"not all the gods give to one person …"
The name of the Carthaginian commander and statesman of antiquity Hannibal is very well known. His victories and the famous "Hannibal Oath" brought him well-deserved fame. It would seem that in relation to this person everything is clear - a great commander and what questions can there be? Nevertheless, there are questions. I want to emphasize right away that the purpose of this article is not at all to "expose" the commander of antiquity. In the end, he earned a well-deserved fame for his deeds. The purpose of this article is to criticize contemporary authors who over-praise Hannibal and are not critical of the primary sources. I also consider it necessary to note an important nuance - we have not reached any Carthaginian information about Hannibal. All that we know about him is the fruit of the creativity of the ancient Greeks and Romans. So, in order.
In the textbook of the history of the Ancient World for the 5th grade, only four commanders of antiquity are mentioned: Alexander the Great, Pyrrhus, Hannibal and Guy Julius Caesar. Dear readers may object to me: "Well, what do you want from a textbook for the 5th grade?" But if we open the 1st volume of the "History of Military Art" by Colonel, Professor AA Strokov, dedicated to the history of military affairs of ancient and medieval societies, we will see practically the same picture. Of the generals of the time interval between Alexander the Great and Julius Caesar, only Hannibal is mentioned. Although the respected colonel and professor wrote his fundamental work clearly not for children. And again, readers may object to me: A. A. Strokov lived and worked during the years of a totalitarian political regime, he was simply obliged to write in a rigid ideological framework. And since the classic of Marxism and a retired Prussian cavalry officer Friedrich Engels wrote enthusiastically about Hannibal, A. A. Strokov had to do the same.
Okay, well, let's say Russia is unlucky with freedom of opinion, and we are opening a modern independent Internet resource, namely Wikipedia. And what do we see there? And we see there at least the same, if not even more enthusiastic apologetics. Here is a quote: Hannibal is considered one of the greatest military strategists in the history of Europe, as well as one of the greatest military leaders of antiquity, along with Alexander the Great, Julius Caesar, Scipio and Pyrrhus of Epirus. Military historian Theodore Iroh Dodge even called Hannibal "the father of strategy", as his enemies, the Romans, borrowed some elements of his strategy from him. This assessment has created a high reputation for him in the modern world, he is considered a great strategist, along with Napoleon Bonaparte.
Here I would like to draw the attention of readers to how information is presented in our time. A brief assessment is given, but it is not explained by whom and on the basis of what facts it was made. For example, I do not know who this very Theodore Iroh Dodge is. His book was not translated into Russian and was not published in Russia. Therefore, I cannot say anything bad about the author and his work, but nothing good either. It's only sad that Wikipedia only tells us the title that Mr. Dodge bestowed on Hannibal, but is silent about what elements of strategy the Romans borrowed from him? And are these elements so important that, upon borrowing them, give Hannibal such a high-profile title?
And the second quote from the same Wikipedia: Roman historians described the personality of Hannibal biased and biased. Recognizing his military talent, they rush to highlight his shortcomings. In Roman historiography, certain stereotypes of Hannibal's description were formed, which are clearly visible in the description of Titus Livy. Roman historiography, starting with Libya, refused to critically interpret the formed image, as a result of which the image of Hannibal acquired the caricature features of a "war criminal" https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hannibal Hannibal. - M.: Molodaya gvardiya, 2002.-- 356 p. - (The life of wonderful people). Unfortunately, Wikipedia did not indicate the circulation of this edition. Of course, one could find it and read it, but the above quote suggests that the author of this book himself was not critical of ancient historians and made rather incorrect conclusions.
Since the chronology of the Second Punic War is detailed in the same Wikipedia, and dear visitors of the site can easily familiarize themselves with it, I will not quote it, but go straight to the analysis of the campaigns and battles of Hannibal and their assessments by ancient authors, primarily Titus Livy. Why him? Yes, because it was Titus Livy who had the largest number of documents relating to the very time of the war, which have not come down to us. Although Polybius will often have to be remembered.
So, the initial period of the Second and the passage through the Alps. Describing the military forces of the Roman Republic before the start of the war, Polybius writes about the amazing courage of Hannibal. In itself, the courage of Hannibal does not cause doubts, more interesting is the other - no other opponent of Rome has received such praise. Although the power of the Roman Republic grew, none of its enemies after Hannibal even the same Polybius called people of amazing courage. The reasons for Polybius's enthusiastic attitude will be discussed below, and now we will analyze the result of the transition of Hannibal's army through the Alps.
