Most of those who came to our lecture do not need to explain what the Battle of Kursk is. You know that this was the last major German offensive on the Eastern Front. You probably know that it was the largest tank battle of the 2nd World War. You also know that this battle marked the beginning of a series of large retreats for the Wehrmacht and that he finally lost the initiative in the east. And the very definition of "Battle of Kursk" leads many to bewilderment, since in most books on this topic we are talking about "the German offensive on Kursk in July 1943" This offensive, known as Operation Citadel, was only a prologue to the Battle of Kursk. The German side did not talk about the Battle of Kursk at that time. German propaganda called these events in the summer of 1943 "the battle between Orel and Belgorod." Many German veterans, whom I asked if they were near Kursk, answered negatively. They say that in the summer of 1943 they took part in the "Belgorod offensive", meaning Operation Citadel - that is, the beginning of the Battle of Kursk.
Initially, the definition of "Battle of Kursk" appeared in the Soviet Union. Soviet historiography divides this event into three phases:
1. Defensive (5.7 - 23.7.1943) - repelling the German offensive "Citadel";
2. Counteroffensive at Orel (12.7 - 18.8.1943) - Operation Kutuzov;
3. Counteroffensive near Kharkov (3.8 - 23.8.1943) - Operation "Commander Rumyantsev".
Thus, the Soviet side considers the beginning of the Battle of Kursk on July 5, 1943, and its completion on August 23, to be the capture of Kharkov. Naturally, the winner chooses the name, and it has entered international use. The battle lasted 50 days and ended in the defeat of the Wehrmacht. None of the tasks set by the German command was accomplished.
What were these tasks?
1. German troops were to break through the Soviet defenses in the Kursk region and encircle the Soviet troops there. It failed.
2. By cutting off the Kursk ledge, the Germans would have been able to shorten the front line and free up reserves for other sectors of the front. It also failed.
3. The German victory at Kursk was, according to Hitler, to serve as a signal to opponents and allies that the German troops in the east could not be defeated militarily. This hope did not come true either.
4. The Wehrmacht intended to take as many prisoners as possible, which could be used as labor for the German economy. In the battles of 1941 near Kiev, as well as near Bryansk and Vyazma, the Wehrmacht managed to take about 665 thousand prisoners. In July 1943, only about 40 thousand were taken near Kursk. This was, of course, not enough to compensate for the labor shortage in the Reich.
5. Reduce the offensive potential of the Soviet troops and thus obtain a respite until the end of the year. This was also not done. Although the Soviet troops suffered huge losses, the Soviet military resources were so enormous that, despite these losses, the Soviet side managed, starting in July 1943, to carry out more and more offensives along the entire length of the Soviet-German front.
Let's go back to the theater of operations. This is the famous "Kursk Bulge", which, of course, is familiar to you.
The German side intended to break through the deeply echeloned Soviet defenses by striking from the north and south to Kursk within a few days, cut off this arc and encircle the Soviet troops located in this area. The actions of the second phase of the battle took place in the Oryol direction - this is the upper part of the map.
The third phase - the Soviet offensive on Kharkov - is the lower part of the map.
I will devote my lecture not to the actual battles, but to the numerous, still existing legends associated with this battle. The source of many of these legends is the memoirs of military leaders. Although historical science has been trying to deal with them for many decades, nevertheless these legends are firmly rooted. Many authors do not pay attention to the latest research, but continue to draw information from memoirs. In my short speech, I cannot touch on all the misconceptions about the Battle of Kursk and concentrate on six of them, the falsity of which has been absolutely proven. I will present only theses, and those who are interested deeper, I will redirect to my own publications, which I will talk about at the end.
The first legend
After the war, almost all the German military claimed that the attack on Kursk was Hitler's idea. The majority denied their participation, which is understandable - the operation failed. In fact, the plan did not belong to Hitler. The idea belonged to the general whose name is least associated with this event, Colonel General Rudolf Schmidt.
In March 1943, he served as commander of the 2nd Panzer Army. He managed to captivate with his idea - at the beginning of 1943 to cut off the Kursk Bulge - the commander of the Army Group Center, Field Marshal Kh. G. von Kluge. Until the very end, Kluge remained the most ardent supporter of the plan to encircle the Kursk salient. Schmidt, Kluge and other generals managed to convince Hitler that an offensive on the Kursk Bulge, Operation Citadel, was the best option for a summer offensive. Hitler agreed, but he doubted to the last. This is evidenced by his own, alternative plans. His preferred plan was "Panther" - an attack on Kupyansk.
Thus, Hitler wanted to ensure the preservation of the Donetsk basin, which he considered strategically important. But the command of Army Group South and its commander, Field Marshal E. von Manstein, were against the Panther plan and persuaded Hitler to attack Kursk first. And Hitler did not share the idea of attacking from the north and south. He proposed to attack from the west and south. But the command of Army Groups "South" and "Center" were against and dissuaded Hitler.
