, which arrived at the Center on March 5, 1942, was sent to the members of the State Defense Committee at the direction of the Chief of the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) of the General Staff of the Spacecraft. First of all, I. V. Stalin, V. M. Molotov, L. P. Beria, A. I. Mikoyan, as well as the Chief of the General Staff.
The main thing in the reports of military intelligence in January - March 1942 was the well-founded assertion that Hitler determined the direction of the main blow of the summer campaign of 1942, which would be delivered by German troops on the southern flank of the front and aimed at conquering the Caucasus.
At the beginning of 1942, Soviet military intelligence did not yet have information about the existence of the plan for Operation Edelweiss, but the information that Hitler was planning to strike the main blow in the direction of the Caucasus in the summer of 1942 was confirmed by reports from many sources. These data were supplemented by information from operational intelligence, which began to record an increased concentration of German troops on the southern flank of the Soviet-German front.
In the General Staff, which at that time was commanded by General of the Army A. M. Vasilevsky, they understood that the enemy was not broken, he stabilized the front line, and he seeks to use the period of relative calm in hostilities to replenish the troops with personnel and new military equipment.
Remembering those tense days, General of the Army S. M. Shtemenko wrote: “… I must say that the Soviet strategic leadership, headed by I. V. Stalin was convinced that sooner or later the enemy would again launch a blow on Moscow. This conviction of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief was based not only on the danger that threatened from the Rzhev salient. There were reports from abroad that the Hitlerite command had not yet abandoned its plan to seize our capital. I. V. Stalin allowed various options for the enemy's actions, but believed that in all cases, the goal of the Wehrmacht's operations and the general direction of its offensive would be Moscow … Based on this, it was believed that the fate of the 1942 summer campaign, on which the subsequent course of the war depended, would be decided near Moscow. Consequently, the central - Moscow - direction will become the main one, while other strategic directions will play a secondary role at this stage of the war.
As it turned out later, the forecast of the Headquarters and the General Staff was erroneous …”.
Apparently, the reports of military intelligence in January - March 1942 in the Supreme Command Headquarters and the General Staff were not given due attention, which led to a serious error in forecasting the actions of German troops on the Soviet front in the summer of 1942. It turned out that military intelligence reported information about the enemy, which were not taken into account by the Operations Directorate of the General Staff.
Stalin continued to strengthen Moscow's defenses and prepare his troops for an active strategic defense. The General Staff, taking into account Stalin's recommendations, was preparing for active defensive actions.
Hitler secretly prepared to deliver his main blow in the direction of the Caucasus.
The plans of the Soviet General Staff, which provided for private offensive operations in 1942 near Leningrad, in the Demyansk region, in the Smolensk and Lgov-Kursk directions, in the Kharkov region and in the Crimea, did not bring success in 1942.
What was General Oshima reporting in Tokyo?
In the first half of 1942, military intelligence reported to the General Staff that Germany, preparing to strike in the south, was persistently seeking to expand its coalition and was planning to involve Japan and Turkey in the war against the USSR. However, the Japanese and Turks were in no hurry to support Hitler's plans and expected a more favorable moment.
The military intelligence officer Richard Sorge reported to the Center about the wait-and-see attitude taken by the Japanese government in the second half of 1941. After Sorge was arrested by the Japanese counterintelligence, information about the military-political plans of the Japanese government was reported to the Center by Major General Ivan Sklyarov from London, Captain Lev Sergeev from Washington, and Sandor Rado from Geneva. The information received from these residents reflected the desire of the Japanese leadership to establish itself, first of all, in the vastness of China and Southeast Asia. At the same time, the scouts reported to the Center that if the German troops achieved success on the eastern front, the Japanese could enter the war against the USSR on the side of Germany.
Thanks to reliable information obtained in time by military intelligence, the Soviet leadership reacted with restraint to many obviously provocative actions of Japan, which did not allow the Japanese to find a pretext for entering the war on the side of Germany.
On July 23, Hitler approved Directive No. 45, according to which Army Group B was to swiftly capture Stalingrad and Astrakhan and gain a foothold on the Volga. Soon Rostov-on-Don was captured by German troops. The gates to the Caucasus were open. The Red Army troops continued to retreat to the Volga with battles.
In the implementation of the plan to seize the Caucasus, the Germans were to be assisted by Hungarian, Italian mountain rifle and Romanian troops. Military intelligence residents Colonels A. Yakovlev from Bulgaria and N. Lyakhterov from Turkey, as well as Sandor Rado from Switzerland, reported this to Moscow.
On July 25, 1942, German troops launched an offensive. Having broken through the defenses of the Bryansk and Southwestern Fronts, the 6th Field Army developed an offensive and by mid-July reached the great bend of the Don.
The offensive in the Caucasus developed rapidly. For complete confidence in victory, Hitler apparently needed Japan to start military operations against the USSR in the Far East. To achieve this goal, Hitler instructed the German Foreign Minister I. Ribbentrop in early August to organize a trip of the Japanese ambassador, General Oshima, to the southern flank of the eastern front. The Germans wanted to convince the Japanese that they would achieve victory in 1942, and tried to push Japan to enter the war against the USSR.
Ribbentrop fulfilled Hitler's instructions. General Oshima visited the southern flank of the Soviet-German front, where he could be convinced that German troops had already captured Rostov-on-Don and were rushing to Stalingrad and the Caucasus.
After his trip to the front, Oshima wrote a detailed account of his trip to the front and his impressions. An experienced diplomat and military intelligence officer, Oshima reported in Tokyo that the German troops were well trained and well armed, the armies on the southern flank had high morale, and that officers and soldiers had no doubts about an imminent victory over the Soviet Union. The report, on the whole, corresponded to the actual state of affairs in the troops of the German army, but Oshima did not know what was happening on the other side of the front.
Soviet military intelligence learned about the trip of the Japanese ambassador to the southern flank of the eastern front. Oshima's report was obtained and sent to Tokyo. On the basis of this document, a special message was prepared in the GRU, which was sent to all members of the Headquarters of the Supreme Command. “… According to trustworthy intelligence information,” I. V. Stalin was the head of military intelligence - the Japanese ambassador to Berlin, General Oshima, reported in Tokyo about his visit at the invitation of the German command of the southern sector of the Eastern Front. The trip was made from 1 to 7 August 1942 by plane along the route: Berlin - the main headquarters, Odessa, Nikolaev, Simferopol, Rostov-on-Don, Bataysk, Kiev, Krakow, Berlin ….
