In the second half of the 20s, Stalin completely defeated both left and right oppositionists (Stalin's fierce struggle for power in the turning 20s), who opposed his course of building socialism in a single country, which was based on industrialization based on a mobilization economy and a continuous collectivization. The implementation of this course came with a colossal exertion of the forces of the entire society and caused discontent among the population with the extremely difficult situation in the country. Which, of course, created threats both for the policy pursued by him and for his personal power.
It should not be forgotten that the creation of a mobilization economy in the Soviet Union was one of Stalin's most important achievements. By his course, he laid the foundations for the future military and economic might of a state capable of resisting military aggression and conducting business on an equal footing with the leading powers of the West. Industrialization laid the foundation for a great future for the country and the place of the Soviet Union in the club of great powers throughout a whole historical era.
Pursuing a tough policy with inevitable costs, he understood that the further and more successfully he advances in solving his problems, suppressing the resistance of his opponents, the wider the circle of his real and potential opponents becomes. Defeated and publicly repentant opponents from among the left and right did not at all accept their defeat.
The fight with defeated opponents has moved to another phase.
The tactics chosen by Stalin in the 1920s to gradually form his image as an exemplary leader, based on collegiality and the first among equals, changed in the early 1930s.
Now the image of the sole leader began to be imposed. Every year the propaganda expanded the campaign to exalt the leader, emphasizing his wisdom, iron will and unshakable firmness in carrying out the general line of the party.
To oppose Stalin meant to oppose the party line. And he did everything possible to be perceived as a person fulfilling the historical mission that befell him.
The elimination of the kulaks as a class
The remnants of the defeated left and right opposition still posed some kind of threat to Stalin's political course. Moreover, collectivization was not completed. And the appeals of Bukharin and the Rights to take into account the interests of the peasantry forced Stalin to act carefully so as not to provoke resistance from the countryside.
He proceeded from the premise that the success of collectivization will largely depend on whether or not it will be possible to break the opposition of the kulaks and sweep them off the stage of history. They also represented a serious force. In 1927, there were 1.1 million kulak farms in the country, which sowed 15% of the country's sown area. And they were not going to give up.
In December 1929, Stalin decided to deal a decisive blow to the kulaks. And he announced the transition from a policy of limiting exploitative tendencies in the countryside to a policy of eliminating the kulaks as a class.
In January 1930, the Politburo ruled
"On measures to eliminate kulak farms in areas of complete collectivization", according to which the kulaks were divided into three categories.
The first category - the organizers of anti-Soviet demonstrations and terrorist acts were subject to isolation by court decision. Second, big kulaks were moved to sparsely populated areas of the country. And the third - the rest of the kulaks, they moved to lands outside the collective farms.
This decree gave broad powers on the ground in determining who was subject to dispossession. And it created the preconditions for abuse.
In 1930–1931, 381,026 families with a total number of 1,803,392 people were sent to special resettlement. This campaign provoked resistance in the village. And it became a tragedy for the well-to-do peasantry, which was liquidated. She equalized everyone in rights - in the collective farms.
Stalin did this deliberately, he sought to eliminate the last exploiting class and redistribute resources from the countryside to industry, expanding the possibilities for industrialization.
Fighting non-systemic opposition
In the early 1930s, Stalin's policies were often opposed in secret. It was a series of small party groupings that demonstrated that not everyone in the party agrees with the leader's course.
Syrtsov block. A candidate member of the Politburo, Syrtsov, in his entourage began to express dissatisfaction with Stalin personally. He drew attention to the abnormality of the situation in the work of the Politburo, where all questions are predetermined by Stalin and those close to him. From Stalin's point of view, this was unacceptable. Syrtsov was accused of creating
“Factional underground groups”.
And in December 1930, he and a number of high-ranking functionaries were expelled from the Central Committee for factionalism in the party.
Smirnov's group. In January 1933, the group of Smirnov, the former secretary of the Central Committee who oversaw agriculture and was directly confronted with the dire consequences of collectivization, was declared counter-revolutionary and was completely defeated, which actively opposed Stalin's policy. For the creation of an "underground factional group" in order to change the policy in the field of industrialization and collectivization, they were expelled from the party.
Ryutin's platform. The low-level party functionary Ryutin and his group in their platform (1932) in a concentrated form put forward the main political accusations against Stalin. This document can be considered the most complete and well-reasoned anti-Stalinist manifesto.
