The Munich agreement, about which we wrote in the last article, freed Hitler's hands.
After Czechoslovakia, Romania was the next victim.
On March 15, 1939, German troops invaded Czechoslovakia and approached the Romanian borders with a cannon shot. The next day, Hitler demanded that Romania immediately sign an economic agreement with the most favorable concessions in favor of Germany. Romanian envoy to London V. Thilya even stated in the English Foreign Office that Germany had presented Romania with an ultimatum demanding to agree to a German monopoly in Romanian trade and economy, otherwise Romania was under the threat of dismemberment similar to Czechoslovakia and becoming a protectorate [1].
On March 18, the USSR People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Litvinov told the British Ambassador to Russia Seeds that the Soviet government was proposing to convene a conference of representatives of the USSR, England, France, Poland and Romania. On March 19, Halifax told the Soviet plenipotentiary in London that the convocation of the conference proposed by the Soviet government would be "premature." This Soviet proposal was also passed on to the French government, but no response at all was received from France [2].
On March 23, 1939, the German-Romanian treaty was signed in Bucharest. Romania pledged to develop its economy in accordance with the needs of Germany. The agreement determined the amount of German trade credits and military supplies to Romania (250 million German marks). Provided for the creation in the Romanian ports and other strategically important points of "free zones" for the construction of German warehouses, oil storage facilities and other facilities. Germany was given the right to build railways and highways in Romania at its discretion [3].
Lithuania was the next victim. After the end of the First World War, Memel (the Lithuanian name for Klaipeda) and the Memel region, which was part of East Prussia, was under the collective control of the Entente countries. In 1922, Memel received the status of a "free city", like Danzig (Gdansk). In 1923, the Lithuanian government provoked a "popular uprising" in Memel. The "people", which consisted of Lithuanian soldiers in disguise, demanded that the region be annexed to Lithuania, which was eventually implemented. On December 12, 1938, elections to the city government were held in Klaipeda, as a result of which the "German party" won, which declared the residents' desire to be reunited with Germany.
On March 20, 1939, the Lithuanian government accepted Berlin's ultimatum on the annexation of Memel and the Memel region to Germany - in exchange for a “free zone” in the port and “most favored nation” regime in German-Lithuanian trade. German tanks entered the city, Hitler came and delivered a speech. Memel became a major German naval base [4].
Next, it was Poland's turn.
After the First World War, Gdansk, according to the Versailles Peace Treaty (1919), received the status of a free city and was ruled by the League of Nations. The treaty also transferred to Poland the territories that gave it access to Danzig, the so-called. Danzig Corridor (or Polish Corridor) that separated East Prussia from Germany. Most of the city's population (95%) were Germans, but Poles were entitled to their own institutions, such as schools, libraries, etc. In addition, under the Treaty of Versailles, Poland was given the conduct of foreign affairs of Danzig and the management of the railway traffic of the free city.
During negotiations at the Versailles Conference in 1919, then British Prime Minister Lloyd George warned that the transfer of over 2 million Germans to Poles "should sooner or later lead to a new war in eastern Europe" [5]. The English author M. Follick wrote in 1929 that “… of all that is most German in Germany, Danzig is the most German … Sooner or later, the Polish corridor would become the cause of a future war. If Poland does not return the corridor, it must be ready for the most disastrous war with Germany, for anarchy and, possibly, for a return to the state of slavery, from which it was only recently freed”[5].
Joachim Fest in the third volume of Hitler's biography "Adolf Hitler" writes that Hitler, in a conversation with the commander-in-chief of the German ground forces Brauchitsch on March 25, spoke of the undesirability of a violent resolution of the Danzig issue, but he still considered a military action against Poland worth discussing with "especially favorable political prerequisites"
On March 21, the British ambassador to Moscow Seeds handed the USSR People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs M. Litvinov a draft declaration of the USSR, England, France and Poland, which read as follows [6]:
We, the undersigned, being duly authorized thereto, hereby declare that, since peace and security in Europe is a matter of common interest and concern and since European peace and security may be affected by any action that threatens the political independence of any European state, our respective governments hereby undertake to consult immediately on the steps to be taken for general resistance to such action.
However, on March 23, 1939, Chamberlain declared in the House of Commons that "he does not want to create opposing blocs in Europe." The declaration was never signed.
Chamberlain remained deeply distasteful towards the Soviet Union. The writer Feiling, in his book The Life of Neville Chamberlain, quotes the following statement by the British Prime Minister in a personal letter dated March 26, 1939: if she wanted to. And I don't trust her motives”[7].
On April 1, 1939, the world press reported that the Chamberlain cabinet, abandoning the policy of appeasement, had made a promise to Poland to protect it in the event of an attack.
On April 13, similar guarantees were given by Britain to Greece and Romania [8].
The British government offered the USSR to give Poland and Romania the same unilateral guarantee that Great Britain gave Romania and Greece.
A little earlier, on April 11, Litvinov wrote to the Soviet ambassador to France, Ya. Z. Suritsu [9]
It is now necessary to be especially precise and stingy in words in negotiations about our position in connection with modern problems … After the story of the joint declaration, the British and French conversations with us did not contain even hints of any specific proposal for any agreement with us … The desire of England and France is being clarified, without entering into any agreements with us and without assuming any obligations in relation to us, to receive from us any promises that bind us.
We are told that it is in our interest to defend Poland and Romania against Germany. But we will always be aware of our interests and will do what they dictate to us. Why should we commit ourselves in advance without extracting any benefit from these obligations?
Previous events, not without reason, gave Hitler a reason to think that England would not fight for Poland. Moreover, in 1939 Great Britain had practically no land army. As we know, this is what happened - after the German attack on Poland, England declared war on the Third Reich, but did not provide any real help to the Poles.
On April 11, 1939, Hitler approved a plan for an attack on Poland (plan "Weiss") [10].
Here's the first point of the plan:
Germany's position in relation to Poland is still based on the principle: avoid complications. If Poland changes the policy towards Germany, which was based on the same principle so far, and takes a position that threatens her, then it will be necessary to settle the final scores with it, despite the existing treaty.
The goal will then be to destroy the military power of Poland and create an environment in the East that meets the needs of the country's defense. The Free City of Danzig will be declared German territory immediately after the start of the conflict.
The political leadership considers it its task to isolate Poland as much as possible in this case, that is, to limit the war to military operations with Poland.
The intensification of the internal crisis in France and the resulting restraint in England in the near future could lead to the creation of such a situation.
Intervention by Russia, if it were capable of it, in all likelihood, would not have helped Poland, since this would mean its destruction by Bolshevism.
The position of the limitrophes will be determined exclusively by the military requirements of Germany.
The German side cannot count on Hungary as an unconditional ally. Italy's position is determined by the Berlin-Rome axis.