Oshima wanted the Japanese government to make a decision and start military action against the USSR in the Far East. However, Japan was biding its time. The Japanese leadership had certain obligations to Hitler, but in 1942 sought to solve their problems in Southeast Asia. The Japanese could enter the war against the USSR only if Germany achieved a major military success on the eastern front. The battle for the Caucasus was just beginning. The main battles were still ahead.
A critical situation arose on the southern flank of the Soviet-German front. The operational and military intelligence of the retreating Soviet troops were not ready to act in such conditions. The military intelligence officers did not think that one day they would have to fight on their own territory, so the intelligence officers in Rostov-on-Don, Taganrog, Salsk and other cities did not have their own residencies. But information about the enemy was required every day, so ordinary soldiers, more often guys and girls from Cossack farms and villages, were sent for the front line, a clear border of which did not exist. The hope was in their resourcefulness, dexterity and knowledge of their native land. Returning to the reconnaissance departments (RO) of the headquarters, the young scouts reported where the enemy was, which town he occupied, and in which direction his tanks were advancing. However, the situation changed rapidly. Also, many intelligence information quickly became outdated. Nevertheless, this information was of significant value, as it helped the commanders to avoid clashes with superior enemy forces.
The battles were stubborn, enemy tanks passed the Don steppes and rushed to the Volga.
The entire world followed the news from the eastern front. The governments of Japan and Turkey showed particular interest in the events in the Stalingrad region.
Military intelligence officer Lev Sergeev, operating in Washington, was able to obtain reliable information that in 1942 the Japanese government did not plan to start military operations against the USSR. Sergeev's report was of exceptional value, but required confirmation. The data confirming Sergeev's message came from the GRU station in Tokyo, led by Lieutenant Colonel K. Sonin, as well as from the chiefs of the intelligence departments of the headquarters of the Far Eastern districts, who continuously monitored the actions of units and subdivisions of the Japanese Kwantung Army stationed in Manchuria. Apparently, the victory of the Red Army in the battle of Moscow somewhat cooled the ardor of the Japanese generals and admirals and made them more soberly assess the situation on the Soviet-German front. General Oshima's appeals were heeded in Tokyo, but the Japanese chose to operate in Southeast Asia. There victories were given to them faster and easier.
In neutral Turkey
The course of hostilities in the vastness of the Rostov Region, Stavropol Territory, in the Stalingrad region and the foothills of the North Caucasus was closely followed by the political leadership of Turkey. The Turks, too, would not mind seizing the Caucasian territories rich in oil and other natural resources. However, Ankara's position depended on many factors: both on the situation on the Soviet-German front, and on the actions of the Anglo-Americans, and on the active work of influential German diplomats accredited in Ankara. In 1942, agents of the German special services also showed great activity in Turkey, who by any means sought to deteriorate Soviet-Turkish relations. The agents of German intelligence in Ankara showed exceptional ingenuity.
The actions of German diplomats in Turkey were led by the German Ambassador to Ankara Franz von Papen, an outstanding personality, a skillful diplomat and an ambitious politician.
Papen's name is associated with many political events that took place in Turkey during the Second World War and were related to the offensive of German troops in the direction of the Caucasus. First, Papen was the main character that Berlin charged to drag Turkey into the war against the USSR. Secondly, Papen was a supporter of Hitler in words, but in reality he was rather a secret, but clever oppositionist. Thirdly, he almost became a victim of a secret war of special services, one of which tried to destroy him in February 1942.
The main task of Ambassador F. Papen in Ankara, as defined by Hitler in 1942, was to involve Turkey in the war against the USSR. The task was difficult. The Turks in those years would like to own most of the Caucasus and rule the Black Sea. But the Turkish government still understood that the smell of Caucasian oil is pleasant to both the Americans and the British, therefore, they would hardly agree to expand Turkey's influence in this region. In addition, the troops of the Soviet Transcaucasian Front, commanded by General of the Army I. V. Tyulenev, were strong enough to reliably cover the Soviet Transcaucasia. The Turks already had the historical experience of the war against Russia and were in no hurry to unleash military actions against the USSR, although they were preparing for this, secretly concentrating large military forces in Eastern Anatolia.
In a word, a secret uncompromising war began in Ankara and Istanbul, where the stations of the American, British, German and Soviet intelligence existed from the very first days of the Great Patriotic War. The first feature of this war was that the intelligence services of the United States, Britain, Germany, the USSR and other states did not recognize alliances and coalitions and acted according to their tasks and plans, trying to pragmatically fulfill what Washington, London, Berlin and Moscow demanded of them. The second feature of the confrontation between the intelligence services in Turkey was that the Turkish counterintelligence service did not interfere with the German intelligence officers, looked after the Americans and the British and with particular zeal followed all the Soviet diplomatic missions, under the cover of which, as the Turks believed, the Russian military intelligence operated.
Colonel Nikolai Lyakhterov was appointed the resident of the Soviet military intelligence in Turkey in October 1941. Prior to his appointment to this position, he was the Soviet military attaché in Budapest. Hungary was one of Germany's allies. Therefore, when Germany treacherously attacked the Soviet Union, Lyakhterov, like other employees of the Soviet official missions, was forced to leave Budapest.
Lyakhterov did not stay in Moscow for long. Soon he found himself in Ankara, where he began organizing the activities of Soviet military intelligence. Lyakhterov's tasks were difficult. The Center would like to receive accurate information from Soviet intelligence officers from Turkey about the actions of German troops in the Balkans, to know about the activities of German intelligence agents in Turkey, about the dynamics of the development of German-Turkish relations, about the attitude of the neutral Turkish leadership to the war of Germany against the USSR, and much more.
The most important among "many other things" was, first of all, the state of the Turkish armed forces, the combat readiness of the army, navy and air force, as well as information about the deployment of the main ground forces of Turkey. The Turkish fleet was closely monitored by the intelligence department of the headquarters of the Black Sea Fleet, commanded by an experienced military intelligence officer, Colonel Dmitry Namgaladze, and the Soviet naval attaché in Ankara, Captain 1st Rank Konstantin Rodionov. Moscow did not rule out that Turkey, under pressure from Nazi Germany, could enter the war on the side of Hitler against the USSR. Lyakhterov and his assistants were in Ankara and Istanbul, where the Soviet consulate was located, to get answers to questions that bothered the Center.
