In domestic literature, traditionally blame for the death of the "Pearl" on its commander, Baron I. A. Cherkasov, referring to the uniform mess that this aristocrat threw up when he took command of the cruiser. And indeed, reading about what was happening at the "Pearl", one involuntarily begins to doubt that I. A. Cherkasov was, as they say, in his right mind and sober memory. We quote V. V. Khromov:
“From the very beginning of the voyage, Baron Cherkasov established a“resort”mode of service for the team. When ships appeared on the horizon, the combat alert was not played. There was no rest schedule for the team, the servants were not at the guns at night. Mine vehicles were not charged. When parked in the port, the lights were cleared and the anchor lights were turned on, the signal watch was not intensified. Unauthorized persons had the opportunity to visit the cruiser, while they went down to any premises."
The reluctance to somehow ensure the safety of the cruiser reached the point of absurdity. So, for example, having anchored in the port of Blair (Andaman Islands), where "Pearl" arrived in search of "Emden", I. A. Cherkasov went ashore, expressly forbidding him to keep watch at the guns, "so as not to irritate the tired crew." That is, not only does the commander leave the ship entrusted to him, located in a completely unprotected port, in an area where an enemy cruiser may be located, he also does not allow his gunners to be on the alert! To the secrecy regime of I. A. Cherkasov treated the same as devil-may-care about everything else. Once he ordered to transmit to "Askold" a radiogram indicating the coordinates of "Pearl" in plain text. The ship commander countered the objections of the officers with a "murderous" argument: "Nobody knows the Russian language anyway."
There is one extremely impartial version, which was nevertheless supported by the former navigator of the battleship Orel, L. V. Larionov. As it was established later, I. A. Cherkasov informed his wife in letters and by radiotelegraph about the Zhemchug route. This was done so that the wife had the opportunity to follow on regular ships to the ports where the cruiser would call and meet with her husband there. So, according to the version mentioned above, it was these radiograms intercepted by Emden that caused the death of Zhemchug.
Nevertheless, A. A. Alliluyev together with M. A. Bogdanov, and after them the author of this article, believe this version is erroneous. The fact is that, as far as the author of the article knows, there is no mention in German sources that the radiograms of I. A. Cherkasov was "guided" by the commander of "Emden" to "Pearl", but the Germans did not have the slightest sense to hide such a thing. Of course, from the point of view of our compatriots I. A. The Cherkasovs committed blatant and shameful sloppiness, negligence, unthinkable in a combat situation. But for the Germans, such a "radio intelligence" would be a brilliant tactical find that someone would definitely mention in reports or memoirs. However, there is nothing like that. Moreover, Lieutenant von Mücke, who served as a senior officer of Emden, directly points out that according to the "newspaper news" of the allies, French cruisers Montcalm or Duplex could be in Penang, and that Karl von Müller chose them as the target of his attack. Mücke does not mention "Pearl" at all, and after all, being "the second after God" on "Emden" he could not have known about it. Thus, according to the author, "Emden", planning its raid on Penang, did not expect to find a Russian cruiser there.
Without a doubt, I. A. Cherkasov did not at all correspond to his position. In addition to the opinions of Russian historians, there is one more proof of this. The fact is that a commission of inquiry was created upon the death of Zhemchug, and following the results of its work, a trial was held, to which the commander of Zhemchug I. A. Cherkasov and the senior officer of the cruiser N. V. Kulibin. So, the naval court of the times of the Russian Empire (one would like to say: “the most humane court in the world”), which was usually very loyal to its defendants, did not find any “clue” to justify it. I. A. Cherkasov was found guilty of negligence in the service and sentenced to deprivation of the nobility, ranks, orders, "expulsion from the naval service" and surrender to the correctional and prison department of the civilian department for a period of 3, 5 years. And if there are no places in that one - in the prison of the same department for the most difficult work. However, Nicholas II "Bloody" did not ratify the verdict, so as a result I. A. Cherkasov was demoted to sailors and sent to the Caucasian front. There, as usual, he distinguished himself, was presented to the St. George Cross, restored to the rank …
In other words, the mediocrity of I. A. Cherkasov as the cruiser commander is undeniable. And yet, despite all of the above, an impartial analysis of the events of those distant years shows that the culprit behind the death of the "Pearl" should be considered not at all its commander, but Vice-Admiral T. M. Gerram and the commander of the French destroyer Mousquet. However, to them, perhaps, it is necessary to add the engineers of Vladivostok … Or even higher authorities. The thing is that if, by a wave of a magic wand in 1914, in the place of I. A. Cherkasov turned out to be an exemplary, experienced and proactive commander, piously observing the letter and spirit of the charter, this still could not save the "Pearl" from death.
