Each warship is built
ten auxiliary ships!
(Replica of a visitor to the site topwar.ru)
The Navy's rearmament program mostly consists of transports, hydrographs and other logistics tugs. A significant portion of the allocated funds is spent on the implementation of auxiliary fleet projects.
Auxiliary projects are comparable in scale to the construction of first-class warships. For example, the contract for the construction of a series of three logistics support vessels of Project 23120 (the lead one is Elbrus) cost the fleet 12 billion rubles. An amount comparable to the cost of building the frigate "Admiral Grigorovich" (13, 3 billion rubles).
Of course, voiced in 2011-2012. initial estimates turned out to be very far from the final cost. But the ratio remained unchanged: instead of a rocket ship in the far sea zone, there were three “tugs” under construction. In reality, only two of them were completed, due to disruptions in the supply of foreign components for the third building.
As follows from the description of "Elbrus", the main purpose of the vessel is the transportation and transfer of dry cargo, incl. to the unequipped coast, combined with the function of a sea tug. The development of the Arctic infrastructure associated with projects in the offshore oil and gas production industry, as well as the creation of military facilities in high latitudes, make such vessels absolutely necessary as part of the Northern Fleet.
On the other hand, the domestic fleet has never experienced a shortage of transport and tug vessels. So much so that in 2015 the Russian Federation (represented by the Federal Property Management Agency) even sold four similar vessels (Tumcha, Neftegaz-51, 57 and 61) to the Argentine naval forces. We are talking about "workhorses" built in 1986-90. (compare with the age of most naval ships!), which, due to the monotony of their tasks, are designed to operate for many decades.
Readers can rightly note that the Navy has an urgent need for ro-ro ships (for transporting wheeled and tracked vehicles) and container ships suitable for use as part of the "Syrian express" and supply operations on overseas shores. Everyone remembers the story of the urgent purchase of Turkish transports for the needs of the Black Sea Fleet? Unfortunately, ships of this class are not envisaged in the plans. State-owned companies show their interest only in the projects of the tanker fleet necessary for the developing oil and gas industry. As for "Elbrus" and similar vehicles, these are more tugboats than transport ships. They are not suitable for the transportation of large volumes of cargo.
"Today, the auxiliary fleet of the Navy includes 480 sea and road support vessels."
(Deputy Defense Minister Dmitry Bulgakov, 2016).
Even taking into account the correction for the technical condition of some of the units on the balance sheet, there are a dozen auxiliary ships for one combat-ready destroyer, frigate or SSBN of the domestic fleet!
Along with “Elbrus” (project 23120), for the needs of the Navy, sea tugs of project 23470 (“Andrey Stepanov” and “Sergey Balk”), four rescue and tugboats of project 22870 were ordered, deep modernization of sea transport of ice class “Yauza” was carried out according to the 550M project (80% of mechanisms and equipment were replaced), a tugboat pr.20180 (“Zvezdochka”), the construction of a series of vessels is continuing, representing the further development of “Zvezdochka” - naval support vessels of the project 20183 (“Akademik Aleksandrov”).
The abundance of sea tug projects is simply dazzling in the eyes.
Despite the urgent need for warships, for some reason priority is given to auxiliary units
Given the facts and financial constraints, when combat-ready warships become a rare and exclusive phenomenon, the inexplicable desire to update the already numerous logistic support ships looks like a criminal waste.
In addition to Elbrus and other transport and tug vessels, many other contracts were concluded in the interests of the Navy, the necessity and timeliness of which raises questions.
Last year, the Black Sea Fleet was reinforced with an experimental vessel "Viktor Cherokov" (project 20360 OS). Initially - a floating crane-loader of ammunition worth 600 million rubles. and with the date of delivery in 2010. In the process it turned out that the ammunition loader was no longer needed. Seven years later, the ship was completed according to a modified design as a test bench for torpedo weapons.