“Stalin was never a real, genuine leader, but it was all the easier for him to turn into a real dictator in the course of events.
He came to his present undivided domination by cunning combinations, relying on a handful of people and apparatus loyal to him, and by fooling the masses …
People who do not know how to think in Marxism think that the elimination of Stalin will at the same time be the overthrow of Soviet power.
Stalin cultivates and spreads such a view in every possible way.
But he is absolutely wrong."
Ryutin for
"Counter-revolutionary propaganda and agitation"
in October 1930 he was expelled from the party.
But he did not stop his activities. And he created a group of like-minded people. But he was soon arrested.
At a meeting of the Polyutburo, Stalin proposed to shoot Ryutin. But in the end he was left in prison. Where in 1937 he was shot without trial.
Small political groups could in no way influence the policy of the strengthened Stalin. And he quickly (still "softly") dealt with them.
Suicide of Stalin's wife
Soon two important events took place in Stalin's life: the suicide of his wife Nadezhda Alliluyeva (November 1932) and the assassination of Kirov (December 1934), which undoubtedly left an indelible stamp on all of Stalin's future activities.
The death of his wife became a watershed in his fate. And she hardened him to the extreme. Made it even more suspicious and distrustful. Has strengthened in him feelings of irreconcilability and rigidity. The personal tragedy of the leader was transformed into his merciless attitude towards real and imaginary enemies.
His wife was more than twenty years younger than him. She had a strong character. And they really loved each other. But Stalin, due to his workload, could not pay due attention to his young wife. Nadezhda developed a serious illness - ossification of the cranial sutures, accompanied by depression and headache attacks. All this markedly affected her mental state. She was also very jealous. And more than once she threatened to commit suicide.
According to Molotov's recollections, another quarrel took place at Voroshilov's apartment, where they celebrated on November 7. Stalin rolled a lump of bread and in front of everyone threw it into the wife of Marshal Yegorov. Nadezhda was in an agitated state after a quarrel with her husband that had taken place the day before because of his delay with the hairdresser. She reacted sharply to this "lump" and got up from the table. Together with Polina Zhemchuzhina (Molotov's wife), she then walked around the Kremlin for a long time.
In the morning, Stalin found her shooting herself with a pistol given to her by her brother.
There is a version that Stalin considered the Pearl one of the reasons for his wife's death. And in 1949 he treated her harshly. She was sent to the camps for contact with "Jewish nationalists".
After the death of his wife, Stalin experienced a deep internal crisis. He moderated his public activity, spoke little and often remained silent. Many researchers believe that it was this circumstance that prompted the leader to cruel reprisals against his already defeated opponents.
From November 1932, another purge was announced in the party with the aim of
"To ensure in the party iron proletarian discipline and to cleanse the party ranks of all unreliable, unstable and adherent elements."
This especially affected those who spoke (or could act) against the general line.
In total, in 1932-1933, about 450 thousand people were expelled from the party.
In May 1933, on the initiative of Stalin, the ominous decision "On the OGPU troikas" was adopted. In the republics, territories and regions, they have so far been prohibited from passing death sentences.
Kirov's assassination
The assassination of Kirov (a member of the Politburo and a personal friend of Stalin) was a fundamental turning point in the country's development. And a turning point in Stalin's organization of mass repressions, the consequences of which were so massive that they left a deep mark on the life of an entire generation.
Kirov was killed on December 1, 1934 in Leningrad in Smolny with a pistol shot. There were many versions that the murder was organized by Stalin to eliminate his rival. This version was especially promoted by Khrushchev.
Later studies proved that the murder was committed by Nikolaev, who was distinguished by a scandalous character and conflicts with his superiors. For which, in the process of purging, he was expelled from the party and tried to recover with the help of Kirov.
His pretty wife Milda Draule worked in Smolny and was the mistress of Kirov, who was reputed to be a passionate admirer of women. Using his party card, Nikolaev entered Smolny and, out of jealousy, shot Kirov with an award pistol. It was unacceptable to admit the murder of one of the leaders of the party for the banal reason of seducing someone else's wife. And, naturally, they began to look for another reason.
Stalin immediately decided to use this murder for the purpose of reprisals against his opponents. And he left for Leningrad. By taking over the lead in the investigation, he was able to set it on the path he had already envisioned.
