Franklin D. Roosevelt's Address to Congress on January 6, 1941
After the defeat of France, America got a real chance to fulfill its long-held dream of building a world empire, Pax Americana. For the United States to become a world hegemon, it needed a long conflict, "the defeat of opponents and the weakening of allies" (How Roosevelt provoked the Japanese attack // https://www.wars20century.ru/publ/10-1-0-22). England at that time single-handedly opposed Germany and Italy. Japan is bogged down in a war with China. Only the USA and the USSR remained neutral of the leading players of the Great Game. By organizing an attack by Germany on the Soviet Union, and Japan on America, the Americans (since neither Germany nor Japan could cope with the USSR and the United States alone) gave the war a protracted and extremely ruinous character for its participants. Moreover, if England and the USSR were significantly weakened by such an alignment, then Germany and Japan were simply destroyed.
At the same time, America, with its help from the "arsenal of democracy" of both Britain and the USSR, and Germany, gradually inevitably became an economic and financial leader, and having led the anti-Hitler coalition, among other things, also a political leader.
Concentrating the efforts of the allies on the defeat of first Germany, and then Japan, America emerged from the war as a superpower, along with Britain and the USSR. An attempt by England to crush the USSR in hot pursuit was nipped in the bud by America, which did not intend to share world domination with anyone, reasonably believing to seize power over the whole world "by the right of the victor". Having subjugated England with the help of the USSR, America, rallying the West under the slogan of confronting the "Soviet threat" and using all its might, together with the USSR destroyed the bipolar world, finally gaining the one-man global domination so longed for by it and becoming the leading power on the planet.
Meanwhile, it was far from easy to force Germany and Japan to attack the Soviet Union and America, and even more so at random. The example of the Great War showed the impossibility of a simultaneous military confrontation between Germany and the West and East. In Mein Kampf, Hitler, without hiding anyone, showed off his plan to conclude an alliance either with Britain against the USSR to conquer new lands in Europe, or with the USSR against England to conquer colonies and strengthen German world trade (Fest I. Hitler. Biography. Way up / Translated from German A. A. Fedorov, NS Letneva, A. M. Andropov. - M.: Veche, 2006. - P. 355). For the first time, the question of delimiting the sphere of influence in the Balkans between Germany, Italy and the USSR, as well as the participation of the USSR in the war with England, was raised by Germany on March 4, 1940, during the preparation of the occupation of Norway, Holland, Belgium and France (Lebedev S. America against England Part 16. Crossroads of history // https://topwar.ru/73396-amerika-protiv-anglii-chast-16-perekrestok-dorog-istorii.html). After the defeat of France, Churchill continued his confrontation with Germany and obtained help from America. Rudolf Hess's attempt to negotiate with the pro-German forces in England ended in a complete fiasco. It would seem that Germany was literally doomed to conclude a full-fledged alliance with the Soviet Union. Among other things, Germany had obligations with respect to the USSR to friendly Japan.
“When France suffered a crushing defeat in the summer of 1940, Belgium and Holland were occupied, and England's position seemed hopeless, Tokyo felt that Japan had an extraordinary opportunity. The vast colonies of the European powers were now "ownerless", there was no one to defend them. … The growing aggressiveness of the Japanese militarists can only be compared with the size of the booty they intended to seize in the South Seas "(Yakovlev N. N. FDR - man and politician. Pearl Harbor Mystery: Selected Works. - Moscow: International Relations, 1988. - S. 577-578).
“In June 1940 … the German and Japanese representatives agreed on a preliminary plan for the 'strengthening of harmony' between Germany, Japan and Italy based on the division of spheres of influence. The plan established that Europe and Africa would belong to the sphere of domination of Germany and Italy, and the region of the South Seas, Indochina and Dutch East India (Indonesia) would be included in the sphere of Japanese influence. It was envisaged that close political and economic cooperation would develop between Germany and Japan”(History of the Second World War. 1939 - 1945. In 12 volumes. Vol. 3. - Moscow: Military Publishing, 1974. - pp. 244-245). In parallel, "the Japanese leadership increasingly began to express an opinion about the need to" neutralize "the Soviet Union as soon as possible during the movement to the south" (Koshkin AA "Kantokuen" - "Barbarossa" in Japanese. Why Japan did not attack the USSR. - M.: Veche, 2011. - S. 97-98).