About the technical condition of the cruiser
To begin with, let's recall the reason why the "Pearl" generally needed to go to Penang. The fact is that the ship needed cleaning and alkalization of the boilers, that is, a procedure in which the cruiser a priori cannot be fully combat-ready. And then the question immediately arises: why is it that the cruiser, which was doing the "bulkhead of cars and cleaning the boilers" in Vladivostok in the second half of May, already in the first ten days of October of the same year needed alkalization of the boilers? What kind of quality of work did the artisans of Vladivostok have?
It was still somehow possible to understand (with difficulty) if the cruiser was straining from the hardships of service, constantly participating in the pursuits, driving its energy installation, as they say, "in the tail and in the mane." But there was nothing of the kind! Routine service, calm sea-ocean crossings, escorting slow transports, etc. etc. And after four months of such service - the need to clean and alkalize the boilers?
Recall that after the repair in 1910, the cruiser developed "19-20 knots. and more". And why not the 24 knots assigned to him according to the project? Why not reached 23 knots on trials? The cruiser is, in fact, a new one - it was transferred to the fleet in 1904. Yes, I had to serve and took part in the war, but then what prevented a high-quality repair? The naval personnel of the Russian Imperial Navy during the Russo-Japanese War decreased enormously. In fact, of the large ships in the Far East, we only have 2 cruisers, the rest went to the Baltic, and the country was quite capable of ensuring their high-quality repairs. But, apparently, they did not provide it.
In other words, we have every reason to assume the unsatisfactory technical condition of the Pearl at the beginning of the war, and it is hardly possible to blame the newly made commander for this.
Penang instead of Singapore
Of course, I. A. Cherkasov knew about the need to clean the boilers, and he turned to the commander of the allied squadron T. M. Jerram for permission to do this work. But, according to A. A. Alliluyeva and M. A. Bogdanova, I. A. Cherkasov asked T. M. Gerram send Pearls to alkali boilers not to Penang, but to Singapore.
The author of this article does not know what motives I. A. Cherkasov, aiming specifically for Singapore. It is possible that he simply wanted to be with his wife in this city - the Asian pearl of the British crown. But Singapore had a well-protected harbor from the sea, where it was absolutely impossible to fear an attack from enemy cruisers, but Penang, alas, did not have any serious defense. However, the British vice admiral refused I. A. Cherkasov and sent him to Penang. I. A. Cherkasov tried to insist on his request and turned to the commander with his request again. But T. M. Jerram dismissed her again: Penang, period!
Of course, "bungling" is, perhaps, the easiest epithet that can be used to describe the command of Baron I. A. Cherkasov cruiser. And it is more than likely that the baron's desire to lead the cruiser to Singapore was not dictated by the interests of the service. But still, regardless of the motives that were guided by I. A. Cherkasov, he would not have taken the Pearl to Penang on his own initiative - he was ordered to do it.
Let us now consider the chronology of the tragedy.
Russian cruiser before attack
The Zhemchug arrived in Penang on October 13, 1914, and her team immediately began repair work. It would seem that there are more than enough reasons for increasing vigilance: for the duration of the repair, the cruiser should have completely lost its course, being in the harbor unprotected from attack. But, apparently, I. A. Cherkasov did not even admit the thought of meeting the enemy and considered his cruiser's cruise to be a kind of entertainment cruise: he did literally everything to reduce the Zhemchug's combat capability to near-zero value.
First, the Zhemchug commander organized the case in such a way that 13 boilers were dismantled at once, and only one of the rest was left under steam. Alas, this single boiler was not enough to provide the required power supply. In fact, on the night of the attack, neither the projectile feed elevators nor the drainage systems could operate on the cruiser.