On April 27, England introduced universal military service. In his speech on April 28, 1939, broadcast almost to the whole world, Hitler said that the Anglo-Polish treaty was evidence of the "encirclement policy" pursued by Britain against Germany and the incitement of Poland against her. As a result, according to Hitler, having concluded an anti-German treaty with England, Poland itself violated the terms of the German-Polish non-aggression pact of 1934. More determined than Czechoslovakia, the Polish government did not succumb to Hitler's threats and began to mobilize. Hitler used this to accuse Poland of aggressiveness, saying that Poland's military preparations forced him to mobilize his troops.
On April 14, French Foreign Minister J. Bonnet invited the USSR to exchange letters with the following content [11]:
In the event that France, as a result of the assistance it will provide to Poland or Romania, is in a state of war with Germany, the USSR will provide her with immediate assistance and support. In the event that the USSR, as a result of the assistance it will provide to Poland and Romania, is in a state of war with Germany, France will provide the USSR with immediate assistance and support.
Both states will immediately agree on this assistance and take all measures to ensure its full effectiveness."
The feeling of impending war forced the French to change their arrogant policy towards the USSR. This is what Surits wrote when he passed the letter to Bonnet to Moscow [9]:
The attacks in the press have disappeared, not a trace of the former arrogance in conversations with us. They speak to us more in the language of supplicants … as people, in us, and not we in need of them. It seems to me that these are not only "maneuvers" … but the consciousness … that the war is impending. It seems to me that this is the view held by Daladier now. Daladier (according to our friends) is sincerely seeking cooperation with the USSR
In response to the French and British initiatives on April 17, 1939, Moscow proposed to conclude an Anglo-French-Soviet mutual assistance treaty with the following content [11]:
1. England, France, the USSR conclude an agreement between themselves for a period of 5-10 years on a mutual obligation to provide each other immediately with all kinds of assistance, including military, in the event of aggression in Europe against any of the contracting states.
2. England, France, the USSR undertake to provide all kinds of, including military, assistance to the Eastern European states located between the Baltic and Black Seas and bordering the USSR in the event of aggression against these states.
3. England, France and the USSR undertake as soon as possible to discuss and establish the size and forms of military assistance provided by each of these states in pursuance of §1 and §2.
4. The British government explains that the assistance it promised to Poland means aggression exclusively on the part of Germany.
5. The treaty existing between Poland and Romania is declared valid in the event of any aggression against Poland and Romania, or it is completely canceled as directed against the USSR.
6. England, France and the USSR undertake, after the start of hostilities, not to enter into any kind of negotiations and not to conclude peace with the aggressors separately from each other and without a common agreement of all three powers.
7. The corresponding agreement is signed simultaneously with the convention, which has to be worked out by virtue of §3.
8. To recognize it necessary for England, France and the USSR to enter into joint negotiations with Turkey on a special agreement on mutual assistance
On April 25, France agreed to these proposals. At the same time, the French government made comments on the Soviet proposals. Note numbers correspond to paragraph numbers of the previous document [12].
1. The agreement, which the French government considers extremely urgent and which should have an immediate effect, is caused by the threats now hanging over the European world. The very fact of his quick conclusion would help to strengthen the solidarity of all the threatened peoples, would increase the chances of preserving peace. It is feared that it will take too long to conclude a long-term pact of general mutual assistance, which could be interpreted by some countries as evidence of hesitation or disagreement between the three powers. At. In all circumstances, the conclusion of such a pact is a long-term business. And now we need to act as quickly as possible and reflect the possibilities of the coming weeks or the coming month.
2. In order to avoid any controversy {{* Disagreements (French).}} It would be preferable that the intended agreement did not contain any references to one or another category of states, geographically specified. The agreement should be limited to the obligation of assistance, which the three states provide each other in precisely specified circumstances. This kind of limitation would only increase the force. and the significance of the commitment and at the same time would prevent any reaction on the part of third states, which are constrained by the preventive "stipulation" {{** Terms in the agreement (FR.).}} on assistance.
3. The French Government agrees that it is possible to proceed as soon as possible to the consideration of the questions provided for in this paragraph.
4. This article applies exclusively to the British government.
5. For the reasons stated in connection with Art. 2, it would be undesirable to include in the draft agreement an article on behalf of third countries. Taking into account, however, that the Polish-Romanian agreement was concluded by erga omnes {{*** In relation to all.}}, The French government is fully inclined to use all its influence in Warsaw and Bucharest to induce both states to expand the scope of practical application the conclusion of a convention that would provide for the case of aggression by Germany.
[Pp.] 6, 7 and 8 are not objectionable by the French government."
The British were not inclined to cooperate.
On April 19, 1939, at a meeting of the British government committee on foreign policy, a note by the State Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs A. Cadogan was discussed, where he wrote [13]:
This Russian proposal puts us in an extremely difficult position.
What we need to do is weigh the advantages of Russia's written commitment to enter the war on our side and the disadvantages of an open alliance with Russia.
The advantage is problematic to say the least. From the messages of our embassy in Moscow, it is clear that while Russia can successfully defend its territory, it cannot, even if it wished, provide useful active assistance outside its borders.
However, it is very difficult to reject the Soviet proposal. We have argued that the Soviets advocate "collective security" but are not making any practical proposals. Now they have made such proposals and will criticize us if we reject them.
There is a risk - albeit a very remote one - that if we reject this proposal, the Soviets could conclude some kind of "non-intervention agreement" with the German government [. … …]"
On April 26, at a meeting of the British government, Foreign Minister Lord E. Halifax said that "the time is not yet ripe for such a comprehensive proposal."
England, according to her proposal of May 8 and the statements of Halifax, was ready to cooperate with the USSR in the fight against aggression to one degree or another only if Germany committed aggression against Poland or Romania and the latter resisted the aggressor. However, the British government did not want to conclude an Anglo-French-Soviet treaty on mutual assistance against aggression, according to which it would be obliged to provide assistance to the Soviet Union in the event of an attack on itself.
Naturally, the USSR refused such a variant of the treaty. In a note handed by the USSR People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs to the British Ambassador to the USSR on May 14, it was said [20]:
The British proposals do not contain the principle of reciprocity in relation to the USSR and put it in an unequal position, since they do not provide for the obligations of England and France, but guaranteeing the USSR in the event of a direct attack on it by the aggressors, while England, France, as well as and Poland, have such a guarantee on the basis of the existing reciprocity between them.
