This series of articles is devoted to the service of battleships of the "Sevastopol" type in the interwar period, that is, in the interval between the First and Second World Wars. The author will try to figure out how justified was the preservation of three, in general, outdated battleships in the Red Army Naval Forces. To do this, it will be necessary to determine the range of tasks that these ships could solve, remind dear readers of the amount of modernization that each of them has undergone, and, of course, reflect on how much these upgrades were sufficient to fulfill these tasks.
As you know, the USSR inherited from the Russian Empire 4 battleships of the "Sevastopol" type, of which 3 were in more or less satisfactory technical condition. The fourth battleship, "Poltava", renamed "Frunze" in 1926, fell victim to a severe fire that happened in 1919. The ship did not die, but received severe damage: the fire practically destroyed three steam boilers, the central artillery post, both forward conning houses (lower and upper), power plant, etc. As you know, in the future there were many plans to restore it in one capacity or another, once they even started repairing the ship, abandoning this business six months later, but the ship never returned to service. Therefore, we will not consider the history of "Frunze".
As for the "Sevastopol", "Gangut" and "Petropavlovsk", the situation with them was the same. As you know, the Russian Imperial Navy never dared to use the Sevastopol-class battleships for their intended purpose, so in the First World War ships of this type did not take part in hostilities. Civil war is another matter.
During the civil
After the famous "Ice Campaign" of the Baltic Fleet, the battleships remained anchored throughout 1918, while the loss of their crew reached catastrophic levels - the sailors dispersed along the fronts of the civil war, along river flotillas, and simply … dispersed.
In 1918, Finnish troops laid siege to Fort Ino, located 60 km from St. Petersburg. It was the newest fortification, forming a mine and artillery position for direct cover of the "city on the Neva", which was armed with the latest 305-mm guns. The Soviet leadership wanted to keep this fort under its control, but, in the end, obeyed the order of Germany, which ordered the surrender of the fort to the Finns - however, the remnants of the garrison blew it up before leaving.
While there were still plans to keep Ino by force, it was assumed that the fleet could help in this, but only one battleship, the Gangut, was manned for the fighting. However, he never went to Ino. Then "Gangut" and "Poltava" were transferred to the wall of the Admiralty plant, put on conservation (where, in fact, "Poltava" and burned down). Then, when the active detachment of ships (DOT) was formed, Petropavlovsk was included in it from the very beginning, and later - Sevastopol. "Petropavlovsk" was even lucky enough to take part in a real naval battle, which took place on May 31, 1919. On that day, the destroyer "Azard" was supposed to conduct reconnaissance of the Koporsky Bay, but there it ran into superior British forces and retreated to the "Petropavlovsk" covering it. British destroyers, 7 or 8 unitsrushed in pursuit, and were fired upon by the battleship, which used up 16 * 305-mm and 94 * 120-mm shells, while the distance fell to 45 cables or even less. There were no direct hits - the long absence of combat training affected, but nevertheless several fragments hit the British ships, and they thought it best to retreat.
Subsequently, "Petropavlovsk" fired at the rebellious fort "Krasnaya Gorka", using up 568 * 305-mm shells. At the same time, the battleship itself was not damaged, but the "Sevastopol" got it, which, although it did not take part in this operation, was in the sector of the fort's guns. Subsequently, "Sevastopol" fired at the White Guard troops during their second assault on Petrograd. Then their combat activities ceased until 1921, when the crews of both battleships fell into a form of counter-revolution, becoming not just participants, but instigators of the Kronstadt mutiny. In the course of the ensuing hostilities, both battleships actively fired at forts that remained loyal to Soviet power, and also fired at the battle formations of the advancing Red Army men.
"Petropavlovsk" spent 394 * 305-mm and 940 * 120-mm shells, and "Sevastopol" - 375 and 875 shells of the same calibers, respectively. Both battleships received damage from return fire: for example, 1 * 305-mm and 2 * 76-mm shells, as well as an aerial bomb, hit the Sevastopol, and the explosions of the shells caused a fire. 14 people died on the ship. and 36 more were wounded.
Return to duty
As mentioned above, "Petropavlovsk" was damaged only during the Kronstadt mutiny, and "Sevastopol" in addition to this - also from the "Krasnaya Gorka". Unfortunately, the author does not have a complete list of damages, but they were relatively small and allowed the battleships to be returned to service relatively quickly.
