March 7, 2019 Facebook "Marynarka Wojenna RP" (Polish Navy) has published fresh photos of practical torpedo firing of SET-53ME torpedoes.
Given the negative attitude in Poland towards everything Soviet and "totalitarian" and the many years of transition to NATO standards, the fact seems surprising. But actually no. Poland, of course, has "modern NATO torpedoes" - the "newest and best" small MU90 torpedoes. It seems to be there … because the Poles shoot them exclusively as torpedo shells.
Like this. A totalitarian communist torpedo, though ancient, is real. And it still finds its place in the weapons system of a NATO member country in the 21st century. A striking example of the longevity of a complex technical model of military equipment developed back in the 50s of the last century!
The topic of the first domestic homing torpedoes was previously considered in a number of articles and books by both specialists and civil authors. At the same time, all these publications were not just incomplete, but had the character of a description of events without attempts to analyze the development progress, the logic of decisions made and the results obtained (positive and negative). At the same time, the lessons and conclusions of the first domestic anti-submarine torpedo SET-53 are still relevant.
Birth
Research on the creation of the first domestic anti-submarine torpedo began at the Research Mine Torpedo Institute (NIMTI) of the Navy in 1950.
The main technical problem was not just the creation of torpedoes with a two-plane homing system (CLS), but the definition of such technical solutions that would ensure the coordination of its parameters with the maneuverable capabilities of the torpedo and the target, while ensuring its guidance to a fairly low-noise submarine (PL) maneuvering in two planes …
The task of hitting submarines with torpedoes at that time had already been successfully solved in the West, the F24 Fido air torpedo was successfully used during hostilities in World War II. The problem was the extremely low success rate of homing torpedoes at that time. This raises the question of comparing the scientific and technical level of the United States and Germany. Despite the fact that the United States successfully created (and used in battle) an anti-submarine torpedo (in contrast to Germany, which had only anti-ship homing torpedoes), the level of US development still lagged significantly behind Germany, since what the United States had, was obtained on low-speed torpedoes. In Germany, at that time, a colossal amount of R&D was carried out on the creation of homing torpedoes with high performance characteristics (including speed).
In the funds of the Central Naval Library there is a 1947 translated report by the employee of the "Special Technical Bureau of the USSR Navy" (Sestroretsk, "captured Germans" worked) Gustav Glode on the organization of torpedo R&D in Germany. At the torpedo test station, up to 90 test shots (!) Of torpedoes per day reached. In fact, the Germans had a "conveyor" for preparing and testing torpedoes and analyzing their results. At the same time, G. Glode's conclusions were of a critical nature, for example, about the erroneous choice of the German Navy's equal-signal direction finding method of the CCH instead of a more complex phase method, which, however, in the complex of all conditions of use in a torpedo gave a significant gain (providing much more accurate targeting and the possibility of a significant reduction in the volume of field tests).
The first domestic post-war CLNs were completely based on German developments, but their results were perceived by us without deep analysis. For example, the main technical solutions (including the operating frequency of the homing system is 25KHz) of the TV torpedo SSN "survived" with us until the early 90s in the SAET-50, SAET-60 (M) torpedoes and, partially, in the SET -53
At the same time, we completely ignored the experience of the Second World War in terms of the use of the first hydroacoustic countermeasures (SGPD), towed torpedo deflectors of the Foxer type.
The German Navy, having gained experience in the use of torpedoes in the conditions of using Foxers, came to telecontrol (remote control of torpedoes from a submarine via a wire, today instead of a wire, an optical fiber cable is used) of torpedoes and the abandonment of the original equal-signal direction finding method (implemented in the T- torpedo V) to the new SSN in the "Lerche" torpedo with the differential-maximum method of direction finding ("scanning" along the horizon with a single directional pattern was realized due to the rotating "curtain" of the receiver). The point of using this method in the "Lerch" was to ensure the separation of the noise of the target and the towed "Foxer" by the guidance operator (torpedo telecontrol).
Having received the German torpedo groundwork for R&D after the war, we practically repeated the T-V - in our version of the SAET-50, but the first tests showed that this approach is inapplicable for an anti-submarine torpedo. Guidance errors were obtained with which the probability of hitting the submarine was unacceptably small.
There was neither time nor resources for a huge volume of tests (according to the "German model"). Under these conditions, the head of the topic at NIMTI V. M. it was decided to conduct "stop" tests of the CLS ("post-stop" tests with "hanging" samples of CLS torpedoes were called bathyspheric).
