For centuries, Russia remained Turkey's main geopolitical competitor in both the Balkans and the Caucasus. And this persistent competitor constantly tried to strengthen its positions, first in the North Caucasus, and then in the Transcaucasia and Persia, as well as in the zone adjacent to the Black Sea straits.
This, in particular, was openly stated in the appeal of the Turkish government on the day the decision was made to enter this country into the war: “Our participation in the world war is justified by our national ideal. The ideal of our nation … leads us to the destruction of our Moscow enemy in order to thereby establish the natural boundaries of our empire, which will include and unite all branches of our race”(1).
To achieve this goal, it was supposed, using the advantages of neutrality, to open even greater access to the country's economy for the inflow of foreign investment, to strengthen and develop the weak Turkish army, having trained it with the help of German instructors. After that, wait for the allies to deliver the hardest blow to Russia, which will begin to collapse, and at that time seize present Azerbaijan and Nakhichevan, seize Armenia, including it as a Christian autonomy in the Ottoman Empire.
In addition, the Turks did not abandon their hopes of returning Kars and the Adjarian coast of the Black Sea from under Russian control and, of course, again expanding the territories around Constantinople, restoring their lost dominance in the Black and Mediterranean Seas.
The Young Turks, who were just settling into power, developed extremely vigorous activity, turning for promises first to the Entente countries, then to Germany. Both England and France and Germany had extensive economic interests in Turkey, and their money actively influenced political decisions. Germany, in addition, controlled the army of this country - the mission of the German general Liman von Sanders in 1913 was closely involved in the reform of Turkish military units, which significantly complicated relations in the winter of the same year between Berlin and Petrograd.
German General Lyman von Sanders
“The power that controls the army,” wrote the German ambassador to Constantinople, Hans Wangenheim in 1913 to German Chancellor Theobald Bethmann-Hollweg, “will always be the strongest in Turkey. If we control the army, it will be impossible for any hostile government to stay in power.”(11)
Germany very shamelessly viewed Turkey as its colony and considered the establishment of allied relations with it a matter of unnecessary and secondary importance. But Turkey, and specifically - two of the three ruling pashas, have been striving for an alliance with Germany since 1911, now and then blackmailing her with negotiations on allied relations with the same France, seeking to destroy their isolation by concluding an agreement with Bulgaria.
The Sarajevo assassination and the events that followed helped Turkey to join the Triple Alliance. But this was preceded by very serious fluctuations in the Turkish elite.
There were illusions of a favorable outcome for the Turkish army, but not everyone in the Young Turkish government. Indicative in this respect is the telegram from the Ambassador of the Ottoman Empire to France, who telegraphed to Headquarters in 1914: “The low standard of living and the primitive development of Turkey require a long and peaceful growth. The deceptive attractiveness of possible military successes can only lead to our death … The Entente is ready to destroy us if we oppose it, Germany is not interested in our salvation … In case of defeat, it uses us as a means to satisfy the appetites of the victors - in case of victory, it will transform us to the protectorate”(10).
The Turks and the Romanian statesman Take Ionescu warned against rash actions: “Victorious Germany … will never go to such stupidity … to give you the Caucasus or Egypt. She will take them for herself if she can."
Now a little more about the diplomatic steps of Turkey.
Immediately after the bloody events in Sarajevo, it became obvious that the Turkish elite still lacks the expected unity and accord. The government was divided into those who stood for an early alliance with Germany, and those who had high hopes for a Western orientation. One of her supporters, Cemal, in July 1914, came to Paris, where he convinced French diplomats, in particular, French Foreign Minister René Viviani, that his country was vainly supporting the Greeks, while Turkey could be more useful to the Entente.
In the biography of the politician, his words are given: “France and England are pursuing the goal of creating an iron ring around the central powers. This ring has almost closed, except for one place - in the southeast … If you want to close your iron ring … you must accept us into your Entente and at the same time protect us from Russia”(6).
