Prologue
1962, Cuban Missile Crisis. One of the consequences was the McNamara's Folly shipbuilding program. In honor of the head of the Pentagon, super-businessman and (later) the head of the World Bank, Robert McNamara.
In the midst of tensions and the threat of a new world war, McNamara suddenly decided that the Navy would no longer need nuclear-powered aircraft carriers. And you don't need a lot of missile cruisers either.
Instead of powerful warships, the brainchild of the nuclear-missile era, McNamara approved the construction of a series of very strange purposes. Having familiarized themselves with the terms of reference and realizing that these ships would become the basis of the Navy in the coming world war, the sailors were truly perplexed.
The series of 46 ships are known as the Knox-class frigates. The main feature is the impossibility of using it in squadrons and aircraft carrier groups. Too weak dynamics and a speed of 27 knots did not allow the frigates to accompany the warships.
A single propeller shaft, one turbine - in terms of combat stability, the "Knox" did not meet any of the accepted military standards.
Radar detection equipment was also out of date. The two-dimensional general detection radar SPS-40, even by the standards of the 60s, seemed a complete anachronism. The radar was assembled on radio tubes, it was distinguished by an indecently high sensitivity to vibrations and therefore low reliability.
Even less such a frigate was suitable for participation in local conflicts. No "colonial cruiser in Zanzibar" could come of it. If Knox tried to make a name for himself, any rebels and insurgents would have poured him all the way.
The frigate lacked shock and anti-aircraft weapons. And the very first air threat was the last for him - the Knox could be bombed like a training target, without any consequences for the attacking side.
Later, in the 70s, some of the frigates received a short-range SeaSperrow air defense system, with manual guidance through a sight, which was more of a decoration than a real weapon. Due to the lack of high-quality radar equipment, the Knox crew would hardly have had time to play a combat alert.
The Knox had no speedboats or a capture team on board. They were not designed to catch pirates and operate in coastal waters. There was not even a helicopter - initially the project envisaged only an anti-submarine drone of the DASH type.
With all this, the frigates were not an ersatz project, an alteration from an old trawler "in more numbers, at a cheaper price."
The Knoxes had a total displacement of 4,200 tons, a crew of 250, and their cost in current prices would be $ 500-600 million.
Full-fledged combat, but very highly specialized ships.
Created only for one theater of military operations, under the same conditions and one chosen enemy
The hull of the frigate seemed to be built around the "drop" of a sonar with a detection range of submarines in active mode up to 60 km. The basis of the armament was made up of anti-submarine missiles, equipped with warheads in the form of homing torpedoes. And an attack drone, which made it possible to attack submarines at a distance significantly exceeding the distance of a torpedo attack, which seemed very cool by the standards of the 60s.
The AN / SQS-26 sonar station was so successful that it is still installed on Orly Burke-class destroyers; the difference between the GAS frigate "Knox" and the modern GAS SQS-53 lies in the digitization of the signal and the new interface (Mk.116). But it is based on the same antenna.
To increase the chances in a deadly duel, the creators of "Knox" equipped the frigate with Praire / Masker acoustic masking systems. Four perforated lines encircling the hull in the engine room area - for supplying low pressure air to the bottom of the frigate. The bubble curtain helps to reduce the noise level.
The technical appearance of the Knox was ahead of its time. But, despite the better than anyone else's PLO capabilities, the frigate was not designed to operate as part of the Navy.
Then for what purposes did you need a large series of low-speed (and very expensive) anti-submarine ships?
For escorting civil ships. Otherwise - the provision of convoys. This is clearly confirmed by the primary classification of "Knox" - DE (destroyer escort).
Then the next question is - where were the Yankees going to equip the convoys in the coming world war?
Obviously to Europe. Rotterdam and other major ports.
It remains to find out - why convoys in world warif everything ends an hour after it started?
"It won't end," McNamara chuckled, "who decided that the war would be nuclear?"