Major General Nikolai Grigorievich Lyakhterov, military attaché in Turkey (1941-1945)
Army General S. M. Shtemenko wrote about this: “… In the middle of 1942, no one could vouch that Turkey would not side with Germany. It was not for nothing that twenty-six Turkish divisions were then concentrated on the border with the Soviet Transcaucasia. The Soviet-Turkish border had to be kept firmly in place, providing it from any surprises with the forces of the 45th Army. In case the Turkish offensive goes through Iran to Baku, the necessary precautions were taken on the Iranian-Turkish border."
Colonel Nikolai Lyakhterov, who had the operational pseudonym "Zif" in the Center, and his assistants made a lot of efforts to solve difficult reconnaissance tasks.
After arriving in Ankara, Lyakhterov was introduced to the Turkish Minister of War, Chief of the General Staff of the Turkish Armed Forces, met with the Chief of Military Intelligence and other high military officials, with whom he began to establish useful contacts.
In the second half of 1941, Lyakhterov's residency sent 120 materials to the Center, many of which were important for a correct understanding of the real goals of the Turkish government's foreign policy.
On January 16, 1942, Lyakhterov was invited by the head of the Turkish military intelligence, Colonel Helmi Orai. During the meeting, he told Lyakhterov that the Minister of War was asking the Soviet General Staff to share the experience of fighting the Germans. Apparently, the Turkish military circles did not rule out that fascist Germany could start military operations against Turkey if its government opposed the expansion of German influence in the Balkan countries. Therefore, the Turkish Minister of War asked the Soviet General Staff to find an opportunity to convey to the Turkish General Staff Soviet assessments of the tactics of the German army, methods of its actions, especially in winter, to report the tactical and technical characteristics of German military equipment: tanks, aircraft, artillery systems, the organization of Wehrmacht units. The Turks also asked to give them, if possible, several German trophies.
The request was unexpected. Nevertheless, Lyakhterov reported to the Center about the "application" of the Turkish Minister of War and asked to "work out a decision on this issue."
According to Lyakhterov, the Turks should have passed on the materials they asked for about the German army, which could help improve Soviet-Turkish relations.
In Moscow, the request of the Turkish Minister of War was considered, and a positive decision was made on it. Military diplomacy is a complex and difficult art. Lyakhterov was an experienced military diplomat. He was well aware that by fulfilling the request of the Turkish Minister of War, he was creating favorable conditions for his subsequent work.
Fulfilling important military-diplomatic duties, Lyakhterov simultaneously supervised the activities of the Soviet military intelligence station in Turkey. On January 19, 1942, he reported to Moscow: “… According to the Zameya source, the Germans in Ankara, through recruited people from the Caucasus, transferred a batch of explosives to Kars. The goal is to organize acts of sabotage on the way of transporting military cargo of the allies through Iran to the USSR. The task has been set - to establish the location of the German sabotage center in Iran, its leaders and composition."
At the beginning of 1942 Lyakhterov reported to the Center that German military intelligence was carrying out active anti-Soviet measures in Ankara and other Turkish cities aimed at undermining the authority of the USSR and deteriorating Soviet-Turkish relations.
Shortly thereafter, events took place in Ankara, which are still remembered by politicians and historians alike. On February 24, 1942, at 10 o'clock in the morning, an improvised explosive device detonated in the hands of an unknown young man on Ataturk Boulevard in Ankara in the place where the German ambassador Papen and his wife were walking. It was only 17 meters from the explosion site to the German ambassador. Papen received minor injuries. The wife of the German ambassador was not hurt.
The Turkish police surrounded the explosion site, detained all the suspicious, among whom were an employee of the USSR trade mission Leonid Kornilov and the Soviet vice-consul in Istanbul Georgy Pavlov. They were interrogated, and a day later they were arrested and accused of preparing an attempt on the life of the German ambassador.
The Turkish government, which in 1942 was still hiding behind its neutrality and feared an attack by Germany, attached particular importance to the attempt on Papen's life. The Turks did not want to fight against fascist Germany, which had conquered almost all of Europe. The Soviet attack on Turkey in 1942 was from the realm of fantasy. Therefore, the Turks, having arrested the Soviet subjects Pavlov and Kornilov, soon brought them to justice, not paying attention to the protests from the Soviet embassy. The trial took place on April 1, 1942. The accused did not admit their involvement in the assassination attempt on the German ambassador. Nevertheless, the court found Pavlov and Kornilov guilty and sentenced each to 20 years in prison.
Both the "assassination attempt" and the related trial in Ankara were turned into a noisy anti-Soviet propaganda campaign. The Turks undoubtedly wanted to show Hitler that they strictly adhere to the declared neutrality and also strictly punish those who prevent them from doing so.
The assassination attempt on Papen is an incident that still attracts attention to this day. This interest can also be explained by the fact that the world is increasingly faced with more sophisticated and larger-scale terrorist acts. Perhaps the attempt on Papen's life is also attractive because there are many questions left in this case, which have not been and still are not answered.
The main version of the explosion on Ataturk Boulevard is the assertion that it was a failed operation by NKVD agents who, on Stalin's instructions, wanted to eliminate Papen. According to this version, the operation to destroy Papen was developed and prepared by a group led by an experienced NKVD scout Naum Eitington.
The explosion on Ataturk Boulevard, which occurred in 1942, caused a lot of noise in the Turkish capital, spoiled Soviet-Turkish relations, significantly complicated the situation in Ankara, Istanbul and other cities, and intensified the activities of pro-fascist organizations and groups in Turkey. If these are the results that Eitington and his leaders wanted to achieve by preparing the "assassination attempt on Papen," then, one might say, they achieved their goal. After the explosion on Ataturk Boulevard, Turkey became closer to Nazi Germany, increased the grouping of its troops in Eastern Anatolia, which was a serious threat to the security of the USSR in this area.
However, it can hardly be assumed that the NKVD intelligence leadership did not understand that the attempt on Papen's life would lead to a sharp deterioration in Soviet-Turkish relations.
In this regard, the questions - was there an attempt on Papen's life, and who was responsible for organizing this act? - remain open.
I dare to offer another version based on declassified military intelligence documents.