Secondly, the baron ordered to remove the ammunition from the deck to the cellar, as the shells were very hot due to the high temperature. In fact, if this order were carried out, the "Pearl" would be completely unarmed in the face of the enemy, but the senior officer of the cruiser N. V. Kulibin begged the commander to leave two 120-mm guns loaded and keep 5 rounds in the fenders of the first shots with them. In other words, the cruiser could fire 12 shells at the enemy and … that's all, because the shots from the cellars would have to be carried by hand, and in a fleeting battle there could be no time for this.
Thirdly, I. A. Cherkasov did not take any additional security measures. He did not strengthen the watch duty, and although the crew was allowed to sleep on the upper deck, but without observing the combat schedule. Attention is drawn to the fact that, despite the war and the presence of a German cruiser in the region, life in Penang was going on by pre-war standards. No one even thought to put out lighthouses, entrance and leading lights at night at night. I. A. Cherkasov, of course, did not pay any attention to this and saw no reason to increase his vigilance. Moreover, he did not even order to extinguish the lights on the "Pearl" itself!
And, finally, fourthly, the next day after the arrival of "Pearl" in Penang, I. A.'s wife arrived there. Cherkasov. Therefore, the commander announced his discomfort and went ashore to the hotel "Eastern and Orientel".
The battle and death of "Pearl"
And what was Emden doing at that time? The German cruiser appeared at Penang in the morning of October 15 in order to enter the harbor at dawn. At this time of day, it was already possible to orientate well in the passage leading to the rather narrow harbor of Penang, but it was still dark enough to easily identify the Emden. The latter turned out to be all the more difficult because Müller "decorated" his cruiser with the fourth chimney. All British cruisers operating in the area were four-pipe, so the appearance of a three-pipe ship could have become a reason for completely unnecessary suspicions Mueller. In addition, as you know, it is best to sleep at dawn …
However, not all were asleep. At the entrance to the harbor, "Emden" almost sank fishing boats, and only the skill of the helmsman allowed to avoid such an unpleasant event. It can be stated that the fishermen from the local population of Penang did not sleep that morning for sure. But the author of this article has very big doubts about the crew of the destroyer "Mousquet", which was supposed to patrol the entrance to the harbor …
According to A. A. Alliluyev and M. A. Bogdanov, the French sentry let the Emden into the harbor completely unimpeded. V. V. Khromov points out that the French still made a request, but Emden did not give an answer to it. If we turn to the memoirs of Mücke, then he says that from the German cruiser they did not notice any destroyer at all, but, entering the harbor, they saw "a flash of bright white light lasting about a second." Mücke thought it was a signal from a "patrol or patrol boat," while "we did not see the boat itself." Let us remember that the French patrol destroyer was completely overlooked on the Emden - we will return to this moment a little later. In the meantime, let us note that the "Mousquet" did not fulfill its task at all: it did not "explain" the warship entering the harbor and did not raise an alarm.
At 04.50 "Emden" entered the harbor of Penang - at about this time the first dawn rays of the sun appeared, but visibility was still very poor. In the dawn gloom, the sailors of the Emden tried to make out the warships, but they did not see any. Mücke writes:
“Everyone had already decided that the expedition had failed, when suddenly … a dark silhouette appeared without a single light. This is, of course, a warship. In a few minutes we were close enough to be convinced that this was indeed the case. Soon we saw 3 equidistant white lights just in the middle of this dark silhouette. All decided in one voice that it was, apparently, three fighters moored side by side. But when we got even closer, this assumption had to be abandoned: the ship's hull was too high for a fighter. The vessel was stern downstream directly at us, and it was impossible to recognize its type. Finally, when "Emden" passed at a distance of 1 cab under the stern of the mysterious ship and went aboard, we finally established that it was the cruiser "Pearls".
According to Mykke, at this moment “peace and silence” reigned on the “Pearl”, while in the dawn rays it was clearly visible what was happening on the cruiser - visibility was improving every minute. From "Emden" neither watch nor signalmen were seen. Nevertheless, according to A. A. Alliluyeva and M. A. Bogdanova, officer of the watch, midshipman A. K. Sipailo located a certain ship, which he clearly could not identify, and sent a sailor of watch to notify the senior officer. Moreover, "according to some information", from "Pearl" even managed to request "Emden" and received the answer: "Yarmouth, arrived for anchoring." However, von Mücke does not mention anything like that in his memoirs.