Titus Livy, referring to Lucius Cincius of the Aliment, a man "who, by his own admission, was taken prisoner by Hannibal," writes that according to Hannibal himself, he lost 36 thousand people while crossing the Alps. Polybius informs us that Hannibal set out on a campaign with ninety thousand infantry and twelve thousand cavalry. He allocated ten thousand infantry and one thousand cavalry to Gannon, and sent the same number to their homes in order to have supporters in the abandoned Spain. With the rest of the army, which Polybius numbers 50 thousand infantry and 9 thousand cavalry, Hannibal moved to Rodan (modern Rhone). Here Polybius has a discrepancy: if you subtract 22 thousand from 92 thousand, you get 70 thousand, and not 59 thousand. Where 11 thousand more soldiers were lost, Polybius does not say. From the crossing of Rodan, Hannibal, according to Polybius, went to the Alps, having already 38 thousand infantry and 8 thousand horsemen. Where another 22 thousand soldiers disappeared, Polybius is silent. In Italy, according to Polybius, he brought only 20 thousand infantry and 6 thousand cavalry, thus losing 22 thousand soldiers when crossing the Alps. The figure is the same rather big, but given the fact that in the presentation of Polybius, Hannibal lost as many as 33 thousand soldiers in an unknown way, it can be assumed that Polybius, wishing to exalt Hannibal, in this way, underestimated his losses when crossing the Alps. Therefore, in my opinion, the figure quoted by Libya deserves more credibility.
So, 36 thousand soldiers were lost: a lot or a little? But let's compare this figure with the losses of the sides who were defeated in the largest battles of that time. So: 1) the battle of Rafia - from the 68 thousandth army of Antiochus III, 10 thousand soldiers died and another 4 thousand were taken prisoner; 2) the battle of Cannes - of the 86-87 thousandth Roman army, 48,200 people were killed in Libya (Polybius writes about almost 70,000, but most likely this is a dramatization.); 3) the battle at the Kinoskephals - 5,000 of the 25 thousandth army of Philip V were killed; 4) the battle of Pydna - from the nearly 40-thousand army of Perseus, 25 thousand soldiers died. Thus, the transition of Hannibal through the Alps in its consequences is equal to defeat in a major battle.
In our time, a military leader who allowed such high losses, even if he was not sent to the tribunal, would probably be removed from office. And one more important point: neither ancient authors, nor modern researchers explain clearly - for what reasons did Hannibal choose such a dangerous path? Titus Livy reports only that: "He did not want to give them (the Romans) a battle earlier than after arriving in Italy." Strange desire. If he wanted to appear in Italy suddenly, then does such a surprise justify the death of 50-60% of the army? If he wanted to prevent the unification of the consular armies with such a maneuver, the question is the same, is such a maneuver justified? But personally, I have a different opinion: Hannibal misjudged the mood of the Allobrog Gallic tribe inhabiting the Alps. Apparently, he hoped that the allobrog would let him through their territory unhindered. But this did not happen, the Allobrogians fought. Hannibal's miscalculation and very serious is evident. This is indirectly evidenced by Polybius, who, in his description of the passage through the Alps, begins with a criticism of unnamed historians who, according to Polybius, described Alny as excessively impassable, deserted and deserted. However, he admits that Hannibal exposed his army to the "greatest" dangers and even there was a moment when it was on the verge of complete annihilation.
Now let's analyze the first battle of Hannibal in Italy - the Battle of Titinus. Despite the fact that Hannibal's army suffered huge losses during the crossing of the Alps, it outnumbered the army of the Roman consul Publius Cornelius Scipio. There really is one nuance here: the ancient authors do not tell us anything about the number of parties. About the Carthaginian army, we can only say that it consisted of at least 20 thousand infantry and 6 thousand cavalry, since, according to Titus Livy, this is the minimum estimate of the number of soldiers Hannibal had after crossing the Alps. The Roman army was standard: 2 actually Roman legions (9 thousand people), an allied ala - its number could be either equal to the number of legionnaires, or twice as large (the latter, however, began to be practiced already by the end of the Second Punic War and after it) and 2200 galls. In Wikipedia, with reference to the modern historian R. A. Gabriel, the following figures are given: "Scipio had an army of 15 thousand infantry (who participated in this battle only partially), 600 Roman horsemen, 900 allied horsemen and about 2 thousand Gaulish horsemen ". In general, one could agree with these figures, BUT there is one important nuance: neither Polybius nor Titus Livy say anything about the fact that all the Gallic warriors were horsemen. On the contrary, both Polybius and Titus Livy tell us that after the battle, 2 thousand Gaulish infantry and slightly less than 200 horsemen deserted to the Carthaginians. Therefore, it is not clear where Gabriel got the figure of 2 thousand Gaulish horsemen from?
