One of the clear examples of the confrontation between the sword and the shield can be considered counteraction of air attack weapons (SVN) and anti-aircraft missile systems (SAM). From the very beginning of the appearance of the air defense system, they began to pose a huge threat to combat aviation, forcing the aircraft to first climb as high as possible into the sky, and then cuddle to the ground.
To counter the air defense system, specialized aviation ammunition was developed, such as missiles with guidance on the radiation of a radar station (radar), electronic warfare (EW) equipment was improved, and finally, combat aircraft and aviation ammunition were created using stealth technologies, which significantly reduce the range of their detection of the air defense system.
One of the most effective ways to counter an air defense system is to exceed its capabilities to intercept air targets. The limitation may be the maximum number of targets simultaneously detected and tracked by the radar, limiting the number of guidance channels for anti-aircraft guided missiles (SAM), or limiting the number of SAMs themselves in the SAM ammunition.
An increase in the stability of air defense is carried out by creating an echeloned defense, which includes complexes of long, medium and short / short range. Due to the fact that the boundaries of short / short range complexes are currently blurred, in what follows we will say - short range.
In Russia, at present, these are the S-400 Triumph / S-300V4 long-range air defense systems, the S-350 Vityaz air defense systems / BUK-M3 medium-range air defense systems and the Pantsir-S1 / S2 / Tor-M1 / M2 short-range air defense systems. …
SAM tasks of different ranges
The priority task of the long-range air defense missile system is the destruction of strategic aviation aircraft, tanker aircraft, early warning radar aircraft (AWACS), reconnaissance and target designation aircraft of the E-8 Joint STARS type, electronic warfare aircraft at the maximum distance from the protected object. Also, the priority targets of long-range air defense systems are operational-tactical missiles (OTRK) and cruise missiles (CR).
For a medium-range air defense system, the priority task is to destroy tactical aircraft, if possible before they launch air-to-ground weapons (air-to-ground), as well as launched aircraft weapons that pose the greatest threat to the defended object.
And finally, the priority task of the short-range air defense system is to protect the defended object and its "older brothers" from destruction by airborne weapons that have broken through.
All this distribution of roles does not imply that long-range air defense systems cannot shoot down a gliding bomb, and short-range air defense systems should not work against aircraft. The meaning of the division of areas of responsibility is to prevent the enemy from exhausting the limited ammunition of long-range air defense missile systems with false targets or the massive use of inexpensive high-precision ammunition.
Aviation in air defense
Another means of counteracting enemy aircraft is electronic warfare, but they will have to be left out of the brackets for now, since the effectiveness of this weapon against enemy air weapons is not reliably known. Taking into account that enemy aviation also uses electronic warfare means to counter the air defense of an attacked object, we will assume that their action has approximately equal effectiveness for both sides.
The main advantage of aviation is the highest mobility, which allows you to flexibly concentrate the available forces to attack a particular object. Air defense systems do not have this flexibility. An aircraft that has exhausted its ammunition can return to a remote base, and the air defense system, at best, can be moved to another position, since its mobility is limited by the speed of vehicles and the need to cover a certain object.
The main problem of air defense is that, using low visibility, electronic warfare means, a low flight profile and terrain features, the enemy can reach the line of launching / dropping high-precision ammunition in such an amount that with a high probability will oversaturate the capabilities of even layered air defense.
The United States and other NATO countries are constantly increasing the range of means to break through the enemy's air defense. Considering that only Russia and China have powerful echeloned air defense potential adversaries, it is not difficult to guess against whom all these preparations are being made.
UAVs and decoys for a breakout
One of the promising areas of air defense breakthrough is the joint use of manned aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). This significantly reduces the risks for pilots, leaving them with the role of coordinators of hostilities. In turn, UAVs can be smaller and less visible than a manned aircraft, and, accordingly, greater survivability in a confrontation with enemy air defenses.
Within the framework of the Gremlins program, implemented by the DARPA agency, a transport aircraft or a strategic bomber will be able to produce dozens of small-sized reusable UAVs to break through enemy air defenses. In turn, Gremlin UAVs can be equipped with even more small-sized guided munitions, for example, JAGM missiles with a multi-mode homing head (GOS) and a range of 16-28 km.
To increase the probability of an air defense breakthrough and reduce the enemy's own losses, false targets will be used, for example, such as the MALD missile, capable of imitating the radar signatures of 140 types of US and NATO aircraft, as well as jamming enemy detection and guidance radars. Almost all US Air Force attack aircraft are carriers of the MALD missile.