The second legend
Until now, some argue that Operation Citadel could have been a success if it began in May 1943. In fact, Hitler did not want to start the operation in May, as Army Group Africa surrendered in mid-May. He feared that Italy would withdraw from the Axis and that the Allies would attack in Italy or Greece. In addition, the commander of the 9th Army, which was supposed to advance from the north, Colonel-General Model explained that the army did not have sufficient forces for this. These arguments turned out to be enough. But even if Hitler had wanted to attack in May 1943, it would have been impossible. Let me remind you of a commonly overlooked reason - weather conditions.
When carrying out such a large-scale operation, the troops need good weather, which is clearly confirmed by the above photo. Any prolonged rain turns the routes of travel in Russia into an impenetrable swamp, and this is exactly what happened in May 1943. Heavy rains in the first half of the month led to difficulties in movement in the strip of GA "South". In the second half of May, it was almost continuously pouring in the strip of GA "Center", and almost any movement was impossible. Any offensive during this period was simply unfeasible.
The third legend
New tanks and self-propelled guns did not live up to expectations. First of all, they mean the Panther tank and the Ferdinand self-propelled gun.
By the way, at the beginning of 1943, Ferdinands were considered assault guns. Indeed, the first use of "Panthers" was disappointing. The vehicles suffered from a mass of "childhood diseases", and many tanks were out of order for technical reasons. But the large losses of "Panthers" cannot be explained only by imperfect technology. Much more important was the tactically incorrect use of tanks, which led to unjustifiably large losses. The situation with Ferdinands looks very different. Many sources speak of them pejoratively, including in Guderian's memoirs. They say that this car did not live up to expectations. The reports from the parts suggest otherwise. The troops admired the Ferdinand. The crews considered these machines to be practically a "guarantee of survival." The ZHBD of the 9th Army notes on 07/09/43: "… It should be noted the successes of the 41st Panzer Corps, which owes much to the" Ferdinands "…". You can read other similar statements in my book, coming out in 2017.
The fourth legend
According to this legend, the Germans "themselves gave up" the planned victory at Kursk. … Allegedly, Hitler gave a premature order to end the offensive due to the Allied landings in Sicily. This statement is first encountered by Manstein. Many to this day stubbornly adhere to it, which is fundamentally wrong. First, Hitler did not stop the attack on Kursk as a result of the landing in Sicily. To the north of Kursk, the offensive was interrupted due to the Soviet offensive on Orel, which began on July 12, 1943, which already led to breakthroughs on the first day. On the southern face of the arc, the offensive was halted on July 16. The reason for this was the planned Soviet offensive on the Donetsk Basin on the 17th.
This offensive, which is still overlooked, was the start of the epic battle for the Donetsk Basin, in which the Soviet Army deployed nearly 2,000 tanks and self-propelled guns.
The map shows a Soviet plan that failed. This offensive ended in a heavy defeat for the Soviet side. But the reason for this was that Manstein was forced to use tank formations that participated in the offensive in the Belgorod area, including the very strong 2nd SS Panzer Corps, to repel him. In addition, it should be noted that Operation Citadel could not have ended successfully without the withdrawal of troops to other sectors of the front. The commander of the 4th Panzer Army, Colonel-General Goth, told Manstein on the evening of July 13 that a further offensive was impossible. It failed in the south and north, and it was clear to all participants.
Fifth legend
The Wehrmacht suffered unacceptable losses near Kursk, which would not have happened, had the German side limited itself to defense in the summer of 43rd. This is also not true. Firstly, the Wehrmacht did not have the opportunity to remain on the defensive and maintain strength. Even if the Wehrmacht remained on the defensive, the Red Army would still carry out its offensives, and heavy fighting would be inevitable.
Secondly, although the human losses of the Wehrmacht in the offensive "Citadel" were higher than in subsequent defensive battles (this is due to the fact that the troops were forced to leave shelters and break through the deeply echeloned Soviet defenses), but the losses in tanks were higher in the defensive phase battles. This is due to the fact that the attacker can usually take out the damaged equipment, and when retreating, he is forced to abandon it.
If we compare the losses in Operation Citadel with other battles on the Eastern Front, then the losses do not look too great. In any case, not as they imagine.
Sixth legend
The Battle of Kursk is presented by the Soviet side as the third decisive battle of the Second World War. Moscow-Stalingrad-Kursk. Even in many recent Russian studies this statement is repeated. And many Germans with whom I have spoken say that Kursk was a turning point in the war. And he was not. There were events that had a much greater impact on the course of the war. This is the entry into the war of the United States, and the failure of two German offensives on the Eastern Front in 1941 and 1942, and the Battle of Midway, as a result of which the initiative in the Pacific theater passed to the Americans. Kursk was a turning point in the sense that it became clear to everyone that the war in the east had finally rolled back. After the failure of the summer offensive, it became clear not only to Hitler, but also to many Germans that it was impossible to win the war in the east, while Germany was forced to wage war on several fronts.
