The 1917 revolution did not just crush the monarchy: there was a deep civilizational rift and, as a result, a different cultural and historical phenomenon arose - the USSR. In essence, modern Russia has little in common with that power that has gone forever. It is possible to return the previous names to all cities and streets, but this will not change the mental attitudes of the post-Soviet society.
There will always be disputes about the reasons for the death of the Russian Empire. But there is no doubt that the February coup was possible not least due to purely military factors, for example, the death of a significant part of the regular officers and soldiers brought up in unconditional loyalty to the Tsar and the Fatherland.
The Russian imperial army suffered the most serious losses in 1915 during the so-called Great Retreat from Galicia, after which the officers' shoulder straps were donned by purely civilians: yesterday's teachers, doctors, musicians. Most of them fought bravely and selflessly loved their homeland, but their mental attitudes were very different from the worldview of their “predecessors”. The draft officers were ready to die for the Fatherland, but not for the Tsar. At the turn of the century, the Russian intelligentsia was seriously infected with liberal ideas that were in no way compatible with loyalty to the throne.
The peasants drafted into the army, who replaced the soldiers who died in 1915, did not understand the meaning of the war at all. The highly respected non-commissioned officer corps - traditionally well-trained and well-trained - was largely knocked out in the first two years of the fighting.
However, the focus of our attention is not on the political choice of the officers in 1917 and not on the perception of the war by yesterday's peasants called up from the reserve, but on the analysis of the purely military reasons for the catastrophe in Galicia. Where are they - in the field of tactics or strategy? In other words, was the defeat of 1915 caused by the poor execution of competent strategic decisions of the Headquarters, or, on the contrary, was it precisely its actions that led to military failures?
In the USSR, there was an opinion about the mediocrity of the Russian generals. How objective is such a judgment? The failures in the Russo-Japanese and the First World War were usually cited as an example of the low training of the highest command personnel of the imperial army. However, we note that neither in 1905, nor in 1914-1917, our troops, with the exception of the 1st and 2nd armies in East Prussia in 1914, were not defeated. Even during the Great Retreat, the Russian corps suffered terrible losses, but managed to avoid defeat. Our generals as a whole had good tactical training, many division and corps chiefs showed themselves well in battles with the Japanese, and a decade later - in battles against the Germans and their allies. The situation was more complicated with the high command - those who were responsible for the strategy.
Generals NN Yudenich and AA Brusilov are rightfully considered the best Russian military leaders of the First World War, and the latter did not graduate from the Academy of the General Staff, which was a rarity for commanders of such a high rank. Actually, that's all. The names of the rest are little known to non-specialists, with the exception of General M. V. Alekseev, who, however, became truly famous as one of the founders of the White movement and the creators, along with L. G. Kornilov, of the Volunteer Army.
However, in 1915 they were not the ones who determined Russian strategy. Brusilov led the 8th Army of the Southwestern Front, Yudenich commanded the Caucasian Army, Alekseev - the Northwestern Front. He, of course, could influence the adoption of strategic decisions by the Headquarters, however, according to the opinions of some contemporaries, he did not have the strong will necessary for a major military leader (this opinion was held, in particular, by General A. I. Denikin, Alekseev's ally in the White movement) … And in addition, he often performed most of the secondary current work that was the responsibility of subordinates.
Stranger uncles
Who then determined the strategy of Russia until 1915? Our army entered the First World War under the command of Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich Jr. - the uncle of the tsar. Fighting bravely in the Turkish campaign of 1877-1878, the Grand Duke would have looked perfect in the role of the commander of the guard, but he was not a commander. Suffice it to say that, from his point of view, the capture of large geographic objects is sufficient for victory, and not the defeat of the enemy. In addition, he did not participate in the development of the war plan, which is not surprising - this requires a serious academic education, which Nikolai Nikolaevich did not have, as well as experience in making strategic decisions.