The assassination attempt on Papen in February 1942 could have been a special operation prepared by one of the special services of the country that would benefit most from the removal of the German ambassador in a neutral country. If the Americans and the British did not need it, then the secret services of the USSR and Germany could have organized the assassination attempt. For the Soviet leadership, the destruction of Papen, Hitler's enemy, was unthinkable, because such an action would inevitably lead to a deterioration in Soviet-Turkish relations. In Moscow in 1942, they feared any action that could aggravate the USSR's relations with both Japan and Turkey. Therefore, Stalin would never have sanctioned an operation that would bring Turkey closer to Germany, which could lead to the creation of a new front in Transcaucasia or to the transfer of German troops through Turkey to the southern borders of the USSR.
In this case, it remains to assume that the assassination attempt on Papen was a skillful staging, prepared and deftly executed by German intelligence officers. If Papen had died in the course of this rehearsal, Hitler would have lost little. But the Berlin conspirators, it seems, did not intend to destroy Papen. Scare - yes. And most importantly, they undoubtedly wanted to assign all responsibility for this act to Soviet intelligence. The German intelligence officers who were preparing this action could not have foreseen that Soviet subjects would find themselves in the zone of its conduct. And when it happened by accident, this fact was used 100% to substantiate the version of the involvement of Soviet intelligence in the assassination attempt on the German ambassador.
This conclusion is confirmed by the report of Sandor Rado from Switzerland. He was much closer to Berlin, where many provocative plans were being developed. To achieve his goals, Hitler could sacrifice not only Papen. In Berlin, in circles close to Hitler, Sandor Rado had reliable sources.
What did Sandor Rado manage to find out about the attempt on Papen's life? On May 6, 1942, Rado reported to the Center: “… The assassination attempt on Papen in Ankara, according to the Swiss embassy in Berlin, was organized by Himmler with the help of the SS representative in Belgrade Grosbera, who is the head of the police guard in Serbia. He contacted the Yugoslav group to organize this act. The bomb was made in Belgrade, and it was stamped with Russian stamps."
The service car of the German military attaché General Hans Rode, the head of German military intelligence in Turkey, was located 100 meters from the place of the attempt on Papen's life. Probably General Rode was watching what was to happen on Ataturk Boulevard. When everything ended with the death of the terrorist himself, the general offered Papen help and brought the frightened head of the German diplomatic mission to the embassy.
The explosion on Ataturk Boulevard and the anti-Soviet campaign that erupted after that turned the Turkish public and Turkish inhabitants against the USSR. No one paid attention to the fact that the man who was supposed to "destroy" Papen was blown up by a mine that was in his hands and went off much earlier than it should have happened. The Bulgarian terrorist, as the Turkish police admitted, was killed. For the Turks, the culprit was killed, for the organizers of the assassination attempt, the main witness of the action was killed. The Moor did his job …
The time for the assassination attempt on Papen was chosen precisely - the German command was preparing to implement the plan for Operation Edelweiss. If Papen had died, Hitler would have gotten rid of his political rival. But Papen did not die. After World War II and the Nuremberg trials, at which he was convicted as a war criminal, Papen noted in his memoirs that the terrorist attack in February 1942 in Ankara was prepared by the Gestapo or the British. He did not say a word about Soviet intelligence officers.
It was extremely difficult for Soviet intelligence officers to operate during the war years in neutral Turkey. After the propaganda whirlwinds around the incident on Ataturk Boulevard subsided, an emergency occurred in the station headed by Colonel N. Lyakhterov - the station officer Izmail Akhmedov (Nikolaev) asked the Turks for asylum. Attempts by the staff of the Soviet embassy to return the fugitive ended in vain. The Turks did not extradite Akhmedov. And he betrayed to the Turks his former intelligence comrades, who were forced to leave Turkey.
Despite the difficulties, the GRU station in Turkey continued to operate. In 1942-1943, that is, during the battle for the Caucasus, Lyakhterov constantly received materials from Lyakhterov, which revealed the composition, grouping, numbering and deployment of units of the Turkish army. The Center received reports on the political situation in Turkey, Turkish-German contacts, the situation in the Balkans.
In the summer of 1942, when the situation on the Soviet-German front was particularly unfavorable for the Red Army, the number of supporters of the war against the Bolsheviks grew among the ruling elite of Ankara. The Turkish government, which at that time was pursuing a policy hostile to the USSR, concentrated 26 of its divisions on the border with the Soviet Union. Colonel N. Lyakhterov timely reported to the Center about the concentration of Turkish troops in this area. Taking this into account, in the most intense period of the battle for the Caucasus with the German fascist troops, the Headquarters of the Supreme Command was forced to keep large forces on the Caucasian border with Turkey.
Soviet military intelligence officers operating in Turkey were closest of all to those Turkish government agencies, behind the walls of which the secret plans of the Turkish leadership in relation to the USSR were formed. These institutions and their secrets were closely guarded. However, thanks to the skillfully organized activities of military intelligence officers and their sources, many important secrets of the Turkish generals became known in Moscow.
In 1943 Colonel Makar Mitrofanovich Volosyuk (pseudonym "Doksan") arrived in Ankara. The center sent him to Turkey as a deputy resident of military intelligence. Volosyuk worked successfully. He managed to recruit a cipher officer at the embassy of one of the countries of the bloc of fascist states, who agreed to sell ciphers and secret mail of his military attaché. This agent at the Center was given the pseudonym "Karl". In 1943-1944, a significant amount of classified material was received from "Karl", many of which were of undoubted interest for Soviet military intelligence.
After some time, Volosyuk managed to recruit another agent who had access to important military and military-political information. During the battle for the Caucasus and, especially at the final stage of the Great Patriotic War, valuable materials came from this agent to the Center. Only in 1944 from the sources of the residency, which was led by Colonel N. G. Lyakhterov, the Center received 586 information materials and messages. The most valuable materials came from illegal intelligence groups Dilen and Dogu, as well as sources Balyk, Dammar, Dishat and Dervish. They had their informants in the German Embassy, the Office of the German Defense Attaché, the Turkish War Ministry, the Turkish General Staff and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Colonel Makar Mitrofanovich Volosyuk, Assistant Air Force Attaché in Turkey (1943-1946)
Lyakhterov and his associates also reported to the Center that the United States and Britain are pursuing their own policy towards Turkey, which is inconsistent with the general tasks of the war of the allied states against Nazi Germany and its satellites. Judging by the data that Lyakhterov sent to the Center, Churchill hoped to use Turkey to implement his plans in the Balkans. The Americans and the British supplied Turkey with weapons, despite the fact that she could enter the war against the USSR.