V. M. Molotov
On May 3, Vyacheslav Molotov was already the USSR People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs. Litvinov was an active supporter of rapprochement with the West and an enemy of Germany. Historian W. Shearer believes that Litvinov's fate was decided on March 19 - after the British rejected the Soviet Union's proposal to hold a conference in connection with the German ultimatum to Romania [14]:
Obviously, the desire to conduct further negotiations with England after such a refusal from the Russians diminished. Maisky later told Robert Boothby, a Conservative MP, that the rejection of the Russian proposals was seen as another crushing blow to collective security policy and that this sealed Litvinov's fate.
Obviously, after that, Stalin began to think about concluding an agreement with Germany, for which a tough and pragmatic politician was needed, not so intransigent towards Germany as Litvinov. Molotov was such a politician.
One of the few voices of reason in British politics of that time was the staunch anti-communist W. Churchill.
Here is what he said in the House of Commons on May 19 [15]:
I cannot understand in any way what are the objections to the conclusion of an agreement with Russia, which the Prime Minister himself seems to want, to its conclusion in a broad and simple form proposed by the Russian Soviet government?
.. What's wrong with this simple sentence? They say: "Can you trust the Russian Soviet government?" I think they say in Moscow: "Can we trust Chamberlain?" We can say, I hope, that both of these questions should be answered in the affirmative. I sincerely hope so …
If you are ready to become allies of Russia during the war, during the greatest test, a great opportunity to prove yourself for everyone, if you are ready to unite with Russia in the defense of Poland, which you guaranteed, as well as in the defense of Romania, then why do you not want to become allies of Russia now that by doing so, perhaps, you will prevent a war? I do not understand all these subtleties of diplomacy and delays. If the worst happens, you will still find yourself with them in the very crucible of events and you will have to extricate yourself with them as much as possible. If difficulties do not arise, you will be provided with safety at the preliminary stage …
After Litvinov's resignation, Hitler, for the first time in six years of his rule, expressed a desire to listen to his experts on Russia. From their report, Hitler learned a lot for himself, in particular - that the USSR now adheres not to the policy of world revolution, but to a more pragmatic state course.
Hitler's interest in Russia was growing. After watching a documentary about Soviet military parades, the Fuhrer exclaimed: "I did not know at all that Stalin was such a handsome and strong person." German diplomats were instructed to continue to probe the possibilities of rapprochement with the USSR. [16]
Information that Germany is going to intensify relations with the USSR reached England. Hearing about this, Halifax said that "there is no need to have much confidence in such messages, which, quite possibly, are spread by people who want to push us towards a pact with Russia" [17]
Against this background, the British decided to start negotiations with Germany. On June 9, the British Ambassador to Germany Henderson visited Goering and told him that if Germany had wished to enter into negotiations with England, it would have received "not an unfriendly answer." On June 13, Henderson met with State Secretary of the German Foreign Ministry Weizsacker, who, in the notes of this conversation, noted that the British ambassador "clearly having instructions, spoke of London's readiness to negotiate with Berlin … criticized British policy in Moscow" and " does not attach any importance to the pact with Russia”[17].
Summer negotiations of the USSR with England and France
The developing situation forced Great Britain and France on June 6-7 to accept the Soviet draft treaty as a basis. However, the British were not going to conclude the treaty itself. Their real goal was to drag out the negotiations, and thereby keep Hitler at risk of building a powerful coalition against him. On May 19, Chamberlain announced in parliament that he would "rather resign than form an alliance with the Soviets." At the same time, as already shown above, an alliance with Hitler was also not ruled out.
In turn, “It was believed then in Paris that the Soviet authorities would wait for the outcome of political negotiations with Paris and London before they begin official, even purely economic, contacts with Berlin,” Z. S. Belousov, the content of French diplomatic documents [16].
For negotiations that decided the fate of Europe, the British government sent an ordinary official to Moscow - the head of the Central European Bureau, Strang, while on the part of the USSR the negotiations were headed by the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Molotov. Churchill noted that "sending such a minor figure was an actual insult." According to V. G. Trukhanovsky and D. Fleming, sending a low-ranking official to the USSR was a "triple insult," since Strang also defended British engineers who were accused of espionage in the USSR in 1933, and was also a member of the group accompanying prime minister on his trip to Munich [18].
France was also not represented at the talks by the highest official - the French ambassador to Moscow, Najiar.
As planned by the British government, the negotiations dragged on, which was also noticed by the British press.
So, for example, the newspaper "News Chronicle" in the issue of July 8 gave the following caricature in this regard: in a room woven with cobwebs, surrounded by dozens of volumes of British "proposals" for 1939-1950. depicts a decrepit Chamberlain sitting in an armchair, who, with the help of a sound-amplifying tube, talks to Halifax. The head of the Foreign Office informs him that he has just sent the last offer. Two turtles act as couriers, one of which has just returned from Moscow, and the other is heading there with new proposals. "What are we going to do next?" Halifax asks. “Oh yes, the weather is beautiful,” Chamberlain replies to him [18].
Nevertheless, by mid-July, during the negotiations, a list of obligations of the parties, a list of countries to which joint guarantees were given and the text of the agreement were agreed. The issues of a military agreement and "indirect aggression" remained uncoordinated.
Indirect aggression meant what happened to Czechoslovakia - when there were no hostilities themselves, but under their threat the country was forced to fulfill Hitler's demands. USSR expanded the concept of "indirect aggression"
“… The expression“indirect aggression”, - emphasized in the proposals of the Soviet government of July 9, 1939, - refers to an action to which any of the above states agrees under the threat of force from another power or without such a threat and which entails for itself the use of the territory and forces of a given state for aggression against it or against one of the contracting parties, - therefore, entails the loss of this state of its independence or violation of its neutrality”[19].
The Soviet government insisted on extending the concept of "indirect aggression" to the Baltic countries and Finland, although they did not ask for this, which was motivated in the already mentioned note of May 14:
The absence of guarantees from the USSR on the part of Britain and France in the event of a direct attack by the aggressors, on the one hand, and the openness of the north-western borders of the USSR, on the other hand, can serve as a provoking moment for directing aggression towards the Soviet Union.
The protest of the negotiating partners was prompted by the words "or without such a threat" in the definition of indirect aggression and its spread to the Baltic countries. The British Foreign Office feared that such an interpretation of "indirect aggression" might justify the USSR's intervention in Finland and the Baltic states, even without a serious threat from Germany.
In early July, the French ambassador Nagiar proposed to resolve the controversy over the Baltic countries in a secret protocol, so as not to push them into Hitler's arms by the very fact of the treaty, which actually limits their sovereignty [16]. The British agreed with the idea of a secret protocol on 17 July.
As you can see, representatives of Western democracies were not alien to the idea of signing secret protocols concerning the fate of third countries.
On August 2, another milestone was reached - a general definition of "indirect aggression" was adopted, but an amendment was made that if a threat to independence arises "without a threat of force", then the issue will be resolved through consultations [21]. However, this option did not suit the USSR - the example of Czechoslovakia showed that consultations could take too long.
