The Syrian land has become a testing ground for ideas, concepts and weapons from the world's largest manufacturers. It is a rare and especially valuable opportunity for commanders and designers to test novelties in action.
Comparison of Russian and American weapons of ground forces in terms of their nominal effectiveness ("Equipment on the verge of unnecessary"), of course, is lame. But the comparison of weapons and military equipment in real combat conditions serves as a starting hot spot for both developers and their potential customers.
Arms from all over the world flock to Syria, as well as to Iraq. It is supplied to the government army, transferred to the "moderate opposition", it is purchased by the IS banned in Russia, it is stocked by Hezbollah and the Kurdish militias. Here you can find Chinese army vehicles Yongshi and ATGM HJ-8, French mines and land mines, Israeli missile shells, Canadian sights, Belgian machine guns.
But the main protagonists of this "exposition" are Russian and American defense companies. This is obliged by their place as world leaders in the development of weapons, and their role in the Syrian conflict. In addition, Russian and American weapons are attracting close attention of the world press also because the rating positions of both the first and the second are being revised.
Behind the "Curtain" like a stone wall
American "Abrams" are involved in the fight against jihadists from Iraq. Having jumped over sixty tons, the American car feels confident in this region. Firm soils hold up well, and there are too few natural obstacles here to impede movement.
The Abrams have almost no rivals, because the IS militants, although they have a certain number of captured tanks, still try to protect them. But there are enough opponents - in addition to traditional RPGs, there are also modern anti-tank missile systems in the arsenals of the belligerent parties: Chinese, Russian and actually American.
"Abrams" burn brightly in this war, knocked out both by their own ATGMs and products of competing manufacturers. Still, the thirty-year trampling of American tank-building thought affects old tanks, a banal increase in the mass of armor does not respond to the challenges that have arisen in the 21st century.
The Russian military industry in Syria is represented by more than one MBT model. Here and T-72 in a variety of export modifications, and even Soviet medium tanks T-62, T-55, T-54. But the already famous T-90 was destined to become famous. The media widely scattered footage of the T-90 holding the strike of an anti-tank missile, presumably a TOW-2A, whose tandem warhead, specially designed to combat reactive armor, could not hit a tank equipped with a rather old Contact-5 DZ.
The Shtora-1 active protection complex also shows itself well, taking off the missiles of such outdated anti-tank systems as TOW, HOT, and Fagot. Those T-90s that we see in Syria are far from the latest models, but they do their job. This tank was born for our forests - with a mass of only 46.5 tons and the ability to take an almost two-meter ford with a short preparation, it reveals itself best in the vastness of the Russian plain, but it also feels good in arid Syria.
He would still have appropriate crews, otherwise the Syrians who have completed the accelerated course often do not differ in either discipline or training.
Traits of weak training are inherent in both Assad's army and the Iraqi formations that have ridden the American Abrams. Tanks often find themselves alone, even without infantry cover, resulting in predictable deaths.
Well, isn't it nonsense?
M2 Bradley's stay in the Middle East feels similar to the Abrams. If you remember, it was created as a response to the Soviet BMP-1 to stop the red hordes rushing into Western Europe. Since then, "Bradley" has seriously gained weight, while the designers tried to provide her with protection, covering the aluminum hull with armor plates. As a result, the combat vehicle noticeably lost its maneuverability and lost the ability to overcome water obstacles on the move. But in Iraq, this is not critical.
In terms of protecting the Bradley, of course, the vehicle is morally outdated and when faced with a motivated enemy it is unlikely to fulfill its tasks. Her armor, both in the forehead and in the side, is stitched by any modern and not very RPG. It's good when IS fighters have few of them.
Our BMP-3s, which appeared in Syria, are not far from their American counterparts in defense. That is why we took care of the development of the Kurganets-24 project a few years ago. However, the BMP-3 gives Bradley a hundred points of handicap in firepower. In addition to a 100-mm cannon-launcher and a 30-mm automatic cannon paired with it, our vehicle is armed with one machine gun in the turret and two course guns with separate control. There are also embrasures for airborne weapons. The American vehicle has only a 25-mm cannon and a 7.62-mm machine gun, and the side embrasures were closed in the modifications of the 80s.
The large number of points of fire of the BMP-3 is well suited for suppressing a weakly fortified enemy, when the landing force may not leave its squad. Just what you need to fight the militants.
Stuck in Iraq
It would seem that in clashes with lightly armed terrorists, combat vehicles of the Stryker family, the only new development for the US ground forces in the last three decades, should have shown themselves well.
Unlike the heavy and clumsy Abrams and Bradleys, the Strikers are mobile, which, coupled with the superior communications and responsiveness of the American army, should have been a decisive factor in the fight against jihadists. But something about these machines is not heard at all. The point is probably that "Stryker" came out ambiguous. Its bulletproof protection turned out to be completely insufficient, and after the strengthening of the reservation, mobility seriously fell, the equipment began to get bogged down even in Iraqi soil.
Despite the wide range of vehicles on a common base, even the Stryker BMP is inferior to our latest armored personnel carriers. Which is not surprising if you have a machine gun as the main and only caliber.
This series was created largely in order to have a combat vehicle that would be a feasible load for the Hercules aircraft, and for this opportunity, the Stryker is forgiven a lot, even its indecent cost.
In view of such contradictory qualities, the Americans themselves struggle to fight in their cars, and handing them over to the Iraqis is like throwing them away.
But the Russian armored personnel carriers in Syria showed their best side. In addition to the BTR-80, two years ago they began to run in the BTR-82A, armed with a 30-mm cannon and a 7.62-mm machine gun paired with it. This armored vehicle is really nimble and does not require discounts on the nature of the ground. The increased parameters of bullet and fragmentation protection, although they do not make it invulnerable to RPG shots, make the crew feel confident in battles with lightly armed terrorists.
What the American army differed from the Russian one in the 21st century was the active use of armored vehicles as a means of transporting infantry directly into the combat zone. Now we have acquired promising armored vehicles that promise to grow into a whole family called Typhoon. Only last year, the technique completed the last tests for detonation and execution, and now it has already been spotted in Syria. It seems that it is used to deliver goods to "safe" areas. This confirms the opinion about the future use of "Typhoons" as trucks, but with excellent mine and bulletproof protection. In the immediate combat zone, it is still preferable to move on an armored personnel carrier or infantry fighting vehicle.
The best advertisement for Russian weapons will be that it is with them that the victory of the government forces over the plague of IS will be won. If you want to cope with external threats, buy Russian.
But the image is not the most valuable thing that is extracted from this campaign. We learn to fight in new conditions and adapt our technology to them, making it versatile and truly effective.
This is perhaps the most important thing that the Russian army can take out of the Syrian conflict.
