The Great Battle of Kursk began 70 years ago. The Battle of the Kursk Bulge is one of the most important battles of the Second World War in terms of its scope, forces and means involved, tension, results and military-strategic consequences. The Great Battle of Kursk lasted 50 incredibly difficult days and nights (July 5 - August 23, 1943). In Soviet and Russian historiography, it is customary to divide this battle into two stages and three operations: the defensive stage - the Kursk defensive operation (July 5-12); offensive - Oryol (July 12 - August 18) and Belgorod-Kharkov (August 3 - 23) offensive operations. The Germans called the offensive part of their operation "Citadel". About 2, 2 million people, about 7, 7 thousand tanks, self-propelled guns and assault guns, over 29 thousand guns and mortars (with a reserve of more than 35 thousand), more than 4 thousand combat aircraft.
During the winter 1942-1943. the offensive of the Red Army and the forced withdrawal of Soviet troops during the Kharkov defensive operation in 1943, the so-called. Kursk ledge. The Kursk Bulge, a west-facing ledge, was up to 200 km wide and up to 150 km deep. During April - June 1943, an operational pause occurred on the Eastern Front, during the course of the Soviet and German armed forces tensely preparing for the summer campaign, which was to become decisive in this war.
The forces of the Central and Voronezh fronts were located on the Kursk salient, threatening the flanks and rear of the German army groups "Center" and "South". In turn, the German command, having created powerful shock groups on the Oryol and Belgorod-Kharkov bridgeheads, could inflict strong flank attacks on the Soviet troops defending in the Kursk region, surround them and destroy them.
The plans and forces of the parties
Germany. In the spring of 1943, when the forces of the opponents were exhausted and there was a thaw, which nullified the possibility of a quick offensive, it was time to prepare plans for the summer campaign. Despite the defeat in the Battle of Stalingrad and the Battle of the Caucasus, the Wehrmacht retained its offensive power and was a very dangerous enemy who longed for revenge. Moreover, the German command carried out a number of mobilization measures and by the beginning of the summer campaign of 1943, in comparison with the number of troops at the beginning of the summer campaign of 1942, the number of the Wehrmacht had increased. On the Eastern Front, excluding the SS and Air Force troops, there were 3.1 million people, almost the same as there were in the Wehrmacht at the beginning of the campaign to the East on June 22, 1941 - 3.2 million people. In terms of the number of formations, the Wehrmacht of the 1943 model surpassed the German armed forces of the 1941 period.
For the German command, unlike the Soviet, a wait-and-see strategy and pure defense were unacceptable. Moscow could afford to wait with serious offensive operations, time was playing on it - the power of the armed forces grew, enterprises evacuated to the east began to work in full force (they even increased production compared to the pre-war level), partisan warfare in the German rear was spreading. The probability of the landing of the Allied armies in Western Europe and the opening of a second front grew. In addition, it was not possible to create a solid defense on the Eastern Front, which stretched from the Arctic Ocean to the Black Sea. In particular, Army Group South was forced to defend with 32 divisions a front up to 760 km long - from Taganrog on the Black Sea to the Sumy region. The balance of forces allowed the Soviet troops, if the enemy limited themselves to defense only, to carry out offensive operations in various sectors of the Eastern Front, concentrating the maximum number of forces and assets, pulling up reserves. The German army could not adhere to only defense, this was the path to defeat. Only a mobile war, with breakthroughs of the front line, with access to the flanks and rear of the Soviet armies, allowed us to hope for a strategic turning point in the war. The major success on the Eastern Front gave hope, if not for victory in the war, then for a satisfactory political solution.
On March 13, 1943, Adolf Hitler signed Operational Order No. 5, where he set the task of preempting the advance of the Soviet army and "to impose his will on at least one of the sectors of the front." In other sectors of the front, the task of the troops is reduced to bleeding the advancing enemy forces on the defensive lines created in advance. Thus, the strategy of the Wehrmacht was chosen back in March 1943. It remained to determine where to strike. The Kursk salient appeared at the same time, in March 1943, during the German counteroffensive. Therefore, in Order No. 5, Hitler demanded the infliction of converging strikes on the Kursk salient, wishing to destroy the Soviet troops located on it. However, in March 1943, German troops in this direction were significantly weakened by previous battles, and the plan to strike the Kursk salient had to be postponed indefinitely.
