… the fight was inevitable. At 17:28 the signalmen lowered the Dutch flag, and a swastika flew up on the gafel - at the same moment the raider "Cormoran" (German cormorant) fired point-blank from his six-inch guns and torpedo tubes.
Mortally wounded Australian cruiser "Sydney" with the last effort thrust three shells into the German bandit and, engulfed in flames from bow to stern, withdrew from the battle. On the raider, the situation was also bad - the shells pierced the Cormoran (the former diesel-electric ship "Steiermark") and disabled the power plant transformers. The raider lost speed and extensive fires broke out. At night the Germans had to abandon the ship, while the glow of the dying Sydney was still visible on the horizon …
317 German sailors landed on the coast of Australia and, observing exemplary order, surrendered; the further fate of the cruiser "Sydney" is unknown - none of the 645 people of its crew escaped. This was the end of a unique sea battle on November 19, 1941, in which an armed civilian ship sank a real cruiser.
Where will the smart one hide the leaf? In the woods
The Club-K container complex of missile weapons externally is a set of three standard 20- or 40-foot cargo containers, which house a universal launch module, a combat control module and a power supply and auxiliary systems module. The original technical solution makes the "Club" practically undetectable until the moment of its application. The cost of the kit is half a billion rubles (frankly, not so little - for example, the Mi-8 helicopter costs the same).
The Club uses a wide range of ammunition: the Kh-35 Uranus anti-ship missiles, the 3M-54TE, 3M-54TE1 and 3M-14TE missiles of the Caliber complex to engage surface and ground targets. Complex "Club-K" can be equipped with coastal positions, surface ships and vessels of various classes, railway and automobile platforms.
Analogs
In a broad sense, the practice of camouflaging weapons has been known since the inception of Mankind.
In a narrow sense - there are no analogues of the "Club" complex.
Of the systems closest in purpose, I could only recall the Armored Box Launcher (ABL) for launching Tomahawks. ABLs were installed in the 1980s on Spruance-class destroyers, battleships, as well as on helipads of Virginia and Long Beach nuclear-powered cruisers. Of course, no versatility was envisaged - ABL was a compact box-type launcher and was used exclusively on warships. ABL was removed from service after the appearance of the new UVP Mark-41.
Club-K for attack
If a samurai takes out a sword from its scabbard by 5 centimeters, he must stain it with blood. The ability to kill an enemy in one movement, only for a moment showing the weapon and hiding it back, was considered a special chic. These ancient rules are best suited to describe the Soviet "special trains". The RT-23UTTKh “Molodets” strategic rail-based missile system was guaranteed to provide the enemy with a “one-way ticket”.
The developers of the "Club" complex often draw an analogy between their product and the RT-23UTTH. But here there is the following "nuance": the railway complex with ICBMs "Molodets" is intended for a preventive / retaliatory nuclear strike in the event of a global war; it is understood that a second shot is no longer required. Such weapons should, if possible, be hidden and camouflaged, so that at the right moment they suddenly "snatch them from their scabbards" and hit the enemy at the other end of the Earth with one blow.
Unlike the truly formidable RT-23UTTH, the Club complex is a tactical weapon and its power is not so great as to end the enemy's forces with one, ten or even a hundred launches.
During Desert Storm, the US Navy fired 1,000 Tomahawk cruise missiles at Iraqi positions. But the use of a colossal number of "Tomahawks" did not solve the outcome of the local war - to "consolidate" the effect obtained, it took another 70,000 sorties of aviation!
What, in fact, prevented the Coalition forces from continuing to bombard Iraqi positions with Tomahawks? The exorbitant price of cruise missiles - $ 1.5 million! For comparison, the cost of one hour of flight of an F-16 fighter-bomber is $ 7,000. The cost of a laser-guided bomb is from $ 19,000. A combat flight of an aircraft is dozens of times cheaper than a cruise missile, while a tactical bomber performs its "work" better, more efficiently and can strike from a "watch in the air" position.
The use of cruise missiles against conventional targets is too ineffective and wasteful: Tomahawks are always used only in conjunction with aviation and ground forces, as an auxiliary means for suppressing air defense and destroying critical targets in the early days of the war. Therefore, during local operations, the Club missile system loses its advantage - stealth. What is the point of disguising the launcher as a cargo container if, within a few months, thousands of armored vehicles, a million soldiers and hundreds of warships are being transferred to the area of the operation in front of the whole world (that is how much force was required to carry out Desert Storm). It is pointless from a military point of view to simply install several Club kits on a container ship and organize a trip to the shores of a “potential enemy”.
Club-K on the defensive
Specialists of JSC Concern Morinformsistema-Agat position their missile complex "Club" in the world market as an ideal weapon for developing countries - simple, powerful, and most importantly, it implements the principle of "asymmetry" so beloved by Russian designers - for example, the annual volume of traffic in China has over 75 million standard containers! There is no way to find three containers with a "surprise" in such a traffic flow.
The unparalleled secrecy of the "Club" complex allows, in theory, to equalize the chances of strong and weak armies. In practice, the situation is somewhat more complicated: a set of three "standard 40-foot containers" is not a weapon by itself, since the Club missile system is facing an acute problem of external target designation and communication.
The armies of the NATO bloc are well aware that target designation and communication are stumbling blocks for the developers of any weapon, therefore, they are taking unprecedented measures to destroy enemy communications - in zones of local conflicts, the sky is buzzing with radio-technical reconnaissance and electronic warfare aircraft. Radars, radio towers, command centers and communication centers are the first to be hit. Aviation, using special ammunition, disables electrical substations and de-energizes entire areas, depriving the enemy of the opportunity to use mobile and telephone communications.