However, their return was most negatively influenced by the completely deplorable financial situation in which the Soviet Republic found itself. In 1921, the composition of the RKKF was approved, and in the Baltic it was planned to leave in service from warships only 1 dreadnought, 16 destroyers, 9 submarines and 2 gunboats, 1 minelayer, 5 mine boats, 5 minesweepers, destroyers and 26 minesweepers. At the same time, the head of the Naval Forces of the Red Army, E. S. Panzerzhansky, in his address to the sailors on May 14, 1922, explained that the only reason was the dramatic reduction in military spending, caused by "extremely serious financial difficulties." In 1921-22. it got to the point that even such a reduced composition of the fleet could not be provided with either fuel for going to sea, or shells for practice shooting, and the personnel of the RKKF was reduced to 15 thousand people.
Oddly enough, but in the best condition was the most intensively used during the Civil War, "Petropavlovsk", after the Kronstadt mutiny, became "Marat". It was he who became part of the Baltic Sea Forces (MSBM) in 1921, having occupied the "vacancy" of the only battleship of the Baltic Sea, and since 1922 participated in all maneuvers and exits of the fleet.
Only in June 1924 the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR and the Supreme Council of the National Economy submitted a memorandum to the Council of People's Commissars, in which they proposed to start the first, in essence, shipbuilding program of the USSR. In particular, in the Baltic it was supposed to complete the construction of 2 light cruisers (Svetlana and Butakov), 2 destroyers, a submarine and return 2 battleships to service.
It must be said that "Sevastopol", which became the "Paris Commune", was included in the training detachment since 1922, and in 1923 it even took part in training exercises. But this participation consisted only in the fact that the battleship, standing in the roadstead of Kronstadt, provided radio communication between the MSBM headquarters and ships at sea. As a full-fledged combat unit, the "Paris Commune" returned to the fleet only in 1925. But the "October Revolution" - "Gangut", which stood at the wall throughout the civil war and had no combat damage, was taken to put in order in the last turn: entered service only in 1926.
It must be said that during this period the tasks of battleships in the RKKF were not yet clearly formulated for the simple reason that the tasks for the RKKF as a whole had not yet been defined. Discussion of the naval concept of the USSR began in 1922 with the discussion "What kind of RSFSR does the fleet need?", But at that time no final conclusions had been made. The theorists of the "old school", adherents of a strong linear fleet, on the one hand, did not want to deviate from the classical theory of sea ownership, but on the other hand, and they understood that the creation of a powerful linear fleet in the current conditions is completely utopian. Therefore, the discussions did not give much result, and soon turned to the undoubtedly important, but still secondary issues of interaction of heterogeneous forces, that is, surface ships, aviation and submarines. At the same time, the most important postulate of the need for a balanced fleet at that time was almost not disputed by anyone, although there were already supporters of an exclusively mosquito fleet at that time.
Of course, the sailors already then proposed the tasks that the fleet would have to provide in the near future. For example, Deputy Chief and Commissioner of the RKKF Naval Forces Galkin and Acting Chief of Staff of the RKKF Vasiliev in the "Report of the Command of the Naval Forces to the Chairman of the RVS of the USSR M. V. Frunze on the state and development prospects of RKKFlot "offered for the Baltic Fleet:
1. In the event of a war with the Great Entente - the defense of Leningrad and the support of operations against Finland and Estonia, which required complete possession of the Gulf of Finland to the meridian of Fr. Seskar and the "disputed possession" - up to the Helsingfors meridian;
2. In the event of a war with the Little Entente - complete possession of the Baltic Sea, with all the ensuing tasks and advantages.
However, all this remained at the level of proposals and opinions: in the 1920s, no answers were given yet as to why the country needed a fleet and there was no concept of naval development. Much simpler and more mundane considerations led to the need to keep battleships in the fleet. Everyone understood that the country still needed the navy, and the Sevastopol-class battleships were not only the strongest ships at our disposal, but were also in a completely acceptable technical condition, and entered service relatively recently. Thus, they represented a naval power that would be strange to ignore. And even such an enemy of the line fleet as Tukhachevsky considered it necessary to keep them in the fleet. In 1928, he wrote: "Taking into account the available battleships, they should be kept as an emergency reserve, as an additional means for the duration of the war."
Thus, in 1926, three Baltic battleships returned to service and the need for them for the fleet was not disputed by anyone. However, in the next year, 1927, the question arose about their large-scale modernization. The fact is that, although the same Galkin and Vasiliev believed that our battleships "… of the" Marat "type, despite 10 years ago from the time of construction, still represent units of the modern order", but many of their shortcomings, including including "in terms of booking, the weakness of antiaircraft artillery and protection against underwater explosions" was fully realized.
