In the 70s of the twentieth century, at the height of the Cold War, the American fleet was faced with the urgent task of ensuring the safety of transoceanic convoys on the way from the New World to Europe. In the event of an armed conflict with the Soviet Union, this route was particularly vulnerable. Due to the successful actions of the naval missile aircraft and submarines of the USSR, American bases in Europe would be cut off, and the countries of the NATO bloc, left without support, would not be able to resist the Soviet tank armies for a long time.
As a result of discussions, the Department of the NAVY has formed an opinion about the new escort ship.
It was decided to take as a basis the concept of the KNOX-class frigate, saturating the structure to the limit with modern electronic means and missile weapons. Like its predecessor, the new warship was originally designed for operations far from the coast, had good seaworthiness, a transoceanic cruising range (4500 miles at a speed of 20 knots) and could operate effectively both as part of convoys and aircraft carrier formations, and in a solo campaign. The total displacement of ships of this class was 3600 tons, and later, in the course of modernization, increased to 4000 … 4200 tons.
An important criterion for evaluating the project was its cheapness and manufacturability. The design of the new ship was as simple as a bucket of bolts and focused on large-scale production - the Americans seriously intended to make frigates the main escort ships of the Navy, replacing them with escort frigates of the Knox class and the destroyers URO of the Farragut and Charles F. Adams types.
In 1977, the lead frigate of the class "Oliver Hazard Perry" (OLIVER H. PERRY class), named after the American naval commander of the 19th century, entered service. The ship received the operational code FFG-7 (frigate, guided weapons), which underlined its special status - "a frigate with guided missile weapons."
Outwardly, the ship turned out to be very nice - with laconic lines and a sharp "clipper" nose. To increase manufacturability and reduce the cost of installation and operation of equipment, the superstructure had "straight" shapes, and the forecastle, ¾ of the hull, made all the decks of the frigate parallel to the structural waterline.
In an effort to reduce the cost of the ship, the engineers went for further simplifications - the General Electric gas turbine power plant, to the detriment of survivability, is single-shaft. The combination of two LM2500 gas turbines, provides an output of 41,000 hp. with. The time required to reach full power from a cold start is estimated at 12-15 minutes. Each turbine is enclosed in a heat and sound insulating casing and placed on shock-absorbed platforms along with all auxiliary mechanisms and equipment. The power plant of the frigate "Oliver H. Perry" is completely unified with the power plants of the cruisers and destroyers of the US Navy.
For maneuvering in narrows and harbors, as well as for emergency running in case of a power plant failure, the frigate is equipped with two propelling and steering columns of the "Azipod" type, with a capacity of 350 hp. each one. Auxiliary thrusters are located in the central part, about 40 meters from the bow of the ship.
Armament
The main tasks of the Oliver H. Perry were anti-submarine and air defense of naval formations in the near zone. According to the American concept of using the Navy, surface targets were the prerogative of carrier-based aircraft.
To repel aviation attacks, a Mark-13 single-beam launcher was installed in the bow of the ship. Despite its one-handedness, the system has proven itself well on the Chardz F. Adams destroyers and California-class nuclear-powered cruisers. The light Mark-13, due to its low inertia, was quickly guided in azimuth and altitude, which compensated for its relatively low rate of fire.
In the cellar of the launcher (outer drum - 24 positions, inner - 16) there were 36 Standard-1MR (medium range) anti-aircraft missiles ready for launch with an effective firing range at air targets - 30-35 km. Warhead - high-explosive fragmentation Mk90, weighing 61 kg.
The remaining four cells were occupied by RGM-84 Harpoon anti-ship missiles.
The air defense of the frigate, frankly, was weak, which in the future led to major troubles on the frigate "Stark". The Mk92 fire control system initially provided simultaneous shelling of no more than two targets at medium and high altitudes, only the sixth Mk92 modification added the ability to fire low-flying targets.
When choosing an artillery piece for the Oliver H. Perry, the Italian firm Otobreda unexpectedly won the competition. The Americans forgot about patriotism and signed a contract with Italy for the supply of a batch of universal naval guns OTO Melara 76mm / L62 Allargato. An unremarkable 76 mm artillery system. Rate of fire - 80 rds / min.