On April 15, Hitler signed Operational Order No. 6. Operation Citadel was planned to begin as soon as weather conditions permitted. Army Group South was supposed to strike from the Tomarovka-Belgorod line, break through the Soviet front on the Prilepy-Oboyan line, link up at Kursk and east of it with the formations of the Center group. Army Group Center struck from the Trosno line - an area south of Maloarkhangelsk. Its troops were to break through the front in the Fatezh - Veretenovo sector, concentrating the main efforts on the eastern flank. And link up with Army Group South in the Kursk region and east of it. The troops between the shock groupings, on the western face of the Kursk salient, the forces of the 2nd Army, were to organize local attacks and, when the Soviet troops retreated, immediately go on the offensive with all their might. The plan was pretty simple and straightforward. They wanted to cut off the Kursk ledge with converging blows from the north and south - on the 4th day it was supposed to encircle and then destroy the Soviet troops on it (Voronezh and Central Front). This made it possible to create a wide gap in the Soviet front and intercept the strategic initiative. In the Orel area, the main striking force was represented by the 9th Army, in the Belgorod area - the 4th Panzer Army and the Kempf task force. Operation Citadel was to be followed by Operation Panther - a blow to the rear of the Southwestern Front, an offensive in the northeastern direction in order to reach the deep rear of the central group of the Red Army and create a threat to Moscow.
The start of the operation was scheduled for mid-May 1943. The commander of Army Group South, Field Marshal General Erich von Manstein, believed that it was necessary to strike as early as possible, forestalling the Soviet offensive in Donbas. He was also supported by the commander of Army Group Center, Field Marshal General Gunter Hans von Kluge. But not all German commanders shared his point of view. Walter Model, the commander of the 9th Army, had great authority in the eyes of the Fuehrer and on May 3 he prepared a report in which he expressed doubts about the possibility of a successful implementation of Operation Citadel if it began in mid-May. The basis of his skeptical attitude was intelligence data on the defensive potential of the opposing 9th Army of the Central Front. The Soviet command prepared a deeply echeloned and well-organized defense line, strengthened its artillery and anti-tank potential. And the mechanized units were withdrawn from the forward positions, taking them out of a possible enemy strike.
Discussion of this report took place on 3-4 May in Munich. According to Model, the Central Front under the command of Konstantin Rokossovsky had an almost double superiority in the number of combat units and equipment over the 9th German army. Model's 15 infantry divisions had half the size of the regular infantry; in some divisions, 3 of the 9 regular infantry battalions were disbanded. Artillery batteries had three guns instead of four, and in some batteries one or two guns. By May 16, the divisions of the 9th Army had an average "combat strength" (the number of soldiers directly participating in the battle) of 3, 3 thousand people. For comparison, 8 infantry divisions of the 4th Panzer Army and the Kempf group had a "combat strength" of 6, 3 thousand people. And the infantry was needed to break into the defensive lines of the Soviet troops. In addition, the 9th Army experienced serious transport problems. Army Group South, after the Stalingrad catastrophe, received formations, which in 1942 were reorganized in the rear. Model had mainly infantry divisions that had been at the front since 1941 and needed urgent replenishment.
Model's report made a strong impression on A. Hitler. Other military leaders were unable to put forward serious arguments against the calculations of the commander of the 9th Army. As a result, we decided to postpone the beginning of the operation by a month. This decision of Hitler would then become one of the most criticized by German generals, who pushed their mistakes onto the Supreme Commander.
Otto Moritz Walter Model (1891 - 1945).
It must be said that although this delay led to an increase in the striking power of the German troops, the Soviet armies were also seriously strengthened. The balance of forces between Model's army and Rokossovsky's front from May to early July did not improve, but even worsened for the Germans. In April 1943, the Central Front numbered 538,400 men, 920 tanks, 7,800 guns, and 660 aircraft; at the beginning of July - 711, 5 thousand people, 1785 tanks and self-propelled guns, 12, 4 thousand guns and 1050 aircraft. Model's 9th Army in mid-May had 324, 9 thousand people, about 800 tanks and assault guns, 3 thousand guns. At the beginning of July, the 9th Army reached 335 thousand people, 1014 tanks, 3368 guns. In addition, it was in May that the Voronezh Front began to receive anti-tank mines, which will become a real scourge of German armored vehicles in the Battle of Kursk. The Soviet economy worked more efficiently, replenishing the troops with equipment faster than the German industry.