Around the "Iranian corridor"
Colonel N. Lyakhterov often sent information to the Center that German agents were preparing to carry out sabotage actions on the routes of delivery of military cargo of the Allies through Iran to the USSR. This information caused concern in the Center - an important channel through which the military-technical assistance of the allies came could be under threat. Lyakhterov's station and his agents failed to establish the exact location of the German sabotage center and identify its employees, but, nevertheless, a warning from Ankara was sent to the leadership of the NKVD, as well as to the head of the GRU station in Tehran, who was supposed to prevent acts of sabotage by German agents on his own. on the routes of military cargoes through the territory of Iran.
Moscow knew that the Nazis, with the help of Reza Shah, had turned Iran into an anti-Soviet bridgehead. The military intelligence stations operating on the territory of Iran, as well as the heads of the intelligence departments of the headquarters of the Central Asian and Transcaucasian military districts, reported to the Center that German agents formed sabotage groups and created weapons depots in the areas bordering the USSR.
After the attack of Nazi Germany on the USSR, these groups of German agents intensified their activities and began to carry out acts of sabotage in the Soviet border areas. The Soviet government has repeatedly warned the Iranian leadership about the danger of such activities of German agents, both for the USSR and for Iran itself. In August 1941, acting on the basis of Article VI of the Soviet-Persian treaty of 1921, the USSR sent its troops into the northern regions of Iran. Soviet troops, which included the formations of the Transcaucasian Front and the Central Asian Military District, as well as the forces of the Caspian Flotilla, entered Iran. Perhaps the Iranian government was not happy with this action, but the introduction of troops was in accordance with the treaty, which was signed in Moscow on February 26, 1921 by authorized representatives of the RSFSR and Persia.
The Soviet Union never sought to establish its influence in Iran and did not try to take advantage of Iranian natural resources. Good-neighborly relations with Iran have always been an important condition for relations between Moscow and Tehran.
Despite the fact that the introduction of Soviet troops into Iranian territory was carried out in accordance with the treaty, the appearance of Soviet troops on Iranian territory was met with ambiguity by the Iranians. In some areas, spontaneous protest rallies arose, which were reported to the Center by a military intelligence resident. The reports that the Center received on the situation in Iran were scanty, poorly reasoned and did not allow to fully understand the position of the Iranian leadership, as well as to determine the prospects for the development of the situation in this region, which is important for the security of the USSR. It became clear at the Center that in connection with the new circumstances, it is necessary to send a more experienced resident to Iran, who is well acquainted with the situation in the country and the main political forces operating in it.
The choice fell on Colonel Boris Grigorievich Razin. This officer was relatively young, energetic, completed special courses at the Intelligence Directorate, worked as an assistant to the head of the border reconnaissance point in Central Asia, in 1937 graduated from the Military Academy of the Red Army and served as head of the intelligence department of the Central Asian military district. In July 1942, Boris Grigorievich was appointed a Soviet military attaché to Iran and headed the activities of the Soviet intelligence station in that country. From the very first days of his stay in Tehran, he had to establish interaction with the British, who had already settled in Iran.
The British supported the introduction of Soviet troops into the northern regions of Iran. At the direction of Churchill, British troops were sent into the southern regions of this country. The British, naturally, defended their interests in Iran, in particular, the oil fields, which could be destroyed by German saboteurs. One way or another, the introduction of Soviet and British troops into Iran was carried out, and on January 29, 1942, an agreement was signed in Tehran between the USSR, Great Britain and Iran, which formalized the order and terms of the stay of Soviet and British troops in Iran, provided for cooperation between Iran, USSR and Great Britain and the use of Iranian communications for the purpose of waging a war against Nazi Germany.
At the end of 1942, the American construction troops arrived to the aid of the British, the number of which by the end of the war amounted to 35 thousand people. In 1943, they assumed full responsibility for the transport of goods through the territory of Iran, which was initially controlled by the British. While the British reconstructed the port of Bender Shah, where the Tehran railway began, the Americans practically rebuilt the port of Khorramshaherr with seven berths, overpasses and access roads, platforms and warehouses. Then they quickly connected the port with a 180-kilometer railway with the main transport artery of Iran.
At the same time, a large amount of work was carried out by Soviet builders. They have reconstructed the Caspian ports.
Apparently, the Americans found support in the Iranian leadership, since relatively quickly they managed to introduce their advisers to the Iranian army, gendarmerie, police and a number of important ministries.
Colonel B. Razin regularly sent reports to the Center about the expansion of American influence in Iran. The British did the same. Both those and others created favorable conditions for their activities in Iran after the end of the war. Iranian oil wealth could be expensive for both.
On the basis of Colonel Razin's reports, GRU analysts made the following conclusion: “… The British are trying to create a pro-British government in Iran and, behind its back, to provide conditions for turning Iran into a springboard for future military operations in the Near and Middle East, as well as for limiting the influence of the USSR in this region ….
Despite the fact that the interests of the USSR, the United States and Great Britain in Iran did not coincide, the allies were solving common immediate tasks in a completely coordinated manner. This contributed to their effective struggle to counter the German agents in Iran. The common thing in the activities of the Soviet, British and American generals who commanded the troops of their countries in Iran was to ensure the safe transit of military cargo. They coped with this task quite well.
In 1942, the military intelligence command sent a group of military intelligence officers to Iran under the cover of Iransovtrans, the organization responsible for transporting military supplies through Iran. It consisted of nine military intelligence officers. Major General Leonid Zorin was appointed head of the group. The group received the operational pseudonym "Augereau" at the Center and was supposed to conduct intelligence against German agents, as well as collect information about the expanding influence of the British and Americans in Iran. The Augereau group completed its tasks and was disbanded at the end of 1944.
Colonel B. Razin was able to organize the work of his station in such a way that its valuable sources "Grigory", "Hercules", "Tanya", "Iran", "Qom" and others were able to obtain important information that ensured the safety of transportation of military cargo, reflected political fluctuations in Iranian society, revealed the main goals of the Iranian military leadership's ties with the Americans and the British.
To fight against German agents and ensure the safety of transportation of military cargo through the northern part of Iran, the intelligence departments of the headquarters of the Central Asian Military District and the Transcaucasian Front in 1942-1944. 30 well-trained military intelligence officers were brought to Iran to work against German agents.