Modernization plans
I must say that the issues of modernizing battleships of the "Sevastopol" type also caused a very lively discussion. The main accents - directions of modernization - were highlighted at the "Special meeting" held on March 10, 1927 under the chairmanship of the Chief of the Naval Forces of the Red Army R. A. Muklevich. The discussion was based on the report of a prominent naval specialist V. P. Rimsky-Korsakov, who noted many of the shortcomings of battleships of the "Sevastopol" type, and ways to increase their combat effectiveness. On the whole, the meeting came to the following conclusions.
1. The armor protection of battleships is completely inadequate, and requires strengthening: this deficiency cannot be completely eliminated, but the optimal solution would be to bring the thickness of one of the armored decks to 75 mm. The weakness of 76 mm roofs and 75-152 mm barbets of the main caliber turrets was also noted.
2. The firing range was found to be insufficient; in the opinion of V. P. Rimsky-Korsakov should have been increased to 175 cables. In this case, the Sevastopol's firing range would have surpassed that of the best British ships of the Queen Elizabeth class by 2.5 miles - at that time, experts believed that it reached 150 cables. In fact, this was a somewhat premature judgment, because initially the towers of battleships of this type provided an elevation angle of 20 degrees, which allowed only 121 cables to be fired. Subsequently, the elevation angle was increased to 30 degrees, which made it possible for the British battleships to shoot at 158 cables, but this happened already in 1934-36. V. P. Rimsky-Korsakov proposed 2 possible ways to increase the firing range: the creation of a lightweight (about 370 kg) projectile equipped with a special ballistic tip, or much more serious work on the modernization of the towers, bringing the elevation angles to 45 degrees. The latter, in theory, was supposed to provide a firing range of "classic" 470, 9 kg shells in 162 cables, and lightweight - up to 240 cables.
3. An increase in the range of the main battery guns and an increase in the range of combat were to be provided by appropriate improvements to the fire control system. New, more powerful rangefinders should be installed on the battleships, and placed higher than was done in the original project, in addition, the battleships should be provided with the most modern fire control devices that could be obtained. It was also considered necessary to equip the battleships with at least two spotter seaplanes.
4. In addition to the firing range, the main caliber also needed an increase in the rate of fire, at least one and a half, and better - two times.
5. Anti-mine caliber: 120-mm guns placed in casemates relatively low above sea level and having a firing range of up to 75 cables were considered obsolete. V. P. Rimsky-Korsakov advocated replacing them with 100-mm guns housed in two-gun turrets.
6. It was also required to qualitatively strengthen the anti-aircraft artillery. However, V. P. Rimsky-Korsakov understood perfectly well that the strengthening of mine and anti-aircraft artillery was only advisory in nature, since the fleet and industry simply did not have suitable artillery systems.
7. The seaworthiness of the battleships was also considered insufficient - in order to resolve this issue, it was recommended, in one way or another, to increase the freeboard in the bow of the ship.
8. Coal as the main fuel of battleships was considered by all the participants in the meeting to be a complete anachronism - the participants in the meeting spoke of the transfer of battleships to oil as a settled matter.
9. But on the anti-torpedo protection of battleships no unambiguous decision was made. The fact is that the rejection of coal, and the protection provided by coal pits, reduced the already frankly weak PTZ of battleships of the "Sevastopol" type. The situation could be saved by the installation of boules, but then one would have to come to terms with a decrease in speed. And the participants in the discussion were not ready to decide on this: the fact is that speed was considered one of the most important tactical advantages of the battleship. Realizing that the Sevastopoli, in terms of the aggregate fighting qualities, are seriously inferior to modern foreign "21-knot" battleships, the sailors considered speed as an opportunity to quickly get out of the battle if circumstances were not in favor of the RKKF, and this, for obvious reasons, seemed more than probable.
10. In addition to all of the above, battleships needed such "little things" as new radio stations, chemical protection, searchlight and much more.
In other words, the participants of the meeting came to the conclusion that the battleships of the "Sevastopol" type to maintain their combat effectiveness require a very, very global modernization, the cost of which, in the first reading, was approximately 40 million rubles. for one battleship. It is obvious that the allocation of funds in this amount was extremely dubious, almost impossible, and therefore R. A. Muklevich ordered, along with the "global", to work out the "budget" option for the modernization of battleships. At the same time, the transition to oil heating was considered mandatory in any case, and the speed (obviously - in the case of installing boules) should not have decreased less than 22 knots.