He instructed Yezhov, who oversees the work of the NKVD:
"Look for killers among the Zinovievites."
Guided by this, the NKVD artificially linked Nikolaev with the former members of the Zinoviev opposition. He falsified the criminal cases of the "Leningrad" and "Moscow" centers, the "Leningrad counter-revolutionary group", the "Trotskyist bloc", the "united" and "parallel" centers.
At the direction of the leader, a decree of the CEC of December 1, 1934 was developed and published
"On the procedure for conducting cases on the preparation or commission of terrorist acts."
The law prescribed to complete the investigation of cases of terrorist organizations within ten days, to consider cases in court without the participation of prosecution and defense, not to allow cassation and petitions for pardon, and to carry out execution sentences immediately.
In the course of this case, Stalin planned to create the necessary basis for declaring the supporters of Trotsky and Zinoviev not as ideological fighters, but as a gang of assassins and agents of foreign intelligence services. The corresponding preparatory work was entrusted to Yezhov.
After the appropriate "processing" Nikolaev began to give the necessary testimony. In Leningrad, Moscow and other cities, mass arrests of former Zinovievites and members of other opposition groups in the past began. Zinoviev and Kamenev were arrested and convoyed to Leningrad. From the arrested, by threats and promises to alleviate their fate, they obtained testimony about the existence of the "Leningrad Center" and the associated "Moscow Center" and the recognition of political and moral responsibility for the crime committed by Nikolayev. In the end, such recognition was received from Zinoviev and Kamenev.
Stalin personally selected 14 people from the 23 arrested for the trial in the Leningrad Center case, while deleting the names of Zinoviev, Kamenev and other oppositionists, who were later convicted in the Moscow Center case.
On December 29, 1934, the military collegium of the Supreme Court sentenced all the accused in the "Leningrad Center" to death. And on January 16, 1935, in the Moscow Center case, Zinoviev, Kamenev and other oppositionists were sentenced to imprisonment for terms of five to ten years.
In the two and a half months after Kirov's murder, 843 people were arrested in the Leningrad Region. And from Leningrad, 663 family members of the repressed were sent to the north of Siberia and to Yakutia.
In January 1935, a letter from the Central Committee was sent to all party organizations, stressing that the ideological and political leader of the Leningrad Center was the Moscow Center, which knew about the terrorist sentiments of the Leningrad Center and incited these sentiments. Both "centers" were united by a common Trotskyite-Zinoviev platform, which sets the goal of achieving high posts in the party and government.
At the same time, during this period, the number of arrests on charges of preparing terrorist acts increased significantly. If for the whole of 1934 6,501 people were arrested, then in 1935 there were already 15,986 people. The rise of the ominous figure of Yezhov, whom Stalin had already planned to replace Yagoda, also began.
"Kremlin affair" or the case of the cleaners
In July 1935, the NKVD officers falsified the "Kremlin case" about counter-revolutionary terrorist groups in the government library and the Kremlin commandant's office, according to which 110 people were convicted, two of them were sentenced to death. In this case, the Kremlin's security officers, employees of the government library, employees and technical staff of the Kremlin were involved, who allegedly were preparing the assassination of Stalin.
One of the tasks was to substantiate the future accusation of Kamenev and tie it to his brother's ex-wife, who worked in the Kremlin library and is involved in this case.
In fact, this was a case against a friend of Stalin's underground youth, CEC secretary Abel Yenukidze, who more than once came to the defense of persons discredited by Stalin and by that time had begun to more actively express doubts about the correctness of his actions.
It became obvious that Stalin did not stop even before the elimination of his former closest friends. Yenukidze was accused of political and domestic corruption and transferred to peripheral work. And in 1937 he was arrested and charged with treason and espionage. And in October 1937 he was shot by a court sentence.
Stalin's policy in the mid-1930s was ambivalent and contradictory.
On the one hand, there has been a colossal economic and social breakthrough. A qualitatively new level of the country's defense capability. Unprecedented growth of education and culture of the people. And a noticeable improvement in the material situation of the population. The new Constitution (1936) declared and enshrined democratic norms and basic social and political rights of citizens.
On the other hand, it was during this period that large-scale repressions and purges were being prepared. And also conditions were prepared for Stalin's implementation of not political, but physical elimination of his real and potential opponents.