Insufficient ammunition problem
Although the capabilities of long-range and medium-range radars make it possible to detect hundreds of targets, they can simultaneously fire at about 10-20 targets (for one complex). It is possible to increase the intensity of target firing by using missiles with an active radar homing head (ARGSN), however, the development of missiles of this type in Russia has been delayed, and only recently has it reached the home stretch. Also, the cost of missiles with ARGSN is higher than missiles with semi-active guidance, and potentially less resistance to electronic warfare.
The number of missiles on launchers (PU) is also limited. At the same time, after the depletion of the ammunition, the air defense missile system becomes incapable of combat for a long time, and will restore its combat readiness in about 1 hour, provided that spare ammunition is generally available (there are transport-loading vehicles).
The developers are trying to solve the problem of increasing the ammunition load, for example, the new S-350 Vityaz medium-range air defense system has an ammunition load that has been increased several times compared to the S-300PM and BUK-M2 / M3 complexes, which it is supposed to replace. Another way to increase the ammunition load of long and medium-range complexes is to place several missiles (up to four) of a shorter range in a transport-launch container (TPK). However, this proportionally reduces the number of long-range and medium-range missiles, turning the air defense system into essentially a short-range complex.
Thus, despite the fact that the main striking force of air defense are air defense systems of a large and medium range, the limitation of their capabilities in terms of ammunition and the number of guidance channels shows the importance of short-range air defense systems as a means of countering enemy attacking ammunition.
The capabilities of domestic short-range air defense systems
What are the capabilities of Russian short-range air defense systems? At the moment, Russia has two modern short-range air defense systems, these are the Tor-M1 / M2 air defense system and the Pantsir-C1 / C2 air defense system.
The ammunition load of the Tor-M1 / M2 air defense system is, respectively, 8/16 missiles and about the prospects for its increase has not yet been heard.
The ammunition load of the Pantsir-S1 / C2 air defense missile system is 12 missiles and 1400 rounds of 30 mm caliber for two twin 2A38M anti-aircraft guns. As the test results and the actual use of the Pantsir-S air defense missile system in combat show, the effectiveness of anti-aircraft guns can be questioned, at least until the appearance of guided 30 mm ammunition, or at least shells with remote detonation on the trajectory.
Thus, the ammunition load of two Pantsir-C1 / C2 air defense systems is less than the ammunition load of one F-15E fighter armed with UAB SDB II, and the ammunition load of one Tor-M2 air defense system is comparable to the ammunition load of an Eurofighter Typhoon fighter armed with MBDA SPEAR missiles. If we take into account that two missiles may be required simultaneously to hit dangerous or complex targets, then the situation worsens even more.
The disadvantages of the Tor-M1 / M2 air defense system and the Pantsir-C1 / C2 air defense system can also be attributed to the fact that their missiles require control throughout the flight, and the number of simultaneously fired targets is limited to three for the Pantsir-S2 air defense system and four for the Tor-M2 air defense system. … In this case, simultaneously fired targets must be in the radar guidance zone, i.e. simultaneous work on targets attacking from different directions is impossible.
Problem solving options
How can you increase the productivity of air defense? The introduction of additional launchers with a large number of short-range missiles in the composition of long and medium-range air defense systems does not make sense, since the performance of the air defense system will still be limited by the number of channels for simultaneous missile guidance to the target. Missiles with ARGSN and thermal seeker, which do not require control throughout the entire flight, can reduce the dependence on the number of guidance channels, but their cost in many cases will significantly exceed the cost of the targets they hit.
The problem of depleting the ammunition of the air defense missile system can be solved by promising short-range air defense systems based on powerful lasers, with a conventionally infinite ammunition load. However, their ability to repel a massive attack is limited by the need to keep the beam on the target for 5-15 seconds required to defeat it. In addition, apart from the mysterious Peresvet complex, there is no information in Russia about the development of anti-aircraft laser systems, so it is impossible to predict their effectiveness as part of the Russian air defense system.
Thus, we return to the short-range air defense system, the cost of the air defense system of which should be significantly less than the cost of the air defense system for the long and medium-range air defense system.
The problem of breaking through air defense by exceeding its capabilities to intercept targets is known to the Russian armed forces and defense enterprises, and work is underway to resolve it
In particular, the development of the modernized SAM / ZRPK Pantsir-SM is nearing completion. The double designation of the SAM / ZRPK is indicated because, presumably, two versions of the complex should be implemented, with missile and cannon armament - ZRPK, and only with missile armament - ZRK.
Given the low efficiency of anti-aircraft guns, a purely rocket version of the Pantsir-SM air defense system is of greater interest.