Based on the design and purpose, the task of "Viktor Cherokov" is to launch samples of experimental practical torpedoes (with a set of measuring instruments installed instead of the warhead), followed by their search and ascent to the surface.
This is in conditions when the Navy is already in trial operation several modern, but, for a number of reasons, limitedly combat-ready ships. For example, the submarine B-90 “Sarov” or the head diesel-electric submarine of pr. 677 “Saint Petersburg”, which are the best suited for testing mine and torpedo weapons. The identified shortcomings of the power plant in this context do not matter. Ships do not participate in combat services and spend all their time near their native shores. And once you've built it, use it as efficiently as possible.
Complete test benches , as close as possible in design to the warships of the Russian Navy.
In addition to these units, a whole series of torpedo boats is currently being built on the updated project 1388.
Against this background, the emergence of another project of a floating stand for launching torpedoes looks like a redundant solution. Especially in a situation where the carriers of "new types of torpedo weapons" themselves can be counted on one hand.
Floating laboratories and experimental ships are a whole mainstream in the Navy's rearmament program.
For less than a decade, a pair of Project 11982 vessels (Ladoga and Seliger) were built for the needs of the Navy, designed to conduct tests of special technical means, equipment and weapons. Along with them, an oceanographic vessel was built according to the project 22010 "Yantar" for the study of the seabed. Quite expensive programs.
In total, the cost of the contract for the construction of "Yantar" and "Seliger" was 7 billion rubles. (original estimate as of 2009).
Measure seven times - that sounds wise. Experiments allow one to gain knowledge about the real characteristics of objects, to confirm or refute their declared properties in certain conditions. But in the context of the navy, all these experiments and studies of the seabed make sense only if the accumulated body of knowledge can be applied on board warships. And here at this point the program of rearmament of the Navy is at odds with common sense.
The Americans, with a fleet of 70 destroyers, can afford to build auxiliary units for any purpose. In our case, the approach should be different. In view of the officially announced figures on the available number of auxiliary vessels and the existing financial constraints, all forces and means should be devoted to the rearmament of battalions of warships.
As for the test ships, the Japanese demonstrated an example of the most rational spending of funds by building a "test ship", fully corresponding in size, power and seaworthiness to a serial destroyer. Differences - in the composition of weapons and electronic "stuffing".
JDS Asuka is designed to test radars, CIUS elements, launchers and various ship systems. Despite the experimental nature of this ship, in fact, in the Japanese Navy there is another, unaccounted for missile destroyer.
The cabin bearers - the striking force of the fleet
The “cherry on the cake” of today's review will be communication boats of the new generation. Traditionally, boats of this class are designed for service trips when controlling ships on roadsteads, transporting groups of persons, documents and small cargo. But here, behind the routine name, there are completely different scales.
As it became known from official sources, a "boat" with the serial number "403" was built at the Sokolskaya shipyard in the Nizhny Novgorod region
67 meters in length, displacement of 1000 tons. In terms of their dimensions and cost, the "boats" surpassed the small rocket carriers "Caliber". Admirals have a lot to be proud of. The only question is - what is the combat value of this vessel?
The new "communication boat" will be able to adequately display the flag at the docks of the Monte Carlo casino. And in terms of the richness of the internal equipment, this representative yacht should surpass the “ceremonial” communication boats of the project 21270, which will be described a little below.
Several years ago, three "communication boats" of project 21270, specially prepared for receiving maritime parades, appeared in the Baltic Fleet at once. Each has six comfortable cabins: the main VIP cabin with a separate office and five cabins for lower ranks, a 20-seat saloon for banquets, as well as a restaurant-observation deck on the upper deck, allowing everyone present to admire the parade formation of the warships.
It is curious that the declared splendor of the project 21270 and various modifications of the project 1388 remained out of work. At the 2017 naval parade in St. Petersburg, Vladimir Putin traditionally chose a more ascetic and brutal image. The President received the main parade from a high-speed patrol boat, project 03160 ("Raptor"), painted a snow-white color and equipped with all the equipment necessary for this purpose.