The first trial of the "Anti-Soviet United Trotskyite-Zinoviev Center"
Stalin decided not only to finally deal with his main opponents Zinoviev and Kamenev, but through an open trial to present them as terrorists and murderers. The trial should have become unusual, since Lenin's closest associates and, in the recent past, the most prominent leaders of the party and the country were in the dock. Society was already prepared for the forthcoming conviction of the accused.
As a preparatory act, the Central Committee sent a letter in which new facts of the criminal acts of the Zinoviev group and their role in terrorist activities were revealed. Zinoviev and Kamenev had to confirm at an open trial that, under the leadership of Trotsky, they were preparing the assassination of Stalin and other members of the Politburo.
Despite the resistance of Zinoviev and Kamenev, Yezhov and Yagoda managed to convince them that their lives would be spared and their relatives would not be subjected to reprisals if they admit that they were preparing their terrorist and anti-Soviet actions at Trotsky's instructions. The suffering of Zinoviev and Kamenev ended, their conditions of detention were improved. And the doctors started treating them. They believed that if in court they recognize the organization of the crimes imputed to them, they will remain alive.
The court performance took place in August 1936, in which all the accused pleaded guilty to the creation of numerous terrorist organizations throughout the country with the aim of assassinating Stalin and other leaders. And they did it with some kind of readiness incomprehensible to a normal person and, as it were, with a sense of fulfillment of a high duty. They seemed to be competing with each other to make themselves look their worst. The public prosecutor demanded
"So that the mad dogs were shot - every one of them."
And all 16 defendants were sentenced to capital punishment.
Before his execution, Zinoviev humbly pleaded with Stalin to call and save his life. But the Moloch could no longer be stopped. On the basis of this process, in 1936 more than 160 people were arrested and shot, allegedly preparing terrorist acts throughout the country.
The second trial of the "Parallel Anti-Soviet Trotskyist Center"
To expand the scale of repression and purge already unnecessary executors, Stalin needed another person as head of the NKVD.
In September 1936, Yagoda was replaced by the secretary of the Central Committee, Yezhov. Stalin knew him as a person not burdened with feelings of pity, compassion and justice. He was, without exaggeration, a sadist. In addition, on a personal level, Yezhov was tied hand and foot, since he was an alcoholic and homosexual.
The main task in the second half of 1936 for Yezhov was the preparation and conduct in January 1937 of the second large show trial, in which there were seventeen accused. The main figures were Pyatakov, Serebryakov, Radek and Sokolnikov. The defendants were accused of attempting to overthrow Soviet power, for which they allegedly launched widespread sabotage, espionage and terrorist activities.
Those arrested during the investigation were subjected to the same procedure of intimidation, provocation and interrogation with partiality. In order to persuade those under investigation to confess in the press, a change in the criminal legislation was published, which allowed them to count on the preservation of life in the event of a frank confession of their crimes. Many believed this, giving the testimony required of them. And they did this, in their words, in the interests of exposing and defeating Trotskyism.
So Radek at the trial asserted:
"I admitted my guilt based on an assessment of the overall benefit that this truth should bring."
And Pyatakov, in particular, made a proposal on his own to allow him to personally shoot all those sentenced to death. Including his ex-wife. And publish it in print.
The court sentenced Pyatakov, Serebryakov, Muralov and ten other defendants to be shot. Sokolnikov and Radek, as well as two other minor characters in this judicial performance, received 10 years in prison. But in May 1939, they were killed by inmates in the prison.
The case of the "Anti-Soviet Trotskyist military organization" (the Tukhachevsky case)
In the process of clearing the political field, Stalin could not ignore the army, where they were able to prepare and carry out a real conspiracy.
By the beginning of 1937, preparations began for the purge in the top leadership of the army, since the thought of serious opposition to his political course could well wander there.
The candidate for the head of the conspirators was Marshal Tukhachevsky, who was in conflict with Voroshilov and more than once expressed unflattering epithets to the "former cavalryman" in his close circle. Dissatisfaction and criticism is one thing, and plotting a conspiracy is quite another. But the marshal with Bonapartist manners and his entourage were a wave of conspirators.
Back in 1930, the arrested teachers of the Military Academy. Frunze Kakurin and Troitsky testified against Tukhachevsky. Allegedly, he is waiting for a favorable environment to seize power and establish a military dictatorship. And he allegedly has many supporters in military circles.
