June 22 is not only the day of the beginning of the most terrible war in the history of our country. Exactly 19 years later, in 1960, an event occurred that could lead to no less tragic consequences. Namely, the actual rupture of relations between the Soviet Union and China, which was a great gift for the United States. The gap has been closed, but the myth of the "Chinese threat" is still alive.
Fortunately, the matter did not come to a full-scale war between the nuclear powers, but during the local conflict over Damansky Island, 58 people were killed on the Soviet side. The exact number of victims from China is unknown, some sources say up to 800 dead.
Red split
“In 1979, a 600,000-strong Chinese army invaded the territory of a former ally. In two weeks, China managed to capture several border regional centers"
Initially, there were no geopolitical or economic reasons for the deterioration of relations. In the 1950s, the USSR did not pretend to be the "big brother", and China did not try to increase its weight in the world communist movement to the detriment of its northern neighbor. The contradictions were purely ideological: Mao Zedong was offended by Khrushchev's revelations against Stalin, and Khrushchev, in turn, was offended by the "paper tiger."
As a result, in April 1960, Soviet specialists were recalled from China, who helped China to create its industrial base. The supply of raw materials, equipment and spare parts was reduced or delayed. In June, there was a serious quarrel at a meeting of the Communist Parties in Bucharest. Later, the Soviet Union demanded the return of loans provided by the PRC. The trade, however, continued, but not in the same volumes as before. Further downward - up to Damansky, and pronounced tension until the end of the 80s.
China fought border wars not only with the USSR. In 1962, there was a conflict in Tibet, and in 1967 - in the Indian state of Sikkim. At the same time, mutual contradictions did not prevent both the USSR and China from providing assistance to North Vietnam during the war with the United States.
But China also managed to fight Vietnam: in 1979, a 600,000-strong Chinese army invaded the territory of its former ally. In two weeks, China managed to capture several border regional centers, on March 5, Vietnam announced a general mobilization, but on the same day, Beijing interrupted the military operation and began to withdraw its troops.
The number of victims is unknown - the sides traditionally underestimate their losses and overestimate the others, but at least 20 thousand Chinese and Vietnamese were killed. Given that the attacking side traditionally loses more soldiers, most likely, China's losses were higher. And those who like to talk about the fact that neither Georgia nor Ukraine has and did not have a chance to withstand Russia due to the difference in size should be reminded about Vietnam. It's not about the size, but about the motivation of the soldiers.
In the early 80s, Deng Xiaoping's reforms began, which led to the fact that China has now become the largest economy on the planet, and a few years later perestroika began, which ended with the collapse of the USSR and a decade of economic depression in Russia.
The founding father of Singapore, the recently deceased Lee Kwang Yew, called Gorbachev's fatal mistake that "the publicity campaign began before the restructuring of the economy," while "Deng Xiaoping showed a lot of wisdom by doing the opposite in China."
It is possible to debate for a long time why the Chinese reforms were successful, while the Soviet ones destroyed the state, and the public consensus about the Russian changes in the early 90s is also inclined to believe that it was a failure. But now (as always, in fact) the main question is not "who is to blame", but "what to do."
Threat or salvation
Both nationalists and liberals like to intimidate Russians with the "yellow threat". As has been noted many times, these political forces generally have a lot in common, and only in Russia they cannot find a common language. But fears about China are the few that unite them.
One of the latest "horror stories" is the lease by China of 115 thousand hectares of unused land in Buryatia. On social networks, "maps" are circulating on which the territory "sold to the Chinese" is outlined several times larger than the Crimea. In reality, 115 thousand hectares is 1150 square kilometers, a square with sides less than 34 kilometers, which is more than half the territory of Moscow or 0.0000067% of the territory of Russia. Sixty-seven millionths of a percent. "Sold Russia", yeah.
Also, in social networks and in the media, allegedly Chinese maps regularly appear, where the border is drawn almost across the Urals, and comments from domestic "experts" who attribute Hitler's theories of "living space" to Chinese leaders. They say, China is cramped, and it will inevitably expand. These "experts" should be sent to study not only history, but also geography, and more specifically, a map of the density of China's population, which is mainly concentrated along the coast. The most densely populated state in the world has enough of its own undeveloped lands, and it does not need our taiga with forest-tundra. And agricultural land, like minerals, in the modern world is more profitable to rent, rather than reclaim. They are not worth a nuclear mushroom in the place of Beijing or Shanghai.
By the way, earlier China planned to rent much more from Ukraine - up to three million hectares. Now it is unlikely to work out. Dealing with today's Ukraine is more expensive for itself.
And even if suddenly a crazy leader comes to power in China, who decides to "expand living space", he would rather turn his attention to the south, and not at all to the north. However, the CCP's personnel selection system practically excludes such a possibility.
In addition, there is the example of the Russian Empire, which welcomed foreigners to its agricultural lands. Both the Volga region, and Novorossia with Bessarabia, and later the Far East with Central Asia, were actively settled by Germans, from whom no one demanded to give up their identity. The number of Germans in the empire in 1913 was, according to various estimates, from one and a half to two and a half million people. According to the most conspiracy calculations, there are an order of magnitude less Chinese in modern Russia. By the way, there was no mass or even any noticeable betrayal among the Russian Germans either during the First World War or during the Great Patriotic War.
The second project, about which spears are now actively breaking, is the HSR (high-speed highway) from Moscow to Kazan with the possibility of extension to Beijing. And again, the "experts" say that Russia does not need this (just as their would-be predecessors opposed the Transsib or the Moscow metro to the last), that it will not pay off, that it is a bondage - and so on.
Infrastructure projects around the world improve the economic situation of the population, even if this is not an instant effect, but a delayed one. Good highways, high-speed highways, regional aviation are all not a whim, but an urgent need to preserve the unity of Russia. And if the Chinese are ready to invest and transfer technology, then they have to take it.
Of course, the Chinese are not benefactors. They are tough negotiators, and they will not give money "just like that" for promises of friendship. The main difference between the current Chinese leadership and what it was 55 years ago (as well as modern Americans and Europeans) is that they are not interested in carrying their ideology around the world. The Chinese are pragmatists, which means that one can and should negotiate with them.
By the way, the Ukrainian media, which are extremely anti-Russian, are actively writing about the "Chinese danger" for Russia. As you know, Russia is not at war with Ukraine, but Ukraine is convinced that it is waging a war with us not for life, not death. If an enemy, even a self-appointed one, convinces you that a certain phenomenon is bad, then it is actually good.
