More than 16 years have passed since the signing of the so-called Khasavyurt agreement. Aslan Maskhadov and Alexander Lebed signed the document on behalf of the presidents of the Republic of Ichkeria and the Russian Federation. It is officially believed that it was Khasavyurt'96 who put an end to the bloody war in Chechnya and confirmed the complete and final victory of the Chechen army, supported by international separatists of all stripes, over the federal troops; the victory of the then Chechen leadership over Yeltsin and his political entourage. Naturally, this version for a long time served as the same life-giving balm for the supporters of the severing of the North Caucasus from Russia with the subsequent creation of the so-called Caucasian Caliphate, capable of stretching from the Black Sea to the Caspian Sea.
However, both the agreements between Moscow and Grozny and their underlying motives, even years later, remain extremely contradictory and give rise to doubt that the victory of Chechnya over the federal center was solely due to the military superiority of the former over the latter. And there is a number of proofs of this, many of which have proven documentary form.
So, once again dryly and officially: the Khasavyurt agreements of the sample of August 31, 1996 were signed by the chief of staff of the republic of Ichkeria Maskhadov and the secretary of the Russian Security Council, General Lebed. Here are the points defining the relationship between Grozny and Moscow according to the Khasavyurt paper:
1. An agreement on the fundamentals of relations between the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic, determined in accordance with generally recognized principles and norms of international law, must be reached by December 31, 2001.
2. No later than October 1, 1996, a Joint Commission is formed from representatives of the state authorities of the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic, whose tasks are:
control over the implementation of the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of June 25, 1996 No. 985 and preparation of proposals for the completion of the withdrawal of troops;
preparation of coordinated measures to combat crime, terrorism and manifestations of national and religious enmity and control over their implementation;
preparation of proposals for the restoration of monetary, financial and budgetary relations;
preparation and submission to the government of the Russian Federation of programs for the restoration of the socio-economic complex of the Chechen Republic;
control over the coordinated interaction of public authorities and other interested organizations in providing the population with food and medicines.
3. The legislation of the Chechen Republic is based on the observance of human and civil rights, the right of peoples to self-determination, the principles of equality of peoples, ensuring civil peace, interethnic harmony and security of citizens living in the territory of the Chechen Republic, regardless of nationality, religion and other differences.
4. The Joint Commission completes its work by mutual agreement.
Moscow undertakes to withdraw military units from Chechnya, to channel funds for the restoration of the destroyed republic, to provide Ichkeria with food, money and medicines. A kind of indemnity that Moscow must pay …
However, this is not the main thing. After all, Moscow is still helping Chechnya financially … The main thing here should be considered the phrase contained in the first paragraph of the principles for defining relations between Grozny and Moscow. We are talking about such a concept as "in accordance … with the norms of international law." In other words, the Chechen Republic was de jure to be recognized as a subject of international law, having seceded from Russia within the next five years. Journalist Andrei Karaulov talks about three years of "waiting" for full independence for Ichkeria. Three years or five years - by and large does not matter. What matters is that a document was signed on behalf of the President of Russia, in which Russia not only admits its defeat in the North Caucasus, but also creates a precedent for the withdrawal of the North Caucasian republics from the federation. After all, hardly anyone today doubts that the separation of Chechnya from Russia would not entail the so-called domino effect, when the whole country, already plagued by economic and political problems, would start to crumble.
Let's not forget that in August 1996, less than five years have passed since the signing of the notorious Belovezhskaya Agreements, which put an end to the big country. It turns out that in 1996, Yeltsin, who recently celebrated an extremely dubious election victory, in fact received the status of a state leader, who managed to take part in the collapse of two states (first the USSR, and then the Russian Federation) for less than five years.
But was there only Boris Yeltsin's hand in the Khasavyurt agreements, or was he not the most important figure in someone's big game?
Answering this question, it is worth considering the background of the Khasavyurt agreements themselves, according to which Ichkeria could become an independent state within a few years and become the “first swallow” of the total destruction of the Russian Federation. The rationale is that the Khasavyurt agreements were signed on August 31 after units of Chechen militants occupied Grozny, knocking out federal troops, but according to the secretary of the Security Council of the Chechen Republic Ruslan Tsakaev, the agreements themselves were prepared by General Lebed at least a month before the Chechen attack. separatists. According to him, the attack on the Chechen administrative center itself was an event that should have justified the signing of the paper in the Dagestani Khasavyurt.
It turns out that the Russian authorities at that time needed an excuse to end the war on the territory of Chechnya, but the withdrawal of troops without an obvious reason would look completely ridiculous. The fact that many knew about the attack of militants on August 6, 1996 on Grozny is today confirmed by both politicians and journalists who at that time worked in Chechnya. In particular, Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Chechen Republic Yuri Plugin says that an unexpected order was received to remove the Ministry of Internal Affairs officers from several checkpoints at the entrance to Grozny and, for obscure reasons, send them to the villages of the region to carry out passport control and control the situation on rural roads. Moreover, just before the attack of militants on Grozny, the commander of the united group of Russian troops in Chechnya, General Vyacheslav Tikhomirov, left on vacation, and General Vladimir Shamanov (at that time the commander of the group of forces of the Ministry of Defense in the Chechen Republic) was unexpectedly summoned to study at the Academy of the Russian General Staff in Moscow … In fact, the army group was decapitated, and it was clear that someone very persistently and methodically cleared the way for international terrorists so that they could calmly take over the Chechen capital. In total, according to information published by the head of the information bureau of the separatists, Mayrbek Vachagaev, 887 people entered Grozny almost unhindered, who, after several days of confrontation with representatives of the Chechen militia loyal to Moscow, as well as units of the Ministry of Defense and Internal Troops remaining in the city, took Grozny under their control.