For self-defense of the frigate from low-flying anti-ship missiles, a six-barreled Mark-15 "Falanx" machine gun of 20 mm caliber is installed in the rear of the superstructure.
One of the drawbacks of the Oliver H. Perry is the poor placement of the artillery. The weapon has limited sectors of fire: the Falanx protects only the rear hemisphere, and the OTO Melara gunners must think seven times before firing in order not to hit the chimney and not to demolish the antenna posts on the superstructure roof.
To detect submarines, the frigate was equipped with a towed sonar station SQR-19 "Towed Array", an under-keel GAS SQS-56, as well as a Mark-32 ASW anti-submarine complex consisting of two triple torpedo tubes of 324 mm caliber.
But the main means of anti-submarine warfare were two helicopters of the LAMPS III system (Light airborne multipurpose system), for which a hangar and a helipad were organized in the aft part of the frigate.
The following should be noted here: the first 17 frigates were built in a "short" version, which excluded the basing of large helicopters on them, only one SH-2 "Sea Sprite" was placed in the hangar.
All detection systems, electronic warfare systems, and the Oliver H. Perry weapons complex are linked together by the Naval Tactical Data System (NTDS) combat information management system.
No matter how hard the developers tried, the laws of nature could not be deceived. The small size of the frigate makes itself felt - already with a six-point storm, with longitudinal roll, the fairing of the underkeeping GAS is partially exposed, and then an even more unpleasant effect occurs - a bottom slamming is formed and the ship is completely overwhelmed by water (in other words, slamming is when the bow of the ship first rises on the crest of a wave, exposing the bottom, and then, thousands of tons of metal fall down, causing a giant waterfall of splashes, a very beautiful sight). This makes it impossible to use helicopters and reduces the efficiency of the sonar station. Dynamic loads can seriously damage the aluminum structure of the frigate, you have to reduce the speed. By the way, the low speed is another drawback of "Oliver H. Perry", at full speed no more than 29 knots. On the other hand, with the development of rocket weapons, speed became less important for escort ships (according to the outdated rules of naval tactics, escort ships had to be able to develop faster than the main forces of the convoy).
Combat losses
On a hot Arabian evening on May 17, 1987, the US frigate USS Stark (FFG-31) was patrolling 65-85 miles off the coast of Bahrain to Nord-Ost along the Iran-Iraqi war zone. At 20:45, the air defense destroyer Coontz, located nearby, received data on an approaching air target, obviously an Iraqi aircraft: "course 285 degrees, distance 120 miles." A minute later, this information was duplicated by an E-3 AWACS airborne early warning aircraft of the Saudi Arabian Air Force. At 20:58 from a distance of 70 miles, "Stark" took the target to accompany its radar. The frigate at that time was going at a speed of 10 knots, all systems were put on alert no. 3 (detection equipment and weapons were ready for use, personnel were at combat posts).
The commander of "Stark", Commander Glenn Brindel climbed onto the bridge, but, finding nothing suspicious, returned to the cabin - the Iraqis beat the Iranians every day, why be surprised? The US Navy does not take part in the conflict.
Suddenly, the operator of the air situation observation post reported to the CIC: "The distance to the target is 45 miles, the target is heading for the ship!" The destroyer Coontz was also worried - at 21:03 the frigate received a warning: “Iraqi plane. Course 066 degrees, distance 45 miles, speed 335 knots (620 km / h), altitude 3,000 feet (915 m). Goes straight to Stark!"
By this time, news of the approaching Iraqi aircraft had already reached the USS La Salle. From there they asked "Stark": "Guys, there is some kind of plane flying over there. Are you okay? " Having received an affirmative answer, “La Salle” calmed down - everything was under control.