What is the essence of such tests? The fact is that instead of launching a torpedo from the ship, its homing system is immersed in the water and it is actually tested "on weight". This method allows you to significantly speed up the passage of tests, but at the cost of less proximity of their conditions to real conditions in a moving torpedo.
The variant of the equipment, selected according to the results of stop tests, is a passive system that "operates" on an equal-signal principle in the vertical plane (similar to the T-V and SAET-50) and the maximum differential in the horizontal one, which also confirmed its capabilities during tests of an experimental model on a running dummy torpedo.
Note: indicated in the work of Korshunov Yu. L. and Strokova A. A. the maximum method in the vertical plane (and equal-signal in the horizontal one) was implemented already on subsequent versions of torpedoes (with modified control devices), and initially the “receiver with a shutter” worked precisely “horizontally”. At the same time, for its work, an ethylene glycol environment was needed (with the corresponding "personnel losses"). R. Gusev:
“At the acoustics, the light on it converged like a wedge: only in its environment did the soldered rotating shutter of the receiving device produce a minimum level of acoustic interference and, therefore, ensure the maximum response range of the homing equipment. But this ethylene glycol was a tough poison and had, unfortunately, the chemical formula C2H4 (OH) 2.
SET-53 became the first domestic torpedo, in which the task of ensuring high maneuverability of the torpedo in the vertical plane was solved. Prior to it, the maximum trim angle of our torpedoes was 7 degrees, which were provided by the hydrostatic apparatus of the Italian 53F torpedo of the early 20s (which became our 53-58 and has survived to this day practically unchanged in the 53-65K torpedo in service with the Russian Navy) …
Two versions of the system were developed: in the form of a bellows-pendulum device and a hydrostatic switch. Both systems have passed successful full-scale tests on running mock-ups. When transferring work to industry, the choice fell on a bellows-pendulum device.
The depth of travel (search) of torpedoes was introduced mechanically - by rotating the depth spindle. At the same time, the limitation of the "bottom" (the maximum depth of torpedo maneuvering) was introduced automatically as a doubled search depth (about the problems of such a solution - below).
To ensure the explosion of an explosive charge (HE), in addition to two new contact fuses UZU (unified ignition device), an active electromagnetic circular fuse was installed, the emitting coil of which protruded from the hull in the aft part (similar to TV and SAET-50), and the receiving housed in the combat loading compartment of the torpedo.
In 1954, NIMTI specialists carried out stop and sea trials of an experimental torpedo model. The results confirmed the possibility of creating a torpedo with given tactical and technical characteristics.
Thus, the most difficult technical problem was successfully solved by NIMTI in the shortest possible time, and the main role here was played by the conduct of bathyspheric tests.
In 1955, to complete the development and deployment of serial production, all work was transferred to the industry, NII-400 (the future Central Research Institute "Gidropribor") and the Dvigatel plant. The chief designer of the torpedo was first appointed V. A. Golubkov (the future chief designer of the SET-65 torpedo), in the same 1955 he was replaced by the more experienced V. A. Polikarpov.
Explanation: NIMTI, as a body of the Navy, could only conduct research work (R&D) with the creation of experimental samples and testing them. To organize the serial production of weapons and military equipment (AME), experimental design work (R&D) is required already in industry, with the development of working design documentation (RCD) for a model of AME for a series, and it meets all special requirements ("the impact of external factors": blow, climate, etc.). There is an unofficial definition of the ROC: "verification during testing of the design documentation for a prototype to ensure its further serial production."
In 1956, the Dvigatel plant manufactured 8 prototypes of torpedoes using the developed in NII-400 RKD plant, and their preliminary (PI) tests began at the sites of Ladoga and the Black Sea.
In 1957, state tests (GI) of the torpedo were carried out (a total of 54 shots were fired). According to Korshunov and Strokov, state tests were carried out on Ladoga, which raises some doubts, since the requirements of the GI unambiguously require firing from carriers (submarines and surface ships) and a complete check of the specified tactical and technical requirements for a torpedo, which is possible only under conditions fleets.
Some of their details are of interest.