The following picture emerges: the Roman consul, taking with him 300 Roman horsemen (the standard of the Roman legion), 900 Allied horsemen and 200 (maybe a little more) Gallic horsemen, as well as an unknown number of velits (lightly armed javelin throwers) went on reconnaissance. The number of the velites was no less than 2400, but hardly more than 4800. In reconnaissance Scipio faced the cavalry of Hannibal, which, if inferior in number to the total number of the Romans, is quite insignificant. But the Carthaginian cavalry was qualitatively significantly superior to the Roman. If the number of the Carthaginians was greater than Polybius indicates (according to Livy's testimony, Hannibal set out on a campaign with 18 thousand horsemen)? We take away 2 thousand left in Spain, we believe that the bulk of the losses during the transition fell on the infantry, it turns out that Hannibal should have had at least 12 thousand cavalry), then the ratio of forces in their favor increases even more significantly. With such a balance of forces, the Roman army was simply doomed to defeat. It is significant that neither Titus Livy nor Polybius say anything about Hannibal's military leadership. Livy only states the fact of the superiority of the Carthaginian cavalry over the Roman. Friedrich Engels, in his work "The Cavalry", also notes that the Romans did not have the slightest chance of success. In order to win with such a balance of forces, you did not have to be Hannibal at all - any other military leader of antiquity who did not deserve so many enthusiastic epithets would have achieved this.
Now about the battle of Trebbia
The unconditional manifestation of Hannibal's leadership talent is nothing to discuss here. I would only like to draw the attention of dear readers that from this battle the style of Hannibal's military art begins to form - setting up ambushes.
It also makes no sense to analyze in detail the battle of Lake Trasimene, everything has long been described and analyzed, I will only note that after this battle, Hannibal increasingly begins to succumb to his main enemy in the middle stage of the Second Punic War - the Roman dictator Quintus Fabius Maximus Kunctator. Not daring to make an attempt to begin a siege of Rome, Hannibal allowed the Romans to use their most important resource - a much larger, in modern language, mobilization reserve.
And finally we got to the Battle of Cannes
What I would like to note, speaking about this battle in the context of this topic. Although ancient authors describe the course of the battle in the same way, there are some differences in their assessments. Rereading Polybius, I noted an interesting detail - describing the course of the battle, Polybius mentioned the name of Hannibal 2 times and 3 times the name of the cavalry commander of the left flank of Hasdrubal (according to Titus Livy, Hasdrubal commanded the right flank). Even more interesting is the conclusion made by Polybius: "Both this time and earlier, the victory of the Carthaginians was most helped by the large number of cavalry. Future generations were taught by this a lesson that it is more profitable for a war to have half the number of infantry in comparison with the enemy and decisively surpass the enemy in cavalry than to join into battle with forces completely equal to those of the enemy."
It is clear to anyone in the slightest degree familiar with military affairs and to a reasonable person that such far-reaching conclusions are not drawn from the outcome of one battle. And I think Polybius understood this perfectly. But Polybius inserted his conclusion at the end of the description of the battle. Why did he do it? I think, then, that he would like to hide one aspect of the battle. What is the nuance? We will try to figure this out when it comes to Polybius.
Titus Livy expressed his attitude to the Battle of Cannes in two ways: a hidden hint and an open opinion. He mentions Hasdrubal only once, mentions Hannibal only in connection with the phrase he allegedly said, but describes in detail the death of the Roman consul Lucius Aemilius Paul. Let's turn to his text: "Gnei Lentulus, a military tribune, riding past on horseback, saw the consul: he was sitting on a stone covered in blood.": while you still have strength, I will put you on a horse and go, covering, next to you. Do not darken this day with the death of the consul; and so there will be enough tears and grief. "" Praise your valor, Gnei Cornelius, - replied the consul, - do not waste time, in vain lamenting: there is so little of it - hurry, escape from enemy hands. Leave, publicly announce to the senators: let, before the victorious enemy has approached, they will strengthen and strengthen their protection; Tell Quintus Fabius, Lucius Aemilius remembered his advice, while he lived, he remembers even now, dying. Leave me to die among my fallen soldiers: I do not want to become the accused for the second time from the consul and I do not want to become the accuser of my colleague in order to defend my innocence with someone else's fault.”During this conversation, they were caught first by a crowd of fleeing fellow citizens, and then by enemies: not knowing that the consul was in front of them, they threw him with javelins; Lentula from the alteration carried the horse."