The station "Zhores", headed by Colonel B. Razin, was successfully obtaining intelligence information, and the peripheral stations created by the Center on the territory of Iran were also active. The Center received important information from the illegal stations Zangul, Demavend and Sultan. The source "Zarif" worked perfectly.
On the basis of information received by the Center from military intelligence officers from Iran, the Center prepared 10 special messages sent to members of the Supreme Command Headquarters, created new guides on the Iranian armed forces, prepared many other valuable information materials.
The Tehran station of Colonel B. Razin had valuable sources in the Iranian Ministry of War, the General Staff and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Thanks to the efforts of the Tehran, Mashhad and Kermanshah residencies of the GRU, military intelligence in 1942-1943. the task of obtaining important military-political and military intelligence has been fully completed.
In 1943 Iran formally declared war on Germany. The activities of all German representations in Iran were terminated.
In the valleys and high in the mountains
At the beginning of 1943, another reorganization was carried out in the system of the Main Intelligence Directorate. At the urgent request of a number of front commanders in April 1943 I. V. Stalin signed an order, according to which, along with the Main Intelligence Directorate, the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff was created. The main goals of the new directorate consisted in "… leadership of the military and agent intelligence of the fronts, regular information about the actions and intentions of the enemy and the conduct of enemy misinformation."
According to the directive of the Supreme Command Headquarters of April 3, 1943, the military intelligence was assigned broad tasks to obtain information about the enemy. In particular, to constantly monitor all changes in the grouping of enemy forces, to determine in a timely manner the directions in which he is carrying out a covert concentration of troops, and especially tank units, to obtain information about the state of the military industry of Germany and its satellites, to prevent the appearance of new ones on the Soviet-German front. types of weapons in the enemy troops …
Created in April 1943, the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army was headed by Lieutenant General F. F. Kuznetsov. The Intelligence Directorate directed the actions of the intelligence departments of the North Caucasian and Transcaucasian fronts, coordinated the interaction of the intelligence department of the North Caucasian Front with the intelligence of the Black Sea Fleet.
On the territory of the North Caucasus, temporarily occupied by the enemy, the scouts of the military intelligence were actively operating. They carried out many daring operations behind enemy lines. In the battles for the Caucasus, scout platoon commander Lieutenant S. Valiev distinguished himself, his subordinate Private M. Burdzhenadze, private reconnaissance company of the 74th rifle division of the 12th Army T. Koshkinbaev, commander of the sabotage detachment of the 56th army Senior Lieutenant F. Shtul, scout 395 1st Infantry Division Senior Lieutenant V. Ponomarev, private reconnaissance company of the 395th rifle division of the 56th army S. Medvedev and many others. They carried out operations in the course of which they obtained valuable information about the enemy, captured German officers, blew up bridges over mountain rivers, destroyed enemy command posts, its communication centers, warehouses and military equipment.
Scout platoon commander, Lieutenant Sirojetdin Valiev
Private of the reconnaissance company of the 74th rifle division of the 12th army Tulegen Koshkinbaev
In the battles for the Caucasus, the military intelligence officer, Captain D. S. Kalinin. He successfully commanded a reconnaissance group operating behind enemy lines, destroyed the command post, several enemy vehicles.
Scout of the 395th Division of the 56th Army Senior Lieutenant Vasily Danilovich Ponomarev
Other military intelligence officers were also active. They underwent special mountaineering training, acquired the skills of action in the mountains at the school of military mountaineering under the guidance of famous climbers, masters of sports B. V. Grachev and instructors L. M. Maleinova, E. V. Abalakova, A. I. Sidorenko, P. I. Sukhov and others.
Acting in small groups, military scouts penetrated the rear of the German troops, created panic in the enemy's defense, and paved the way for the entry of strike forces in the main directions.
On one of the passes of the North Caucasus. A resident of the front-line village Osman Akhriev points out to military intelligence officers G. P. Naydenov and A. M. Kaviladze road to the mountain path. October 29, 1942 Photo by M. Redkin
By order of the commander of the 56th Army, Lieutenant General A. A. Grechko, a large reconnaissance and sabotage detachment was formed for operations behind enemy lines, which was headed by Lieutenant Colonel S. I. Perminov.
As part of the detachment, there were fighter-sabotage groups, brought together in motor reconnaissance numbering more than 300 scouts, the 75th battalion of anti-tank rifles and a platoon of sappers. In total, the detachment consisted of 480 people. Perminov's detachment successfully operated behind enemy lines, inflicting significant losses on him in manpower and military equipment.
Colonel Stepan Ivanovich Perminov. During the Great Patriotic War, Deputy Chief of Intelligence of the 56th Army of the North Caucasian Front, Honorary Citizen of the city of Abinsk, Krasnodar Territory
Military scouts in the Caucasus mountains
During the battle for the Caucasus, radio intelligence also distinguished itself. The radio divisions of the North Caucasian Front were able to correctly establish a grouping of enemy forces on the Taman Peninsula, provided timely information on the movements of the headquarters of enemy formations and their actions (in particular, on the actions of the 44th and 5th Army, 49th Mountain Rifle and 3rd Tank corps), opened up the reinforcement of the enemy grouping in order to eliminate the bridgehead on Malaya Zemlya in the Novorossiysk region. In addition, the radio intelligence of this front continuously monitored the basing of enemy aircraft in the Crimea and its rear areas.
Fleet reconnaissance acted decisively
Interaction between the Red Army and the Black Sea Fleet acquired an important role in the battle for the Caucasus. By this time, the fleet, as a result of fierce battles, suffered significant losses in ships, and the very existence of the Black Sea Fleet largely depended on the Red Army's retention of the Caucasian coast: in early August 1942, the enemy reached Krasnodar, and there was a threat of a breakthrough near Novorossiysk and in the Tuapse direction. … With the capture of Anapa, the situation near Novorossiysk became even more complicated, and the possibilities for basing the ships of the fleet were reduced to a minimum - only a few poorly adapted Georgian ports remained.
To support the combat activities of the Black Sea Fleet and the interacting formations of the Red Army, as well as to maintain the operational regime in the Black Sea theater of operations (theater of operations), the fleet headquarters actively conducted operational reconnaissance throughout the theater of operations.