The British and French governments accused the Soviet Union of the delay in negotiations in front of the publics of their countries, which, according to them, was putting forward more and more new demands. What was, in the opinion of M. Carley, an outright lie is not true, “that Molotov constantly put forward more and more new demands in front of Seeds and Nadzhiar. The foundations of Soviet policy were clearly defined as early as 1935 … There were no new problems or "unexpected" demands, questions about "indirect" aggression, about guarantees to the Baltic states, about rights of passage and about a military agreement. Daladier lied when he said that the Soviet demands … came as a surprise to him”[17].
On July 22, the resumption of Soviet-German economic negotiations was announced. This stimulated the British and French on July 23 to agree to the Soviet proposal, simultaneously with negotiations on a political agreement to discuss military issues. Initially, England and France wanted to sign a political agreement first, and then a military one. If only a political one was signed, and there would be an aggression by Germany against the USSR, then Britain and France would themselves determine the extent to which they provide military assistance to the USSR. Therefore, the USSR demanded the simultaneous signing of a political and military agreement, so that the amount of military assistance was clearly spelled out.
As mentioned above, the British and French sought first of all to drag out the negotiations, so their delegation to negotiate on military issues, led by Admiral Drax from the British side and General Dumenk from the French side, went to the USSR on a low-speed cargo and passenger steamer " City of Exeter ", which sailed to Leningrad only on August 10. The delegation arrived in Moscow on August 11. For comparison, let us recall that during the Munich Agreement, the British Prime Minister Chamberlain considered it possible for himself for the first time in his life to get on a plane in order to quickly fly to Hitler.
The composition of the British delegation said that Britain had no serious intentions to sign agreements. Here is what the German Ambassador to Great Britain G. Dirksen wrote on August 1 in a report to the State Secretary of the German Foreign Ministry E. Weizsäcker [22]:
The continuation of negotiations on a pact with Russia, despite the sending of a military mission - or, rather, because of this - is viewed with skepticism. This is evidenced by the composition of the British military mission: the admiral, until now the commandant of Portsmouth, is practically retired and has never been a member of the headquarters of the admiralty; the general is just like a simple combat officer; General of Aviation is an outstanding pilot and flight instructor, but not a strategist. This indicates that the military mission is more likely to establish the combat capability of the Soviet Army than to conclude operational agreements.
The head of the French mission, General Dumenc, said that there was "no clarity or definiteness" in the instructions given to him. Moreover, the delegations did not have the authority to negotiate: “It simply did not fit into any framework,” Drax wrote later, “that the government and the Foreign Office sent us on this voyage without supplying us with credentials or any other documents. confirming our authority”. Dumenk spoke almost identically [17].
Nevertheless, negotiations began.
According to the Anglo-French plan, the USSR was to join the obligations of these countries in relation to Poland and Romania. The USSR quite logically demanded that these countries at least allow the passage of Soviet troops through their territory. Otherwise it would have been impossible to come into contact with the German troops if they had attacked, for example, Poland from the western border. The Poles, however, because of their long-standing hostility to Russia, were opposed.
On August 19, Polish Foreign Minister Beck, at the direction of Marshal Rydz-Smigla, gave French Ambassador Noel a negative answer to the question of the possibility of Soviet troops passing through Polish territory, stating that the Poles “cannot in any form discuss the issue of using part of the national territory by foreign troops "[23]. Moreover, Daladier instructed Dumenk not to agree to any military agreement that would stipulate the right of the Red Army to pass through Poland.
The French ambassador Nagiar wrote: "Poland did not want to enter into such an agreement … and the Anglo-French did not insist too much … We want to look good, and the Russians want a very specific agreement, which would include Poland and Romania" [17].
On August 21, Marshal K. Voroshilov made the following statement [24]:
The Soviet mission believes that the USSR, which does not have a common border with Germany, can provide assistance to France, England, Poland and Romania only if its troops pass through Polish and Romanian territories, for there are no other ways to enter into contact with the troops. aggressor.
..
The Soviet military mission cannot imagine how the governments and general staffs of England and France, sending their missions to the USSR to negotiate the conclusion of a military convention, could not give precise and positive instructions on such an elementary issue as the passage and actions of the Soviet armed forces against the troops of the aggressor on the territory of Poland and Romania, with which England and France have corresponding political and military relations.
If, however, the French and the British turn this axiomatic question into a big problem requiring long-term study, then this means that there is every reason to doubt their desire for real and serious military cooperation with the USSR.
As for determining the amount of military assistance that the parties were supposed to provide to each other, the British and French also avoided specifics, which the USSR demanded. When Admiral Drax informed the British government of the requests of the Soviet delegation, Halifax said at a cabinet meeting that he "does not consider it correct to send any response to them" [17]. Negotiations on a military agreement were effectively thwarted.
What was behind the reluctance of the British and French to sign an agreement with the USSR? Here is what L. Collier, the head of the northern department of the British Foreign Ministry in 1935-1942, wrote about this. years [17]:
It is difficult to get rid of the feeling that the real motive for the cabinet’s behavior is the desire to enlist the support of the Russians and at the same time leave hands free, so that, on occasion, show Germany the path of expansion to the east, at the expense of Russia … Soviet support should have been on its side, and …, in exchange for the promise of their help, the assurance that we will not leave them alone in the face of German expansion.
Back in the spring of 1939, Chamberlain, reflecting on the position of his country in the current situation, believed that Russia, and not Germany, was the main threat to Western civilization [25].
As a result, the short-sighted policy of France and England led to the breakdown of negotiations.
Louis Fisher, a renowned American journalist and historian, asked the British for exclusive information in September 1939 for an article condemning Soviet politics. Halifax denied him, saying "… it's not so incredible that these materials will make us blush."
Negotiations with Germany
Joachim von Ribbentrop
Germany was the first to show the initiative for rapprochement with the USSR after the Munich Agreement. German industry needed Soviet raw materials. Goering, who headed the Hermann Goering Werke concern since 1937, which took over the numerous factories confiscated from the Jews, and later the factories in the occupied territories, demanded that the German Foreign Ministry “at least try to reactivate … trade with Russia, especially in that part, where we are talking about Russian raw materials”[14]. When the Soviet-German trade agreement was extended on December 16, 1938, the chairman of the German economic delegation K. Schnurre told the deputy Soviet trade representative Skosyrev that Germany was ready to provide a loan in exchange for expanding Soviet exports of raw materials. The German credit initiative was cost effective and resonated. The trip of the German delegation to Moscow was planned on January 30, 1939. However, when reports of Schnurre's trip leaked to the world press, Ribbentrop banned the visit, the negotiations broke down, which for some time convinced Stalin that the Germans' economic intentions were frivolous (there was no talk of a "political basis" yet) [16].
