Commander of the First Army of the North-Western Front, Adjutant General and General of the Cavalry P. K. Rennenkampf, even during the reign of Emperor Nicholas II, was declared by public opinion the main culprit in the defeat of the Second Army of the cavalry general A. V. Samsonov at the Battle of Tannenberg in East Prussia in August 1914, and then the unsuccessful outcome of the ód operation, which was the reason for his resignation.
The harsh accusations leveled against Rennenkampf in 1914–1915 were repeated word for word first by "liberal" investigators dispatched by the Provisional Government to investigate its omissions and "crimes", and then by Soviet "experts" in the history of the First World War. Perhaps it was revenge for the suppression of anti-government riots in Transbaikalia in 1906, when the military expedition of P. K. Rennenkampf pacified the revolutionary element, fulfilling the will of the supreme power? But it is also indisputable that, starting from the autumn of 1914, Pavel Karlovich was constantly reminded of his German surname, seeing in this circumstance, independent of the general's will, the main reason for his "suspicious" behavior (in other editions - direct betrayal) in the extremely complex vicissitudes of the East -Prussian and Lodz operations …
The Estlandian Rennenkampf family has served Russia faithfully since the 16th century - even before the annexation of present-day Estonia to Russia by Peter I.
Since the time of the victories over the Swedes in the Northern War of 1700 - 1721. this surname now and then flickers in the award lists of Russian officers. It is not for nothing that on the silver pipes of the Kegsgolm Regiment, bestowed by Empress Elizabeth Petrovna for the capture of Berlin, is embossed: “September 28, 1760, as a sign of the capture of Berlin, under the leadership of His Excellency Lieutenant-General and Knight Peter Ivanovich Panin, during his stay (regiment commander - A. P.) Colonel Rennenkampf.
Kegsholms under the command of the "German" Colonel Rennenkampf over 150 years before the Great War of 1914-1918. bravely fought with the vaunted troops of the Prussian king Frederick II and defeated them, which was immortalized by the memorable inscription on the regimental insignia …
At all times until 1914, until the beginning of the armed clash with Germany, Russia was overwhelmed by petty demons of widespread Germanophobia and spy mania (maliciously fueled by liberal circles in order to "rock the boat" of government in the empire), the similarity of the surname with the German did not serve as a reason for accusations treason or something like that.
Suffice it to recall that such distinguished figures of previous times as the creator of the Separate Corps of Gendarmes, General of the Cavalry A. Kh. Benckendorff or the hero of the Patriotic War of 1812 and the Foreign campaigns of 1813–1814. Field Marshal P. Kh. Wittgenstein.
And in the XX century, only uneducated people or figures pursuing some own goals could groundlessly throw insulting accusations against the honored general for his "German" surname.
All the more so for such a general, who by the beginning of the Great War (and he was already over sixty then!) Had earned a reputation as a worthy successor to the best traditions of the Russian army - the traditions of the Suvorov school.
The record of Pavel Karlovich von Rennenkampf, who was born on April 29, 1854 in Pankul Castle near Revel, in the family of the Russian nobleman Karl Gustav Rennenkampf (1813-1871) and who graduated from the Helsingfors Infantry Junker School in 1873, included service, as they say, from a young fingernail in the Lithuanian Uhlan regiment, brilliant study at the Nikolaev (General Staff) military academy (graduated from it in 1881 in the first rank), four years of command of the Akhtyrka dragoon regiment (from 1895 to 1899, and this regiment with him became one of the best regiments of Russian cavalry, returning their former glory) … By the way, earlier, in the 1870s, Rennenkampf's future "partner" in the East Prussian operation, General A. V. Samsonov.
In the fight against the hurricane that hit the Manchu branch of the Chinese Eastern Railway and the Far East with the Boxer Uprising in China (1900-1901) P. K. Rennenkampf, being the chief of staff of the troops of the Trans-Baikal region, declares himself as a brave and energetic military leader.
