The main elements of the armed forces of the Russian Federation, ensuring the minimization of the likelihood of large-scale aggression against our country, are the strategic nuclear forces (SNF). In its current form, the Russian SNF is a classic nuclear triad, which includes strategic missile forces, naval strategic forces and strategic aviation capable of striking about 1,500 nuclear charges. The ratio of the number of charges between the components of the strategic nuclear forces can change, but in general, the structure of the strategic nuclear forces, which Russia inherited from the USSR, remains the same. The ground component of the strategic nuclear forces is predominant.
Tactical nuclear weapons stand apart, of which the Russian Federation has about two thousand warheads for various purposes.
According to the existing version of the military doctrine, the Russian Federation reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction against it and (or) its allies, as well as in the event of aggression against the Russian Federation with the use of conventional weapons, when threatened the very existence of the state.
The structure of the strategic nuclear forces of the United States of America generally corresponds to the structure of the strategic nuclear forces of Russia (USSR), with the difference that the naval component is dominant in the United States.
In other countries of the nuclear club, approximately the same picture is observed, adjusted for the absence or underdevelopment of some components of the strategic nuclear forces and the lower potential of carriers and warheads.
A distinctive feature of the strategic nuclear forces of Russia, the United States, and other countries of the world is its narrow specialization: ensuring the deterrence of the enemy from a full-scale attack, including the use of nuclear weapons. Strategic Nuclear Forces cannot prevent the enemy, carry out hostile actions, such as organizing coups d'etat, organizing local conflicts on the borders or even on the very territory of the target of aggression, implementing measures of economic and political pressure and other similar hostile actions. In this regard, strategic nuclear forces are a useless burden on the budget of the state and the armed forces, limiting the development of general-purpose forces.
After the collapse of the USSR, the developers of the US nuclear strategy concluded that the new era of international relations is characterized by the presence of numerous potential adversaries, sources of conflict and unprecedented challenges, as well as a range of difficult-to-predict scenarios. Compared to the Cold War era, the world has become more dangerous and unpredictable for the United States. As a result, the existing containment policy, which was based on a nuclear confrontation with one country - the Soviet Union, must be adapted to the new conditions.
The traditional triad of nuclear forces, according to the new US nuclear strategy, was supposed to be transformed into a triad consisting of nuclear and non-nuclear strategic forces, active and passive anti-missile defense (ABM) systems of global coverage, as well as a flexible infrastructure for testing, production and combat use of strategic nuclear and non-nuclear weapons, united by a communications, reconnaissance and control system based on new information technologies.
In the new nuclear triad of the United States, it is necessary to highlight such components as the presence of a global missile defense system, a non-nuclear component of strategic forces, which was planned to include means of a rapid global strike, and a highly effective system of intelligence, command and control and communications for the rapid identification of targets.
Also, low-power nuclear charges were considered as means of operational use, the use of which, according to the United States, may be justified in some scenarios of regional conflicts. For some time, the topic of the so-called. clean nuclear charges, which practically do not leave behind radioactive contamination and can be widely used in local conflicts. However, there is currently no detailed information on this area.
In recent years, the Russian Federation has been facing increasing pressure from Western countries, primarily the United States. The main instrument of the United States in this matter is the instrument of economic sanctions. Using the available economic and political instruments, the United States is imposing participation in the sanctions against the Russian Federation on countries that are in one way or another connected with the American economy.
In addition, military rhetoric is escalating. Under the guise of alleged violations by Russia of the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty), the United States is threatening to withdraw from this treaty, as it had previously withdrawn from the ABM Treaty.
List of existing and potential threats at the beginning of 2019:
The threat of the US withdrawal from the INF Treaty, expressed in an ultimatum, will be able to launch the procedure for withdrawing from the agreement on February 2, 2019.
For Russia, the deployment of medium-range missiles and cruise missiles means a significant reduction in decision-making and retaliatory strike time, as well as a decrease in the number of missiles for a retaliatory strike.