The next active stage of negotiations began in the summer.
On June 28, 1939, the German ambassador to the USSR, Schulenburg, in a conversation with Molotov, said that "… the German government wants not only normalization, but also an improvement in its relations with the USSR." Here is how Molotov describes his conversation with Schulenburg further [26]:
Schulenburg, developing his thought at my request, said that the German government wants not only to normalize, but also to improve its relations with the USSR. He further added that this statement, made by him on behalf of Ribbentrop, had received Hitler's approval. According to Schulenburg, Germany has already given evidence of its desire to normalize relations with us. As an example, he pointed to the restraint of the tone of the German press in relation to the USSR, as well as to the non-aggression pacts concluded by Germany with the Baltic countries (Latvia and Estonia), which he considers as a gratuitous contribution to the cause of peace and which show that Germany has no evil intentions towards the USSR. Also in the field of economic relations, according to Schulenburg, Germany tried to go to us. towards. In response to my comment that the pacts mentioned by the ambassador were concluded not with the USSR, but with other countries and have no direct relation to the USSR, the ambassador said that, despite the fact that these pacts were not concluded with the USSR, the question of the Baltic countries is of a delicate nature and is of interest for the USSR. We believed, Schulenburg added, that by concluding these pacts Germany was taking a step that was not unpleasant for the USSR. Refraining from confirming Schulenburg's thought, I reminded him of the recent non-aggression pact between Germany and Poland, which had suddenly lost its force. At the mention of this fact, Schulenburg launched into explanations that Poland itself was to blame for this, while Germany had no evil intentions towards Poland. Breaking up the said pact, Schulenburg added, was supposedly a defensive measure on the part of Germany.
On July 18, E. Babarin, the Soviet trade representative in Berlin, handed to K. Schnurre a detailed memorandum on a trade agreement, which included an increased list of goods for exchange between the two countries, and said that if minor differences between the parties are resolved, he is authorized to sign an agreement in Berlin. From the report of the meeting, which was presented by Dr. Schnurre, it is clear that the Germans were satisfied.
"Such a treaty," wrote Schnurre, "will inevitably have an impact at least on Poland and England." Four days later, on July 22, the Soviet press reported that Soviet-German trade negotiations had resumed in Berlin [14].
On August 3, Ribbentrop sent a telegram to Schulenburg in Moscow marked "urgent, top secret":
Yesterday I had a long conversation with Astakhov [USSR Chargé d'Affaires in Germany], the content of which I will present in a separate telegram.
Expressing the desire of the Germans to improve German-Russian relations, I said that all the way from the Baltic to the Black Sea, there are no problems that we could not solve to mutual satisfaction. In response to Astakhov's wish to proceed to negotiations on specific issues … I said that I was ready for such negotiations if the Soviet government informs me through Astakhov that it also seeks to establish German-Russian relations on a new basis.
On August 15, Schulenburg read out a message from Ribbentrop to Molotov, insisting on an urgent rapprochement between the two countries, and said that the German foreign minister was ready to immediately arrive in Moscow to settle Soviet-German relations. On August 17, Molotov's official response followed:
Until recently, the Soviet government, taking into account the official statements of individual representatives of the German government, which were often unfriendly and even hostile towards the USSR, proceeded from the fact that the German government was looking for a pretext for clashes with the USSR,prepares for these clashes and often justifies the need to increase their armaments by the inevitability of such clashes.
If, however, the German government now makes a turn from the old policy towards a serious improvement in political relations with the USSR, then the Soviet government can only welcome such a turn and is ready, for its part, to restructure its policy in the spirit of its serious improvement in relation to Germany.
The USSR government believes that the first step towards such an improvement in relations between the USSR and Germany could be the conclusion of a trade and credit agreement.
The USSR government believes that the second step in a short time could be the conclusion of a non-aggression pact or confirmation of the 1926 neutrality pact with the simultaneous adoption of a special protocol on the interest of the contracting parties in certain foreign policy issues, so that the latter would represent an organic part of the pact …
By August 17, the Soviet leadership had already realized that the British and French did not intend to conclude an agreement with the USSR, and decided to conclude a pact with Germany in order to obtain certainty in the military-political plan for the near future.
On August 21, Soviet-German trade agreements were signed.
On August 23, Ribbentrop flew to Moscow. Interestingly, near Velikie Luki, Soviet anti-aircraft gunners mistakenly fired at Ribbentrop's plane heading for Moscow. They were not warned about the route of the flight, they were taken by surprise and fired even without sights [27].
On the same day, a non-aggression pact was signed, which went down in history as the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Attached to the pact was a secret protocol describing the division of the spheres of influence of Germany and the USSR in Europe.
According to the protocol, the USSR's sphere of interests in the Baltics included Latvia, Estonia and Finland, and Germany's - Lithuania; in Poland, the division took place along the Narew-Vistula-San line, Vilnius passed from Poland to Lithuania. At the same time, the very question of whether it is desirable from the point of view of the interests of the contracting parties to preserve the Polish state, was left to "the course of further political development", but in any case had to be resolved "in the order of friendly mutual consent." In addition, the USSR emphasized its interest in Bessarabia, and Germany did not object to the interests of the USSR in this region of Romania.
Molotov signs a treaty, followed by Ribbentrop, Stalin on the right
Consequences of the pact and its meaning
1. Accession of territories
Poland
Partition of Poland in 1939
The pact allowed the reunification of the Ukrainian and Belarusian peoples, when the corresponding territories of Poland, obtained by it in 1921 after the signing of the Riga Peace Treaty, which ended the Soviet-Polish war of 1919-1921, became part of the USSR after the partition of Poland between Germany and the USSR in September 1939.
Is it worth condemning the USSR for bringing troops into Polish territory when the Polish government had already fled, and the Polish army was defeated? As already mentioned, Poland received these territories only in 1921. The overwhelming majority of the population in these territories were Belarusians and Ukrainians, who in Poland at that time suffered discrimination on the basis of ethnicity.
The reunification of the Ukrainian and Belarusian peoples can hardly be called a historically unjust act.
Let us illustrate the thesis that the Ukrainians and Belarusians in Poland were not in the best position. Here is what P. G. Chigirinov in the book "History of Belarus from antiquity to the present day":
The crises of 1924-1926 and 1929-1933 were deep and protracted. At this time, the number of enterprises in the Western Belarusian lands decreased by 17.4%, workers - by 39%. The workers here received wages 1.5-2 times less than in the central regions of Poland. Moreover, by 1933, compared with 1928, it decreased by 31.2%. In Western Belarus, poor peasants accounted for 70% of the population, nevertheless, the authorities settled the so-called "sieges" on the state lands and on the lands of Russian owners who were forced to leave Poland. Siegemen are "racially pure" Poles, participants in the wars of 1919-1921.