The plan for the offensive of the 9th Army from the Oryol direction was somewhat different from the typical technique for the German school - Model was going to break into the enemy's defenses with infantry, and then bring tank units into battle. The infantry was to attack with the support of heavy tanks, assault guns, aviation and artillery. Of the 8 mobile units that the 9th Army had, only one was immediately brought into battle - the 20th Panzer Division. In the zone of the main attack of the 9th Army, the 47th Panzer Corps was supposed to advance under the command of Joachim Lemelsen. The zone of his advance lay between the villages of Gnilets and Butyrki. Here, according to German intelligence, there was a junction of two Soviet armies - the 13th and 70th. In the first echelon of the 47th Corps, the 6th Infantry and 20th Panzer Divisions attacked, they struck on the first day. The second echelon housed the more powerful 2nd and 9th Panzer Divisions. They were supposed to be introduced already into the breakthrough, after breaking the Soviet line of defense. In the direction of Ponyri, on the left flank of the 47th Corps, the 41st Panzer Corps advanced under the command of General Josef Harpe. In the first echelon there were the 86th and 292nd Infantry Divisions, in the reserve - the 18th Panzer Division. To the left of the 41st Panzer Corps was the 23rd Army Corps under the command of General Friesner. He was supposed to deliver a diversionary blow with the forces of the 78th assault and 216th infantry divisions at Maloarkhangelsk. On the right flank of the 47th Corps, the 46th Panzer Corps of General Hans Zorn was advancing. In its first strike echelon there were only infantry formations - the 7th, 31st, 102nd and 258th infantry divisions. Three more mobile formations - the 10th motorized (tank grenadier), 4th and 12th tank divisions were in the reserve of the army group. Von Kluge had to hand them over to Model after the breakthrough of the strike forces into the operational space behind the defensive lines of the Central Front. It is believed that Model did not initially want to attack, but was waiting for the Red Army to attack, even prepared additional defensive lines in the rear. And he tried to keep the most valuable mobile formations in the second echelon, so that, if necessary, transfer them to a sector that would collapse under the blows of Soviet troops.
The command of Army Group South was not limited to the attack on Kursk by the forces of the 4th Panzer Army of Colonel-General Hermann Goth (52nd Army Corps, 48th Panzer Corps and 2nd SS Panzer Corps). Task Force Kempf under the command of Werner Kempf was to advance in the northeastern direction. The group stood with a front to the east along the Seversky Donets River. Manstein believed that as soon as the battle began, the Soviet command would throw into battle strong reserves located east and northeast of Kharkov. Therefore, the strike of the 4th Panzer Army on Kursk should have been secured from the eastern direction from suitable Soviet tank and mechanized formations. Army Group Kempf was supposed to hold the defense line on the Donets by one 42nd Army Corps (39th, 161st and 282nd Infantry Divisions) of General Franz Mattenkloth. Its 3rd Panzer Corps, under the command of General of the Panzer Forces Hermann Bright (6th, 7th, 19th Panzer and 168th Infantry Divisions) and 11th Army Corps of General of Panzer Forces Erhard Raus, before the start of the operation and until July 20, it was called the Reserve of the High Command of the Special Forces of Rous (106th, 198th and 320th Infantry Divisions), were supposed to provide active actions to ensure the offensive of the 4th Panzer Army. It was planned to subordinate the Kempf group to another tank corps, which was in the reserve of the army group, after it seized a sufficient area and ensured freedom of action in the northeast direction.
Erich von Manstein (1887 - 1973).
The command of Army Group South was not limited to this innovation. According to the recollections of the chief of staff of the 4th Panzer Army, General Friedrich Fangor, at a meeting with Manstein on May 10-11, the offensive plan was adjusted at the suggestion of General Hoth. According to intelligence, a change in the location of Soviet tank and mechanized troops was observed. The Soviet tank reserve could quickly enter the battle, passing into the corridor between the Donets and Psel rivers in the Prokhorovka area. There was a danger of a strong blow to the right flank of the 4th Panzer Army. This situation could lead to disaster. Goth believed that it was necessary to introduce the most powerful formation that he had in the oncoming battle with the Russian tank forces. Therefore, the 2nd SS Panzer Corps Paul Hausser as part of the 1st SS Panzer Grenadier Division "Leibstantart Adolf Hitler", the 2nd SS Panzer Grenadier Division "Reich" and the 3rd SS Panzer Grenadier Division "Totenkopf" (" Death's Head”) was no longer supposed to advance directly north along the Psel River, he should have turned northeast to the Prokhorovka area to destroy the Soviet tank reserves.