Placement of launchers of conventional weapons on the borders of the Russian Federation, positioned as elements of the US missile defense
Actually, this can be considered as preparatory measures for the previous point. In the event that the United States withdraws from the INF Treaty, cruise missiles with nuclear and conventional warheads can be deployed in universal launchers. In the future, as the US develops medium-range missiles, they can be deployed at the same bases of US vassals, where missile defense elements are now deployed.
Economic sanctions
The list of economic sanctions is constantly expanding and has a significant impact on the Russian economy. In addition to the sanctions that are already in force, the uncertainty factor for both parties has a significant impact. In particular, a supplier of sophisticated high-tech equipment may in the future refuse services to support it, under the pretext of a new package of sanctions, in turn, a Russian buyer should take this factor into account when purchasing. Full import substitution … First, in the modern world, with a monstrously expanded technology tree, it is beyond the power of any country in the world, including the United States. Secondly, this is definitely impossible in Russia, given the collapse of industry over several decades and the loss of many critical industries.
Creation of hostile regimes and hotbeds of tension on the borders of the Russian Federation
Geographic isolation - the impossibility of transporting goods, laying pipelines, the impossibility of moving the armed forces. Disruption of economic ties and the need to respond to the emergence of a zone of instability. In the future, providing footholds for the deployment of nuclear or conventional weapons of medium and short range.
Political pressure
Adoption at the level of international organizations and at the interstate level of declarations and resolutions defining Russia as an aggressor country with an illegitimate regime. Building a political base for further imposing economic sanctions and legitimizing hostile actions against Russia.
Informational impact at all levels
Blackening of any information originating from Russia, from news programs to children's cartoons. Psychological preparation of the population of Western countries for aggression against Russia, focusing on Russia as the main source of world problems. Distortion of historical facts, including the role of the USSR in World War II.
If we extrapolate the above actions, then they directly lead to the transition from the Cold War to a real “hot” conflict. And it's not far from here to a full-scale nuclear war. Taking into account the potential of Russia's strategic nuclear forces, it is unlikely that someone will decide on direct armed aggression, but sometimes the logic of the emergence and development of armed conflicts does not correspond to the expectations of their participants. Example: in the event of an escalation of the situation in Ukraine, a regional conflict with the participation of Russia, Ukraine and NATO countries may begin with unpredictable consequences.
Economic sanctions are no less serious threat. As mentioned earlier, in the modern world, not a single country, even the largest country, can develop normally without interaction with other countries, without adopting someone else's experience and without participating in scientific developments. Taking advantage of the attractiveness of its economy, market capacity and high purchasing power of the population, the United States is forcing economic entities of other countries that are not interested in sanctions against Russia to participate in them under the threat of restricting access to technologies of US companies and sales markets.
An example of the effectiveness of such sanctions. In April 2018, the US Department of Commerce imposed a seven-year ban on ZTE purchases of products from American technology companies due to violations of the sanctions regime against Iran and North Korea. For ZTE, this decision almost turned into a complete collapse of the company, and only by "going to repentance" in the United States and paying billions in fines, the company was able to stay afloat.
How can we cool the ardor of our Western partners and their accomplices?
The reorganization of Russia's strategic nuclear forces can be proposed as one of the effective means.
All of the following measures can be taken simultaneously or in stages in response to the US withdrawal from the INF Treaty or, for example, exceeding a certain critical threshold of economic sanctions.
1. Withdraw from all treaties limiting the number and means of delivery of nuclear weapons
Nuclear weapons are essential to keep the war from starting. The less it is, the greater the desire to "try". It is assured destruction that makes war unacceptable to all parties. It does not matter for us at all whether the United States will have 10,000 warheads, we need to have enough of them to guarantee the destruction of all targets in a retaliatory and retaliatory strike. In this sense, 10,000 warheads for the United States and 5000 warheads for Russia are better than 1,500 warheads each for us and for them. Moreover, with an increase in the number of warheads, the factor of the difference in the volumes of the nuclear arsenal will play an ever smaller role. Moreover, we are already concluding limitation treaties with the United States, without taking into account the nuclear arsenals of other NATO countries and Israel. With a decrease in the total number of warheads in Russia and the United States, their contribution is becoming more and more significant.