It is naive to rely on the GPS system - NATO experts know how to ruin the enemy's life: during the aggression in Yugoslavia, GPS was turned off all over the world. The American army can easily do without this system - Tomahawks are guided using TERCOM - a system that independently scans the terrain; aviation can use radio beacons and military radio navigation systems. This situation was corrected only with the emergence of Russia's own global positioning system "Glonass".
Qualitative data for the development of a cruise missile combat mission can only be obtained from spacecraft or reconnaissance aircraft. The second point is excluded immediately - in a local war, air supremacy will immediately go to the stronger side. All that remains is to receive data from the satellite, but here the question arises about the possibility of receiving information in conditions of hard electronic suppression, and the working electronics unmask the position of tactical missiles.
An important factor is that the turnover of standard 40-foot containers in the Third World countries (namely, they are the prospective customers of the Club complex) is rather limited. The above figure of 75 million applies only to China with its super-industry and a billion people. The USA, Japan, Taiwan, Singapore, South Korea, the Eurozone countries are the main operators of the "standard 40-foot containers".
Three containers, standing among the African slums, will immediately arouse suspicion, given that the processing and analysis of satellite images is performed by a computer that instantly notes all the nuances. 12-meter containers cannot appear in the right place on their own - trailers and a truck crane are needed - such fuss will immediately attract attention. Moreover, now any military specialist in the world knows that the containers may contain the "Club" complex (in principle, any weapon can be in suspicious containers, so they should be destroyed).
And the third question - against what targets can the "Club" complex be used in a defensive operation? Against the advancing tank columns? But the loss of one or two tanks will not in any way affect the offensive of the aggressor. Against enemy airfields? But they are far away, and the maximum firing range of the Caliber missiles is 300 km. Strikes at coastal landings? It's a good idea, but, even without taking into account the probability of a breakthrough by the military, several missiles with a 400 kg warhead will not cause serious damage.
Club-K as an anti-ship weapon
The most realistic option for using a missile system. Several containers on the coast can provide control of territorial waters and straits; protection of naval bases and coastal infrastructure, as well as provide cover on landing areas.
The problems are all the same - shooting at the maximum range is possible only with the use of external target designation. Under normal conditions, the detection range of surface targets is limited by the radio horizon (30 … 40 kilometers).
But then, what is the difference between the "Club" complex and the already adopted mobile coastal missile systems Bal-E? The only difference is stealth. But visual secrecy is not the most reliable tool. In combat conditions, the included radar unambiguously unmasks the location of the missile position, and electronic reconnaissance aircraft can detect the operation of the complex's electronic equipment.
On the other hand, self-propelled Ball-E on a high-cross-country chassis can be made up to look like anything and hidden in any port hangar. Bal-E, like the Club, can use the Kh-35 Uranus anti-ship missiles. In principle, the experience of original camouflage of missile positions has been known since the days of Vietnam, and this does not require buying a launcher for half a billion rubles.
As for the idea of installing containers on small ships and container ships, using them in the ocean as ersatz missile carriers to destroy the ships of the "potential enemy" Navy, the practice of installing weapons on merchant ships has been known since the days of the Columbus caravels. At the beginning of the article, a case was given of the successful use by the Germans of a civilian ship - "Cormoran", using the factor of surprise and carelessness of the "Sydney" team, delivered a preemptive strike and destroyed a large warship.
But … with the development of aviation and radar facilities, the idea of a "raider" disappeared into oblivion. Equipped with modern electronics, aircraft of deck and base patrol aircraft check hundreds of thousands of square kilometers of the ocean surface in an hour - a lone raider will no longer be able to disappear so easily into the vast expanses of the sea.
Dreaming of a "strike container ship", in one of the containers of which the launcher of the "Club" system is hidden, the following problems need to be solved: firstly, who will give the container ship target designation at a distance of 200 kilometers? Secondly, a container ship that appears in a combat zone can be easily boarded or destroyed as it poses a potential threat. For the US Navy, this is a familiar event - in 1988, American sailors shot down an Air Iran passenger "Airbus" and did not even apologize. Do not forget that the container ship does not have any means of self-defense (and their installation immediately unmasks a civilian ship), and during Operation Desert Storm, the US Navy and the Royal Navy of Great Britain just shot all floating craft larger than a lifeboat - British Lynx helicopters were especially rampant, destroying many patrol boats and trawlers converted into minesweepers with the help of miniature Sea Skua missiles.
Conclusion
The wise Lao Tzu once said: "To send unprepared people into battle is to betray them." I am categorically against any "asymmetric" means. In modern conditions, their use leads to even greater human losses, tk. no "cheap asymmetric means" can withstand a well-equipped and trained army, air force and navy. I am all for the development of real combat systems and the construction of real warships, not "container ships with missiles."
As for the prospects of the original Club-K missile system ("affordable strategic weapons" in the opinion of its creators), I have no right to draw any conclusions here. If Club-K is successful on the world market, it will be the best refutation of all military theories, although these are already problems of the Open Joint Stock Company “Concern Morinformsistema-Agat”.
Much more pleasant is the fact that the cruise missiles of the Caliber family have a diameter of 533 mm, which means they are adapted for launching Russian nuclear Shchuk from torpedo tubes. This is a real Russian combat system!