In 1938, about 100 Orthodox churches in Eastern Poland were either destroyed or transferred to the jurisdiction of the Roman Catholic Church. By the beginning of World War II, not a single Belarusian school remained on the territory of Western Belarus, and only 44 schools with partial teaching of the Belarusian language survived.
And here is what the Canadian historian of Ukrainian origin Orest Subtelny, a supporter of the independence of Ukraine and critical of the Soviet regime, writes [29]:
A serious deterioration in Ukrainian-Polish relations began during the Great Depression, which hit the agricultural regions inhabited by Ukrainians with particular force. The peasants suffered not so much from unemployment as from a catastrophic drop in their incomes caused by a sharp drop in demand for agricultural products. During the crisis years, the net profit per acre (0.4 ha) in small peasant farms decreased by 70-80%. Under these conditions, the hatred of the Ukrainian peasants for the well-financed Polish colonists and wealthy Polish landowners sharply intensified. Dissatisfaction among the Ukrainian intelligentsia grew, especially among young people who did not have a job, since the small number of places provided by the state was inevitably occupied by Poles. Therefore, when radical Ukrainian nationalists called for active resistance to Polish domination, Ukrainian youth readily responded to this call.
Baltics
First, it should be noted that the Baltic states in the 1930s were not democratic at all, but quite the opposite.
In Lithuania in 1927, Antanas Smetona, the head of the ruling pro-fascist party "Tautininkai Sayunga", declared himself "the leader of the nation" and dissolved the parliament. Until November 1, 1938, martial law was in force in the country (canceled at the request of Nazi Germany in connection with the events in Klaipeda). In Estonia in March 1934, as a result of a coup, the dictatorship of the leader of the Agrarian Party Konstantin Päts was established. Parliament was dissolved and all political parties were banned. In Latvia, in the same 1934, Karl Ulmanis, the leader of the "Peasant Union", became the dictator.
A significant part of the population of the Baltic States sympathized with the USSR. Here is what the Ambassador to Latvia K. Ord reported to the British Foreign Office:
From cipher telegram No. 286 dated June 18, 1940:
Serious riots took place in Riga yesterday evening, when the population, a significant part of whom greeted Soviet troops with cheers and flowers, clashed with the police. Everything is calm this morning …
From cipher telegram No. 301 dated June 21, 1940:
"Fraternization between the population and the Soviet troops has reached considerable proportions."
On July 26, 1940, the London Times noted:
The unanimous decision to join Soviet Russia reflects … not pressure from Moscow, but a sincere recognition that such a way out is a better alternative than inclusion in the new Nazi Europe"
Finland
Initially, the USSR did not intend to fight with Finland and tried to achieve Finland's concession of a part of the Karelian Isthmus in exchange for a territory in North Karelia that was twice as large in area, but less suitable for agricultural use, as well as the transfer of several islands and part of the Hanko (Gangut) peninsula to the USSR under military bases. The Karelian Isthmus was strategically important for the USSR - after all, in 1939 the Soviet-Finnish border was only 32 km away. from Leningrad - the largest industrial center, the second largest city in the country and an important transport hub. Moreover, the territory of Western Karelia was not originally Finnish, but was acquired by Finland in 1920 under the Peace of Tartu after the Soviet-Finnish war of 1918-1920.
The territory of the Vyborg province was conquered by Peter the Great from Sweden during the Northern War (there was no talk of an independent Finland at that time), and at the end of 1811, according to the manifesto of Emperor Alexander the First, the Vyborg province (which also included Pitkyaranta) entered the autonomous Grand Duchy of Finland … For 90 years of being a part of the Russian Empire, it has become significantly Russified and many of its inhabitants "did not know anything other than the Russian language." And even more so, the original Finnish territory was not the large center of Orthodoxy, the island of Valaam on Lake Ladoga, although formally before the revolution of 1917 it was part of the Finnish principality of the Russian Empire, and after 1917 it ceded to independent Finland.
territorial changes after the Soviet-Finnish war
Accession of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina to the USSR
Bessarabia was a former Russian province, therefore, according to the government of the newly formed USSR, it should have become part of it. In 1918, Romania announced to the Western European states that it did not rule out the annexation of Bukovina and Bessarabia. At that time, the region was the Moldavian Democratic Republic, led by Sfatul Tarii, loyal to Romania.
This violated the agreement with the RSFSR, signed at the beginning of the year. Taking advantage of the civil war in Russia and anarchy, Romanian troops in January of the same year crossed the Danube and Prut rivers and reached the Dniester. With Sfatul Tarii, an agreement was signed on the unification of Bessarabia with Romania. The new border with the OSR and the UPR, then with the Ukrainian SSR and the Moldavian ASSR as part of the USSR, until 1940, passed along the Dniester line. She was not recognized by the Soviet government. The RSFSR also categorically refused to recognize these territories as Romania [31].
Thus, if in the case of Poland and Finland it was at least about those territories that the USSR legally recognized for these countries, then in the case of Bessarabia everything was not so and the territory, obviously, was more than controversial.
The local population suffered from Romanization [31]:
The Romanian administration considered it a task of exceptional importance to oust Russians and Russian-speaking people from government bodies, the education system, culture, thereby trying to minimize the role of the “Russian factor” in the life of the province … according to which all the inhabitants of Bessarabia had to accept Romanian citizenship, speak and write in Romanian … The expulsion of the Russian language from the official sphere affected, first of all, a detachment of thousands of officials and employees. According to some estimates, tens of thousands of families of officials who were fired due to lack of knowledge of the language or for political reasons were left without any means of subsistence.
The annexation of this territory did without military action. On June 27, 1940, King Carol II of Romania accepted the ultimatum from the Soviet side and handed Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina to the USSR.
Military significance - pushing back borders
The annexation of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus pushed the borders to the west, which means that it increased the time for German troops to move to the Soviet industrial centers, and gave more time for the evacuation of factories.
Opponents of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact point out that it would be better if the USSR had buffer states between itself and Germany, and therefore it was not worth annexing the Baltic states. However, this does not stand up to scrutiny. Due to the fact that there were Soviet troops in Estonia, Estonia was able to resist the fascist invaders from July 7 to August 28, 1941 - almost 2 months. Obviously, if at that time Estonia would have been an independent state, then its armed forces would not have been able to hold back the Wehrmacht for so long. If in big Poland the resistance lasted only 17 days, then in small Estonia it would have lasted 3-4 days maximum.