But France and England preferred an alliance with Russia, which, in their opinion, would help to recruit the Balkan countries into the coalition of 1914, so that Dzhemal had no chance in Paris, especially since he chose not a very good time for the visit - on the eve of his arrival in France Russian Tsar Nicholas II. Jemal's bitter pill of refusal was sweetened with lavish receptions and the award of the Legion of Honor.
Meanwhile, at the same time, in July 1914, an equally influential person of the Turkish cabinet - Enver Pasha, with the participation of the Austro-Hungarian ambassador, negotiated with the German ambassador to Turkey Hans Wangenheim, and also met with the chief of the German General Staff Helmut von Moltke.
General Enver Pasha
Together with them, Enver prepared a draft of the Turkish-German treaty, which Jemal, who had resisted earlier, after his Paris failure, adopted "without hesitation." Under the terms of the treaty, the Second German Reich was supposed to support Turkey in the "abolition of capitulations", in reaching with Bulgaria "an agreement corresponding to Ottoman interests in the division of territories to be conquered in the Balkans", as well as in the return of the Aegean archipelago, which was lost in previous wars, including Crete., in the event that Greece is on the side of the Entente.
The expansion of the territory of the Ottoman Empire at the expense of Russia "in such a way as to ensure direct contact … with the Muslim population", in other words, the capture of the Russian part of Armenia, and, finally, huge compensation for possible losses in the war. In return for all this, Turkey offered itself as a devoted military ally. The parties signed the agreement and the accompanying papers secretly on August 2 and 6, 1914. But the Turks clearly did not see it as something to fetter their initiative on the diplomatic front.
Thus, Minister of Finance Javid Bey made a request to the French ambassador in Constantinople for written guarantees of the territorial inviolability of his country for a period of 15-20 years and the abolition of lost "surrenders", and Grand Vizier Cemal hinted to the English Sir Lewis Mallett that Turkey dreams the patronage of the West, so that he would protect it from Russia (6).
Grand Vizier Jemal Pasha and General Talaat Pasha
But the height of impudence was Enver Pasha's confidential conversation with the Russian military attaché, during which Enver, one of the leaders of the Turkish political elite, and perhaps the most energetic and unprincipled one, proposed to conclude … an alliance for 5-10 years.
At the same time, he emphasized that his country did not have any obligations to other states, swore the most benevolent attitude towards the Russians, promised to withdraw Turkish troops from the Caucasian borders, send German military instructors home, completely transfer Turkish troops in the Balkans to the command of the Russian Headquarters, and together with Bulgaria to fight against Austria.
Of course, all this is not free of charge. Enver offered to transfer the Aegean Islands to Turkey, seizing them from Greece, and the region of Western Thrace with a Muslim population, which Bulgaria controlled. In this case, Greece would receive territories in Epirus, Bulgaria in Macedonia as compensation … Naturally, at the expense of Austria-Hungary, which recently participated in the conclusion of a solemn diplomatic alliance with Turkey.
The reaction of Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Sazonov to the demarche of "Napoleon", as Enver was called in Russia, was predictable. He did not openly express his indignation in response to unheard-of arrogance and gave the command to the military attaché to continue negotiations "in a benevolent sense … avoiding any binding statements" (8).
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Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Dmitrievich Sazonov
Sazonov, of course, knew, if not about the very conclusion of the military Turkish-German alliance, then about its preparation, about Enver's admiration for the personality of the Kaiser, the Russian ambassador to Constantinople Nikolai Girs, in addition, reported that “negotiations were underway between Turkey and Bulgaria community of actions in the current crisis, relying on Austria and Germany”(9).
Many modern scholars believe that Enver's proposal was aimed at embroiling Petrograd with Bulgaria, Romania and Greece. Meanwhile, the Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Sazonov, formally supporting part of the Turkish proposals, in fact sought not an alliance with Turkey, but an alliance with the Balkan states at the expense of the Ottoman Empire.
For example, he offered Bulgaria a part of Serbian Macedonia plus Turkish Thrace up to the Enos-Media line and waited for a response from Sofia, holding on to Enver and finally promising him guarantees of the inviolability of Turkey and the gratuitous possession of all German economic concessions in Asia Minor. Enver left with nothing. Diplomatic sounding failed to carry out the tsarist government.