Due to the abandonment of cannon armament, the ammunition load of the SAM in the Pantsir-SM air defense system can be increased to 24 units. Presumably, the SAM / ZRPK Pantsir-SM will receive a radar with an active phased antenna array (AFAR), but it is not yet clear whether the AFAR will be used only in the preliminary detection radar, or in the guidance and tracking radar. In the second case, the capabilities of the complex for the simultaneous firing of several targets should be significantly increased. And in either case, while maintaining the current configuration of the complex, the problem of a limited view of the guidance and tracking radar remains. The target detection range should increase from 36 to 75 km.
The range of destruction should increase from 20 km at Pantsir-S to 40 km at Pantsir-SM, the maximum speed of the missile defense system will be 1700-2300 m / s, h (5-7M). Also Pantsir-SM will be able to hit targets moving along a ballistic trajectory.
Another way to increase the ammunition load of the air defense missile system, as mentioned earlier, is to place several shorter-range missiles in one container. Considering that the Pantsir-C1 / S2 / SM air defense system is a short-range complex, but in the last modification it will approach the characteristics of medium-range complexes, the appearance of such missiles on it is more than justified.
For the Pantsir-SM complex (and possibly for the Pantsir-C1 / C2 complexes), a small-sized highly maneuverable missile defense system is being developed, which has received the unofficial name "Nail". This missile is designed to destroy UAVs, mortar mines, guided and unguided ammunition. Compact size allows you to place this missile in the amount of four units in one TPK. Thus, when armed with Gvozd missiles alone, the ammunition load of the Pantsir-SM air defense system can be up to 96 missiles.
The missiles of the existing Pantsir-C1 / C2 complex are made according to the bicaliber scheme, the booster engine is located in the detachable first stage. After the completion of the acceleration and separation of the first stage, the second - the combat stage flies by inertia. On the one hand, this reduces the speed and maneuverability of the missile with an increase in altitude and range, on the other hand, it is possible that the enemy will have problems detecting the second stage of the Pantsir-C1 / C2 missile defense system by missile attack warning systems operating on the principle of infrared detection. (IR) and ultraviolet (UV) radiation from a running rocket engine. It is possible that the AN / AAQ-37 system of the F-35 stealth fighter will not be able to track the second stage of the Pantsir-C1 / C2 air defense missile systems after the separation of the first stage.
It is not yet clear whether the Pantsir-SM air defense missile system will change, it is possible that in order to obtain an increased firing range of up to 40 km, the second stage will also be equipped with an engine. If not, then the advantage of a surprise attack may be retained for Pantsir-SM. At least, judging by the appearance of the small-sized SAM "Nail", it can be assumed that there is no engine in the second stage.
The alleged appearance of the SAM / ZRPK Pantsir-SM possibly speaks of another feature of this complex. The images show a rocket-cannon version with a surveillance radar and a missile version with an increased ammunition load without a surveillance radar.
The cost of the surveillance radar, especially if it is based on the AFAR, should be a significant amount, constituting a significant part of the cost of the air defense missile system / air defense missile system. Accordingly, the developers can implement several variants of the complex - with and without a surveillance radar, and most likely this is possible, both for the air defense system and for the air defense missile system. In this case, short-range complexes should act in a group like long and medium-range air defense systems.
For example, in a group of four Pantsir-SM vehicles, only one is equipped with a surveillance radar. The capabilities of the radar with AFAR will allow you to track much more targets than a single air defense system can handle, especially given the remaining limitation on the radar guidance sector of view. In this case, an air defense missile system with a surveillance radar issues target designation to the rest of the machines, which provide tracking and destruction of targets. In addition, the Pantsir-SM air defense missile system / ZRPK without a surveillance radar are themselves capable of searching for targets with an optical location station (OLS) they have.
A group of four vehicles will be able to repel an attack of air attack weapons simultaneously from all directions, or concentrate fire on the most threatened area. Four Pantsir-SM air defense systems only with missile armament can carry a total of 48 missiles with a firing range of 40 km and 192 nail-type missiles with an estimated firing range of 10-15 km. The combination of 240 surface-to-air missiles and a large number of guidance channels will allow four Pantsir-SM air defense systems to repel a massive enemy fire raid, for example, a flight of a flight of four F-15E fighter-bombers with 28 GBU-53B UABs on each or a salvo of eight multiple launch rocket systems M270 MLRS.
Based on the foregoing, we can conclude that the adoption of the medium-range air defense system S-350 "Vityaz" with the 9М96 and 9М100 missiles, as well as the completion of the development of the Armor / ZRPK Pantsir-SM (especially in a purely rocket version) with missiles with a range of 40 km and small-sized SAM "Nail", will give a fundamentally new capabilities of the Russian air defense system to repel massive fire raids by enemy air forces.
The S-500 Prometheus long-range air defense system, which is being designed, remains a "dark horse", and one can only guess what capabilities it will provide to the Russian air defense system.