It was after this that Moscow, or, more precisely, those who stood behind it then, had a motive to withdraw its troops from Ichkeria, effectively announcing the defeat of the federal troops. The motive, as mentioned above, in the scenario version was painted before the so-called storming of Grozny by the militants.
After the signing of the paper in Khasavyurt, under the watchful eye of OSCE diplomats, General Lebed in Russia was accused of almost high treason. But if, let's say, rewind time back, it becomes clear that he was not the person who played a serious role in this big game. The fact is that Alexander Lebed, as you know, in 1996 ran for president from the "Congress of Russian Communities". At the same time, in the first round of the presidential campaign, Lebed managed to take third place, gaining more than 14% of the vote. Obviously, Boris Yeltsin needed the votes cast for the general, and he made an offer to Lebed, which he could not refuse. Yeltsin appointed General Lebed, who was popular among the troops, as the Assistant to the President of the Russian Federation for National Security and Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation.
Apparently, immediately after the appointment, Lebed was told how it was necessary to end the Chechen campaign. At first glance, it is surprising why the general, who managed to distinguish himself in Afghanistan and Transnistria, went to the shameful proposal to conclude agreements with the separatists, in fact, conniving at the fact that Russian servicemen were left in Grozny for apparent death. Betrayal?.. Ignorance of the situation?.. Vanity?..
The answer to this question can be found in the words spoken by Lebed in an interview with the German edition of Der Spiegel. In particular, in 1996, General Lebed announced that he was ready to take the presidency and did not see any potential in the sick and aging Boris Yeltsin.
In other words, Lebed could have signed the Khasavyurt agreements, including in order to show the world who actually stopped the war in Chechnya. Probably, the thought was running through his head that this would give him some political trump cards, and especially the trump cards would appear when the West supported him in the event that Yeltsin retired due to his health condition. It turns out that it was vanity that could push the military general to such a very dubious move as a handshake with Maskhadov and other representatives of the separatists. Obviously, Lebed knew well who was really behind the militants in Chechnya, and therefore wished them to be liked by all means as a kind of peacemaker general.
But General Lebed's aspirations were not destined to come true: the West, led by the United States, supported Boris Yeltsin, who in mid-October 1996 (since the Khasavyurt agreements) dismissed Alexander Lebed. The situation is reminiscent of the one in which General Lebed, who had hoped for someone's help in pushing his candidacy for the highest state post, skillfully took advantage of, and then simply merged … Yeltsin seized the moment, received votes from Lebed, gave him the opportunity to carry out an extremely unpopular task in Russia, and then gently pulled the drain rope …
Thus, for many, Lebed is still associated with a man who was ready to have a hand in the collapse of Russia, but in fact he only took part in a fairly short stage of a large geopolitical party. At the same time, President Yeltsin himself played the role of an extra, who obviously did not intend to become a two-time destroyer of the country, because this could finally bury his chances of continuing his political career, which by that time was already under considerable doubt. Yeltsin, who, according to his own associates, received active funding from abroad for his election campaign, had to pursue a policy that was interesting to the West. At the same time, the Khasavyurt agreements are one of the stages of such a policy.
In simple terms, President Yeltsin himself found himself hostage to the forces that at one time asked to support himself in the elections. These forces supported him, but on conditions capable of putting an end to such a state as Russia. For obvious reasons, Yeltsin was burdened by this dependence, and he wanted to show his character, once and for all, severing the western Gordian knot that bound his hands. At the same time, Yeltsin dealt his main blow to those who decided to finally tear Russia to pieces in 1999, when, without agreement with Western "partners", he decided to make first the second and then the first person in the state of Vladimir Putin. It is clear that Putin did not fit into the Western concept of the Russian leader, if only because it was thanks to Putin that the very Khasavyurt agreements, apparently dictated in 1996 by a certain group of foreign "specialists" and which became Yeltsin's pass for a second presidential term, were buried and the Caucasian people are consolidated against the separatist movement in the Caucasus. The events of 1999 in Dagestan, when the Chechen militants decided to strengthen their positions, and the people of Dagestan gave them a serious rebuff, illustrate this vividly.
The big political game, in which Russia was assigned the role of a patchwork quilt, each part of which had to snap at neighboring parts, turned out to be completed in a completely different way than those interested in the disintegration of the country expected.
This can be judged by the Western and Russian overly liberal newspapers of that time, which, from peacefully narrating about the victory of law and democracy in Chechnya, about the joyous day of the possible independence of this North Caucasian republic from Russia, at first suddenly turned into somewhat taken aback, and then began to throw mud at the new the leadership of Russia, accusing them of "oppression" of the Caucasian peoples and new "imperial ambitions". And this mournful disc has been spinning for the 13th year in a row, confirming the thesis that in 1999 Yeltsin, having signed the document on Putin's appointment, seriously confused someone's cards …