"By June 12, 1940 … the General Staff of the Japanese Navy prepared … a plan" The policy of the empire in the conditions of the weakening of England and France ", which provided for" a general diplomatic settlement with the Soviet Union "and aggression in the South Seas. On July 2, 1940, the Japanese ambassador to Moscow S. Togo in a conversation with V. M. Molotov makes a far-reaching proposal for the conclusion of a neutrality treaty between Japan and the USSR, which lay within the framework of the new strategic concept of Tokyo. In addition, Togo proposed to include in this treaty a reference to the Soviet-Japanese treaty of 1925 and, as an annex to it, a secret note about the Soviet Union's refusal to help China "(A. Mitrofanov, A. Zheltukhin. Gromyko's Refusal, or Why Stalin Did Not Capture Hokkaido / / https://www.e-reading.club/chapter.php/147136/5/Mitrofanov, _Zheltuhin _-_ Otkaz_Gromyko, _ili_Pochemu_Stalin_ne_zahvatil_Hokkaiido.html).
“The new international situation demanded a new government. On July 16, 1940, under pressure from the army, a relatively moderate cabinet formed in the thick shadow of Khalkhin Gol resigned. The new government was headed by the 49-year-old prince Fumimaro Konoe”(Yakovlev NN Decree, op. - p. 578). Prime Minister Konoe appointed Matsuoka as Foreign Minister. “On July 26, 1940, on the fourth day of its existence, the Konoe cabinet decided to create a new order by Japan in the great“East Asia”. Matsuoka published this decision as a government communique. "Japan, Manchukuo and China will be just the core of a bloc of countries in the great East Asian sphere of common prosperity," it said. “Complete autarky is the goal of the bloc, which, in addition to Japan, Manchukuo and China, will include Indochina, Dutch India and other countries of the South Seas. To achieve this goal, Japan must be ready to overcome all obstacles that stand in its way, both material and spiritual”(Matsuoka Yosuke //
On July 31, 1940, Roosevelt banned the export of aviation gasoline to Japan on the ludicrous pretext of a shortage, cutting off the main source of fuel for Japanese combat aircraft. “Having dealt a blow to the power of the Japanese Air Force, Roosevelt continued his unfriendly actions towards Japan, transferring $ 44 million to China in the summer of 1940, another $ 25 million in September, and already $ 50 million in November. This money was used by the Chinese government for the war against Japan "(How Roosevelt provoked the attack of Japan. Ibid.). After Konoe came to the government, “the process of consolidation of the German-Japanese military alliance accelerated noticeably. In August 1940, both sides continued negotiations "(History of the Second World War. Decree. Op. - p. 245). Since Moscow did not respond to the proposals of July 2, on August 5, Matsuoka telegraphed the Japanese ambassador to Togo about the need to conclude an agreement on neutrality between the two states as soon as possible, which he announced to Molotov on the same day. On August 14, Molotov replied about a positive attitude towards the conclusion of a treaty of neutrality (Mitrofanov A., Zheltukhin A. Ibid).
September 4, 1940 at a meeting in Tokyo with the participation of Konoe, Matsuoka, Minister of War Tojo and Minister of the Navy Oikawa Matsuoka expressed "the idea of developing the" pact of three "into a" pact of four "and" granting "the territory of India and Iran to the Soviet Union. … At the meeting, it was decided to "contain the Soviet Union in the east, west and south, thus forcing it to act in a direction beneficial to the common interests of Japan, Germany and Italy, and to try to force the Soviet Union to expand its influence in such a direction in which it will exert the most insignificant, direct influence on the interests of Japan, Germany and Italy, namely, in the direction of the Persian Gulf (it is possible that, if necessary, it will be necessary to agree with the expansion of the Soviet Union in the direction of India). " Thus, everything that Ribbentrop proposed to Molotov in November 1940 was thought out and formulated at a meeting of four ministers in Tokyo "(Matsuoka Yosuke, ibid.).