The confrontations carried out with the presence of Stalin himself proved Tukhachevsky's innocence. But the ground for suspicion about the marshal remained. In addition, false material was planted about his ties with Germany, since he was in contact with German generals on duty.
In April 1937, Stalin made serious changes in the generals: Tukhachevsky was sent to command the Volga Military District, Marshal Yegorov was appointed First Deputy People's Commissar of Defense, Chief of the General Staff - Shaposhnikov, Yakir was transferred to command the Leningrad District.
Participants of the "conspiracy" at the suggestion of the Politburo were arrested in May on charges of participation in the "anti-Soviet Trotskyist-right bloc" and espionage for Nazi Germany. The indictment stated that the "Trotskyist military center", whose leadership included Tukhachevsky, Gamarnik, Uborevich, Yakir and other military leaders, on the direct instructions of the German General Staff and Trotsky, with the support of the Bukharin-Rykov right-wing group, was engaged in sabotage, sabotage, terror and prepared overthrow of the government and seizure of power in order to restore capitalism in the USSR.
The military conspiracy case at a closed court hearing was considered on June 11, 1937 by the Special Court Presence, which included Blucher and Budyonny. After the reading of the indictment, all the defendants pleaded guilty.
The universal confession of the accused in all trials was very surprised even in Germany. They assumed that they were injected with some kind of drug. And they instructed the intelligence to find out. But everything turned out to be trite simpler. Stalin was simply well versed in people. And he knew their weaknesses.
On the day of the trial, on the instructions of Stalin, instructions were sent to the republics, territories and regions to organize meetings and pass resolutions on the need to apply capital punishment. Naturally, all the accused were subjected to angry condemnation and curses. The court sentenced all eight of the accused to death, which was carried out the next day.
After the trial of Tukhachevsky, 980 senior commanders and political workers were arrested (as participants in a military conspiracy).
In total, in 1937-1939, 9,579 officers were arrested for political reasons. And 17 981 people were repressed. Of these, 8,402 were dismissed from the army, which is just over 4% of the payroll of the commanders of the Red Army.
Stalin understood perfectly well that it was impossible to decapitate the army before the war, which he considered inevitable. And he knew the real price of the heroes of the Civil War and the reputation of the military leaders inflated by propaganda who fell into the millstones of the "conspiracy". And he was ready to sacrifice them.
The third trial of the anti-Soviet "bloc of Rights and Trotskyites"
The trial over the military shocked the entire country.
But Stalin's plans also included holding a public process that would become a kind of crown of this entire campaign. And the central figures in it were to be Bukharin and Rykov.
The process was supposed to demonstrate the complete and unconditional bankruptcy of all former political opponents of the leader. They were supposed to appear before the whole country not as political opponents, but as a group of political bandits, spies, united in a kind of common Trotskyist conspiracy, in which Trotsky played the main role, and Bukharin, Rykov and others danced to his tune.
At the March 1937 plenum, on the eve of which Ordzhonikidze committed suicide, the persecution of Bukharin's group continued.
Stalin toughly and consistently pursued a course towards their unconditional expulsion from the party and prosecution. They were unfoundedly accused of not abandoning their political and hostile beliefs to the country, standing on the platform of capitalist restoration in the USSR, preparing for the overthrow of the Stalinist leadership and entering a bloc with the Trotskyists, Zinovievists, Socialist-Revolutionaries, Mensheviks and other factional groups, switched to methods terror and the organization of an armed uprising.
There was even a far-fetched accusation of intent to physically destroy Lenin, Stalin and Sverdlov.
Bukharin, arrested right at the plenum, rejected these absurd accusations with anger and indignation. And it was not so easy to break him. Feeling hopelessness, Bukharin began to write letters to Stalin, in which he sought to dissuade him from the fact that he was an enemy of the party line and Stalin personally. He does not skimp on immeasurable political curtsies about Stalin and his policies, but all was in vain.
In March 1938, an open trial took place. Three former members of the Politburo - Bukharin, Rykov and Krestinsky, as well as Yagoda and other high-ranking party leaders - were in the dock at once. In addition to this process, closed trials were held, at which, in a simplified manner, sentences were passed to those who were at risk of being brought to an open trial. Stalin took an active personal part in the preparation of the trial and determined the main directions of the indictment. He also patronized Bukharin's interrogations at confrontations.