* * *
This is not often spoken about, but there is such an opinion: at "X hour" no one will dare to press the button. The world war will have to be waged with conventional weapons.
In contrast to the chanting bang! the whole world to dust!”, those who have the“red button”in their hands, they have something to lose. To bury their status, privileges, way of life in the ground at once, and even to take their own lives for the sake of … These people are used to making decisions in a more balanced and deliberate way.
The use of nuclear weapons is similar to detonating a grenade in hand-to-hand combat. Nuclear parity (guaranteed mutual destruction) does not allow the use of nuclear weapons with impunity and deprives any advantage of the one who decides to use it first.
The military confrontation between the superpowers that began for some reason, most likely, would not have been able to go beyond the level of conventional, non-nuclear weapons.
The superpowers once approached the "danger line" in 1962, not yet realizing that nuclear parity had been established between them. And realizing this, they immediately turned back, thinking about more traditional methods of war.
In addition to re-equipping the Armed Forces with outlandish weapons, McNamara began a sharp increase in the number of personnel. Before his resignation in 1968, he managed to increase the size of the US armed forces by one and a half times - from 2.48 to 3.55 million people. The McNamara Madness was a set of preparations for a conventional war.
A minor problem for the Americans has traditionally been the transfer of reinforcements and the supply of expeditionary forces in the Old World. The personnel could be quickly airlifted, but the delivery of heavy equipment, fuel and food required sea transport.
Navy in this war the decisive role was to ensure the escort of convoys through the troubled waters of the Atlantic.
* * *
A naval war with the USSR would be the first such conflict in history. When one of the parties is completely independent of sea communications, and its fleet is forced to destroy sea communications in the rear of the enemy, getting there through five seas and two oceans.
The situation confused all the maps and minds in the US Navy General Staff.
All the concepts of using the Navy and the conclusions formed in the first half of the twentieth century as a result of rivalry with the maritime powers (primarily Japan) were not suitable in such a situation.
The USSR was independent of sea routes, it had nowhere to go and there was no need to lead convoys in open sea areas. He practically did not have a surface fleet - against the background of the size of the naval forces of the Anglo-Saxon countries. Someone seriously believes that the BOD pr. 61 or RKR pr. 58 could break through somewhere and noticeably influence the situation, given the absolute superiority of the enemy at sea and air.
Next is pure geography.
The ability of the US Navy to strike with impunity against Kamchatka did not correspond to any of the real tasks and did not contain a single drop of practical meaning. All prepared lines of defense of the AUG became useless. For purely geographical reasons not a single important and necessary task for large warships in the war against the USSR was visible. Just as there could not have been tasks for missile cruisers, which in the 60s. have not yet had a Tomahawk.
Only the Anglo-Saxons had sea communications. On which transports with military supplies for the European theater of operations would move.
There is no doubt that these sea routes would become the object of close scrutiny by the Soviet submarine fleet. The Pentagon realized the danger and launched a specialized escort ship into the series.
* * *
The Yankees were not so naive, hoping that 46 "Knox" and 19 similar frigates "Brook" will be able to hold the defense against dozens of nuclear submarines.
To help the frigates from the reserve, 127 destroyers of the Second World War were removed. Their outdated artillery weapons were dismantled, and in exchange the ships received a new generation of anti-submarine weapons. In terms of their PLO capabilities, these units were a weak resemblance to the Knox frigates, but the number partly compensated for their quality. The salvoes of ASROK rocket torpedoes at any source of underwater noise are what was required in the coming war.
Also, do not dismiss allied fleets, due to the deplorable financial condition, they are often unable to build anything larger than escort frigates. For example, at the Navantia shipyard, five modified Knox frigates were built under license for the Spanish Navy.
As for the frigate "Knox", then, as noted above, it was a fairly large ship, corresponding in size to the destroyers of the 60s, with a hull length of 134 meters and a total displacement of 4,200 tons. The latest US Navy project with a boiler and turbine power plant.
The architecture of the hull and superstructures was typical of foreign naval shipbuilding of that era. Smooth-decked ship, with angular shapes, transom stern and a distinctive mast-pipe.