According to the author, a German cruiser was indeed found on the Zhemchug when it was already close by. If the officer of the watch would testify that the watch “did not oversleep” the appearance of a battleship in the immediate vicinity of the Russian cruiser, then some kind of deception could still be suspected. But the fact is that A. K. Sipailo died in that battle, so he could not tell anyone about what happened. This means that someone else told about this episode, who obviously had no self-interest to mislead anyone. Consequently, most likely the watchmen of the "Pearls" nevertheless found "Emden", but the information about the request for "Emden" is most likely erroneous, since the Germans do not confirm anything of the kind.
As soon as the Russian cruiser was identified on the Emden (it happened at 05.18), they immediately fired a torpedo at it and opened fire from artillery pieces. Moreover, the torpedo hit the Pearl in the stern, and the gunfire concentrated in the bow. Panic broke out among the sailors sleeping on the upper deck, some of them jumped overboard into the water. But others did try to answer.
Senior officer N. V. appeared on the deck. Kulibin and artillery officer Y. Rybaltovsky, who tried to restore some kind of order. The gunners stood up to the onboard guns, but they had nothing to shoot with, and some of them were immediately killed by enemy fire … As a result, the Emden was answered only by the bow and stern guns, which received "from the commander's bounty" as many as 6 shots each. The nasal was directed by midshipman A. K. Sipailo, but it was able to fire one or two shots. The first was absolutely certain, but the second coincided with a direct hit by a German shell, which destroyed the gun, killing the midshipman and the crew as well. Can it be argued that this shot really took place, or was it confused with the rupture of a German shell? Yu Rybaltovsky stood up to the stern gun and managed to make several shots from it.
According to Russian eyewitnesses, the very first shot of A. K. Sipailo hit and caused a fire on the Emden, and Yu. Rybaltovsky was sure that he had hit the Emden twice. Mücke confirms the fact that the Pearl opened fire, but reports that in that battle not a single enemy shell hit the Emden.
In response to shots from the Russian cruiser "Emden", which was at that moment about two cables from the "Pearl", turned around and, without stopping artillery fire, fired a second torpedo. She struck the "Pearl" in the bow, and caused its death, causing the explosion of the bow shell cellar. A minute after the impact, the Russian cruiser lay on the bottom at a depth of 30 meters, and only the very end of the mast with a rail rose above the water - like a cross over a grave. Warrant officer A. K. Sipailo and 80 lower ranks, later seven more died of their wounds. Another 9 officers and 113 sailors received injuries of varying severity.
About spreading cranberries
What happened next? According to Mücke, French warships opened fire on Emden at the same time as the Pearl. Although the senior officer of the Emden did not know who was firing at his cruiser, he claimed that the fire was fired at him from three directions. It is possible, however, that nothing of the kind happened - the fact is that according to the testimony of the same Mücke, after the destruction of the Pearl on the Emden, they no longer saw enemy warships and stopped firing, and the return fire also died down. It is clear that the Emden gunners could not shoot without seeing the target, but what prevented the French from continuing the battle?
The further description of those distant events is already quite contradictory and strange. Moreover, surprisingly enough, domestic sources give an extremely logical presentation. So, according to V. V. Khromov, "Emden" found a French gunboat, and wanted to deal with it, but at this time the signalmen found an unknown ship approaching from the sea. Fearing that it might be an enemy cruiser, Emden retreated, sinking the destroyer Mousquet on the way. It seems that everything is clear and understandable, isn't it?
The description of the senior officer of the Emden von Mücke is a different matter. While reading his memoirs, the author was constantly reminded of the famous joke of military historians: "he lies like an eyewitness." However, judge for yourself, dear readers.
According to Mücke, shortly after the ceasefire, a French gunboat was actually found on the Emden, surrounded by commercial ships, and was about to attack, but at that moment they saw a fighter at sea speeding towards the harbor. The harbor, as mentioned earlier, was very narrow, maneuvering in it was difficult and it would be difficult to evade a torpedo. Therefore, according to Mücke, "Emden" gave full speed and went to the exit from the bay to meet the enemy destroyer on the outer roadstead. All this seems to be logical, but …
From a distance of 21 cables "Emden" opened fire on the destroyer. He immediately turned to the right, and … unexpectedly turned out to be "a large English government steamer." Mücke assures that the whole thing was in refraction, which is especially strong in those latitudes. Well, let’s assume that this is how it actually happened - what would not be seen in the sea! Of course, the fire was immediately stopped and the Emden turned towards the harbor - to "deal" with the French gunboat.