In that difficult campaign, the numerous forces of the Chinese Ichtuan, merciless to all foreigners, threatened even the Russian Blagoveshchensk. Priamursk Governor-General N. I. Grodekov appointed Rennenkampf as the commander of a rather small detachment that set out on a campaign in July 1900. Having flown like a whirlwind on the Chinese who were accumulating near Aigun, Pavel Karlovich scatters them and immediately rushes to Tsitsikar. He takes this city in one throw and consistently attacks the enemy congregations, ten times superior to his detachment, first at Girin, then at Thelin. In these battles, Rennenkampf, very much inferior to the enemy in numbers, managed to defeat three Chinese armies, for which Grodekov, having removed from his chest, the Order of St. George, 4th class, received from the late Skobelev … By the way, Emperor Nicholas II found this prestigious award still insufficient for such an outstanding military leader as Major General Rennenkampf had recommended himself, and bestowed him with the even higher order of St. George 3rd Art.
“From his first appearance on the battlefields,” writes the historian S. P. Andulenko in the emigre magazine Vozrozhdenie already in 1970 in an article refuting the false opinion about Rennenkampf as a mediocre general and a traitor - he goes down in history as a brave, enterprising and happy boss …"
In the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. Pavel Karlovich is in command of the 2nd Trans-Baikal Cossack Division. Under his leadership, the Trans-Baikal Cossacks show miracles of courage.
The personal courage of the already middle-aged general and the skillful command of the division attracted the color of cavalry officers to his regiments, among whom the notorious "black baron" P. N. Wrangel.
In one of the battles with the samurai near Liaoyang, Rennenkampf is seriously wounded in the leg. But, once in a hospital bed, he tries to get the doctors not to send him to European Russia for treatment. Soon, not even recovering from his wounds, he returned to duty and, at the head of the VII Siberian Army Corps, participates in the Battle of Mukden in February 1905. This, above all, the remarkable resilience of his regiments made it possible to stop the offensive of the army of Marshal Kawamura near Mukden. It is no coincidence that Kawamura and another Japanese marshal, Oyama, speak of Rennenkampf (for Mukden promoted to lieutenant general) with great respect, as a very worthy opponent …
By the way, Rennenkampf's conflict with the future general A. V. Samsonov, who arose on personal grounds. Some authors considered this clash at the Mukden station as a key motive, "explaining" the reason why, almost ten years later, Rennenkampf, who commanded the First (Neman) Army of the North-Western Front in 1914, did not come to the rescue of Samsonov, who commanded 2- th (Narevskaya) army, which fell into the German "pincers".
Immediately, we note that an attempt to write off the inconsistency of the actions of the two commanders only on their tensions is a too primitive explanation of the reasons for the defeat of the Second Army in the battle of the Masurian Lakes.
“From his youth, the general was distinguished by his ebullient energy, strong, independent character and great demands in his service,” the historian Andulenko writes about Rennenkampf in the already mentioned publication in the Vozrozhdenie magazine. - Sharp, persistent, not stingy with caustic reviews, he made himself a lot of enemies. Not so among his subordinates, many of whom not only loved him, but at times adored him directly, but among the bosses and neighbors …”.
This is confirmed by another author, Yuri Galich: “The liberal circles did not tolerate him, considering him a reliable guardian of the regime. Peers envied the successes and easy Chinese laurels. The higher authorities did not like it for independence, harshness, obstinacy, wide popularity among the troops."
Perhaps the fatal role in the fate of Rennenkampf was played by the tragic events of the First Russian Revolution. In early 1906, as the commander of the VII Siberian Army Corps, Lieutenant General Rennenkampf took command of the military train, which, starting from Harbin, restored the communication of the Manchurian army with Western Siberia, disrupted by the raging revolutionary movement in Eastern Siberia. (In Soviet historiography, this bacchanalia of anti-state riots, begun by the seizure of weapons by militants from military depots, was loudly called the "Chita Republic"). After defeating the rebel forces in the Manchurian railway strip, Rennenkampf entered Chita and brought the most rabid ones to court-martial. Four were sentenced to hanging, commuted to firing squad, the rest were commuted to hard labor. The names of the leaders of the rebellion are still worn today by seven streets of Chita; at the foot of the Titovskaya Sopka, a monument is erected to them. The name of the military general, who restored legal power and order, is still desecrated …
Against the background of the indecision and confusion that gripped almost the entire empire under the pressure of a new turmoil, the Siberian corps commander shows unyielding will and active loyalty to the sovereign to whom he swore allegiance.
“In a short time, he pacifies and puts in order vast areas,” notes S. Andulenko. - Naturally, he becomes the enemy of the entire "revolutionary community." Subsequently, the so-called. liberal circles will try to get rid of the dangerous general for them …”.