I think everyone understands that in battle, conversations are not conducted in such an exquisite style. But Titus Livy inserted this dialogue into his essay. Readers may ask me: why? I answer: in this way Livy expressed his opinion about who exactly he considers to be the culprit of the defeat of the Romans. The words of the military tribune about the innocence of Emilius Paul and the words of the consul about his unwillingness to be the accuser of his colleague tell us that Livy considered the second consul, Gaius Terentius Varro, incompetent in military affairs, to be the culprit of the defeat of the Romans. And in the conclusion of the XXII book of his work, Livy already directly writes: “the spirit of the people was so high at that very time that all the estates came out to meet the consul, the main culprit of the terrible defeat, and thanked him for not despairing in the state; be he a leader Carthaginians, he would not have escaped a terrible execution. " That is, according to Livy, it was not so much Hannibal that showed his talent as a leader, but Varro that showed his complete incompetence. Therefore, the general assessment of the battle of Libya is very remarkable: "Such was the battle of Cannes, as famous for its sad outcome as the battle of Allia, however, the consequences of the disaster turned out to be less serious due to the fact that the enemy hesitated, but in terms of human losses - and harder and more shameful ". Not the very fact of defeat, but its shameful character, due to the incompetence of the commander, Livy considered the main result of the Battle of Cannes.
The Battle of Cannes marked the pinnacle of Hannibal's impressive, but very short, successful military career. Immediately after the battle, a disagreement broke out between Hannibal and his hipparch Magarbal, during which Magarbal threw a reproach to Hannibal, which can be considered a moral sentence to Hannibal as a commander. Titus Livy tells about it this way: "All those around the winner - Hannibal, congratulated him and advised after such a battle to devote the rest of the day and the next night to rest for himself and the tired soldiers; only Magarbal, the commander of the cavalry, believed that it was impossible to linger like that." Understand, - he said, - what this battle means: in five days you will be feasting on the Capitol. Follow on, I will gallop forward with the cavalry, let the Romans know that you have come before they hear that you are coming. " Magarbal, but it takes time to weigh everything. "Yes, of course, - said Magarbal, - not everything is given by the gods to one person: you can win, Hannibal, but you do not know how to take advantage of victory." and the city, and the whole state."
By refusing to march on Rome and begin a siege, Hannibal did more than just make a mistake. By his decision, he crossed out all his victories and, figuratively speaking, with his own hands gave the strategic initiative to the enemy. Without an attempt to siege and take Rome, the very invasion of Italy lost all meaning. It is unlikely that Hannibal did not know about Pyrrhus's war in Italy, sources say he did. And without a doubt, he knew about the battles of his father, Hamilcar Barca, with the Romans. Did he really think that two defeats, even very cruel ones, would force the Roman Senate to sign a surrender? Did he seriously think that upon hearing about the defeats of the Romans, the Italians would rush headlong to enroll in his army? Indeed, after the Battle of Cannes, many Italic tribes separated from Rome. But, as subsequent events showed, they did this with the goal of regaining their status before the establishment of Roman rule in Italy, and not at all in order to shed their blood for the Carthaginians.
It took 13 years from the Battle of Cannes to Hannibal's departure from Italy. Exactly the same number of Alexander the Great ruled Macedonia. But Alexander for 13 years of his reign conquered the territories of modern: Bulgaria, Greece, most of Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Palestine, Egypt, Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, Tajikistan and Pakistan. Part of the conquest may have been too hasty, but the overall scale is impressive. In 312 BC. Seleucus with 1 thousand.soldiers returned to the capital of his satrapy - Babylon. After 11 years, he already controlled most of the Macedonian conquests in Asia, had an army, one of the strongest among the armies of the Diadochi and the most numerous elephanteria, which ensured him victory in the Battle of Ipsus and the honorary title of Winner. Antiochus III, a contemporary of Hannibal and a very mediocre military leader, was defeated in the Battle of Rafia in 217, but in 15 years he managed to strengthen his kingdom and take revenge. Gaius Julius Caesar conquered Gaul in just under 14 years and brought the Roman Republic itself to its knees. Since Wikipedia compares Hannibal to Napoleon, we can say a little about the latter. During his entire reign, which was almost equal in duration to the Second Punic War, Bonaparte established control over most of the European continent, and in 1812 even reached Moscow.