A characteristic feature of the activities of the Black Sea Fleet intelligence was that it had to solve tasks not only in the interests of the fleet, but also, to a greater extent, in the interests of the army command, as a result of which not only the enemy's naval forces, but also its ground forces, became the main objects of reconnaissance. aviation. This circumstance forced the naval intelligence officers to study new reconnaissance objects, new methods of obtaining intelligence information about the enemy. This was especially true of radio intelligence officers, who in the pre-war years did not prepare at all to conduct reconnaissance of the ground forces and did not know the communication systems of the ground enemy.
The organization of intelligence operations was led by the head of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the Black Sea Fleet, Colonel D. B. Namgaladze. The deputy chief of the RO of the fleet headquarters was Captain 2nd Rank S. I. Ivanov, the radio intelligence units of the fleet were commanded by Lieutenant Colonels I. B. Aizinov, I. Ya. Lavrischev and S. D. Kurlyandsky. The organization of military intelligence was carried out by Captain S. L. Ermash.
To carry out the tasks of operational intelligence, radio intelligence of the Caspian Flotilla, reconnaissance and partially combat aviation, reconnaissance detachments (groups) of the fleet headquarters, the Azov flotilla and the Novorossiysk naval base, submarines, surface ships at sea, as well as parts of coastal defense and surveillance services and communications of the fleet.
Significant contributions to the solution of enemy reconnaissance tasks during the battle for the Caucasus and, especially, during the preparation of the Novorossiysk landing operation, were made by radio reconnaissance, reconnaissance aircraft and reconnaissance groups, as well as units and subunits of radio reconnaissance of the fleet and the Caspian flotilla.
During the battle for the Caucasus, the 3rd coastal radio detachment of the Black Sea Fleet was actively involved in radio intelligence of the enemy. The objects of radio intelligence were the Air Force and the naval forces of Germany, Romania, Turkey, as well as some enemy army units.
In the summer of 1942, during the period of intense hostilities in the North Caucasus, radio intelligence of the Black Sea Fleet reported to the command that the enemy fleet had received significant reinforcements: torpedo boats, minesweepers, large self-propelled artillery barges, six submarines and small vessels of various types. The composition and number of Romanian units operating against the Don Front were clarified. The radio reconnaissance officers timely reported to the command of the fleet about the creation of operational groups of the Romanian headquarters in Rostov, the transfer of mountain rifle units near Novorossiysk and Nalchik, as well as other important information about the enemy.
During the days of the Battle of Stalingrad, the radio direction-finding point of the radio detachment, commanded by senior lieutenant B. G. Suslovich, was in the Stalingrad region, obtaining valuable information about the enemy, which was transferred to the headquarters of the arrow division of General A. I. Rodimtseva. In 1942-1943. this radio direction-finding point changed its location 10 times.
The radio intelligence officers of the Black Sea Fleet carried out a great deal of work to monitor the actions of enemy reconnaissance aircraft. They established that reconnaissance aviation was operating on the Southern Front, consisting of nine groups of Ju-88 and He-111 aircraft, which were based at airfields in Mariupol, Saki and Nikolaev. Other enemy airfields were also uncovered, behind which constant radio surveillance was established and carried out.
One of the most important tasks of the detachment was the timely opening of the network of radar stations (radar) of the enemy, who widely used radar in the Black Sea. Two radar networks in the Crimea were identified, which included 11 radar stations, which were taken into account by the forces of the Black Sea Fleet and aviation during the course of combat operations. Enemy radar networks on Romanian territory were also identified.
During the battle for the Caucasus, radio intelligence of the Black Sea Fleet played a significant role. Throughout the entire period, the operations of the fleet and ground forces were planned taking into account the information that was obtained by the radio intelligence forces of the Black Sea Fleet.
In general, during the battle for the Caucasus, the 3rd coastal radio unit of the Black Sea Fleet transmitted to the headquarters of the fleet:
2 thousand reports on the activities and deployment of enemy surface ships and submarines;
more than 2 thousand reports on the activities of all types of German and Romanian aviation;
more than 3 thousand reports on the detection of ships of the Black Sea Fleet by the enemy's radio-technical reconnaissance forces;
more than 100 reports on the activities of army units and formations of the enemy
During the battle for the Caucasus, the coastal detachment was skillfully commanded by Captain I. E. Markitanov. Radio intelligence officers B. Suslovich, V. Rakshenko, V. Sizov, I. Grafov, I. Lichtenstein, V. Storozhenko, S. Mayorov, V. Zaitsev, M. Gilman and others demonstrated their high professional skills.
In the battles for the Caucasus, radio intelligence officers of the coastal radio unit of the Caspian Flotilla, commanded by Lieutenant-Commander P. Ivchenko, also distinguished themselves.
During the battle for the Caucasus, scouts - sailors of the Black Sea Fleet - acted courageously. One of them - Warrant Officer F. Volonchuk took part in the defense of Sevastopol, carried out combat missions in the central part of the Main Caucasian ridge, acted behind enemy lines in the Crimea, on the Kerch and Taman peninsulas. The scouts under the command of midshipman Volonchuk defeated the police department in the Nazi-occupied Yevpatoria, carried out a number of sabotage acts in the enemy rear on the Yalta highway, and captured German soldiers at the Umpirsky pass of the Main Caucasian ridge.
Assessing the contribution of military intelligence officers to the liberation of the North Caucasus from German invaders, the head of the GRU General Staff of the RF Armed Forces, Hero of Russia, General of the Army V. V. Korabelnikov wrote: “In the numerous and diverse in form of battles, which became integral components of the difficult battle for the Caucasus, military intelligence officers - officers of the intelligence departments of the headquarters of several fronts - the North Caucasian, Southern and Transcaucasian, as well as the headquarters of the Black Sea Fleet, Azov and the Caspian flotillas, brave frontline intelligence fighters. Important information about the long-term plans of the German command for the conduct of the war on the Soviet-German front in 1942-1943. were also mined by military intelligence officers who operated in the capitals of a number of European states, in Iran, Iraq and Turkey. They were able to timely reveal the general concept of the action plan of the German command in the North Caucasus, identify the forces and means that were allocated by Hitler and his generals to seize the Caucasian oil-bearing regions, obtain information that made it possible to prevent Turkey from entering the war against the USSR on the side of Germany, as well as to ensure safe deliveries in 1942-1943 of material assistance to the USSR from the USA and England."
