In 2015, the contours of the renewal of the British nuclear deterrent force became clearer and more definite. The four second-generation nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), which will be abandoned in the late second and early third decades of this century, will be replaced by four next-generation SSBNs, which will be larger, but with the same type of weapons. The first of them will enter service in the early 2030s. This is the decision of the government, subject to early approval by the parliament.
THE FACE OF THE ROCKET CARRIER
An analysis of information from open sources suggests that the new SSBN will have an underwater displacement of 17,000 tons and 12 launchers of SLBMs (only 8 in operation). Missiles - first 8 missiles of the old and then of the new type with ammunition load of 40 nuclear warheads (YABZ) for strategic and substrategic response and each with a capacity of 80–100 and 5–10 kilotons (kt), respectively. The Successor submarines will continue Operation Relentless, a nuclear deterrent by intimidation through continuous patrols at sea of at least one SSBN.
Preliminary work on the project started back in 2007. In 2011–2015, the "assessment phase" was carried out, and since 2016, the "construction phase" has been carried out with appropriate funding for the creation of construction equipment and individual components and elements of the ship and with the completion of the second stage of design work. The final date for laying the lead SSBN has not yet been announced.
The need for SSBNs now and in the indefinite future is justified by the existence of nuclear arsenals in other countries, the possibility of further proliferation of nuclear weapons in the world, as well as the presence of the risk of nuclear blackmail, the encouragement of nuclear terrorism, and the impact on UK decision-making during the crisis from the countries with nuclear weapons. The November 2015 government document "National Security Strategy and Strategic Defense and Security" stresses: "We cannot rule out further advances that would put us or our NATO allies in grave danger." Judging by this and other documents on the country's nuclear policy, the UK intends to have:
- minimum nuclear warheads in terms of the number of nuclear warheads and their total capacity and the minimum number of carriers and delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons to deter any aggressor by intimidation, guaranteeing the security and defense of the country and its allies;
- guaranteed forces of nuclear deterrence by intimidation (at least one SSBN will always be at sea, being undetectable and thus invulnerable from a preemptive or preemptive attack by the aggressor);
- A convincing nuclear deterrent force capable of inflicting damage on any adversary that outweighs the adversary's gains from his attack.
Nuclear weapons (NW) of Great Britain can be used only by order of the Prime Minister of the country (here it should be borne in mind that the monarch has the power in special cases to remove the Prime Minister and dissolve the lower house of parliament). The formal condition for the transition to the use of nuclear weapons is the creation of an emergency situation in which the use of British nuclear weapons is required for the self-defense and defense of NATO allies. Great Britain does not abandon the use of nuclear weapons first and intends to maintain uncertainty about the specific conditions for the transition to its use (time, methods and scope). When a direct threat of the use, development and proliferation of chemical and biological weapons from states developing these types of weapons of mass destruction arises for Great Britain and its vital interests, the circle of which is not deliberately delineated, Great Britain reserves the right to use its nuclear weapons against such states. Great Britain will not use its nuclear weapons against non-nuclear countries that are parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and that comply with it.
HISTORY LESSONS
In the late 1950s, the British did not think about minimal nuclear deterrence by intimidation, they sought to build up their nuclear weapons stock through the creation of national nuclear warheads and the "lease" of American nuclear warheads. In those years, the English list of objects for the destruction of nuclear weapons included about 500 civil and military objects, mainly in the European part of the USSR. Then, in the plans for delivering massive nuclear strikes, the main role was assigned to the British medium bombers of the "V" type and provided to the British by the American ground-based BSBM "Thor". The main purpose of the massive nuclear strikes was to inflict the maximum possible damage on the Soviet Union. For example, in the early 1960s, a statement was made about targeting 230 Mt of British Air Force nuclear weapons at 230 objects in the USSR.
After the end of the Cold War, the calculating British, who are also in NATO under the cover of the US nuclear umbrella, completely abandoned nuclear weapons of the Air Force and tactical nuclear weapons of the ground forces and the Navy, concentrating from the beginning of 1998 the country's nuclear power in the form of strategic and non-strategic nuclear warheads on SLBM "Trident-2" nuclear submarines "V" ("Vanguard"). According to the plan announced in the mid-90s by the Minister of Defense, after the decommissioning of nuclear bombs, Great Britain was supposed to have 21% less nuclear warheads and 59% less nuclear weapons capacity than in the 70s. In 1998, it was announced that it intended to have one-third fewer nuclear warheads deployed in the country's nuclear arsenal than had been previously planned. The British started talking about their intention to have a minimal nuclear deterrent force. At the same time, the main unit of measurement of minimality was the undetectable and therefore invulnerable SSBN on patrol with its smallest ammunition load of missiles and nuclear warheads. The derived quantities from this unit of measurement were the deployed nuclear warheads for three SSBNs and the country's total nuclear ammunition, which included deployed and non-deployed nuclear warheads. So there was a transition from deterring the enemy by the threat of inflicting maximum damage on him with the use of 230 Mt to the ability to do this by the threat of using the ammunition load of one patrolling SSBN with a capacity of up to 4 Mt and three - up to 12 Mt. The number of targets hit can be judged by the currently officially quoted ratio: each English high-power nuclear warhead delivered to the aiming point (the designated epicenter of the explosion) must, on average, neutralize one and a half objects.