Now let's see how Hannibal disposed of such a long time? And here we will be disappointed. Hannibal accomplished nothing great and brilliant during these 13 years. In 211 he approached Rome with his army, but again did not dare to start a siege. All combat activities of Hannibal were reduced to numerous, but insignificant skirmishes with the Romans in anticipation of help from their brothers. And his enemy, meanwhile, wasted no time. First, they regained control of Sicily, then they began to invade Spain and in 206 BC. NS. drove the Carthaginians out of it. The conquests of Hannibal's father, Hamilcar Barca, were lost. In 207 BC. NS. Hannibal's brothers, Hasdrubal and Magon, were defeated by the Roman consuls Mark Livy Salinator and Guy Claudius Nero at the Battle of the Metaurus. Hannibal's strategy failed completely, there was no hope of victory. In 204 BC. NS. the Romans landed in Africa. The most important ally of Carthage, the Numidian king Massinissa, went over to their side. The Carthaginian Herusia sent an order to Hannibal to return to his homeland.
So we come to the final battle of the Second Punic War - the Battle of Zama
First, I will express my opinion, and then I will quote a little Polybius and Titus Livy. In the battle of Zama, Hannibal showed himself not at all as the "father of strategy", it is not even necessary to talk about it. He proved to be more of a "stepchild of tactics", placing war elephants against the front of the Roman infantry. But by that time it was already known that war elephants are most effective against cavalry and chariots. At the Battle of Ipsus, Seleucus Nicator, throwing his elephants against Demetrius's cavalry, cut it off from the phalanx of Antigonus, which allowed the coalition army to surround and defeat it. In the "battle of the elephants", the son of Seleucus, Antiochus I Soter and his adviser, the Rhodian Theodotus, whom no one considers to be great generals, also achieved victory over the numerically superior army of the Galatians, putting the elephants against the cavalry. Hannibal, on the other hand, acted at the Battle of Zama in the spirit of his opponent at the Battle of Cannes - Gaius Terentius Varro. He tried to break through the center of the Roman army, but left open the flanks and rear. Put the elephants in the rear of his infantry, it was more difficult for the enemy cavalry to make their attack.
There is an original passage on Wikipedia in an article about the Battle of Zama, which I will quote: "If Scipio had not had numerous Numidian cavalry, Hannibal could have used his war elephants against the enemy's cavalry, and he would have won the battle for sure. But the Numidian horses were accustomed to the appearance of elephants, and the riders themselves sometimes took part in catching them. In addition, this light cavalry conducted only a throwing battle and would hardly have received serious losses from the attack of huge mammals. "(https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Zame) who is the author of this opus, but the nonsense is written complete. First, even if the horses of the Numidians were not afraid of elephants, it is unlikely that the Numidian cavalry would have been able to attack the rear of the Carthaginian infantry covered by elephants; and secondly, the Numidians were also armed with swords, as evidenced by an episode from Titus Livius' description of the battle of Cannes. It was the Numidian cavalry that the Romans subsequently widely used to pursue a defeated enemy.
Well, how did the ancient authors assess the actions of Hannibal? And here we are faced with an interesting phenomenon. Apologetics are at least as much, if not more, than in their own assessment of the Battle of Cannes. Here is Polybius: “And yet Hannibal knew how to take timely measures against all their devices with incomparable insight. So, from the very beginning he stocked up on a large number of elephants and then put them in front of the battle line in order to upset and break the ranks of the enemies. he placed, first of all, mercenaries, and then the Carthaginians, in order to exhaust the forces of the enemy in a preliminary and prolonged struggle, and also in order to force the Carthaginians to remain in place during the battle by being in the middle … from other things, the troops, so that they could observe the course of the battle from a distance and, while maintaining their strength intact, could serve their valor at the decisive moment. victories, then one cannot condemn him harshly. Sometimes fate opposes the designs of valiant men, and sometimes, as it says the proverb, "the worthy meets the worthy in another." This, one might say, happened then with Hannibal."