On October 30, 1906, the Socialist-Revolutionary terrorist N. V. Korshun makes his assassination attempt. He tracked down and watched Rennenkampf as he walked down the street with the aide-de-camp Captain Berg and the orderly Lieutenant Geisler, and threw an "explosive shell" at their feet. Fortunately, the terrorist "alchemists" did not calculate the power of the bomb, it turned out to be insufficient to kill; the general, adjutant and orderly were only stunned by the explosion …
From 1907 to 1913, commanding the III Army Corps on the western borders of Russia, Rennenkampf energetically and rationally prepares it for war. The corps under his leadership becomes exemplary.
And contrary to the view that Nicholas II was established in Soviet times as a woe-sovereign, who fatally did not understand people and all the time appointed “wrong” figures to leading posts, the emperor appreciated the whole set of merits of P. K. Rennenkampf and shortly before the start of the war he appointed him commander of the Vilnius military district with the rank of adjutant general (earlier, in 1910, he received the rank of general from the cavalry).
It was Rennenkampf who turned out to be the only general of the Russian army who managed to defeat the well-trained and superior in many respects German troops the only unconditional victory in the entire war.
She gave a reason to say that after three months of such battles Berlin will fall …
This was the famous Battle of Gumbinnen-Goldap on August 7 (20), 1914, on the third day after the entry of the 1st Army of the North-Western Front under the command of Rennenkampf into East Prussia. We will not describe the entire course of the battle - enough has been said about it. But here it is necessary to emphasize a number of important circumstances. Firstly, the troops of the 1st Army entered the battle practically on the move, being thoroughly exhausted by a six-day, with short days, foot march. Meanwhile, the enemy moved through its territory in the most comfortable way, making extensive use of the dense network of railways.
Secondly, for objective reasons, the Rennenkampf units could only be mobilized on the 36th day, and they set out on a campaign on the 12th, entered the enemy's territory on the 15th day, having against themselves fully mobilized and outnumbered 8- 1st German army under the command of the tried and tested General M. von Pritwitz. The offensive with understaffed and unprepared troops was the result of well-known agreements with France, which feared the entry of the Kaiser's hordes into Paris and urged the Russian Headquarters to pull as many enemy corps as possible from the western front to the eastern one. We note right away: the outcome of the Gumbinnen-Goldap battle and the entry into East Prussia of Samsonov's 2nd army just forced the German General Staff to transfer a total of up to 6 corps to the Russian front, including reserves intended for capturing Paris.
Thirdly, Russian troops were marching through enemy territory, when a threat came from everywhere for our soldiers, and any movement of Russian regiments to the headquarters of the German troops was reported by telephone calls from any manor, any farm … Add to this operational reports from the pilots of the Kaiser's airplanes and intercepted uncoded radiograms from the Russian headquarters, and it will become clear that literally every step of the troops of both the Second and First armies on this land was for the Germans at a glance. While in the Russian infantry divisions there was almost no cavalry necessary to conduct tactical reconnaissance on their way …
Fourthly, the Germans had a significant superiority in the Gumbinnen and Goldap axes both in manpower (a total of 8 German divisions against 6 Russians) and in artillery, especially heavy. They fiercely fired at and attacked our battle formations, and only virtuoso battery fire, well-aimed infantry shooting and its excellent ability to apply to the terrain (primarily in parts of the III Army Corps, which Rennenkampf commanded for many years) allowed the troops of the 1st Army to gain the upper hand over 8 th German.
Let us emphasize that the Germans, having experienced the destructive power of Russian fire, committed a crime against humanity: advancing, they drove the Russian prisoners ahead of themselves.