ROCKET AMMUNITION
In the 60s and 70s, on each patrolling SSBN of type "R" ("Resolution") in 16 launchers there were 16 SLBMs "Polaris" with 48 nuclear warheads (three nuclear warheads per missile) with a total capacity of 9.6 Mt. With the arrival in the 90s of the second generation SSBNs of the Vanguard type with 16 launchers for the Trident-2 SLBMs, each of which was capable of carrying eight YaBZs, the British had the theoretical opportunity to have on each SSBN 128, 96, 64 or 48 YaBZ. Taking into account the ability that has appeared since 1996 to place on one or more missiles of each SSBN one sub-strategic nuclear warhead of low power, the ammunition load would become lower than the above indicators. The ammunition load of 128 YaBZ on each SSBN (as it was assumed in 1982-1985) was clearly inaccessible, "up to 128 YaBZ" (so they thought in 1987-1992) turned out to be speculative, "up to 96 YaBZ" (as they said in 1993-1997) became closer to reality, although there were reports in the media that with the announced ceiling “up to 96 YaBZ”, the submarine sometimes had 60 YaBZ.
A 1998 Strategic Defense review reported that each SSBN patrolling would carry 48 nuclear warheads, as opposed to the previous government's decision to have "no more than 96 nuclear warheads." It also stated: “48 YABZ deployed on each SSBN with SLBM“Trident”to solve both strategic and sub-strategic tasks, will have a capacity of one third less than 32 YABZ“Shevalin”, installed on each SSBN with SLBM“Polaris” ". As you know, the YaBZ at the head of the Shevalin had a capacity of 200 kt. In accordance with the decision announced in the 2010 Strategic Defense and Security Review, it was to be YaBZ in total nuclear ammunition from "no more than 225" to "no more than 180" by the mid-1920s. Reducing the number of nuclear warheads on each patrolling SSBN to 40 and the number of deployed nuclear warheads to 120 was carried out in 2011-2015. Time will tell whether the new SSBNs will have 120 deployed nuclear warheads and whether the country's total nuclear stockpile by 2025 will exceed 180 nuclear warheads, because everything in the world is changeable and the unforeseen happens.
It should be recalled that the "Resolution" -type SSBNs first had the "Polaris" A3T SLBMs, each of which housed a scatter-type warhead (warhead) with simultaneous deployment of three warheads. The warhead (warhead) carried one YABZ with a capacity of 200 kt. All three YaBZ were to explode at a distance of 800 m from each other. Then came the turn of the Polaris A3TK SLBM with the Shevalin-type warhead, which differed from the previous configuration (two YABZ 200 kt each and several units of anti-missile defense penetration means) and the ability to detonate YBZ at a much greater distance from each other.
The Vanguard-class SSBNs are armed with the Trident-2 SLBMs. The missile is equipped with a warhead, which can carry up to eight warheads of individual guidance with their sequential breeding. They are capable of striking objects in a circle several hundred kilometers in diameter. The missile can also have a monoblock equipment - it can carry one warhead with one YABZ. The YaBZ design was tested during five nuclear tests in 1986-1991. Multiple-charge SLBMs carry nuclear warheads with a fixed power of 100 kt, monoblock ones with a fixed power somewhere between 5-10 kt.
The estimates of the capacity of the British nuclear warheads, which are a copy of the American nuclear warheads W76 / W76-1, must be treated with caution, since the exact capacity of the existing nuclear warheads is among the information that is not subject to disclosure. What will be the power of the new British nuclear warheads, whether they will have a variable explosion power, is still unknown. It is only clear that it will take 17 years from the start of the development of the new YaBZ to the arrival of the first serial product in the fleet. In the meantime, judging by the official statement, "new YaBZ for replacement are not required, at least until the end of the 30s, and possibly later."