On September 22, Japanese troops occupied Northern Indochina. Thus, "Japan has actually started to implement the southern version of its expansion" (Koshkin AA Decree. Op. - p. 97). “A few days later … On September 26, 1940, President Roosevelt, on behalf of the American government, announced the prohibition of the export of scrap metal, iron and steel to foreign countries, with the exception of Great Britain, Canada and the countries of South America. Japan was not included in this list of consumers of American scrap. Consequently, Roosevelt understood perfectly well what was forcing her to attack the United States "(Buzina O. Pearl Harbor - Roosevelt's setup // https://www.buzina.org/publications/660-perl-harbor-podstava-rusvelta.html) …
On September 27, 1940, the Tripartite Pact was concluded in Berlin between Germany, Italy and Japan. “The pact provided for the delimitation of zones of influence between the Axis countries in the establishment of a new world order and military mutual assistance. Germany and Italy were destined to play a leading role in Europe, and the Japanese Empire - in Asia”(Berlin Pact (1940) // https://ru.wikipedia.org). Regarding the Soviet Union, it made a special reservation that it was not directed against the USSR, which was essentially an invitation to expand the pact to the four main participating countries. "In secret letters exchanged between Japan and Germany at the signing of the" pact of three ", Germany agreed to involve the Soviet Union in this pact" (Matsuoka Yosuke. Ibid.).
In November 1940, Molotov went to Berlin in order to "find out the real intentions of Germany and all the parties to the Pact of the Three … in the implementation of the plan for the creation of" New Europe ", as well as the" Great East Asian Space "; borders of "New Europe" and "East Asian Space"; the nature of the state structure and relations of individual European states in "New Europe" and in "East Asia"; stages and terms of implementation of these plans and, at least, the nearest ones; prospects for other countries to join the Pact 3; the place of the USSR in these plans now and in the future. " He had to “prepare an initial outline of the sphere of interests of the USSR in Europe, as well as in Near and Central Asia, probing the possibility of an agreement on this with Germany, as well as with Italy, but not concluding any agreement with Germany and Italy at this stage of negotiations, having in view of the continuation of these negotiations in Moscow, where [was - S. L.] Ribbentrop was to arrive in the near future.”- March 1, 1941 - M.: International relations, 1998. - S. 30-31).
In the negotiations, "proceeding from the fact that the Soviet-German agreement on the partial delimitation of the spheres of interests of the USSR and Germany has been exhausted by events (with the exception of Finland)," he was instructed to "ensure that the sphere of interests of the USSR includes: - the German agreement of 1939, in the implementation of which Germany had [had - S. L.] eliminate all difficulties and ambiguities (withdrawal of German troops, termination of all political demonstrations in Finland and Germany aimed at the detriment of the interests of the USSR); c) Bulgaria - the main issue of negotiations, should be, by agreement with Germany and Italy, attributed to the sphere of interests of the USSR on the same basis of guarantees of Bulgaria from the USSR, as was done by Germany and Italy in relation to Romania, with the introduction of Soviet troops into Bulgaria " (Documents of foreign policy of the USSR. Decree. Op. - p. 31).
In case of a favorable outcome of the main negotiations, it was supposed “to propose to make a peaceful action in the form of an open declaration of 4 powers … on the condition of preserving the British Empire (without mandated territories) with all those possessions that England now owns, and on condition of non-interference in European affairs and immediate withdrawal from Gibraltar and Egypt, as well as with the obligation to immediately return Germany to its former colonies and immediately grant India the rights of dominion. … Regarding China in the secret protocol, as one of the points of this protocol, to say about the need to achieve an honorable peace for China (Chiang Kai-shek), in which the USSR, perhaps with the participation of Germany and Italy, is ready to take on mediation, and we do not object to Indonesia being recognized as a sphere of influence of Japan (Manchukuo remains with Japan) "(Documents of the USSR's foreign policy. Op. cit. - p. 32). On November 11, Stalin sent Molotov to a special train, in which he was heading to Berlin, for immediate delivery a telegram in which he asked not to raise the issue of India for fear that "the counterparties might perceive the clause on India as a trick with the aim of fomenting a war" (Documents Foreign Policy of the USSR, op. cit. - p. 34).