An eyewitness to this atrocity of the "enlightened" Teutons A. A. Ouspensky wrote: "In the battle of Gumbinnen, the brave Germans disgraced themselves with an inhumanly atrocious crime: during one of the attacks, they put a handful of unfortunate Russian prisoners, unarmed, in the front ranks of their attackers, and forced them to go ahead of themselves … until they were all shot!" …
Similar atrocities marked the entire combat path through Russian territory of the Kaiser's troops, brought up in the spirit of confidence in the "superiority of the German nation" and contempt for universal human morality. In fact, they were the direct predecessors of Hitler's barbarians from the Wehrmacht and the SS. The Polish city of Kalisz destroyed from heavy guns, the Christian shrine of the Czestochowa Monastery that suffered from the same fire, Russian soldiers mutilated or severely starving in German captivity - all this was. And all this strongly fueled in Russian society hostility to everything that was somehow connected with Germany and representatives of the German people, regardless of whether they were subjects of the Kaiser or Emperor Nicholas II. It is no coincidence that in the first months of the war in Moscow and Petrograd, as a result of spontaneous unrest of residents, almost all shops owned by ethnic Germans were destroyed and closed … Swabian "surnames …
It should be borne in mind that all of Europe followed the rapidly unfolding hostilities in East Prussia with bated breath. In this first major battle, the military reputation of both Pavel Karlovich Rennenkampf himself and the entire Russian army, which entered the most difficult war, was at stake. How the results of the Gumbinnen-Goldap battle were assessed, at least by our allies, can be judged by the fact that British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, already during the next world war, in correspondence with I. V. Stalin, wishing to please him, recalled "the brilliant victory of the Russian troops at Gumbinnen."
And this victory, undoubtedly, was the result of both the will and endurance of the army commander Rennenkampf, and the heroism and training of the troops trained and trained by him …
But how did the general, who was initially applauded not only by the whole of Russia - by the entire Entente, suddenly turned into an outcast, into the main culprit of the heavy defeat of the 2nd Army, the captivity or death of 110 thousand of its soldiers and the suicide of General Samsonov?
The main reproaches that were (and still are) addressed to P. K. Rennenkampf following the results of Gumbinenna - why he did not organize the immediate pursuit of the retreating troops of the 8th Army of von Pritwitz and did not build on the success, having at his disposal the corps of General Khan Nakhichevan, which consisted of the elite Guards cavalry, allowing the enemy to freely withdraw and recover from defeat. Why he led a further offensive on Konigsberg, and not on a connection with Samsonov's 2nd army. As for the Khan's corps, it was thoroughly battered in the Battle of Causen on August 6 (19), when the cavalrymen dismounted on the orders of Nakhichevan went in frontal attacks on the German batteries. In addition, the entire Khan corps was on the left flank of the 1st Army, and it was impossible to quickly transfer it to the right flank in order to chase the retreating German divisions … Of course, Rennenkampf could order to follow the retreating enemy and those troops that were in direct contact with him. But, firstly, due to the lack of any means of reconnaissance, the withdrawal made by the enemy was discovered with a delay of actually a day, and secondly, the physical strength and nerves of the soldiers who withstood the hardest battle were severely depleted and the commander considered it necessary to allow them the much-desired rest (which lasted, according to some sources, about one and a half, according to others - about two days).
Konigsberg, however, was seen by the commander-in-chief of the North-Western Front Zhilinsky, who was in charge of the entire East Prussian operation, and the Stavka, who then supported him, as the main, strategic goal of the Rennenkampf offensive, and the option of turning the troops of the 1st Army to join the 2nd Army was not even considered at that time. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich and the staff of his headquarters were so sure that for some reason Gumbinnen should be followed by the complete withdrawal of the German 8th Army from East Prussia beyond the Vistula, which even began a hasty formation in the area of Grodno and Augustow nova, 10- th army, intended directly for the capture of Berlin …
Thus, the high command itself incorrectly assessed the situation, and stubbornly forced Rennenkampf to follow the previously planned route, repeating the typical mistake of those who did not smell gunpowder, but who were accustomed to drawing impressive arrows of staff officers on maps.
By the way, it was noticed by Leo Tolstoy in the first volume of "War and Peace", in the description of the preparation of the unfortunate battle of Austerlitz in 1805 for us. Remember how a foreign general - the author of a battle plan far from the realities - monotonously repeats his points at the meeting the day before: "the first column is on the move, the second column is on the move …"
Rennenkampf, despite the reproaches that soon (after the defeat of the 2nd Army) fell, did not at all show malicious indifference to the fate of Samsonov and his troops. On August 12 (25), he prescribes by telegram to General Gurko: "Get in touch with the 2nd Army, the right flank of which is expected on the 12th in Senseburg." This was the only mention of an attempt to timely organize communication with Samsonov, and it came from Rennenkampf.