Meanwhile, these 2 months that Soviet Estonia resisted were critical for organizing the defense of Leningrad - as mentioned above, the largest industrial and second largest city in the country. The blockade of Leningrad drew on itself the nearly one million-strong group of troops "North" of the Wehrmacht. Obviously, if Leningrad were quickly taken at the very beginning of the war, then this million German soldiers could take part in other battles, as a result of which the history of the Great Patriotic War could be completely different and much more deplorable for the USSR. And finally, we must not forget that on June 19, 1939, the Estonian ambassador in Moscow informed his British colleague that in the event of war, Estonia would side with Germany. That is, there would be no resistance to Estonia at all.
From the same point of view, it was critically important to move the Soviet-Finnish border away from Leningrad. Of course, there is an opinion that if it had not been for the winter war of 1939-1940, then Finland would not have become an ally of the Third Reich, and nothing would have threatened Leningrad from the north, but no one could guarantee exactly this development of events.
Getting time to prepare for war
Stalin understood that the Red Army in 1939 was far from perfect, and the Soviet-Finnish war showed this. It took time for rearmament and reorganization. And Germany helped this. Under the treaty dated February 11, 1940
the list of military materials envisaged for delivery by the German side by the end of this year was 42 typewritten pages printed at one and a half intervals, and included, for example, drawings and samples of the latest German combat aircraft Messerschmitt-109 and -110, Junkers- 88 ", etc., artillery pieces, tanks, tractors and even a whole heavy cruiser" Luttsov ". The Soviet list consisted almost entirely of military materials and included not only those taken into service, but also those that were in development: dozens of field naval and anti-aircraft artillery systems, 50-240 mm mortars with ammunition, the best Pz-III tank, torpedo weapons, dozens of radio stations, etc. [17]. In exchange, the USSR supplied raw materials - oil, grain, cotton, timber, etc.
Neutralization of Japan
In August 1939, the USSR fought with Germany's ally Japan in the area of the Khalkhin-Gol River. For Tokyo, the conclusion of the Soviet-German agreement was a real shock. Soviet intelligence officer R. Sorge reported [32]:
Negotiations for a non-aggression pact with Germany caused a huge sensation and opposition against Germany. The resignation of the government is possible after the details of the conclusion of the agreement have been established … Most of the members of the government are thinking about terminating the anti-Comintern agreement with Germany. The trade and finance groups almost reached an agreement with England and America. Other groups side by side with Colonel Hashimoto and General Ugaki are in favor of concluding a non-aggression pact with the USSR and the expulsion of England from China. The internal political crisis is growing"
And so it happened - the Japanese government resigned. It is quite possible that if the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact had not been signed, then military operations against Japan in the Far East would have continued after 1939. In May 1941, the Soviet Union and Japan signed a non-aggression pact. Of course, the USSR still had to keep large forces in the Far East in case Japan suddenly did attack, but, fortunately, Japan never invaded the territory of the USSR.
What were the alternatives?
1. Conclusion of a military and political agreement with the allies without harsh conditions (corridors, obligations) and detailed planning
This option is considered by the famous military historian Alexei Isaev. We will quote an excerpt from his article “The Molotov-Ribbentropp Pact. The military aspect "[33]:
In this case, it would hardly have been possible to prevent the defeat of Poland. Even Soviet aircraft strikes could hardly have stopped Guderian on his way to Brest. The Baltic states would be occupied with the tacit consent of the allies, again in order to avoid the appearance of the Germans near Narva. The Red Army is mobilized, workers are withdrawn from industry, and the troops are suffering losses. The next round would follow in the summer of 1940. The Wehrmacht strikes at France. True to allied commitments, the Red Army goes over to the offensive. The Germans have at their disposal to exchange time for the territory - the whole of Poland. The maximum that the Red Army of the 1940 model could achieve, i.e. having neither the KV, nor the T-34, nor the lessons of the Finnish war - a breakthrough into Western Ukraine and Western Belarus. Large masses of BT and T-26 would have awaited a merciless beating from the anti-tank guns of the Germans. Examples abound in 1941. Even reaching the Vistula line seems overly optimistic. The defeat of France is practically predetermined, and after it comes the castling of troops to the east. Instead of "Battle of Britain", the Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe attack the Red Army in Poland weakened by the fighting. As a result, there was neither gain in time, nor a favorable strategic position of the border.
Of course, we can say that this option is better than the 1941 disaster. However, the Soviet leadership, of course, did not know that in 1941 the events would take place in this way, but calculating the possible options, they could come to the same conclusions as Alexei Isaev. Naturally, such a development of events could not suit Stalin in any way.
2. Not to conclude a contract. Rearm and wait for the development of events
Worst case scenario. Western Ukraine and Western Belarus retreat to Germany, the Baltic countries are obviously occupied by German troops. If the USSR wants to occupy the Baltics earlier, then most likely the beginning of the war with Germany is precisely because of the Baltics. If Germany occupies these territories, then in the event of an inevitable war between the USSR and the Third Reich, Leningrad is under the threat of capture with all the ensuing consequences, which we wrote about above. Also, obviously, the Soviet-German trade agreement, according to which the USSR received German military technology, would not have been signed.
It is quite possible that in the Far East, hostilities with Japan would have continued after 1939.
Some historians say that due to the signing of the pact and the transfer of borders to the west, the fortified areas - "Stalin's line" and "Molotov's line" were abandoned, and it would be better if the USSR would continue to strengthen these lines. The Soviet army would have dug in there, and no enemy would have passed. Firstly, these lines are not at all as powerful as, for example, Suvorov-Rezun writes about it. Secondly, practice has shown that such lines are not a panacea, no matter how well they are strengthened. They break through by concentrating forces in one area, so passive defense in fortified pillboxes without counter-attacks is the path to defeat.
3. Not to conclude an agreement, to attack Hitler ourselves
In Russia there are many supporters of the theory that the USSR itself planned to attack Germany, but Hitler was ahead of him. How could events have developed if the USSR had really been the first to attack Germany in 1939-1940?
Let us recall that when, during the Munich Agreement, Western envoys gave Benes an ultimatum, demanding that he accept the plan for the partition of Czechoslovakia, they told him:
“If the Czechs unite with the Russians, the war may take on the character of a crusade against the Bolsheviks. Then it will be very difficult for the governments of England and France to stay on the sidelines. That is, England and France then did not rule out the possibility of unification with Germany for the purpose of war against the USSR.
Most interestingly, these plans did not disappear in 1940, when the Second World War was already underway.
During the Soviet-Finnish war, the British government began to prepare expeditionary troops to be sent to Finland. On the basis of the emerging anti-Soviet imperialist front, a commonality of interests and intentions of Britain and France with fascist Germany and Italy has emerged. Hitler and his staffs, interested not only in weakening the Soviet Union, but also in making the Finnish border as close to Leningrad and Murmansk as possible, made it clear about their solidarity with Finland and, like the French leaders, did not hide their satisfaction with those difficulties. which the Red Army met when breaking through the Mannerheim Line.