At 21:06, the Stark electronic intelligence system detected the aircraft's sighting radar from a distance of 27 miles. At 21:09, the air surveillance post broadcast a radio message to the "unknown aircraft" and inquired about his intentions. After 37 seconds, "Stark" repeated the request. Both appeals were broadcast on the international code of signals and on the frequency adopted for this (243 MHz and 121, 5 MHz), but there was no response from the Iraqi plane. At the same time, the Iraqi Mirage turned sharply to the right and increased its speed. This meant that he lay down on a combat course and launched an attack.
A combat alert was played on the Stark, and five seconds later the first Exocet rocket went into the ship. Approximately half a minute later, a second blow followed, this time the "Exocet" warhead worked normally, the explosion of a centner of explosives blew the crew quarters to shreds, killing 37 sailors. The fire engulfed the combat information center, all sources of electricity were out of order, the frigate lost its speed.
Realizing what had happened, the destroyer Coontz yelled over all radio frequencies: “Raise the F-15! Shoot down! Shoot down the Iraqi jackal! But while the Saudi airbase was deciding who would give the delicate order, the Iraqi Mirage flew away with impunity. The motives of the Iraqi side remained unclear: a mistake or a deliberate provocation. Iraqi officials said the Mirage F.1 pilot, a well-trained pilot who knows English and the international aviation language, had not heard any calls from an American frigate. He attacked the target because it was in a combat zone, in which, as he knew, his own or neutral ships should not be.
As for the battered "Stark" - with the help of "Coontz'a" who came to the rescue, he somehow got to Bahrain, from where in 2 months he left on his own (!) For repairs in the USA.
A year later, on April 14, 1988, the frigate "Samuel B. Roberts" got into a similar situation in the Persian Gulf after being blown up by a mine. And this time the crew managed to keep the ship afloat. Oliver H. Perry-class frigates proved to be very tenacious, despite their small size and aluminum deck structure.
Estimates and perspectives
In total, between 1975 and 2004, 71 Oliver H. Perry-class frigates were built in various countries, including:
USA - 55 frigates, 4 of them for the Australian Navy
Spain - 6 frigates (Santa Maria-class)
Taiwan - 8 frigates (Cheng Kung- class)
Australia - 2 frigates (Adelaide-class), in addition to the four purchased in the USA
According to the results of the combat use of "Olivers", it turned out that the creators wanted too much from the small ship. Two days before the Stark incident, exercises were held in the Gulf of Mexico to repel missile attacks. A French Navy ship was invited as the shooter. During the shooting, it turned out that the Aegis cruiser Tykonderoga was guaranteed to shoot down the Exocet anti-ship missiles, but Oliver H. Perry did not. Currently, "serious" missile defense missions are performed by Aegis destroyers of the Orly Burke type (61 destroyers as of 2012) - much larger and more expensive ships. And for anti-terrorist missions in coastal waters, specialized ships of the LCS type are purchased.
By the beginning of the 21st century, the Mark-13 launcher and SM-1MR missiles were considered ineffective and obsolete. In 2003, the dismantling of these systems began, instead of the frigates "Oliver H. Perry" they received … a hole in the deck. Yes, now ships of this type do not carry any missile weapons. The American admirals decided that a three-inch cannon and SH-60 Sea Hawk helicopters were enough to fight drug couriers and pirates. Driving large warships to the coast of Somalia is wasteful. For the rotary-wing aircraft, the Americans, just in case, purchased a batch of Swedish Penguin anti-ship missiles.
Another new role of the "Olivers" is the delivery of humanitarian aid, a ship of this type sailed to Georgia in 2008.
Since the beginning of the 2000s, there has been a constant withdrawal of these ships from the US Navy, someone is sent for scrap, someone is sent to overseas countries. For example, “Olivers” bought Bahrain, Pakistan, Egypt, 2 frigates were acquired by Poland, most of all were bought by Turkey - 8 units for operations in the Black Sea. Turkish "Olivers" have been modernized, the old Mark-13 gave way to the vertical launcher Mark-41, in eight cells of which are placed 32 ESSM anti-aircraft missiles.
Frigates of this type have been “defending democracy” for 35 years in all hot spots of the globe, but despite their solid combat qualities, they have a rather inglorious combat history. The Olivers are now handing over watch to new types of warships.
"Oliver H. Perry" - everything will be H.