Two fuel oil boilers, one turbine, 35,000 hp Power supply system based on three turbine generators grouped in one compartment. If they were damaged or lost steam, the frigate became practically defenseless: the power of the only backup diesel generator was not enough to control the weapon.
"Combat stability" was not given importance due to the purpose of the frigate. The only threat was the torpedoes of Soviet submarines, and there was no anti-torpedo protection capable of saving a 4000-ton ship with a non-contact detonation of 300 kg of explosives under the keel.
The problem has always been not to sink, but to hit. The sub's task was to remain unnoticed and attack the convoy before the "hunters" destroy it.
The full composition of the Knox's armament looked like this:
- launcher RUR-5 ASROK (Anti-Subrarine ROCket) with 8 guides and ammunition from 16 rocket torpedoes. The task is the supersonic delivery of homing torpedoes to a range of up to 9 km (most of the time was taken by a parachute descent).
- two built 324 mm TA for the protection of the near zone.
- hangar and landing pad for an unmanned helicopter Gyrodyne QH-50 DASH with ammunition from two homing torpedoes.
- one 127 mm gun mount, installed "just in case." Artillery duels were strictly contraindicated for the frigate, and the clumsy five-inch Mk.42 was inferior to rifles in anti-aircraft performance.
However, the priority of anti-aircraft weapons was in 7th place, immediately after the cost of operating the frigate. No one seriously considered the threat from Soviet aviation to convoys in the Atlantic.
Bombers and missile carriers did not have a single chance to reach the line of attack. To do this, they would have to fly over all of Europe or the Norwegian / North Sea, staying for hours in the zone of action of fighters from dozens of NATO airfields.
As for submarines with anti-ship missiles, this threat also seemed unrealistic. And it remained so for a long time. As in view of the imperfection of the anti-ship missiles themselves and the small number of underwater carriers, and the lack of target designation in the vastness of the ocean.
* * *
The frigates were built. And the world war never happened. The entire subsequent history of the Knox was an attempt to adapt highly specialized ships to the unpredictable conditions of the Cold War. And learn to apply them where you never planned.
During the service, most of the ships received the SeaSperrow air defense system, which were subsequently replaced by the Falanx aft air defense system.
An anti-submarine drone turned out to be an interesting, but completely impractical idea, ahead of its time. After a short operation and regular accidents due to a control system failure, the surviving 755 built drones were transferred to Vietnam, and partly transferred to the Japanese Navy. Instead, a full-fledged SH-2 SeaSprite anti-submarine helicopter appeared on the frigates.
All frigates were excluded from the Navy in the 90s. and for the most part transferred to the allies. Currently, their operation continues in the naval forces of seven states.
Knox remained a unique Cold War project.
His peers, SKR pr. 1135 "Burevestnik", came out completely different from the American "submarine hunter". By their design and composition of armament, "Petrel" were typical patrol ships for the protection of maritime borders and protection of state interests. "Anti-submarine" specialization took place, but was not as pronounced as that of "Knox".
The subsequent project of the frigates "Oliver Perry" also had a wider purpose. It was created as a cheap means of being present in many regions of the world's oceans. And it turned out to be very unsuccessful - an attempt to combine shock, anti-submarine, anti-aircraft and aviation weapons in a 4000-ton hull led to the ship being unable to properly perform any of the tasks. The technological level of the last century made the idea of creating a universal frigate hopeless. Sami "Perry" suffered humiliating losses in local conflicts. Then the Yankees had too much money, and compromises were a thing of the past. The modern US Navy uses the large and versatile Orly Burke destroyers in any situation.
* * *
In Hell, McNamara had a heated argument with Grand Admiral Doenitz. And McNamara argued that the excellent organization and technical level of the US Navy would have kept the defenses. Doenitz did not agree, in his opinion, the exceptional fighting qualities of nuclear submarines would be a guarantee of the defeat of the convoys.