But then another commercial steamer appeared, going to the harbor and (according to Mücke!) The commander of the Emden decides to first capture it, and only then go to destroy the gunboat - they say, she still won't run away anywhere. On "Emden" they raised the signal "stop the car, take the boat" and sent a boat with a prize party to the transport. But when the boat had already approached the transport, the third ship was found on the Emden, approaching from the sea to the harbor. As soon as this third was discovered, "Emden" called the boat back, managed to raise it, and only after that went to meet the enemy.
The enemy could not be considered for a long time: at first they decided that it was a cruiser, then - that it was a commercial steamer, and only then they identified a fighter in the approaching stranger. And when the distance to it was reduced to 32 cables, the French flag was finally dismantled on the Emden. Accordingly, when the distance was reduced to 21 cables, "Emden" turned to the left and opened fire on the enemy with her starboard side. According to Mücke, now it was only on the French destroyer that they realized who they were facing, turned and gave full speed, trying to escape, but too late! With the third salvo, "Emden" achieved five hits at once, and the destroyer was seriously damaged. The French still managed to open fire from the bow gun and fired 2 torpedoes (according to domestic data, by the way, only one), but both of them did not reach the Emden about 5 cables, and the artillery fire was quickly suppressed, and the destroyer sank.
The German cruiser approached the place of his death, and began to raise the survivors, from whom the Germans later learned that they had sunk the destroyer "Mousquet". But at the end of this rescue operation, the Emden was again discovered … another French destroyer! But this time not coming from the sea, but coming out of the harbor. Moreover, this destroyer, no less, heroically rushed to the "Emden".
The Emden fled just as heroically into the open sea. From a single destroyer, yes. According to Mykke, the cruiser commander feared that an allied cruiser might be nearby and therefore preferred to retreat. After some time, the pursuing "Emden" destroyer disappeared into the rain and was no longer visible. “The plan of our commander to lure him out into the open and then attack and sink failed,” Mücke stated sadly.
On the reliability of Germanic memoirs
Let's try to analyze what von Mücke told the astonished reader. The version that "Emden" left the harbor in order to fight an enemy destroyer, which turned out to be a merchant ship, looks quite realistic - the sea is extremely deceiving for the observer. But then what? Emden's commander Müller is releasing this British steamer, which could well become his next prize. For what? To return and attack the French gunboat. It seems to be logical. But then another steamer appears, and Mueller does what? That's right - postponing the gunboat attack to capture the transport! That is, the commander of the Emden first makes one, and then the opposite decision. What is it like? "Remove orders, put in prison, return, forgive, give orders …"
Then on "Emden" they again see some kind of ship, which may even be a cruiser. Müller orders the return of the boat with the landing party, and rightly so - after all, there seems to be a deadly battle on the bow. But the return of the boat and its lifting on board require a certain time, then the Emden goes to meet and only then, after some time, the distance between it and the enemy ship decreases to 32 cables, that is, to more than 3 miles. In fact, this ship turns out to be the destroyer "Mousquet"! Which, according to Mücke, walked from the side of the sea!
Attention, the question: how did the destroyer "Mousquet", which seemed to be patrolling the entrance to the harbor of Penang, miraculously ended up in the open sea after an hour and a half, many, many miles from the coastline? After all, from "Emden" they did not see the destroyer, while leaving the harbor, while explaining the destroyer, which turned out to be a transport, while turning back, until they noticed another transport, while they were sending a boat with a landing party to it …
The only explanation that occurred to the author of this article was that the Mousquet was not actually patrolling the harbor entrance, but the distant approaches to the harbor. Then all this can still be explained somehow. That "Mousquet", perhaps, did not notice the "Emden" approaching Penang at all, that, hearing the roar of shots and explosions, the destroyer rushed back and collided with the German cruiser emerging from the harbor … True, malicious questions immediately arise. It turns out that the French, on the one hand, did not care at all about the availability of the Penang harbor at night, they did not even extinguish the lights, and on the other hand, they considered the situation so dangerous that they dispatched the destroyer to a distant night patrol? But nevertheless, even with great difficulty, the owl seems to be beginning to stretch itself onto the globe … If not for the memoirs of von Mücke.