At the trial, Bukharin admitted his guilt in general. But he often skillfully refuted absurd accusations. He categorically denied his involvement in espionage, the murder of Kirov and other leaders of the Soviet state.
The public reaction to the process was pre-programmed. Mass rallies took place, angry articles were published with the only requirement - to severely punish the criminals, shoot them like mad dogs. The court sentenced 18 defendants to be shot, less significant persons to various prison terms.
Bukharin wrote his last letter to Stalin:
“If a death sentence awaits me, then I ask you in advance to replace the execution with the fact that I myself will drink poison in the cell …
Let me spend the last seconds the way I want.
Have pity!
Knowing me well, you will understand …”.
But Stalin did not heed the pleas of his former comrade-in-arms.
Completion of the Great Purge
With the last public trial, Stalin, as it were, summed up the struggle against his political opponents.
The victory was total.
It ended with the physical destruction of opponents. In addition to open and closed trials of 1937-1938, convictions were practiced in a “special order”. That is, the decision to shoot was taken by Stalin and his closest associates and was formalized by a "commission" - Stalin, the head of the NKVD and the Prosecutor General.
Also, by the decision of the Politburo on July 31, 1937, lists (limits) of persons subject to repression from several hundred to 5000 people were approved for the republics, territories and regions. There were two categories. The most hostile anti-Soviet elements were subject to arrest and, by decision of the "troikas" - to be shot. And the second category - less active hostile elements were subject to arrest and imprisonment in camps.
As a result of all these actions, 936 750 people were repressed in 1937 and 638 509 thousand in 1938.
On the whole, an atmosphere of general suspicion and denunciation has developed in the country and in the party. The "Great Purge" was intended not only to eliminate real and potential enemies of the people, but also to instill fear and awe in all those who, under favorable circumstances, could rebel against Stalin and his political course.
Stalin, in all likelihood, began to understand that such a massive scale of repression could undermine his own power. He began to prepare the ground for their limitation not from considerations of humanism, but from real political calculations, since the emerging clearly anomalous situation, spy mania and mania for sabotage threatened to cross all borders, lead to the elimination of party and state cadres and to the loss of state stability.
To do this, it was necessary to remove Yezhov, who strove to increase the scale of repression and did not intend to stop. The leader decided to place all responsibility for the massive repression on Yezhov. He did his job and had to leave.
Stalin began a gradual process of removing the people's commissar from power. In April 1938, he was also appointed People's Commissar for Water Transport. And by the decision of the Politburo in August 1938, Beria was appointed first deputy to Yezhov.
There is a version that it was Beria who began to reduce the repression.
Far from it.
He was just the executor of the will of the leader, who took a course to introduce this process into a reasonable channel. Beria was faced with the task of limiting the scale of repression and excluding any possibility of the appearance of opposition to Stalin.
Yezhov was “recommended” to write a letter of his resignation, which he did in September 1938, and in November he was dismissed from the post of People's Commissar.
Even before the formal removal of Yezhov, at the direction of Stalin, Beria launched a purge of the NKVD ranks from the people of the "iron people's commissar". In the period from September to December 1938, an almost complete replacement of the leadership of the NKVD was carried out, up to the heads of departments.
Yezhov was arrested in April 1939. And after a rather long investigation, he and his closest associates were shot. Nothing was reported about his execution. But his short reign left a deep imprint on the consciousness of Soviet society, as
"Iron grip".
All these measures were preparatory steps for the adoption in November 1938 of the decree of the Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars, which eliminated judicial troikas at all levels.
All cases now had to be considered only by the courts or a Special Meeting under the NKVD. With this resolution, Stalin clearly marked the fundamentally new contours of his policy in this area. From now on, there will be no more mass purges. But repressions, as a measure of prevention of opposition to the policy of the leader, remain.
An unbiased assessment of the "Great Purge" suggests that the repressions were carried out by Stalin as an integral part of the political course aimed at building a powerful state, as he understood it, and eliminating any actions, both against the current course and against the leader himself.
His opponents were far from being angels. And it is not known how many misfortunes the implementation of their proposed course would bring.
But nothing can justify the tragedies of hundreds of thousands of innocent people who fell into the molokh of repression.