The experience of the war with the Red Army convinced the German command that there would be strong counter-attacks. Therefore, the command of Army Group South tried to minimize their consequences. Both decisions - the strike of Kempf's group and the turn of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps towards Prokhorovka had a significant impact on the development of the Battle of Kursk and the actions of the Soviet 5th Guards Tank Army. At the same time, the division of the forces of Army Group South into the main and auxiliary strike in the northeast direction deprived Manstein of serious reserves. In theory, Manstein had a reserve - Walter Nering's 24th Panzer Corps. But he was the reserve of the army group in case of an offensive by Soviet troops in the Donbass and was located quite far from the place of the strike on the southern face of the Kursk salient. As a result, it was used for the defense of Donbass. Serious reserves that Manstein could immediately bring into battle, he did not have.
For the offensive operation, the best generals and the most combat-ready units of the Wehrmacht were involved, a total of 50 divisions (including 16 tank and motorized ones) and a significant number of separate formations. In particular, shortly before the operation, the 39th Tank Regiment (200 "Panthers") and the 503rd Battalion of Heavy Tanks (45 "Tigers") arrived in Army Group South. From the air, the strike groups were supported by the 4th Air Fleet of Field Marshal of Aviation Wolfram von Richthofen and the 6th Air Fleet under the command of Colonel General Robert Ritter von Graim. In total, over 900 thousand soldiers and officers took part in Operation Citadel, about 10 thousand guns and mortars, more than 2700 tanks and assault guns (including 148 new heavy T-VI Tiger tanks, 200 T-V Panther tanks and 90 assault guns "Ferdinand"), about 2050 aircraft.
The German command pinned great hopes on the use of new types of military equipment. The expectation of the arrival of new equipment was one of the reasons why the offensive was postponed to a later time. It was assumed that heavily armored tanks (Soviet researchers "Panther", which the Germans considered a medium tank, ranked as heavy) and self-propelled guns will become a battering ram for the Soviet defense. The medium and heavy tanks T-IV, T-V, T-VI entered service with the Wehrmacht, assault guns "Ferdinand" combined good armor protection and strong artillery weapons. Their 75-mm and 88-mm cannons with a direct firing range of 1.5-2.5 km were about 2.5 times higher than the 76, 2-mm cannon of the main Soviet medium tank T-34. At the same time, due to the high initial velocity of the shells, the German designers achieved high armor penetration. To combat Soviet tanks, armored self-propelled howitzers - 105-mm Vespe (German Wespe - "wasp") and 150-mm Hummel (German "bumblebee"), which were part of the artillery regiments of tank divisions, were also used. German combat vehicles had excellent Zeiss optics. The German Air Force received new Focke-Wulf-190 fighters and Henkel-129 attack aircraft. They were to gain air supremacy and carry out assault support for the advancing troops.
Self-propelled howitzers "Wespe" of the 2nd battalion of the artillery regiment "Great Germany" on the march.
Attack aircraft Henschel Hs 129.
The German command tried to keep the operation secret, to achieve a surprise strike. For this, they tried to misinform the Soviet leadership. We carried out intensive preparations for Operation Panther in the zone of Army Group South. They carried out demonstrative reconnaissance, transferred tanks, concentrated ferry means, carried out active radio communications, intensified their agents, spread rumors, etc. In the offensive zone of Army Group Center, on the contrary, they tried to disguise all actions as much as possible, hide from the enemy. The events were carried out with German thoroughness and methodicality, but they did not give the desired results. The Soviet command was well informed about the upcoming enemy offensive.
German shielded tanks Pz. Kpfw. III in a Soviet village before the start of Operation Citadel.
In order to protect their rear from the blow of partisan formations, in May-June 1943, the German command organized and conducted several large-scale punitive operations against the Soviet partisans. In particular, against about 20 thousand. Bryansk partisans were involved in 10 divisions, and in the Zhytomyr region against the partisans sent 40 thousand. grouping. However, the plan was not fully realized, the partisans retained the ability to deliver strong blows to the occupiers.