From the front commander Zhilinsky, as established by the Special government commission formed by the sovereign to clarify the causes of the catastrophe near the Mazurian Lakes, Pavel Karlovich, up to the encirclement of the corps of the 2nd Army, did not receive any news at all about where Samsonov's troops were located, in what condition they were. and shouldn't they come to the rescue. And it is no coincidence that the same commission, which in the most captious way investigated all the activities of Rennenkampf in this operation, bearing in mind the possible assignment of responsibility for the troubles that befell the North-Western Front, did not find absolutely any fault with him, and the general was left in his post … Meanwhile, the ill-fated Yakov Zhilinsky (by the way, when he was chief of the General Staff and who concluded an onerous agreement with the French on the timing of the start of the Russian offensive against Germany), he was finally removed …
After the defeated 2nd Army of Samsonov rolled back into Russian borders, Hindenburg and Ludendorff again brought down all the power of their 8th Army, reinforced with reinforcements from the Western Front and again greatly outnumbered Rennenkampf's troops, on his 1st Army. To the credit of the Russian general, he did not allow these prominent representatives of the Prussian school to "settle accounts" with him, as they did with Samsonov, and in perfect order, inflicting sensitive retaliatory strikes on the enemy (although he also suffered heavy losses), he withdrew his regiments to initial boundaries.
Nevertheless, countless ill-wishers of the general did everything to vying with each other to denigrate him. It was then that the legend of Rennenkampf's "inaction" was born, allegedly settling scores with Samsonov for the incident at the Mukden station in 1905, and even more shameful explanations.
"Public opinion", formed in the country to the tune of the anti-national liberal community hatching far-reaching plans, was eagerly looking for a "traitor." The "German" surname Rennenkampf seemed the most suitable …
Rear Admiral A. D. Bubnov, already then involved in the conspiracy of the liberal opposition against the sovereign, wrote in his memoirs: “The inaction of General Rennenkampf was called criminal by public opinion and even saw in him signs of treason, because, mainly due to this inaction, the Germans managed to inflict such a heavy defeat on Samsonov's army. The share of the blame that fell on General Zhilinsky, however, did not absolve General Rennenkampf from responsibility for lack of initiative, passivity, inability to assess the situation and insufficient desire to establish operational communication with Samsonov."
Perhaps, Rennenkampf did not really show enough personal initiative in the East Prussian operation, not seeing in the cessation of the German attacks a sign of the weakening and withdrawal of the enemy and not organizing, at least at any cost, the pursuit of the retreating. By the way, this is also mentioned in the article about the Gumbinnen battle in the Military Encyclopedia, published in 1994 in the 2nd volume of the authoritative in the Armed Forces. However, let's not forget that both in the following, already Soviet years, and in the sunset period of the Russian Empire, the initiative of the military leaders was not very welcomed, the main valor of a soldier was considered to be the unconditional and accurate execution of the order of the senior commander …
Be that as it may, the sovereign neither rewarded nor scolded his adjutant general. But his greatest oversight was that he nevertheless removed Rennenkampf from the post of army commander and on October 6, 1915, dismissed him from the army (albeit with the right to wear a uniform and a well-deserved pension) after the Lodz operation of 1914, which had essentially ended in a draw. The Emperor took the word of his uncle, Supreme Commander-in-Chief Nikolai Nikolayevich, that a detachment of German General Schaeffer broke out of the "bag" prepared by the Stavka and the front command solely through the fault of the commander of the 1st Army, Rennenkampf. In fact, Pavel Karlovich did not have sufficient forces and, alas, did not have the necessary information again to prevent this breakthrough. Even the Soviet historian Korolkov calls not Rennenkampf, but his direct superior, the commander of the North-Western Front, Infantry General N. V. Ruzsky. And the number of Germans who escaped from the encirclement was relatively small: if by the beginning of active hostilities, Schaeffer's strike group (3 infantry and 2 cavalry divisions) numbered 40 thousand fighters, then only about 6 thousand came out to their own …
History, as you know, does not tolerate the subjunctive mood. But if Rennenkampf had taken the post of front commander, or at least remained an army commander, it can be said with a high degree of confidence that the sovereign had at least one prominent military leader who would have supported him in his fateful moment.