The fact is that this worthy officer Kaiserlichmarine claims the following. According to the rescued sailors, the Mousquet saw the Emden, but confused it with the British Yarmouth. And then he says: "It is very possible that the white flash that we saw at the entrance to Penang was made with Mousquet!" That is, von Mücke sees absolutely nothing wrong with the fact that “Mousquet” should, in fact, be in two different places at the same time!
Now let's put ourselves in the shoes of the French sailors. They are on patrol. At dusk, a certain four-tube cruiser appears, visibility is frankly bad (remember that the Germans themselves were only later able to identify the Pearl only by approaching it up to a distance of 1 cable!) But instead of asking for its identification, they do nothing at all. and calmly pass this cruiser further. Is this how they carry out patrolling, even if it is far or close? But that's okay, at least it can be explained by sloppiness.
But the exit of the second French destroyer from Penang and its valiant pursuit of the Emden defies any logical explanation.
Not a single source known to the author mentions that a French destroyer tried to pursue the Emden. Of course, it would be interesting to study the French reports about this fight, but alas, the author of this article does not have such opportunities. Again, it can be assumed that the pursuit of the sailors of the Emden only imagined - I repeat, at sea sometimes everything is seen. But why did the whole German cruiser run away from one destroyer ?! Mücke's explanation that Mueller feared the imminent arrival of enemy cruisers does not stand up to criticism, and here's why.
If the commander of "Emden" was afraid that the French "in the grave forces" were about to appear and drown him, why then did he start fiddling with the seizure of the prize a little earlier? After all, in order to drown or take away transport with you it takes time, and a lot. It turns out that when Mueller sent the prize batch to the steamer, he did not think about the French cruisers, but how the fighter appeared - he immediately remembered, so what?
Further. If Müller was afraid of the appearance of the enemy, then all the more it was necessary to "remove from the tail" so inopportunely tied to him destroyer. The fight with "Mousquet" clearly demonstrated that this could be done very, very quickly. Instead, according to Mücke, his commander started some cunning game of luring an old fighter into some kind of space, so that later it could be destroyed … What prevented the Emden from doing this right away?
It's your will, but somehow it doesn't make ends meet.
A bit of conspiracy
If we look at the matter impartially, the commander of the Emden, who decided to launch a very dangerous raid, behaved extremely valiantly, and, having sunk the Pearl, achieved remarkable success. But what happened after that? In fact, Emden was in complete control of the situation - the old French ships were absolutely no match for him. The same "Mousquet", in fact, was nothing more than a fighter of the times of the Russian-Japanese war with a displacement of less than 300 tons and with weapons of 1 * 65-mm and 6 * 47-mm guns.
Two other destroyers and a gunboat, which were in the roadstead, apparently did not even have time to get ready for battle.
In other words, "Emden" could fully enjoy the fruits of his victory - it would not have been difficult for him to finish off the remaining French ships, and then at his disposal was a whole harbor of merchant ships, plus a coal station for French cruisers. All this, if desired, could be put to fire and sword.
What did Emden do? He was running.
For the majority of Russian-speaking readers interested in naval history, Karl von Müller, the commander of the famous Emden, is a symbolic figure worthy of every respect. Müller is perceived by us as an exemplary cruiser commander, who excellently commanded his ship and who achieved great success at sea. Without a doubt, that was exactly what he was.
But the fact is that in the top leadership of imperial Germany, the exploits of "Emden" were perceived a little differently. No, the crew was carried on their hands almost in the literal sense of the word, but with the ship's commander everything was not so simple. Although von Müller was nominated for the highest military award, this was opposed by the head of the Naval Cabinet, Admiral von Müller (namesake), who believed that the Emden commander should be held responsible for his erroneous decisions that destroyed the cruiser entrusted to him. True, in March 1918 the Kaiser nevertheless approved the award.
So, Mücke's memoirs were published in 1917. It is known that Mueller enjoyed not only respect, but the love of the team (according to the author, more than deserved!). But could it not happen that the senior officer decided to slightly embellish the reality in favor of his commander, in whose exploits some had the audacity to doubt?