An exception must be made in this paragraph - to preserve the treaty on the non-deployment of nuclear weapons in outer space.
2. Maximum secrecy in terms of the nomenclature and quantity of strategic nuclear forces, similar to how it is implemented in the PRC
What is the point in helping the enemy prepare for the first strike, as well as to defend against our retaliation?
3. Shift the emphasis in international cooperation to ensure maximum awareness of launches, to avoid accidental exchange of nuclear strikes
4. The inclusion of missile defense elements and high-precision conventional long-range weapons in the Russian strategic nuclear forces
Modeled on the updated US Strategic Nuclear Forces triad, to improve flexibility and effective use in limited conflict.
5. "Personalization" of a nuclear strike
It is necessary to dwell on this point in more detail.
The exact lists of targets for nuclear weapons are classified. At the end of 2018, the US National Archives and Records Administration published a list of targets for nuclear missile strikes in the USSR developed in the 1950s, where item 275 - "population" looks the most impressive. The list itself is an 800-page document marked secret. It was designed by the Strategic Air Command in 1956 for a war that could very well have happened about three years after the list was created. The population was planned to be destroyed, since, according to the military of that time, the enemy should be demoralized, both soldiers and civilians.
According to open sources, the current list of US targets for Russia is contained in the CONPLAN-8044 plan of operations (there may already be an updated document). In general terms, its content is known.
If necessary, the American president can choose from four options for delivering a nuclear strike (Major Attack Option, MAO). MAO-1 assumes a strike on all components of the Russian nuclear forces and the entire infrastructure for the creation and operation of nuclear weapons: factories, the fleet, strategic aviation, missile silos, radar stations, satellite communications, telecommunications, etc. military bases and large airfields. Both options deliberately spare politicians and a significant part of the army leadership - so that there is someone with whom to negotiate surrender. When the MAO-3 is implemented, a pair of warheads will also go to them. And finally, MAO-4 is the most uncompromising bombing raid: in addition to all the previous nuclear strikes are delivered against economic targets - the fuel and energy complex and large, primarily defense, industries. In total, such a strike is designed for 1000-1200 targets and assumes that from 8 to 12 million Russians will die.
It is obvious that in Russia there is a similar document that includes certain lists of goals.
This document is proposed to be supplemented with an open part, which includes a dynamic (updated) list of goals.
These goals are the actors of international politics, whose actions are directed against the interests of the Russian Federation and whose actions bring closer or may bring closer the beginning of a "hot" conflict that could escalate into a full-scale nuclear war.
Currently, there are a huge number of people who are actively engaged in hostile, anti-Russian activities: journalists, politicians, opening organizations and closed clubs. Often these people and their property are located on the territory of third countries that are not involved in the conflict. In the event of hostilities, even in the worst-case scenario, they may hope to sit out in a cozy bunker in New Zealand or in a villa in Latin America.
For those who are poorer:
For those who are richer:
Some politicians may think that his country is too small and has no military value, so it is unlikely to come under attack, and you really want to pick up political capital in the confrontation with the "Evil Empire".
The task of the fifth point is to convey to persons hostile to Russia and their entourage, regardless of citizenship, country of residence, profession or position, information that in the event of a conflict, their actions will not go unpunished.
In fact, this will make the strategic nuclear forces an element of information warfare.
The list should include an open and a closed part. In some cases, only the identity of the target can be indicated, but the property is not indicated, since it can be on the territory of a friendly country. Also, for political reasons, most likely, the leaders of states and their immediate entourage will not be indicated (although this is not a dogma).
Also in the closed part of the list there will be strategic targets - military and industrial facilities from existing secret documents.
A multilateral commission, including representatives of various branches of government and security forces, should work on the creation of an open list of targets. After the list of targets is approved, the intelligence structures ensure maximum disclosure of information on the target - real estate, owned or leased, location, etc.
Then this information is posted on the official state website, up to the indication of the types of warheads that will be used on specific objects. The site, in addition to the textual part, should contain a graphic part on which it will be possible to see in the zone of which damaging factors of a nuclear explosion this or that object will be located. Implementation example:
The open list can include not only people, but also government facilities - for example, the US missile defense base in Romania. Perhaps a clear understanding of how many kilotons will fly to them in the event of a conflict will force the population to actively oppose the involvement of their country in conflicts of great powers.