One of the main tasks of the tests was to assess the accuracy of the output of the torpedo to the target. It was verified in two stages. First, they shot at a stationary emitter simulating a target. The accuracy of passing on these firing was assessed using a special marker of the place of passage of a torpedo (OMP), which reacts to the electromagnetic field with a non-contact fuse. Conventional light nets were used as additional control. The torpedoes in their cells left clear breakthroughs. The WMD data and the network breakthroughs showed sufficient coincidence. At the second stage, the shooting was carried out at a moving noise source - an emitter mounted on a torpedo traveling at a speed of 14.5 knots. The pointing accuracy at this stage was assessed purely qualitatively.
The episode with nets and weapons of mass destruction most likely belongs to the stage of preliminary tests, but the episode with the "torpedo with emitter" is very interesting. Due to the significant overweight of our torpedoes, they cannot walk slowly: they need high speed simply to carry their weight (due to the angle of attack and lift on the hull).
All, except for SET-53, which had near-zero buoyancy (and in the first modification - positive buoyancy). Most likely, the target simulator was made just on the basis of SET-53, with the installation of a mechanical noise emitter instead of the combat charging compartment (BZO). Those. On the basis of SET-53, the first domestic self-propelled device for hydroacoustic countermeasures (GPD) was made.
In 1958, the first domestic anti-submarine torpedo was put into service. The torpedo was named SET-53. Its subsequent modernization was carried out under the leadership of G. A. Kaplunov.
In 1965, a group of specialists who took part in the creation of the first domestic anti-submarine torpedo, including V. M. Shakhnovich and V. A. Polikarpov, was awarded the Lenin Prize. Among the subsequent works of V. M. Shakhnovich, it is necessary to note the research work "Jeyran" in the early 60s, which determined the appearance and direction of the main domestic SSN for surface targets with vertical tracking of the wake.
A question that has little coverage both in the media and in special literature is the modifications of the SET-53 torpedo and its real performance characteristics. Usually called the SET-53M torpedo with a silver-zinc battery and increased speed and range, but the question is much more complicated.
In fact, modifications of the torpedo went according to serial numbers (without an end-to-end numbering system, that is, each new modification of the torpedo came with a "near-zero number").
Torpedo SET-53 went into series:
- with a lead-acid battery B-6-IV (46 cells - from the ET-46 torpedo) with a PM-5 3MU electric motor and a speed of 23 knots for a cruising range of 6 km;
- with "numbered BZO", i.e. specific combat charging compartments were rigidly "tied" to specific torpedoes (the receiving circuit of the proximity fuse was "broken": its inductance (coils) were in the BZO, and the capacitance (capacitors) - separately, in the amplifying block of the proximity fuse in the torpedo battery compartment);
- with a single-spindle head of the heading device (ie the ability to enter only the "omega" angle - the first turn of the torpedo after the shot);
- with BZO with TGA-G5 explosives (weighing slightly less than 90kg) and two UZU fuses;
- with SSN with the maximum differential method of direction finding in the horizontal plane and equal-signal - vertical with an antenna covered with a metal fairing.
Torpedoes numbered from 500 received unified and interchangeable BZOs.
Torpedoes with numbers from 800 received a 3-spindle head of the course device with the ability to set the angles "omega" (angle of the first turn), "alpha-stroke" (angle of the second turn) and Dc (distance between them). Due to this, it became possible to form a torpedo salvo with a parallel course of the "comb" of torpedoes to increase the examined CLS of the “strip” and the possibility of switching on the CLO of the torpedo already after passing the distance DS (“shooting for interference”).
Torpedoes with numbers from 1200 received the 242.17.000 roll-leveling device from the AT-1 torpedo, which improved the operating conditions of the SSN (SET-53K torpedo).
Torpedoes with numbers from 2000 received a silver-zinc storage battery (STSAB) TS-4 (3 blocks of 30 elements each from a practical torpedo SAET-60) (torpedo SET-53M - 1963). The speed increased to 29 knots, the range was up to 14 km.
Approximately in the mid-2000s, according to the operating experience, the antenna was turned upside down: the equisignal zone channel became the horizontal channel, and the differential-maximum channel became vertical.
Torpedoes from number 3000 received STSAB TS-3.
Note:
The need to replace the ammunition every 3 months made the operational use of their carriers when carrying out combat services much more difficult. For example, for the Mediterranean squadron, special floating bases continuously ran between the northern bases, Sevastopol and the Mediterranean Sea to replace the ammunition load of submarines that were in combat service, sometimes up to a year or a year and a half (that is, sometimes with 4-5-fold replacement of ammunition during combat service) …
Torpedoes from number 4000 received a new SSN 2050.080 with two channels (horizontal and vertical) with an equal-signal bearing zone and an antenna covered with sound-transparent rubber.
