1941 year. German command against Soviet intelligence

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1941 year. German command against Soviet intelligence
1941 year. German command against Soviet intelligence

Video: 1941 year. German command against Soviet intelligence

Video: 1941 year. German command against Soviet intelligence
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In the previous part, we began to consider intelligence materials (RM) on the enemy grouping concentrated against the troops of the Western Military District. Therefore, we will first finish our consideration of this topic. In accordance with the RM of the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the spacecraft, from mid-May until the start of the war, the increase in the German grouping against the ZAPOVO did not occur. In June, echelons, columns of troops and equipment moved somewhere intensively, but the number of divisions remained unchanged against the PribOVO, and against the KOVO, and against the ODVO, and against the ZAPOVO. Let's try to figure it out.

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Comparison of data on the deployment of German troops on May 31 and June 21

In the previous part, we examined a map of the ZapOVO headquarters with a plotted situation of the location of German troops as of 21.6.41. Earlier, we considered a similar map of the PribOVO headquarters with the situation on June 21. A comparison was made of the data on the map with information from the intelligence report of the PribOVO headquarters dated 6/18/1941. Readers could be convinced of the coincidence of the information given in both documents.

In the free access on the Internet, there are no RMs of the headquarters of the ZapOVO, similar to the specified detailed summary of the headquarters of the PribOVO. Therefore, we will compare the data on the map with the data on the deployment of German troops as of June 1.

For the first time, data on the deployment of German troops as of June 1 were summarized in the intelligence report of the General Staff Intelligence Directorate on May 31, 1941. This information was given in more detail in the appendix to Summary No. 5 (for the West) issued by the Intelligence Directorate on June 15. The figures below show the data from the specified summary in the area of responsibility of the OVOVO. The following abbreviations are used in the figures: AK - army corps, ap (tap) - artillery regiment (heavy artillery regiment), zenap - anti-aircraft artillery regiment, cd (kp) - cavalry division (regiment), md (mp) - motorized division (regiment), pd (pn) - infantry division (regiment), etc. (tp) - tank division (regiment).

One of the enemy groupings farthest from the border was in the Lodz region. In the summary of the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff from 31.5.41, it was noted that. In June, information about this group is no longer found. However, there was no increase in the groupings of German divisions against the troops of the PribOVO, ZAPOVO and KOVO from the beginning of May - mid-May 1941 until the start of the war. Consequently, the grouping in the Lodz area had to remain in place. If she was there at all …

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The grouping in the area of Bartenstein, Allenstein, Bischofsburg was in the disputed area of responsibility of ZapOVO and PribOVO. A small part of the troops during their movements was tracked by the intelligence of the PribOVO. An even smaller part "settled" in East Prussia.

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In the following figures, instead of indicating the location of many military units and some divisions, the text will often be present:. Do not let this phrase confuse you, as towards the end of the part you will come to a shocking conclusion …

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It can be seen from the figures presented that, according to intelligence data, many enemy troops were in places that were noted in the intelligence report dated May 31, 1941. The author will take the liberty of declaring that we are talking about the overwhelming number of troops, as you will soon see for yourself.

In other words, three weeks before the war, German units and divisions did not move as often as indicated in the RM. And again there are no detected headquarters of army groups and tank groups, tank and motorized troops! We will consider materials about these formations in the next part …

Another way to gather intelligence

In the last part, we learned about one of the ways of gathering intelligence information through oral information (through rumors). Now let's consider the second way of collecting PM by sources for our intelligence.

You have already examined eight figures with fairly accurate data on regiments and divisions. Nothing confused you? Without sources in the headquarters and next to them, our intelligence knows everything for sure! Where?! Did the German servicemen go with placards so that our intelligence would not miss them? Exactly! The second method of collecting intelligence information was carried out visually by the shoulder straps of German servicemen. It turns out that by the shoulder straps it was possible to determine the belonging of the servicemen to the regiments and divisional headquarters. Even to the headquarters of corps and armies, but these headquarters will not be considered by the author. Below are photos of German shoulder straps during the war of the 40s.

