Exactly thirty years ago, the first Topol missile system was put on alert. Due to the specificity of the event, no celebrations are envisaged in this regard. Meanwhile, the commissioning of the Topol is a turning point in the nuclear confrontation between the two superpowers. And the fact that it occupies the most important place in the defense doctrine of the Russian Federation to this day has its own explanation.
It is worth clarifying an important thing: "Topol", whose "birthday" we "celebrate", and "Topol-M" are still different things. The modern "Topol-M" differs from the "Topol" thirty years ago, like "Maseratti" from "Zhiguli", although the initial principle is the same.
When the first Topol was put on alert, the nuclear confrontation between the USSR and the United States acquired not a quantitative, but a qualitative character. Moreover, this quality was not comparable to the number of warheads in one carrier: stuffing several multiple warheads into one missile was the last chic of nuclear missile science of that time (yes, the best scientists in the world did it, not fighters for democracy). But the confrontation between the two superpowers also turned into a struggle between the so-called triads - carriers of atomic weapons: strategic bombers, ground-based (silo-based) missile systems and submarines.
Such an arms race did not take shape immediately, but due to the natural development of arms. In the USSR, the mass production of nuclear weapons happened under Khrushchev, who openly favored missile weapons, due to which the development of strategic aviation was slowed down and lagged behind the American one (yes, it was at this time that air concepts were formulated, but they were built on the basis of borrowings from American system).
And since it was precisely silo-based missiles that became the basis of the Soviet nuclear system, one could speak of a partial rejection of the "triad". Under Khrushchev, this seemed normal until it became clear that the United States had superiority in silo missiles. Accordingly, a one-time missile strike not on cities, but on the locations of the mines deprived the USSR of the opportunity to strike back. The nuclear deterrent strategy was going to hell.
It was then that the idea arose of creating, if not a "triad", then at least a system capable of avoiding an attack from the United States due to the lack of geo-reference. The first logical answer: submarines, this led the arms race into the underwater world. Both sides tried to hide their missiles as deep as possible and move them as far away from the enemy as possible. Submarines of the "Shark" type (in NATO "Typhoon") - the largest in the world - had a disadvantage precisely because of their size. Their missiles could wipe out half of America with one salvo, but they had to reach the affected area with a range of 11,000 kilometers. Shark's monstrous size was determined not by Soviet gigantomania, but by the inability at the time to create rockets smaller than an eight-story building. The design of the boat for these missiles, with its "catamaran hull" divided into three compartments, was ingenious in its own way, but not practical. Moreover, reaching the firing range required special training, which not everyone passed. Even in the best of times, of all the "Sharks", only two could be on constant alert.
In addition, the Soviet naval system was initially in a losing position due to its geographic location. Due to the large number of NATO barriers in the Iceland-Faroe section (submarine cables, buoys, mines), the famous “Admiral Gorshkov Street” could bring only a small number of submarines from the Barents Sea into the ocean. A salvo from the "Shark" with all missiles lasts about a minute. But sending an adequate number of submarines to the Caribbean or Cape Cove is already a lottery, not military planning.
And then there were "Topol". Not as compensation for the "triad", but as a completely new solution to the strategy of nuclear war. The very meaning of these missile systems was not in the tactical characteristics of ballistic missiles, but in the very possibility of their eternal movement. Missile tactics indicated the helplessness of the mine storage, and rockets came to the surface (in the literal sense of the word), constantly moving along the ground, their location is difficult to trace. This solution was both simple and surprising.
Around the same time, in the USSR, a kind of analogs of the Topol were created, which were to be transported by rail. This was an adequate decision for the Soviet Union, but no one calculated that most of the Soviet "pieces of iron" would simply not be able to carry such a weight. Then they began to additionally build secret railways, which immediately limited the idea itself. Satellites have already been developed, and it has become problematic to build a railway with a different gauge so that the Americans would not see it. Not to mention the fact that the scheme of the railways of the Soviet Union assumes their convergence at several points, which limits the movement of trains.
As a result, "Topol", precisely as mobile systems that should avoid defeat from the first US strike, turned out to be indispensable, because they had the ability to move in the absence of paved paths. Both on normal roads and off-road. That is why they constitute the "indestructible" part of the Russian nuclear triad.
Now, when the main threat to nuclear security is considered to be the so-called unanswered main strike (BSU) from the United States, systems such as Topol (in its modernized version) remain one of the most adequate response options. Whatever it is called in terms of doctrine, the Topol was and will remain in service as one of the main elements of Russia's nuclear strategic system.