He certainly would not have followed the lead of the circles of the liberal opposition in February - March 1917 …
Pavel Karlovich, after being discharged from the army, despite his already advanced years, was very burdened by the forced inaction, to which he was doomed by the ill-will of ill-wishers. And his enemies were very powerful. From the correspondence between the War Minister V. A. Sukhomlinov and the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief N. N. Yanushkevich, it follows that the minister all the time convinced Yanushkevich of the need to remove Rennenkampf. In the end, Yanushkevich and Sukhomlinov, having agreed among themselves and relying on the opinion of the commander of the Ruzsky front, composed a devastating report presented by the Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Duke to the Emperor: … Rennenkampf by General Litvinov, elected General Ruzsky.
In vain he asked Pavel Karlovich to show him at least the reasons for his dismissal, just as unsuccessfully asked to go to the front, even as a squadron commander. All his appeals went unanswered …
After the February Revolution of 1917, Rennenkampf was arrested and placed in the Peter and Paul Fortress. His case was conducted by the Extraordinary Commission of Inquiry established by the Provisional Government. However, the October Revolution soon broke out, after which Pavel Karlovich, along with several other generals, was released and allowed to leave Petrograd.
Rennenkampf, without delay, left for Taganrog.
We know with a high degree of certainty about the last months of his life and the circumstances of the tragic death of Pavel Karlovich from the "Act of Investigation of the Killing of General of the Cavalry Pavel Karlovich Rennenkampf by the Bolsheviks."
It was drawn up on May 11, 1919 in Yekaterinodar and signed by the chairman of the Special Commission of the Armed Forces of the South of Russia, Justice of the Peace G. Meingard. As stated in this document, P. K. Rennenkampf lived at the beginning of 1918 in Taganrog "in retirement away from military and political activities." On January 20 of the same year, after the entry of the Red Guard troops into the city, he considered it necessary to go into an illegal position. Hiding under the name of the Greek citizen Mansudaki and with a passport in his name, the general settled in the house of another Greek, the worker Langusen, at 1. Commercial per. However, the Chekists tracked down Rennenkampf. On March 3, he was arrested and imprisoned at the headquarters of the Taganrog commissar Rodionov, as the VRK himself confirmed, "on orders from Petrograd."
"During General Rennenkampf's detention, the Bolsheviks offered him three times to take command of their army," the act says, "but he always categorically refused this offer …"
At the end of March 1918, the commander-in-chief of the Soviet troops of the South of Russia V. A. Antonov-Ovseenko. In a conversation with him, Commissar Rodionov asked what he should do with the prisoner Rennenkampf. The commander-in-chief, glorified by Soviet "historians", expressed surprise at why the tsarist general was still alive, and ordered to shoot him immediately, which was done on April 1. The commandant of the Taganrog station Evdokimov (a former worker of a shipyard, then a sailor) with two assistants drove Pavel Karlovich out of town by car and there he was martyred …
The Bolshevik authorities did their best to conceal this villainous murder. On April 1, the day of the murder of her husband, the widow Vera Nikolaevna was even given a certificate signed by Commissar Rodionov and stamped by the Military Revolutionary Committee that her husband "was sent to Moscow under the authority of the Council of People's Commissars by order of Commander-in-Chief Antonov …"
On May 18, 1918, after the White Guard troops entered Taganrog, the union of officers, through police officials, in the presence of prosecutors, dug the graves of the martyred victims of revolutionary terror. In the pit at the site of the general's murder, “two corpses were found and dug in nothing but underwear, with gunshot wounds to the head. In one of these corpses V. N. Rennenkampf unmistakably identified the corpse of her late husband, General of the cavalry Pavel Karlovich Rennenkampf …"
His ashes were reburied in the old cemetery of Taganrog.
And in the local history museum of this southern city, a collection of rarities of Chinese art, collected by Rennenkampf during his stay in the Far East, is still kept.
“For some he is the most capable of the Russian generals of 1914, the conqueror of the Germans and the savior of Paris, for others he is mediocre, almost a traitor …” Andulenko writes. - Although General Golovin at one time and analyzed in detail all the accusations that were thrown at Rennenkampf and in the essential, it would seem, completely whitewashed him, but one must think that his works remained unknown. The persecution of General Rennenkampf continues …"
I would like to believe that in the near future, in particular, with the publication of a six-volume fundamental work on the Great War of 1914–1918, work on which has already been started by a team of authors, the place and role of P. K. Rennenkampf will be finally clarified, the truth will prevail. And, perhaps, the Gumbinnen conqueror will take his rightful place in the pantheon of Russian commanders, albeit not without flaws and miscalculations, but still leading their troops along the roads of honor and glory.