The export torpedo SET-53ME had a SSN 2050.080, but instead of a silver-zinc battery - a lead-acid one, but already T-7 (and not B-6-IV as in the early SET-53 Navy) and a range of 7.5 km (at a speed 23 knots).
Torpedoes from number 6000 received a ZET-3 battery with a transportable electrolyte filled in when fired (from the combat battery of the SAET-60M torpedo - initially 32 elements, which gave 30 speed knots, however, at this speed the torpedo "stalled", and therefore the number of elements was reduced to 30 at a speed of 29 knots). The term of keeping on board carriers of this modification of the torpedo was increased to 1 year.
During practical firing, instead of the combat charging compartment, a practical one was installed with devices for recording trajectory data and work of the CLS (autograph and loop oscilloscope with recording on a film strip), means of designation (a pulsed light device and an acoustic "snitch" - a source of noise by which a torpedo that had fulfilled its task could be to find).
In torpedo training, it is important to be able to shoot a lot and “see” and “feel” the results of the training. SET-53 (ME) provided this completely.
The SET-53 and SET-53ME torpedoes, which had lead-acid batteries, could be caught after the firing and lifted aboard, and re-prepared right on the ship (by charging the battery and filling the air) for subsequent firing. Due to its strength, reliability (including targeting) and the ability to shoot a lot and effectively with it, the SET-53ME torpedo enjoyed significant export success (including in countries that had access to modern Western torpedo weapons, for example, in India and Algeria).
This led to the fact that these torpedoes are still in operation in the navies of a number of foreign countries. Among the latest contracts and references in the media, one can cite the message of the REGNUM agency on September 7, 2018 about the repair of the Polish SET-53ME torpedoes by the Ukrainian Promoboronexport (which was written at the beginning of the article) with the involvement of the Kiev Automation Plant, the manufacturer of the most difficult part of the torpedo - control devices.
In the ammunition of the fleet
SET-53 (M) was the basis of the anti-submarine ammunition of the USSR Navy until the early 70s and continued to be actively used in the Northern Fleet until the end of the 70s, and the Pacific Fleet until the early 80s. She stayed the longest in the Baltic, until the end of the 80s. Shallow depths and low-speed targets in the Baltic were quite consistent with the SET-53M.
Deputy Head of the Department of Anti-Submarine Weapons of the Navy R. Gusev:
The SET-53 torpedo was the most reliable domestic torpedo. It was made without a foreign counterpart. All ours. She entered naval life imperceptibly and naturally, as if she had always been there. In 1978, the operation department of the Mine-Torpedo Institute conducted an analysis of the use of practical torpedoes by the Northern Fleet for 10 years. The best indicators were for the SET-53 and SET-53M torpedoes: 25% of the total number of firings in the fleet. SET-53 and SET-53M were already considered old models. About two hundred torpedoes were used. These are true hard workers of torpedo combat training. Some of them were shot up to forty times, only about 2% of the torpedoes were lost. Of all the other samples of torpedoes, according to these indicators, only the 53-56V steam-gas torpedo can be supplied. But she was the last example of air steam-gas torpedoes at the end of almost a century of their improvement. The SET-53 torpedo was the first [naval anti-submarine torpedo].
Torpedo efficiency
Speaking about the SET-53 torpedo, it is necessary to note two fundamental points: very high reliability and efficiency (within the framework of its performance characteristics).
For the first homing torpedoes of all fleets, these qualities were of limited applicability. The efficiency and reliability of the German Navy's homing torpedoes in World War II turned out to be lower than the old erect torpedoes. The US Navy also had many problems with reliability and efficiency (at the same time, persistently, with huge costs and firing statistics, modifying them), even in the relatively recent 80s about the English torpedo Mk24 "Tigerfish" submarine commanders who had it in ammunition and fired it, spoke of her as a "lemon" (the British submarine "Conqueror", which had Mk24, had to sink the cruiser "General Belgrano" in 1982 with old steam-gas torpedoes Mk8).
The torpedo SET-53 turned out to be technically extremely reliable, durable ("oak": it had a body made of St30 steel, which made it possible to keep it calmly in "duty" (water-filled) torpedo tubes), reliably guided at targets (within its characteristics, despite on a small response radius for real targets (300-400 m - for diesel-electric submarines)).