ROLE AND PLACE
British SSBNs, like American ones, were created for a retaliatory nuclear strike in a general nuclear war. At first, their purpose was to destroy the cities of the attacking country. Judging by the justifications for the need for SSBNs made in the late 50s, the future British SSBNs were supposed to destroy by 50% 44 of the largest cities of the USSR in the event of a sudden start of a nuclear war and 87 in the presence of a threatened period. According to the Americans, two SSBNs of the "Resolution" type were capable of destroying up to 15% of the population and up to 24% of the industry of the Soviet Union. Time passed quickly, and in the plans for a nuclear war, SSBNs were destined to deliver not only retaliatory, but also preemptive strikes. An important place in the plans of the 1980s was occupied by the destruction of state and military administration bodies.
In the second half of the 90s, the British SSBN's nuclear weapons were divided into strategic (multiply charged missiles with 100 kt nuclear warheads) and substrategic (monoblock missiles with one nuclear warhead with a capacity of 5–10 kt). Each SSBN, which was at sea or in a base in readiness to go to sea, could carry a mixed ammunition load, which consisted of the overwhelming number of strategic missiles with YABZ of high power and one or two or more sub-strategic missiles "Trident-2" with one YABZ of low power.
The Trident ballistic missile during a test launch from the British submarine Vanguard. Photo from the site www.defenceimagery.mod.uk
According to the views of the time, sub-strategic nuclear weapons were intended for preemptive and retaliatory actions. It was assumed that it would be used in the form of demonstrative preventive nuclear strikes to prevent a large-scale conflict and in response to the use of weapons of mass destruction (for example, chemical or biological weapons) as punishment for those countries that did not heed the warning about the possible use of nuclear weapons against them. This is what the 1999 edition of the British Maritime Doctrine said: "SSBNs carry the Trident missile system, which performs strategic and sub-strategic nuclear deterrence for the UK and NATO." "Strategic nuclear deterrence by intimidation is the deterrence of aggression carried out by the existence of long-range nuclear weapons capable of keeping important objects at risk of destruction on the territory of any possible aggressor." Substrategic nuclear deterrence by deterrence is the ability to "conduct more limited nuclear attacks than those envisaged for strategic nuclear deterrence in order to carry out nuclear deterrence by deterrence in circumstances where the threat of a strategic nuclear attack may become inconclusive."
Great Britain felt the absence of long-range substrategic nuclear weapons in the 1982 Falklands War. The Resolution SSBN aimed at the central part of the Atlantic could have used at least one Polaris SLBM against Argentina, but this would have been the use of excessive force (the total power of three nuclear warheads on one missile was 0.6 Mt). Getting the ability to use fast and long-range substrategic nuclear weapons freed the British hands. Already in 1998, the Ministry of Defense discussed the feasibility of including the facilities of Iraq, Libya and the DPRK in the list of objects for SSBNs in response to the expected use of biological weapons by Iraq, to the continuation of the creation of chemical weapons by Libya and to the testing of long-range ballistic missiles in the DPRK. And just before the war with Iraq in 2003, the Minister of Defense said that his country "is ready to use nuclear weapons against Iraq in the event that weapons of mass destruction are used against the British during the operation in Iraq."
Since the second half of the 1990s, Britain has clearly adhered to the doctrine of minimum nuclear deterrence by intimidation, which is known to hold cities hostage. Prior to this, during the Cold War, British SSBNs were intended to carry out both national and bloc (for example, the NATO SSP plan) coordinated with the United States plans for a nuclear war against the USSR. You have to be a very naive person to believe that the plans for the use of nuclear weapons by the USA, France and Great Britain against the Russian Federation, which operated in the XX century, ceased to exist in the XXI century.
DISPUTES ABOUT NUMBER
How many SSBNs should the UK have and how many SSBNs can it afford to maintain continuity of nuclear deterrence? In 1959, British admirals dreamed of 16 SSBNs, but would agree to nine. In 1963, they managed to get the government to build only five SSBNs. The presence of five SSBNs allowed two to be continuously at sea, and if one of the two failed, to have a guaranteed ability of the remaining SSBN to launch missiles. But already in 1965, the government considered such a number of SSBNs a luxury and canceled the order for the construction of a fifth submarine. As a result, at first there were 1, 87 SSBNs in the sea, and in total 1, 46 SSBNs of the "Resolution" type (continuous patrolling has been carried out since April 1969).