1941 year. German command against Soviet intelligence
1941 year. German command against Soviet intelligence

Special message:… June 8 at the station. Terespol arrived and there was a group of soldiers in the amount of 25-26 people, whose shoulder straps had the number 709 (information obtained by personal observation of our … agent) …

Special message: … Data on the deployment of 1, 56, 66, 98 and 531 pp in Warsaw No. 711 received from the shoulder straps, there are no numbers on the shoulder straps - they are cut off, but the prints on them remain. He saw such soldiers with numbers in the ranks from the company, passing through the city.

17 pp in Vyshkov was also determined by the disputed numbers, in addition, he specified in conversations with the population. 537 pp has not yet cut off the numbers on the shoulder straps and continues to wear them, in addition, the whole Island knows about him that he came from the Greek front.

50 pp was established in conversations with the population, and # 711 himself saw soldiers with prints on their shoulder straps # 50 before the company. 719 PP # 703 was established in conversations among the population, the location of his headquarters was personally identified by # 703 …

Did the German command know that it was easy to establish the identity of their servicemen by the numbers on the shoulder straps? Of course, she knew and was obliged to use this fact in an extensive disinformation operation deployed at all levels!

In Warsaw, for several months until June 21 (inclusive), our reconnaissance regularly monitored the 8th Tank Regiment. Probably his soldiers and officers were also identified by their epaulettes and conversations with the population. Only this regiment was part of the 15th Panzer Division, which from April 1941 was sent to Libya at the disposal of the German African Corps …

Maybe there were no other divisions and regiments in the border areas? Maybe German military fictitious formations were created, which our intelligence took for real? The author analyzed all regiments and divisions (except for artillery regiments - sorry, but they are too difficult to track).

Let's consider only those German infantry divisions with numbers known to our intelligence, which disappeared without a trace from the territory of the former Poland (in the zone of responsibility of ZAPOVO and PribOVO) after the beginning of June. These are the divisions from the above pictures with a modest text:.

Divisions with numbers 11, 14, 23, 56, 208, 213, 215, 223 and 431 disappeared from the deployment sites. According to intelligence, the 14th Infantry Division still arrived. The most interesting thing is that six (67%) of them (14th, 56th, 208th, 213rd, 215th and 223rd PDs) have never been in the area under consideration, but for some reason their reconnaissance "Saw" and tracked …

A similar picture is observed among the infantry regiments that disappeared in a similar way. A total of 52 regiments disappeared, of which 37 (71%) were also not in the area of responsibility of the ZapOVO and PribOVO.

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33% fake divisions and 29% linden regiments. Something the numbers are close enough to 30% … don't you think?

The above regiments and divisions regularly portrayed groups of German military personnel in front of our intelligence. There could be rumors about them among the population, and when the intensive movement of German troops to the border began, these empty shells simply disappeared. They were replaced by newly arrived divisions in completely different places. New divisions that were not revealed by our intelligence …

Sufficiently "accurate" data on the deployment of German troops served as the illusion of omniscience and confidence in the control of the situation at the command of the spacecraft …

The figures below show the numbers of infantry divisions and regiments, which were discovered by intelligence services of all levels and departments of the Soviet Union, and the actual numbers of military formations by June 22 near the borders of the ZapOVO and PribOVO. Matches in both tables are marked in red.

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Of the 51 infantry divisions that were available by June 22 against the troops of the ZAPOVO and PribOVO, our reconnaissance opened only 16 (31%). It is possible that the German generals did not risk showing only disinformation … They had to "merge" the real formations. Or sometimes the rumors turned out to be true …

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According to the RM, the numbers of the 143rd regiments were determined. In fact, there were 158 regiments at the borders of ZAPOVO and PribOVO. The numbers of 50 regiments coincided (32%). Probably the number of formations that were allowed to be deployed to Soviet intelligence by the German command was determined to be about 30% …

On the eve of the war, at the top of our intelligence service they realized that they were being led by the nose, but it was already impossible to rectify the situation. Headquarters of all levels are accustomed to the fact that they "know everything" about the enemy and control the situation …

In the same way as they used to use wire communication for exercises and did not know how to transmit short messages on the radio …

Special message 16.6.41: … The dislocation of parts of the city of Warsaw, marked on the shoulder straps and according to the conversations of local residents, raises doubts and requires careful verification …

In the next part, we will again dive into the analysis of RM, which has not yet been carried out by any author or historian. We will look at enemy cavalry, rifle and tank units. Stay tuned: it will be even more interesting further …

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