At times, his actions as commander-in-chief were simply ill-conceived. So, in 1914, when the German corps on the Western Front were rapidly advancing through Belgium to Paris, two Russian armies invaded East Prussia. Thus, the Stavka intended to divert part of the German divisions to the Eastern Front and thus alleviate the position of France, whose ambassador in those dramatic days begged Nicholas II to command his generals to advance from Warsaw to Berlin. Perhaps it was under the influence of these circumstances that Nikolai Nikolaevich transferred part of his forces, including the Guards Corps, near Warsaw, intending to prepare an attack in the direction of Poznan, a city located in the middle of the Berlin-Warsaw line. It is easy to see that these actions only led to the dispersal of forces and unnecessary regrouping.
So the appointment of members of the royal family to key positions had a negative impact on the combat state of the army. The same Nikolai Nikolaevich, heading the Council of State Defense before the war, constantly interfered in the activities of the military and naval ministries, introducing confusion and inconsistency in the work of departments.
Who helped the Grand Duke in planning operations? He appointed General N. I. Yanushkevich as Chief of Staff, and Yu. N. Danilov as Quartermaster General - Chief of the Operations Department. Both, according to contemporaries and colleagues, were clearly out of place and did not cope with the responsibilities assigned to them. The North-Western Front was headed by General Ya. M. Zhilinsky, whose career, according to Denikin, caused bewilderment in military circles and could not find a rational explanation. Zhilinsky's inability to establish effective management did not cause the slightest surprise in the army. The Stavka entrusted the Southwestern Front to General N. I. Ivanov, who also did not have great strategic knowledge, which was clearly manifested during the 1915 campaign. Before the war, he headed the Kiev military district and was more involved in economic issues. In 1914, the armies of the Southwestern Front won a brilliant victory over the Austrian troops, but the credit goes largely to the then Chief of Staff of Ivanov, General Alekseev.
In 1915, the Russian command entered with a firm intention to victoriously end the war, however, this goal was set by all the belligerent powers. What was the strategic plan of the Headquarters? The headquarters of Yanushkevich expected to conduct a simultaneous offensive in the Carpathians, Bukovina and East Prussia. It is not difficult to see that such planning forced the Russian troops to beat the enemy with spread fingers. It is curious that in some ways the strategic plan of the Headquarters resembled the Barbarossa plan. As you know, the German army groups in the summer of 1941 also attacked in diverging directions and none of them was able to fully independently complete the assigned tasks.
The original viciousness of the Russian plan was also in the fact that the Northwestern and Southwestern fronts struck in secondary sectors - in East Prussia and Bukovina. Even in the event of the success of Russian weapons, both powers of the Central Union retained control over vital regions and capitals, and with them the levers of command and control of troops.
I must say that not all Russian commanders were delighted with the strategic creativity of the Headquarters. The same Alekseev proposed a more realistic plan - to attack Krakow, which, if successful, would withdraw Russian troops to the flank and rear of the German group operating in the direction of Warsaw. However, he failed to insist on his proposal. As for the idea to attack in the Carpathians, it originated at the headquarters of the Southwestern Front back in 1914 and had a chance of success. However, the transfer of German divisions in 1915 to the aid of the Austro-Hungarians significantly strengthened the enemy's position in Galicia.
Choosing the right strategic decision for Russia was also necessary for geopolitical reasons. In the fall of 1914, Turkey entered the war on the side of the central powers. This closed the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles for our country and, in fact, led to the isolation of Russia from the allies, whose military and economic assistance the country could receive only through the White Sea, which in no way met the needs of the army. In addition, in 1915, the German command decided to shift the center of gravity of military operations from west to east and bring Russia out of the war with a crushing blow. Although it must be said that the strategic plans of the Germans largely depended on their weaker Austrian ally, who at the end of 1914 was on the verge of disaster.
The Germans decided to strike the main blow in the area of Gorlitsy. The goal is to reach the rear of the armies of the Southwestern Front. For this, the German command transferred over ten divisions and united them as part of the 11th Army under the command of General Eberhard Mackensen. To hide the main objectives, the Germans staged distracting demonstrations in Courland and the Carpathians.