When deciding to build a Vanguard-class SSBN, the need for five submarines was not taken into account. Four SSBNs of this type were transferred to the Navy in 1993, 1995, 1996 and 1999. At first, the continuity of patrols was ensured by two SSBNs (Vanguard with 16 SLBMs and Victories with 12 SLBMs), replacing each other at sea. The same situation often developed later, and has developed now. At the end of 2015, the Venjens SSBN came out of the overhaul and began the overhaul of the Vanguard SSBN, for a long time they will remain unreadable. Victoryes and Vigilent are patrolling alternately. After each patrol of a submarine lasting 60–98 days, it is repaired for several weeks, and sometimes months, when it is temporarily unavailable. It may happen that the SSBN on patrol due to an emergency will be unable to launch missiles, and its replacement due to repairs will not be able to quickly go to sea for replacement. Then there will be no talk of the vaunted continuous nuclear deterrence by intimidation, but it will have to be admitted that five SSBNs are better than four.
But back in 2006, when the Prime Minister convinced parliamentarians that there are no alternatives to SSBNs - in the form of cruise missiles on converted civilian aircraft and Trident missiles on surface ships or on land in silo launchers - because of their high cost, vulnerability and danger. these alternatives. He expressed his opinion on the sufficiency of the three new SSBNs. The point in the dispute was put in the government review "National Security Strategy and Strategic Defense and Security" at the end of 2015 - four SSBNs need to be built. It should be noted here that the British do not reckon with the possibility of potential adversaries creating space-based means of detecting submarines at depths of more than 50 m, believing that "successors" cannot be found in the ocean expanses in any sailing conditions. There is one interesting episode related to the difficulties in carrying out continuous patrolling. In 2010, France approached the UK with a proposal to alternately patrol the SSBNs of both countries as part of a joint deterrence deterrent (so that there is always only one submarine at sea - British or French alternately). The rationale behind this proposal was to reduce repair and maintenance costs and maintain the existing force for as long as possible. But the British rejected such an undertaking and decided on a second overhaul of their SSBNs to increase their service life, precisely in the interests of maintaining national continuity of patrols.
OPERATING VOLTAGE AND OPERATING FEATURES
When financing strategic weapons, it is important to correctly determine the terms of their operation, especially for such expensive carriers of nuclear weapons as SSBNs. British SSBNs of the first generation performed an average of 57 patrols - with an average rate of 2, 3 trips per year per submarine - for 22-27 years. SSBNs of the second generation by the beginning of spring 2013 operated at an average rate of 1.6 patrols per year per submarine. At this rate, each SSBN could complete 48 patrols in 30 years, and 56 patrols in 35 years, which would be quite achievable given the operating experience of the previous generation of submarines. Apparently, on this basis, decisions were based on the postponement of the start of the decommissioning of SSBNs of the "Vanguard" type from 2017 to 2022, then to 2028, and now "to the beginning of the 30s." This means that the government is counting on their stay in the fleet for at least 35 years. The service life of the new SSBN is carefully determined at 30 years. To some extent, it is connected with the hope that the new PWR-3 reactor will be able to operate for a guaranteed 25 years without recharging the core, and with an extension of its service life - for all 30 years.
Imitating the Americans, the British on their first generation SSBNs of the "Resolution" type with a displacement of 8,500 tons placed the same launchers as they had on American SSBNs of the "Washington" type of almost the same displacement - 16. When deciding on the number of launchers on the second generation SSBNs, the British considered as follows: eight launchers - too little, 24 launchers - a bit too much, 12 launchers - seems to be just right, but 16 launchers are better, since it gives flexibility in deploying more missiles in the event of an improvement in anti-missile defense in the USSR. So on the second-generation SSBN of the Vanguard type with an underwater displacement of 16 thousand tons, 16 launchers were placed each, although the American second-generation SSBNs of the Ohio type with a displacement of about 18 thousand tons carried 24 launchers each. As you know, four launchers are combined into one module, so one US and British SSBN can have 8, 12, 16, 20 or 24 launchers. On the third-generation SSBNs, which will become “the largest submarines ever built in the UK” (as stated in the 2014 document), it was envisaged to have “12 operational launchers each” by 2010, and “only eight operational PU "and in 2015 - to have launchers for" no more than eight active missiles "(new American SSBNs, which will have an underwater displacement, as they say, 2 thousand tons more than the previous ones, will be limited to 16 launchers instead of the planned 20). Given the past approach of the British to determining the number of launchers on existing submarines (12 active, four empty, 16 launchers in total), it can be assumed that their new SSBNs will have 12 launchers (eight active and four inactive). One more question on PU is also interesting. As far as is known, the Americans abandoned in 2010 the design of launchers for a new SSBN with a diameter of 305 cm, returned to the previous standard of 221 cm, and now intend to place ICBMs and SLBMs of a new generation in the launchers of existing types "without significant alteration." Nevertheless, the costly joint US-British work on the creation of a new missile module (in 2010, the British agreed with the Americans on the size of the launcher) continues. The question is, if there is a product, the design of which is suitable for existing and prospective SLBMs before and after 2042, then why are they fencing a vegetable garden and inventing a new one?