The submarine (submarine), having hydroacoustic contact with the target in the noise direction finding mode with a properly prepared torpedo SET-53 (M), could confidently count on success (aiming the torpedo on the submarine target), incl. in difficult conditions of shallow depths.
An example from the practice of the Baltic submarine:
In the mid-80s in the Baltic Sea, the Project 613 submarine monitored the Swedish Nekken-class submarine for four hours … It all ended with the Swede being "chipped" by active messages from the Tamir-5LS sonar, after which the Swede began to maneuver and evade. Which, in turn, gave 613 a reason to "calm down" and return to its search bar …
Obviously, in a combat situation, instead of an active sending, it would be the use of a combat torpedo, and with a high probability it would be successful.
History has not preserved photographs of "direct hits" on the targets of SET-53 torpedoes. In practical torpedo firing, they shoot with a safe "separation" of the torpedo and target depths and a disabled vertical guidance channel to prevent a practical torpedo from hitting a real target (submarine), but there were enough cases of "direct hits". Both due to errors of personnel (for example, who forgot to turn off the vertical channel of the CCH), and for other reasons:
R. Gusev:
It is a pity that such situations have not been photographed before. There were enough cases. I remember that Kolya Afonin and Slava Zaporozhenko were among the first, dashing gunsmiths, back in the early sixties they decided to "take a chance" and did not turn off the vertical path of the SET-53 torpedo. It was at the naval base in Poti. They fired a torpedo twice, but there was no guidance. The sailors expressed their "phi" to the specialists preparing the torpedo. The lieutenants felt offended and did not turn off the vertical path next time as an act of despair. As always in such cases, there were no other errors. Thank goodness the blow to the stern of the boat was glancing. The torpedo surfaced. A boat with a frightened crew also surfaced. Such firing was then rare: the torpedo had just been put into service. A special officer came to Kolya. Kolya got scared, began to broadcast to him about a strong signal, a blown fuse and other things at the level of household electrical appliances. It has passed. The sailors no longer complained.
When using SET-53 from surface carriers, in those days, which had "without exception" rocket launchers (RBU), the possibility of evading a submarine target from a salvo of SET-53 with a passive SSN by stopping the course was countered by a sharp increase in the effectiveness of RBU on low-speed targets. In turn, the evasion of the attack of the RBU ships by the move provided a significant increase in the effectiveness of SET-53. Those. torpedoes SET-53 and RBU, which had close effective ranges of application, reliably complemented each other on the ships of the first post-war generation of the Navy.
This is definitely positive.
However, there are also problematic issues.
First. Low noise immunity of passive SSN in real combat conditions.
This problem was identified during the Second World War ("Foxers" and other SGPD). The Germans began to solve it immediately and systematically, but we didn’t seem to see it.
For example, at the Pacific Fleet, the first shooting of SET-53 under the conditions of the MG-14 Anabar self-propelled jamming device (with a mechanical noise emitter) was carried out only in … 1975. including torpedoes SET-53) "dragged" behind him both torpedoes of the salvo.
Second - search depth.
The only factor in ensuring the noise immunity of the SET-53 torpedo salvo was the "Ds" installation (the distance of the CCH activation) - "firing for interference".
The problem was that when the CLO was turned on near the target (when shooting “for interference”), its field of view was a “cone” into which the target still needed to be “hit”, and the target's maneuver in depth (especially to the surface) practically guaranteed evasion. In our case, the search depth spindle was rigidly set to limit the bottom of the torpedo, i.e. we could not effectively account for hydrology and target depth maneuvering ability.
Third - firing depth.
The SET-53 torpedo had a caliber of 534 mm and a maximum travel depth of 200 m (targets hit). The firing depth was determined by the capabilities of our submarine's torpedo tubes firing systems. The problem was that the overwhelming majority of submarines of the Navy (projects 613 and 611) had, according to the project, firing systems with a depth limit of up to 30 m (GS-30), their modernization for GS-56 (with a firing depth of up to 70 m) was carried out already in the 60-70s. (and did not cover all SPs). Submarines built in the 60s had a firing depth of 100 m (diesel submarines of projects 633, 641) and 200 m (nuclear submarines of the second generation). Those. even for submarines of projects 633 and 641, the firing depth was in many cases much less than the submarine's immersion depth in the campaign and required, with target detection, to perform a maneuver to reach the firing depth.