Through Swedish correspondents in Berlin, Hitler announced that Germany would not object to the transport of war materials and volunteers through Sweden. Fascist Italy openly supplied Finland with weapons and bombers, and the latter received the right to fly through France. The Evre newspaper wrote on January 3, 1940: "Foreign aid to Finland has been organized. The ambassadors of England and Italy have left Moscow for an indefinite period." Thus, on a common anti-Soviet basis, contact was now almost openly established between Western democracies and fascist states, which were formally in a state of either war or alienation with each other [34].
The English historian E. Hughes later wrote [35]:
The motives for the proposed expedition to Finland defy rational analysis. The provocation by Britain and France of a war with Soviet Russia at a time when they were already in a war with Germany seems to be a product of a madhouse. It provides grounds for proposing a more sinister interpretation: switching the war to anti-Bolshevik lines so that the war against Germany can be ended and even forgotten … Currently, the only useful conclusion can be the assumption that the British and French governments at that time lost their mind.
A. Taylor adhered to a similar opinion: “The only reasonable explanation for all this is to assume that the British and French governments simply went crazy” [35].
The peace concluded by the Soviet Union with Finland thwarted the designs of Britain and France. But London and Paris did not want to give up their intentions to strike at the Soviet Union. Now there, as in Berlin, they began to view the Soviet Union as militarily extremely weak. Eyes turned south. The targets of the strike are the Soviet oil regions.
On January 19, 1940, French Prime Minister Daladier sent a letter to the Commander-in-Chief, General Gamelin, Air Force Commander Vueilmen, General Koelz and Admiral Darlan: "I ask General Gamelin and Admiral Darlan to develop a memorandum about a possible invasion with the aim of destroying the Russian oil fields." Further, the three most probable ways of carrying out an intervention in the Soviet Union from the south were considered. The second of these options was a "direct invasion of the Caucasus." And this was written on the day when the German side was actively preparing for the defeat of France.
In February 1940, the French General Staff completed the development of an intervention plan against the Soviet Union. On April 4, the plan was sent to Prime Minister Reyio. "Allied operations against the Russian oil region in the Caucasus," the plan said, "may have the goal of … taking away from Russia the raw materials it needs for its economic needs, and thus undermining the power of Soviet Russia."
Soon the final date for the attack on the USSR was set: end of June - beginning of July 1941.
In addition to air attacks against the Caucasus, which, in the opinion of the Anglo-French leadership, could undermine the basis of the Soviet Union's economy, an attack from the sea was envisaged. The further successful development of the offensive was to involve Turkey and other southern neighbors of the USSR in the war on the side of the allies. British General Wavell made contact with the Turkish military leadership for this purpose.
So on the eve of the invasion of Hitler's armies, in a situation fraught with mortal danger for France, its ruling circles continued to think about an alliance with Hitler and a treacherous attack on the country, whose people later made a decisive contribution to the salvation of France.
The development of the anti-Soviet plan "Operation Baku" was completed in Paris on February 22, 1940. And two days later, on February 24, in Berlin, Hitler signed the final version of the Gelb directive, which provided for the defeat of France [34].
So, as we can see, there was nothing impossible in the unification of Germany, England and France against the USSR even after September 1, 1939, when Britain and France declared war on Germany. This option was not realized only due to the fact that Hitler himself was the first to neutralize France. However, if the USSR had managed to attack Germany before that moment, then the option of uniting Germany, England and France against the USSR under the auspices of a "crusade against Bolshevism" was quite realistic. However, even if the USSR signed a mutual assistance treaty with Britain and France in August 1939, there are no guarantees that these countries would not plan military operations against the USSR.
Is it Bolshevism?
Someone might say that England and France did not enter into a full-fledged military alliance with the USSR, because were hostile to Bolshevism. However, even a superficial knowledge of history is enough to know that Russia and the countries of the West have always been geopolitical adversaries, even since the time of the confrontation between Alexander Nevsky and the Teutonic Order. At the same time, which is characteristic, Russia itself was not the first to invade either England, France or Germany (with the exception of the Seven Years War, when in the summer of 1757 Russian troops invaded East Prussia). While the opposite cases can be easily remembered.
The hostile attitude towards Russia in Western countries did not depend on what kind of political system it had. It was hostile even when there were no Bolsheviks in Russia, but there was the same monarchy as throughout Europe.
Vasily Galin in his book Political Economy of War. Conspiracy of Europe”provides a good selection of statements by the Western press of the first half of the 19th century about Russia, which I will quote here [34]:
Russia had a reputation in Europe as a “power of conquest by its very nature,” Metternich noted in 1827. “What can a conqueror sovereign not be able to undertake, standing at the head of these brave people who are not afraid of any danger? … Who will be able to resist their pressure, "wrote Ancelot in 1838." In the 1830s, the idea that the Russian emperor was preparing a "crusade" against Western civilization and intends to bring to the West "the civilization of the saber and the club" (according to the definition of the newspaper "National") that the only vocation of Russia is war and that "the rough, militant backward North, driven by instinctive need, will unleash all its might on the civilized world and impose its laws on it" - Revue du Nord, 1838 "Russia was portrayed as" the sword of Damocles, suspended over the heads of all European sovereigns, a nation of barbarians, ready to conquer and devour half of the globe "" - Wiegel. The call "to prevent the wild hordes from the North from reaching Europe … To protect the rights of European peoples" sounded in 1830 in the manifesto of the Polish Sejm
As you can see, these fears are absolutely irrational. Naturally, Nicholas I did not prepare any crusade against Western Europe in the 1830s - Russia had no strategic need for this and such a possibility was not even discussed theoretically.
But this is the 19th century. And here is what General Denikin wrote about the perception of the role of Russia in the First World War in the Western world [37]:
… I met such a misunderstanding of the role of Russia almost everywhere in wide public circles, even long after the conclusion of peace, wandering around Europe. A small episode serves as a caricature, but a very characteristic indicator of it: on the banner - a banner presented to Marshal Foch "from American friends", there are flags of all states, small lands and colonies that in one way or another entered the orbit of the Entente in the great war; the Russian flag was put on … 46th place, after Haiti, Uruguay and directly behind San Marino …
Such were the sentiments in Europe. In the same way, in the 1930s, it was believed that Stalin was planning to invade all of Europe, although at that time the USSR had long abandoned the idea of a "world revolution" and was building socialism in a single country. Such statements can be quoted for a long time. Therefore, most likely, if in the 1930s there were capitalism with democracy in Russia, England and France would behave in the same way at the negotiations, which means that the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact was still inevitable.