For four first-generation SSBNs with 64 launchers, 133 Polaris SLBMs were purchased, of which 49 were spent on combat training launches. For four second-generation SSBNs, the Trident-2 SLBM procurement plan provided for the purchase of 100 missiles, then gradually decreased to 58 missiles, 10 of which were intended for combat training launches during 25 years of SSBN and SLBM service, and by 2013 had already been spent … In connection with the extension of the service life of American SLBMs "Trident-2" on American and British SSBNs at the beginning of the 40s, the consumption of missiles for combat training launches of British SSBNs of the second and third generations is increasing. And this leads to a decrease in ammunition on combat-ready SSBNs. If in the 90s the submarine carried 16, 14 or 12 missiles, then from 2011-2015 it carries only eight (in eight operating launchers). In the 30s, a third-generation British SSBN patrolling with a nominal ammunition load of eight SLBMs in eight operating launchers will clearly have the ability to carry 12 missiles in active and inactive launchers. Fortunately, you can always borrow a fraction of such missiles from the Trident-2 SLBM, which has a surplus.
ON A SPECIAL ACCOUNT
Strategic missile submarines have always been maintained in a high degree of readiness for the use of nuclear weapons. During the Cold War, combat-ready American and British first-generation SSBNs were able to launch missiles in 15 minutes.after receiving an order while patrolling at sea and after 25 minutes. - while on the surface in the base. The technical capabilities of modern SSBNs make it possible to complete the launch of missiles from an SSBN in the sea in 30 minutes. after receiving the order. The British have at least one SSBN on patrol at sea at all times; during the period of replacement of a patrolling submarine, there are two submarines at sea - a replaceable one and a replaceable one.
In the UK, they make it clear that its independent nuclear deterrent forces use purely national systems, means and methods of control, communications, navigation and encryption, have their own database of targets and their own plans for the use of nuclear weapons (although in fact plans for the use of nuclear weapons are being agreed with American ones). The British reiterate that since 1994 their missiles have not been aimed at any country and that the submarines are kept in low readiness for launching missiles. As if in confirmation of this, the British claim that the coordinates of the targets are transmitted to the SSBN by the coastal headquarters by radio, that the British nuclear weapons do not have special safety devices that require the input of the code transmitted from the coast to unlock, that the SSBN commander's safe contains handwritten and addressed personally to the commander, a letter of will of the Prime Minister with instructions on what to do when, as a result of a nuclear strike by the enemy, Great Britain ceases to exist. However, it is not customary in the country to talk about what data should always be on board SSBNs in case of the need for a quick transition to a high degree of readiness.
It is noteworthy that the official documents of 1998–2015 insistently repeat the position that the nuclear deterrent forces patrolling in the sea are in readiness for launching missiles, calculated for several days, but are capable of maintaining “high readiness” for a long time. One involuntarily recalls one American study on the delivery of a sudden disarming strike against the Russian Federation with Trident-2 missiles. Surprise was ensured by the maximum approach of SSBNs to the intended targets and by reducing to a minimum the time for missiles to approach targets by using a flat trajectory (2225 km in 9.5 minutes of flight). But after all, it takes exactly several days for American and British SSBNs to leave their usual patrol areas and occupy the launch lines with the maximum approach to objects in the Russian Federation. This has to be taken into account now, when, against the background of the intensifying military activities of the United States and NATO in the East Atlantic and in Europe, including with the participation of strategic aviation, the Americans are signaling the resumption of patrols in these areas by submarines of the 144th Joint Strategic Command Operational Formation with a demonstrative approach US SSBNs to the base of the 345th operational formation of British SSBNs.
But back to the future British nuclear deterrent force. The British postponed the replacement of the second-generation SSBNs with the intention of squeezing all the resources laid out of them and postponing the start of an expensive upgrade as far as possible. By stretching the program of procurement, construction, testing and commissioning of SSBNs over decades, they seek to distribute the annual costs of nuclear forces so as not to infringe on the development of general-purpose forces. Using domestic and American experience and developments, the country, following the United States, increases the displacement of the new SSBN, reduces the number of launchers on the new SSBN, reduces the SLBM's ammunition load on it, and will put it into operation almost simultaneously with the United States. Of course, the new British SSBN will incorporate all the achievements of science and technology in the field of movement, control, stealth, surveillance and security, leaving enough space for the subsequent improvement of weapons and technology. The “Minimum Convincing Nuclear Deterrence Force” with its “minimum destructive power” provides the UK with the best opportunity to maintain its security in the future.