How can the fifth point affect the threats listed above? Presumably, in addition to exerting psychological pressure directly on hostile individuals, secondary effects may also appear. For example, the value of the land on which the objects of potential targets are located will decrease. In turn, this may cause dissatisfaction with landowners of adjacent plots, refusal to sell or purchase such plots. This secondary financial pressure (“nuclear marketing”) may be more effective than an immediate threat to life. In the end, if you want to disperse a crowd of millions, announce a fundraiser …
Some countries may even deny the right to enter and purchase real estate in their territory to persons on the list.
In addition to the "stick", the "carrot" is also assumed. Since the list is assumed to be dynamic, in the event of a change in policy, adoption of positive decisions for Russia, closure of US bases, etc., the targets are excluded from the list. Is it not a goal for a politician to make his own neutral from the use of nuclear weapons?
In this decision, it seems to me, there is also some justice in the fact that the consequences of the conflict will be disentangled not only by some abstract John, who hates Russia, as much as he is receptive to TV news, but by the direct participants and organizers of the show.
Can potential opponents answer the fifth point symmetrically? Hardly ever. It just so happened that the actors of our policy prefer real estate in Western countries as investments, i.e. they will have to actually strike at their territory. As for the confiscations, this can be carried out now, within the framework of the current economic sanctions.
Technically, the implementation of the fifth point will require effective interaction between strategic nuclear forces and intelligence structures, as well as, possibly, the creation of compact warheads with a minimum power (5-10 kilotons) and dimensions, but high accuracy.
The smallest ammunition is based on a 152-mm artillery shell. The warhead for a ballistic missile, of course, will be larger, due to thermal protection and guidance systems, but in general, it can be hoped that modern technologies will make it possible to obtain the necessary product in minimal dimensions.
As carriers - medium-range missiles for targets in Europe and Asia and intercontinental ballistic missiles for remote regions. Separately, it is necessary to highlight the promising missile "Sarmat". Its capabilities will make it possible to deliver warheads even to New Zealand, which is often considered a safe place in the event of a global conflict.
Minimizing the size of warheads will increase their number on one carrier, which, in turn, will reduce the cost of deploying this element of strategic nuclear forces. For missiles of the "Sarmat" type, from 10 to 15 warheads are declared, depending on the power (usually 100-300 kilotons). For low-power charges, placing about 30-40 warheads on a carrier of this class would be good results.
And finally, the inclusion of conventional weapons in the strategic nuclear forces will make it possible to break down the destruction of targets into stages when some targets are hit by non-nuclear weapons during the threatened period. For example, the leaders of the same Ukraine will think three times about how to bring our peoples to a fraternal war, realizing that they themselves will surely become the first victims. And it is far from a fact that after such a demonstration the United States or someone from the EU countries will decide to "fit in." As Henry Kissinger said, "Great powers do not sacrifice themselves for their allies."
How expensive should it be financially? It all depends on how many additional targets will appear, how much it will be possible to miniaturize the warheads, how many and on what carriers they can be placed. Since not all directions of the strike will be missile defense systems, it is possible to abandon the means of breakthrough and false blocks on some of the delivery vehicles in order to reduce the cost.
How many warheads are needed, provided that the agreements on limiting the number of warheads are withdrawn? Here we go back to the previous question.
Finally, the voiced scenario can be used as a means of political pressure. Those. plans and intentions can be declared, preliminary preparations can be started. In the future, depending on the development of events, this scenario can be partially implemented or canceled completely, as well as fully implemented.
Summing up, we can say that it is not a fact that Russia will be the initiators of the withdrawal from the nuclear arms limitation treaties. If the United States decides that it is beneficial for them, then they will do it without hesitation: they will not be lacking in determination to denounce the treaties. Do not rely on the fact that their industry in terms of the production of nuclear weapons is going through far from the best times. If there is a problem, they will solve it, their scientific base and industry are colossal. In my opinion, it is better to show initiative on our own than to follow someone else's policy.