By the way, if it comes to that, can we, taking into account all of the above, absolutely trust von Mücke's statement that during the battle in Penang harbor not a single enemy (read - Russian) shell hit the Emden? Soon after the events in Penang, the German cruiser was intercepted and destroyed, so there is no way to establish the truth.
Of course, all this is, by and large, conspiracy theories. It can be assumed that von Mücke did not try to mislead anyone at all, but honestly spoke about how he saw those events. Yes, what the senior officer of Emden said is very illogical and in many ways contrary to common sense - but who knows, maybe he perceived what was happening just like that.
In this case, the lesson that we can learn from Mücke's memoirs is that even an experienced naval officer (and we have not the slightest reason to suspect the German senior officer of the Emden of unprofessionalism), under certain circumstances, can confuse a destroyer and a transport at a distance 3 miles and see enemy warships where they are not and were not. Perhaps this example will help us to be more careful with the testimonies of Russian naval officers, and not necessarily look for unprofessionalism or malicious intent in cases where their observations diverged from the real state of affairs.
But back to Pearl.
conclusions
So what is the fault of Baron I. A. Cherkasov? The fact that the Zhemchug's boilers required cleaning just four months after the repair, the cruiser commander is clearly innocent: this is a question of the quality of work of Vladivostok's artisans. The fact that the ship in need of repair was sent to an unprotected port was the fault of A. I. Cherkasov is also not visible - he twice asked to send "Pearls" to Singapore, but British Admiral T. M. Jerram ordered him to go to Penang. The fact that "Mousquet" missed the enemy cruiser in the harbor, the baron, again, cannot be blamed.
And you need to understand that even if all precautions were taken on the cruiser and the service was conducted in an exemplary manner, even in this case, nothing could save the Pearl after the Emden entered the raid. Having found a ship in several cables, which the patrol service had already missed, it was impossible to immediately open fire, it was necessary to first "explain" it. This required a certain amount of time, during which the Emden would still have come close to the distance of a guaranteed torpedo hit. In other words, there was no way to save the "Pearl" at anchor from the German raider, which was walking in several cables and completely ready for battle (unless the guns were probably not deployed). But then what is the fault of I. A. Cherkasov?
In the author's opinion, his fault is that as a result of the mess he created on the Pearl, the cruiser lost the opportunity to inflict tangible damage on the enemy.
Let us imagine for a second that by some miracle there was an intelligent commander on board the Zhemchug. And so, on the night of October 15, the ship is at anchor without lights, but with a double watch and crews sleeping directly at the guns. Only enough boilers are left under the steam to ensure the unimpeded operation of artillery and drainage means. What then?
As mentioned above, although the Emden's first torpedo hit the Pearl, it still could not disable the last one - the cruiser remained afloat and was able to open fire, which could not be suppressed by the 105-mm guns of the German raider. Accordingly, "Emden" had to turn around by machines in order to activate the torpedo tube from the other side.
Consequently, from the start of the German attack to the death of the second torpedo, the Russian cruiser had some time left, but how was it used? In reality, the "Pearl" was able to fire only a few shells in response - no more than 8, and most likely even less. But if I. A. Cherkasov's inspiration came and he prepared the ship for a possible battle as it should, all this time "Emden" would have been under dagger fire at point-blank range of five 120-mm guns. It is doubtful that this could destroy the German raider, but to inflict heavy damage on him, after which the Emden would become an easy prey for the allied cruisers - quite.
Could Pearls have been saved if Mousquet had raised the alarm? In the state to which I. A. Cherkasov is probably not there. But if the service on the "Pearl" was conducted according to the charter, then the cruiser would have time to prepare for battle and meet the approaching raider with the fire of its stern guns. It cannot be argued that in this situation, the "Pearl" would have been guaranteed to survive, but it was quite possible, and the chances of causing severe damage to the "Emden" increased many times over.
Thus, the author comes to the conclusion that the commander of the French destroyer Mousquet, who let the Emden into Penang harbor, is primarily to blame for the death of the Zhemchug. But you need to understand that if it were not for the technical condition of the Russian cruiser and the order of T. M. Jerram, the Pearl wouldn't be in Penang at all. I. A. Cherkasov, with all his many shortcomings and omissions, oddly enough, was not to blame for the death of the cruiser, but because of his negligence, an excellent chance was missed to cause serious damage to the Emden and thereby interrupt the brilliant career of the German raider.