During the battle for the Caucasus, aerial reconnaissance of the Black Sea Fleet obtained valuable information about the enemy. In April - June 1943 alone, aerial reconnaissance of the Black Sea Fleet discovered 232 enemy convoys, in which 1421 ships were noted.
During the battle for the Caucasus, strategic, operational, military and naval intelligence officers showed courage and heroism, high professional skill, reasonable initiative and perseverance. Operating in the mountains, they turned out to be stronger and more successful than specially trained German and Italian alpine riflemen and reconnaissance and sabotage detachments of German intelligence. Over the course of a year and a half of the battle for the Caucasus, military intelligence officers obtained valuable information about the enemy and thereby contributed to the disruption of Operation Edelweiss, developed by the German command and providing for the capture of the North Caucasus. Many military intelligence officers were awarded orders and medals for the feats performed in the performance of command assignments. The high rank of Hero of the Soviet Union was awarded to military intelligence officers G. I. Vyglazov, N. A. Zemtsov, D. S. Kalinin.
Colonel V. M. Kapalkin (head of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the North Caucasian Front in May - September 1942), Colonel N. M. Trusov (head of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the North Caucasian Front in January - December 1943), A. F. Vasiliev (head of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the Southern Front), N. V. Sherstnev (head of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the southern front in April - September 1942), P. N. Vavilov (head of the reconnaissance department of the Transcaucasian Front), D. B. Namgaladze (head of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the Black Sea Fleet).
Lieutenant General Alexander Filippovich Vasiliev, head of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the Southern Front
Major General Dmitry Bagratovich Namgaladze, head of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the Black Sea Fleet
By joint efforts they thwarted "Edelweiss"
The last stage of the battle for the Caucasus ended on October 9, 1943. On this day, the Taman Peninsula was liberated. The operation of the German command, which had the code name "Edelweiss", was thwarted and ended in complete failure.
During the battle for the Caucasus, representatives of all types of military and naval intelligence distinguished themselves. Important information about the enemy's plans was obtained by military intelligence officers of foreign (strategic) intelligence Shandor Rado, N. G. Lyakhterov, B. G. Razin, M. M. Volosyuk and others.
Military intelligence officers acted boldly and proactively in the mountains and valleys of the Caucasus. Summing up the results of the battle for the Caucasus, Marshal of the Soviet Union A. A. Grechko wrote after the war: “… The hostilities in the Caucasus confirmed the importance of creating specially trained and armed detachments for operations in the highland zone. Therefore, in the course of battles in mountainous and wooded areas, serious attention was paid to the bold and daring actions of small units. An important role was played by small sabotage and extermination detachments, which were sent to the rear of the enemy ….
The preparation of personnel for operations behind enemy lines was led by experienced military intelligence officers, who, together with these groups, often visited the enemy's rear. One of these brave commanders was the military intelligence officer, the commander of the reconnaissance company of the division of the 56th Army of the North Caucasus Front, Lieutenant Colonel Stepan Ivanovich Perminov. After the end of the Great Patriotic War, the military intelligence officer S. I. Perminov became an Honorary Citizen of the city of Abinsk, Krasnodar Territory.
During the battle for the Caucasus, scouts - sailors of the Black Sea Fleet - fought bravely. One of them is midshipman F. F. Volonchuk. Together with his comrades, Volonchuk took part in the defense of Sevastopol, carried out combat missions behind enemy lines in the Crimea, on the Kerch Peninsula, Taman, in the central part of the Main Caucasian ridge.
One of the companions-in-arms of midshipman Volonchuk, midshipman Nikolai Andreevich Zemtsov, in 1943 for the courage and heroism shown during the performance of the mission in the rear of the enemy, was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.
The title of Hero of the Soviet Union was also awarded to the military intelligence officer, Captain Dmitry Semenovich Kalinin, who died in April 1943 while carrying out a mission behind enemy lines.
Colonel Khadzhi-Umar Dzhiorovich Mamsurov also fought bravely for the freedom of the Caucasus in 1942-1943. Chief of the Operations Department and Assistant Chief of the Central Staff of the Partisan Movement. In 1945, Kh. Mamsurov was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. In 1957-1968. Colonel-General Khadzhi-Umar Dzhiorovich Mamsurov was the deputy chief of the Main Intelligence Directorate.
Hero of the Soviet Union Warrant Officer Nikolai Andreevich Zemtsov
The last stage of the battle for the Caucasus was completed on October 9, 1943. The commander of the North Caucasian Front, Colonel-General I. Ye. Petrov issued an order, which said: “… Today, on October 9, 1943, the troops of the 56th Army with a swift attack broke the last resistance of the enemy and at 7.00 in the morning they reached the shore of the Kerch Strait. The scattered remnants of the enemy were cut off from the crossing and exterminated. The Kuban and Taman Peninsula were completely cleared of the enemy. The last stage of the battle for the Caucasus, which began in the fall of 1943 on the Terek, near Novorossiysk, Tuapse, on the passes of the Main Caucasian ridge, is over. The gates to the Caucasus are tightly closed for the enemies of our Motherland ….
One of the veterans of military intelligence, retired Colonel Pavel Ivanovich Sukhov, with whom I am well acquainted, talking about my participation in the Battle of the Caucasus, once said:
- It was difficult to knock the Germans out of the Caucasus, but we did it and with our joint efforts tore down the Edelweiss …
By joint efforts, it means by the efforts of all those soldiers, officers and generals who fought near Maykop, in Novorossiysk, Tuapse, on the outskirts of Rostov-on-Don, at Malgobek, Grozny and Ordzhonikidze (now Vladikavkaz).
Russia has always been the guarantor of peace and tranquility in the Caucasus. During the battle for the Caucasus, the Red Army, in whose ranks the best representatives of all Caucasian peoples fought, interacting with the Black Sea Fleet and partisan detachments, defended this ancient, beautiful and rich land from the devastation that inevitably threatened it in the event of the capture of Nazi Germany by the troops.
In October 1943, the operation of the German troops "Edelweiss" suffered a complete collapse. The exploits performed by the soldiers and officers of the Red Army, among whom were military intelligence officers, have not been forgotten.
Keeping the memory of those who selflessly defended the Caucasus during the Great Patriotic War, in 1973 Novorossiysk was awarded the title "Hero City", and modern Russia in 2007-2011. awarded the cities of Anapa, Vladikavkaz, Malgobek, Nalchik, Rostov-on-Don and Tuapse the honorary title "City of Military Glory".