Mackensen's divisions were aimed against the 3rd Army of General R. D. Radko-Dmitriev, whose headquarters knew about the concentration of a powerful enemy grouping. The commander offered the only correct solution in that situation - to withdraw the army from the Carpathians and regroup the forces. However, the headquarters of the Grand Duke, as well as the Southwestern Front, did not see the impending danger and were refused. It is curious that the British Minister of War, Field Marshal Count Kitchener, warned Headquarters about the impending German strike. But Nikolai Nikolaevich did not attach any serious importance to this information. Meanwhile, in the direction of the main attack, the Germans created a colossal superiority in forces. On May 2, Mackensen's divisions went on the offensive, overcoming the heroic resistance of Radko-Dmitriev's 3rd Army. However, when the intentions of the Germans to break through our defenses in the Gorlitsy area became apparent, Ivanov's headquarters still believed that this was nothing more than a diversionary maneuver, and the Germans would deliver the main blow in the Carpathians. The rate was limited to the installation: "Not a step back!", Which once again testified to the mediocrity of both Nikolai Nikolaevich and his entourage. In fierce battles, the Germans broke through the defenses of the Russian Southwestern Front.
Prelude to the revolution
Denikin's recollections testify to what the battles in Galicia were like in those days of May 1915. He commanded the 4th Iron Division, which became famous in the Russian-Turkish War of 1877-1878 and was part of the Southwestern Front during the Great Retreat. Denikin's brigade, he said, played the role of a fire brigade, deployed to the most threatened sectors of the front. So it was in the terrible days for Russian weapons. Anton Ivanovich recalled: “These battles south of Przemysl were the bloodiest for us. In particular, the Iron Division suffered greatly. The 13th and 14th regiments were literally swept away by the incredible strength of the German artillery fire. For the first and only time I saw the bravest of the brave Colonel Markov (in the future, the legendary White Guard general and Denikin's comrade-in-arms - I. Kh.) In a state close to despair, when he was withdrawing from the battle the remnants of his the body of the commander of the 14th regiment who was walking next to him, whose head was blown off by a shell fragment. The sight of the headless colonel's body, standing for a few more moments in the pose of a living, cannot be forgotten … "Further, the general wrote:" During the year of the war, due to the position of the front, I had to both advance and retreat. But the latter had the character of a temporary and rolling maneuver. Now the whole situation and even the tone of orders given from above testified to the catastrophe … The great retreat cost us dearly. Our losses amounted to more than a million people. Huge territories - part of the Baltic, Poland, Lithuania, part of Belarus, almost all of Galicia were lost by us. The frames have been knocked out. The spirit of the armies has been undermined."
The personnel have been knocked out … These two words are in many ways the key to understanding the reasons that made possible the February coup and the subsequent collapse of the army, the soldiers' terror of the officers. The consequence of such terrible losses, first of all, was, as the events of the First World War showed, a low level of strategic training of a part of the Russian generals, as well as, we repeat, a vicious system of assigning members of the royal family to key positions in the imperial army.
A natural question arises: why, in the midst of the numerous officer corps of the Russian imperial army at the beginning of the 20th century, there were not enough military leaders with strategic talent and the ability to competently plan and carry out complex operations, professionally lead the fronts? In part, the answer to this question is the opinion of the commander-in-chief of the Russian army in the Japanese war, General A. N. Kuropatkin, about the reasons for the defeat in 1905: they seemed restless to many bosses. As a result, such people often left the service. On the contrary, people spineless, without convictions, but docile, always ready to agree with the opinion of their superiors in everything, moved forward. It cannot be said that the situation changed dramatically by the beginning of the First World War.
Finally, another reason for the low level of strategic training of the Russian generals lay in the fact that the Nikolaev Academy of the General Staff, designed to train commanders, could not cope with the tasks assigned to it. But this is a topic for another conversation.
What was the fate of those who determined the strategy of the Russian imperial army in the first two years of the war? Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich safely left Russia and did not take part in the Civil War. He lived peacefully and died in France, formally heading the Russian All-Military Union - a military organization of veterans of the White movement. The head of the Northern Front and one of the main participants in the February coup, General N. V. Ruzsky was held hostage by the Bolsheviks and hacked to death by them in Pyatigorsk in 1918, and Radko-Dmitriev died with him. In the same year, Generals Yanushkevich and Zhilinsky fell at the hands of revolutionary soldiers. Alekseev took part in the legendary Ice Campaign and died in Novocherkassk. Danilov left Russia and died quietly in 1937 in Paris.