When you read these lines, two thoughts involuntarily come to mind: 1) if Hannibal is the "father of strategy", the greatest military leader, then who is his winner - Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanus? 2) Oh, and Hannibal was a foolish person! And why did he in Ephesus say that the long-dead Alexander the Great was the greatest commander? I would say that the greatest commander was the Roman Gaius Terentius Varro, and the fact that he was defeated at Cannes was an evil fate and the envy of the gods. And Scipio would have had nothing to say.
Consider now the assessment of Titus Livy: "Both Scipio himself and all experts in military affairs paid tribute to him for the exceptional skill with which he built his army that day: he put elephants in front so that a sudden attack of these irresistibly strong animals would upset the battle order of the Roman army, on which the Romans most of all counted; he put auxiliary troops in front of the Carthaginians, so that this multi-tribal rabble, these mercenaries, who do not know loyalty, held only by self-interest, were deprived of the opportunity to escape; they had to take on the first frantic onslaught of the Romans, tire them out and at least to blunt their weapons against their bodies; then the Carthaginians and Africans were placed - Hannibal placed all hope on them; having entered the battle with fresh forces, they could win up over an enemy equal in strength, but already tired and wounded; after they were at some distance from the Italians, pushed as far as possible by Hannibal - it was not known whether they were friends or enemies? was the last example of Hannibal's martial art."
As we can see, the assessments of Polybius and Titus Livy practically coincide, with the exception of one detail. The Greek Polybius allegedly evaluates Hannibal's actions independently, and Livy directly indicates that this is an assessment of Scipio Africanus and his entourage. It is possible that this assessment was contained in the report of Scipio to the Senate. If so, then there is nothing surprising in Scipio's praise of Hannibal. After all, glorifying Hannibal, he thereby glorified himself.
The last years of Hannibal's life look strange for a great commander. He wandered from one court of the Middle Eastern dynasts to another, never staying long anywhere and not receiving recognition worthy of his glory. If he was given instructions, they did not in any way correspond to the reputation of a well-known military leader - the deputy head of the navarh, the head of construction work. It is not known why he left the distant and relatively safe Armenia and moved to closer to Rome, and, therefore, more dangerous Bithynia? It is not known whether the Romans themselves found him there, or did the Bithynian king decide to extradite him? We will probably never get the answers to these questions. Another thing is important, the star of Hannibal has faded away, and, it would seem, one could forget about him. But he was not forgotten. And the merit in this is the Greco-Roman historians, primarily Polybius and Titus Livy. Both had their own reasons to glorify Hannibal, even when the facts did not oblige them to do so.
Polybius was a Greek, but he lived for many years in Rome and was close to Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanus (the Younger) Numanteus and was a member of the literary and philosophical circle organized by the latter. Scipio Aemilian himself was the grandson of Lucius Aemilius Paulus, consul who died in the Battle of Cannes, and the adopted son of Publius Conelius Scipio, the son of Scipio Africanus the Elder and a Roman historian who wrote the history of Rome in Greek that has not come down to us. It is very likely that Polybius made extensive use of this work when writing his "General History". The closeness of Polybius to Scipio Emilian explains the reason for the historian's apologetic attitude towards Hannibal. Glorifying Hannibal, Polybius, thereby, glorified the name of his patron.
As for Titus Livy, his motive was different. Libya's youth passed in the years of a brutal civil war between the Pompeians and the Caesarians. The Roman Republic, of which Titus Livy was a patriot, was on its way to its end. There was less and less news of the victories of the Roman legions over the enemies of Rome, but more and more news of the victories of the Romans over the Romans came in. Livy condemned this state of affairs. He saw the ideal in those times when the Republic was in a state of unity and was not torn by strife. And the era of the Second Punic War was such a time. Therefore, praising Hannibal, Titus Livy praised not only the valor of the ancestors who defeated the "conqueror", but also softly expressed his critical attitude to modernity.
So, we conclude: Hannibal was undoubtedly an outstanding, very talented military leader. But, he was not more talented and brilliant than Seleucus I Nicator, Antigonus I Monophthalmus, Demetrius I Poliorketus, his father, Hamilcar Barca, Scipio Africanus, Gaius Marius and Lucius Cornelius Sulla, therefore adorning epithets like "father of strategy", " the greatest "seem out of place. As well as mentioning only his name in the relevant sections of textbooks on the history of military art.