As for pleasure yachts of communication boats, they have remained toys for admirals.
The only positive moment of this story is that they did not hesitate to build representative yachts at domestic shipyards. Following the military order, a reputation will appear, and then, for sure, orders from individuals. The German shipyard Blohm & Voss may lose its regular customers.
On the other hand, the number of parade boats in the Baltic Fleet will soon exceed the number of active warships. All this looks like a curious story with the number of admiral's posts in one well-known naval power.
What's the bottom line?
“We sawed off the allocated funds, instead of destroyers and submarines they built vessels of dubious purpose,” the indignant reader will say.
In fact, everything is somewhat different. As part of any type of armed forces, a significant part of the equipment falls on special-purpose equipment. For example, an order for the construction of a series of 9 hydrographic vessels of the project 19910, taking into account the length of Russia's maritime borders, looks like a perfectly justified decision. Installation of navigation buoys, maintenance and recharging of floating aids to navigation is the most important set of works to ensure the safety of navigation and the activities of ships, naval bases and training grounds of the Navy.
There can be no doubt about the need for the so-called. communication vessels (sea reconnaissance) of project 18280 "Yuri Ivanov" and "Ivan Khurs". Or the ocean-class rescue vessel "Victor Belousov" (project 21300S) with the deep-sea vehicle "Bester-1". So that in the event of emergency situations, you no longer have to turn to the Norwegians and British for help. Another question is why such an important ship, giving a chance to rescue submariners in distress, was built in a single copy? But tugboats - for all occasions!
Most of the reports on the renewal of the naval staff are related to the construction of ships, which are very far from the tasks and needs of naval sailors. The Navy is a tool for protecting Russia's interests in the sea. And, no matter what modern "philosophers" say that the fleet begins with tugs and support vessels, the Navy is, first of all, warships. It is their quantity and characteristics that determine the potential of any naval forces.
What is now being built at the shipyards under the guise of the rearmament program of the Navy, for the most part, has nothing to do with the navy. In the current situation, numerous tugs, transports and “oceanographers” can only become an excellent trophy for the enemy.
Let's get some experience - and then
Analogies with the post-war program of rearmament of the Navy in the late 40s - early 50s. are completely irrelevant here. Then, hundreds of ships of obsolete projects were built at the shipyards with the main goal: to preserve the shipbuilding industry and gain experience in building ships on their own (in contrast to the pre-war years, when all technologies were acquired abroad).
Now there is no need for experience in building tugs. Let us leave tales about the lack of specialists and technologies on the conscience of those who cannot (or do not wish) to see the truth point-blank.
And it is as follows: the shipbuilding industry of the Russian Federation and related research institutes and industries are ready to implement projects of any complexity up to the construction of an aircraft carrier. A striking example is the rebuilding of the 270-meter “Gorshkov” into the Indian “Vikramaditya” with the replacement of 243 hull sections, the laying of 2,300 km of cables and the complete replacement of all mechanisms and equipment: power plant, deck configurations, aircraft lifts.
Over the past 25 years, Russian shipyards have been building packs of first-class warships for export: destroyers and submarines for the PRC, supplied long-range air defense systems for the Chinese fleet, one after another handed over Talwaras to customers, took part in the development of the latest destroyers for the Indian Navy. Among the eloquent examples: Indian submariners received export "Calibers" (Club-S) ten years earlier than the domestic submarine fleet!
Why are the programs for the construction of warships for the Russian Navy being carried out with such tension and slippage? Why are the allocated funds redistributed in favor of projects that are far from the first priority? Who benefits from the senseless promises “to gain experience, saturate the fleet with tugs, so that while we manage to build, and only then …” Answers to these questions should be sought among those who are responsible for the distribution of funds.
There is no other explanation.
