In recent years, the Russian army has been criticized even by those who have nothing to do with it and have absolutely nothing to do with it. If you take 10 of any newspaper, magazine or Internet publications offhand, you can see that 7-8 of them will contain criticism of anything related to army life, strategy and tactics, equipment, personnel training methods, etc. NS. And if criticism is constructive and relies on the real state of affairs, then this can only benefit the Russian Armed Forces, but in most cases criticism resembles pouring a single fact from one dirty vessel into another in order to turn it into some kind of dimensionlessly inflated substance, far from reality. At the same time, as the well-known social law says: it is always easier to criticize, because criticism can get you some of your own preferences. So there are so many hunters to criticize that sometimes this general hubbub of criticism clogs even objective reality.
One of the favorite topics for criticizing the fundamental concept of the existence of the Russian (Red, Soviet, Russian) army at different times was that it (the army) never had the idea of retaining personnel, but there was one single principle: victory at any cost, victory for the sake of victory. They say that domestic military leaders never paid much attention to the rank and file, and with the help of this "cannon fodder" they solved those tasks that raised them up to the state power. They will overwhelm, they say, the enemy with the corpses of their own soldiers, and receive stars, medals and crosses on the chest, although it could have been won in a more "civilized" way …
But, firstly, it is generally not accepted to judge the winners, and secondly, during attacks of excessive strategic fever, you need to put yourself (as far as possible) in the place of those who at a certain moment led the operation and gave orders. Sitting in a warm armchair and sipping the duty coffee from the duty glass, it is so convenient to criticize those who were forced to make truly fateful decisions.
However, those who like to criticize the Russian strategy of waging any kind of wars often “forget” that in the military history of our Fatherland there are many examples of operations that led to victory with minimal losses among personnel. Why are they so rarely mentioned in the press? Because it does not fit into the general imposed concept of criticism. It is much more convenient to present all Russian commanders as die-hard madmen who are ready to throw as many soldiers against an enemy tank battalion as necessary to get the tanks bogged down in corpses, and then declare themselves victors … It is much more convenient to declare that the Russian military strategy is so destructive that the Russian army is already nothing and no one will help … And after all, young people are actively clinging to this information bait!
Against the background of constant criticism of the Russian army, it is worth citing one significant example of the fact that the formed public opinion about the total unprofessionalism of Russian officers is often just an attempt to convince modern youth that serving in the army is a heavy burden that will ruin any young man. …
Autumn 1999 … The active phase of the second Chechen. Chechen fighters, financed with the help of Arab intermediaries, settled in the second largest city in Chechnya, Gudermes. If they do not act quickly, this will allow the militants to continue transforming the settlement into another impregnable fortress, take a break, lick their wounds and carry out a counterstrike against the federal troops. Therefore, the command decided to take the city. Two options were considered.
The first is to use the method of total stripping, when bullets and tank tracks can hit not only militants, but also hundreds of civilians. Second, negotiate with local elders to persuade the militants to surrender.
General Troshev decided to choose the second option. However, this option would have remained unrealized had it not been for the covert night march into the city of the column of armored vehicles of Colonel Gevork Isakhanyan. Isakhanyan decided to hold the 234th Airborne Regiment in Gudermes under cover of night. 10 km were covered by an armored personnel carrier and a BMD, moving with the headlights off at a minimum speed. The militants clearly did not expect such a move from Colonel Isakhanyan, as they were sure that if federal troops began to enter the city, it would be early in the morning. After the Pskov paratroopers had established a foothold in the city, Isakhanyan suddenly heard an order that there was no need to enter Gudermes. Allegedly, the militants have already begun to respond to the proposal of the elders to leave the city and even surrender their weapons … However, the soldiers of the 234th regiment themselves perfectly understood that there were no contacts between the elders and the militants in the city, and instead they were actively preparing for the "meeting" of the federal troops. And while this training on the part of international terrorists was going on, Colonel Isakhanyan's subordinates blocked all the main routes out of the city, in fact, taking Gudermes into a tight ring.
Realizing that the Pskov paratroopers were ahead of them, the militants made several attempts to break through the ring of federal forces, but all attempts were unsuccessful. After another attack, a suspicious silence reigned in the city, which could only say that the militants were preparing either for a new attack, or for an attempt to leave the city, let's say, through the back door. And such a "back door", according to Colonel Isakhanyan, could become the bed of the Belka River for the militants. A special group was sent to the river, which set up minefields there. It was these barriers that the bandits ran into. Then the airborne troops entered the battle, opening heavy fire from the shore, during which they managed to destroy 53 militants in a few hours with their own minimal losses.
For this operation, many fighters were presented with high awards, and Colonel Isakhanyan received the Hero of Russia star.
This is one example of the fact that “filling the enemy with corpses” is a stereotype about the Russian command, which is often artificially cultivated. It is obvious that Colonel (and now General) Isakhanyan is far from the only Russian officer who violates this stereotype with his entire service.
Unfortunately, there is a realization that the armies of modern Russia also have to fight on information fronts, where there are many hunters for provocations. Let's hope that here, too, there will be officers capable of making non-trivial decisions, forcing the critics, who already have a white ticket in their hands, to throw out the white flag as well.
