In several previous articles, we talked about the 152-mm howitzers of the Red Army, which, to one degree or another, were quite successful for their time. For some characteristics, they even surpassed their foreign counterparts. For some they were inferior. But in general they met the requirements of the time of creation. It was still impossible to call them breakthrough, masterpiece, the best.
Today we are talking about a truly masterpiece. Weapons, which have not ceased to be admired to this day. Moreover, this admiration is also among those who design weapons today, and those who use the weapon due to their official duties. The gun, which, despite the fact that it was produced for only 6 years, from 1943 to 1949, became the most massive 152-mm howitzer of the Red, and then the Soviet army!
Tell me, who doesn't know this picture?
The track record of this howitzer begins with the battles of the Great Patriotic War and ends with almost all more or less significant military conflicts of the 20th century. And the military service of the system continues today in several armies of the world.
The author of the system is Fedor Fedorovich Petrov, the chief designer of the design bureau of plant No. 9 (UZTM), which we have repeatedly mentioned.
It was the experience and genius of FF Petrov and his design team that "helped" the new system to become operational in the shortest possible time.
But one more person must also be remembered. A man who, although he was not a designer of artillery systems, but without truly "howitzer" solutions in penetration at all levels of character, without his organizational skills, the fate of the masterpiece could have been less triumphant.
This is the People's Commissar for Armaments Dmitry Fedorovich Ustinov. Better known for the majority of readers-veterans of the USSR and Russian Armed Forces as one of the last Ministers of Defense of the USSR (1976-1984).
But back to the howitzer itself. In an article about the M-10 howitzer, we wrote about the termination of the production of such weapons in 1941. There are many materials on the reasons for this decision. The shortage of tractors is also mentioned, which is true. And the complexity of production, especially the gun carriage, which is also true. And the complexity of the weapon itself.
But, in our opinion, the main reason was the lack of production capacity. The country needed guns. And the factories were producing guns. Only M-30 and ML-20 (howitzer-gun) were produced from howitzers. The production of which was established in the shortest possible time on the one hand, and which provided the need of the Red Army for weapons of this type.
The turning point in relation to howitzers for the designers was the offensive near Moscow and further actions of the Red Army in 1942. It became clear that the army was going on the offensive. This means that the army will soon require powerful, mobile artillery systems.
Design bureaus began on an initiative basis, in their free time, to design such systems. However, in wartime conditions, the main requirement for designers was not revolutionary ideas and developments, but the ability to organize production in the shortest possible time at existing facilities.
It was here that the talent of Petrov and his team came in handy. The solution was found truly brilliant. To impose the barrel group of the M-10 howitzer, the power and production technologies of which have been preserved, on the well-proven carriage of the 122 mm M-30 howitzer. And thus combine the power of the 152mm M-10 howitzer and the mobility of the 122mm M-30 divisional howitzer.
Probably, the new howitzer can be regarded as a duplex of two systems at once - M-10 and M-30. At least for its predecessor, the M-10, the D-1 howitzer is a duplex without any reservations.
Then the detective begins. At the beginning of 1943, the People's Commissar Ustinov came to plant No. 9. After checking the production and meeting with the management of the plant, Petrov brings the People's Commissar the calculations of the new howitzer.
On April 13, a phone call is heard from Moscow. Ustinov informs Petrov of the GKO decision to supply 5 products by May 1, 1943 for field tests at the Gorokhovets test site.
On May 5, tests of two prototypes begin at the test site. The difference between the samples was small differences in the recoil devices. True, one sample has already been tested at the factory. The second was from scratch.
On May 5 and 6, the guns were seriously tested. A total of 1217 shots were fired. The rate of fire of the gun, both with and without correcting the aiming, turned out to be 3-4 rounds per minute! Already on May 7, the test site issued a report that, after troubleshooting, the D-1 howitzer could be recommended for adoption.
By the GKO decree of August 8, 1943, the D-1 was put into service under the name "152-mm howitzer arr. 1943" Its gross production was started in 1.5 months at plant No. 9. This plant was the only manufacturer of D-1.
Howitzer device:
- bed of sliding type;
- breech (breech);
- shield armor plate;
- recoil roller and recoil roller that make up recoil devices;
- howitzer barrel;
- muzzle brake DT-3;
- wheel travel (KPM-Ch16 howitzer wheels with GK 1250 200 tires);
- suspension of the course.
The howitzer carriage consisted of the bed, suspension and wheel travel. The barrel group consisted of a breech, recoil devices, a barrel with a muzzle brake.
What solutions did F. F. Petrov in the D-1 design? upon closer examination, it turned out that this design contains an element of another weapon.
The gun barrel is beyond doubt. Howitzer 152 mm model 1938. It's the same story with the gun carriage. Improved carriage of howitzer caliber 122 mm M-30. The sighting device is also from the M-30 howitzer. But the question with the shutter. Petrov used a bolt from a 152-mm howitzer model of 1937 ML-20.
As you can see, from a technical point of view, the design is quite perfect. Although, in order to simplify production, improve technology, changes were still carried out.
So, the frames of the guns of the first releases were completely riveted, and the bodies of the guns of later releases were welded.
Later howitzers also had manual rollers. The roller pin was inserted into the hole in the pivot beam.
Tactical and technical characteristics:
Weight
in the stowed position, kg: 3 640
in firing position, kg: 3 600
Vertical angles, degrees: -3 … + 63, 5
Horizontal angles, degrees: 35
Rate of fire, rds / min: 4
Firing range, m: 12 400
OFS weight, kg: 40
Maximum transport speed, km / h: 40
Calculation, people: 8.
If you look at the statistics on the production of the D-1 howitzer during the Great Patriotic War, a completely wrong impression is created about the number of these powerful guns in our army. In many sources, information is given in a rather "streamlined" manner. During the war, about 1000 howitzers were produced.
The picture changes completely if you look at the release of systems by year.
1943 - 84 pieces.
1944 - 258 pieces.
1945 - 715 pieces.
1946 - 1050 pieces.
1947-49 years - 240 pieces each.
As can be seen from these data, the growing demand for this particular weapon testifies precisely to the fact that the howitzer has "entered".
The authors managed to talk with the officer who worked on these howitzers during the Soviet era. He shared some interesting details about firing this gun.
When shooting on soft ground, it is necessary to make a flooring under the wheels. When shooting at elevation angles over 37 degrees, a ditch is pulled out between the beds. In exceptional cases, shooting is possible with the stands not extended. In this case, the horizontal angle of fire is 1.5 degrees. In all cases, when shooting, wooden beams are fixed under the openers.
The appearance in 1943 of these howitzers significantly increased the mobility of Soviet tank and motorized units. The howitzer, thanks to its "swiftness", kept pace with the rapidly advancing units of the Red Army. This means that the contribution of this system to the war is undeniable. And this howitzer rightfully occupies a place in Russian and other museums.
Finishing the article, I would like to once again admire the genius of our designers, who, in the most difficult conditions of war, were able to create a great weapon. A weapon that became a teacher for many Soviet and even Russian artillerymen.