For diesel-electric submarines with GS-30, the problem was simply critical, since this maneuver not only took a lot of time, but in a number of cases was very sub-optimal in terms of hydrology, leading either to the loss of contact with the target or the loss of stealth of our submarine.
For comparison: faced with the problem of a shallow depth of fire for the "extras" of its submarines during the Second World War, the US Navy created electric torpedoes of 483 mm caliber, which provided self-exit from the 53-cm torpedo tubes of all submarines of "self-defense torpedoes" (originally - Mk27) … When creating the "same age" SET-53, the massive universal torpedo Mk37, the US Navy retained the 483 mm caliber precisely because of the logic of providing deep firing without restrictions from all 53-cm TA of all US Navy submarines. We, having our own, and significant, experience of using 45-cm torpedoes from a TA of 53 cm caliber in the 30s and during the Great Patriotic War, managed to safely forget it.
Fourth … Significant weight and size characteristics and, accordingly, limited ammunition on the carriers.
The weight of the SET-53 torpedo (depending on the modification) was about 1400 kg, the length was 7800 mm.
For comparison: the mass of its American rival Mk37 is 650 kg (and the weight of the explosives in the warhead is 150 kg, more than on the SET-53), the length is 3520 mm, i.e. twice smaller.
Obviously, the significant weight and size characteristics of the SET-53 torpedo limited the anti-submarine ammunition of the carriers.
For example, the SKR of project 159A, in addition to RBU, had two five-tube torpedo tubes for 40-cm small torpedoes SET-40 (the performance characteristics of which were formally superior to the SET-53), and the SKR of project 159AE had only one three-tube torpedo for the 53-cm SET-53ME. At the same time, the SET-40 torpedoes had a number of serious problems with both reliability and the ability to operate the CLS in difficult conditions. Therefore, from the point of view of real combat effectiveness, it cannot be said that the TFR of the 159AE project had a significant superiority over the 159A project (formally exceeding it in the number of torpedoes by more than three times).
Fifth. Non-versatility of torpedoes in terms of targets (only submerged submarines can be defeated).
The SET-53 torpedo was created on the basis of the German groundwork for anti-ship torpedoes and had every opportunity to become the first universal torpedo in the Navy. Alas, all the available technical capabilities for this were sacrificed to the formal implementation of the tactical and technical assignment (TTZ), in which the depth of target destruction was set to 20-200 m. Above (closer to the surface) 20 m, SET-53 would not have allowed its devices control (bellows-pendulum device), even if its CLS saw and held the target in the capture there …
Yes, the 92-kilogram mass of BZO SET-53 explosives was too small to sink surface targets, but self-defense against enemy ships is better than nothing. Moreover, the small-sized self-defense torpedo MGT-1 (80 kg) had a mass of BZO explosives close to SET-53.
Our torpedo theorists did not think about the fact that a submarine target could jump out to the surface (and even more so about the defeat of surface targets) when evading. As a result, for example, the K-129 diesel-electric submarine went on its last campaign in 1968, having four SET-53 anti-submarine torpedoes and two oxygen 53-56 torpedoes with nuclear warheads in ammunition. That is, the strategic carriers of the Navy left for combat service without a single non-nuclear anti-ship torpedo for self-defense.
The missed anti-ship capabilities of SET-53 is a mistake that is worse than a crime, and the leadership of the "torpedo bodies" of the Navy, and NIMTI specialists.
Results and conclusions
The SET-53 torpedo, created on the basis of the Second World War, turned out to be, of course, a successful example of domestic torpedo weapons.
Its strengths are its very high technical reliability and reliability in aiming at targets within its performance characteristics. The torpedo had significant success not only in the USSR Navy (it was operated until the second half of the 80s, the last with it was the Baltic Fleet), but also in the navies of foreign states, where it is still in operation.
At the same time, the torpedo had insufficient performance characteristics (significantly lower than its American counterparts, but at the level of the English "peer" Mk20), and most importantly, a number of significant shortcomings (primarily non-versatility in terms of targets) that could be easily eliminated during modernization. Unfortunately, the high reliability and efficiency for combat training of SET-53 overshadowed real problems for specialists and the command of the USSR Navy that would inevitably arise during its combat use (primarily noise immunity).