Ribbentrop, already in the first conversation on November 12, 1940, invited Molotov to think about the form in which Germany, Italy and Japan could come to an agreement with the USSR. "During Molotov's conversations with Hitler, the latter directly stated that" he offers the Soviet Union to participate as the fourth partner in this pact. " At the same time, the Fuhrer did not hide the fact that it was a question of joining forces in the fight against Great Britain and the United States, saying: “… We are all continental states, although each country has its own interests. America and England are not continental states, they only strive to set European states against each other, and we want to exclude them from Europe. I believe that our success will be greater if we stand back to back and fight external forces than if we stand against each other with our chests and fight against each other."
On the eve, Ribbentrop outlined the German vision of the geopolitical interests of the participants in the "projected" alliance: and the Arabian Sea … "Ribbentrop proposed an agreement between the USSR, Germany, Italy and Japan in the form of a declaration against the expansion of the war, as well as the desirability of a compromise between Japan and Chiang Kai-shek. Reacting to this information, Stalin instructed Molotov in Berlin as follows: “If the results of the further conversation show that you can basically come to an agreement with the Germans, and for Moscow there will remain the end and formalization of the case, then so much the better … points "(Koshkin AA Decree. op. - pp. 109-110).
In exchange for joining the Triple Pact, Molotov demanded the full control over Finland promised by Germany, as well as the Straits to ensure the security of the southern borders of the USSR and Bulgaria to ensure the security of the Straits. In response, Hitler began to impose unequal conditions on the Soviet side and limited Soviet demands. Instead of accepting Moscow's declared price for a full-fledged alliance, Hitler demanded that it “come to terms with the German invasion of the Soviet sphere of interest in Finland, the formation of a German sphere of influence in the Balkans, and the revision of the Montreux Convention on the Straits instead of handing them over to Moscow. A. Hitler refused to say anything specifically about Bulgaria, referring to the need for consultations with partners in the tripartite pact - Japan and Italy. The negotiations ended there. Both sides agreed to continue negotiations through diplomatic channels, and I. von Ribbentrop's visit to Moscow was canceled (Lebedev SP Soviet strategic planning on the eve of World War II. Part 5. Battle for Bulgaria // https://topwar.ru/ 38865-sovetskoe-strategicheskoe-planirovanie-nakanune-velikoy-otechestvennoy-voyny-chast-5-bitva-za-bolgariyu.html).
Churchill once admitted that “it is difficult to even imagine what would have happened as a result of an armed alliance between the two great continental empires, possessing millions of soldiers, with the aim of dividing the spoils in the Balkans, Turkey, Persia and the Middle East, with India, and Japan - an ardent participant in the "sphere of the Great East Asia" - as its partner "(W. Churchill. World War II // https://www.litmir.co/br/?b=81776&ShowDeleted=1&p=227). According to the memoirs of F. von Pappen, Hitler's decision could change the face of the world: "I could understand how tempting Hitler must seem to be the idea of opposing the British Empire and the United States with his alliance with the Russians." Germany. 1933-1947 / Translated from English by M. G. Baryshnikov. - M.: Tsentrpoligraf, 2005. - S. 458). According to Hitler himself, "the coalition between Germany and the Soviet Union will be an irresistible force and will inevitably lead to complete victory" (F. von Papen, op. Cit. - p. 458). And although Hitler was dissatisfied with the guarantees that the USSR agreed to provide Bulgaria, "in order to resolve the main problem associated with the acquisition of colonies by Germany and victory over England, in principle he agreed to the demands of Molotov and was already inclined towards an alliance with Moscow" (Lebedev S. Ibid.).
In particular, according to Churchill, “among the seized correspondence of the German Foreign Ministry with the German Embassy in Moscow, a draft four-power pact was found, on which no date was indicated. … By virtue of this project, Germany, Italy and Japan agreed to respect each other's natural spheres of influence. Since their areas of interest overlapped, they pledged to constantly consult in an amicable manner on the problems arising in this connection. Germany, Italy and Japan declared for their part that they would recognize the existing limits of the Soviet Union's possession and would respect them. The four powers pledged not to join any combination of powers and not to support any combination of powers that would be directed against one of the four powers. They pledged to help each other in every possible way in economic matters and to supplement and expand the existing agreements between them. This agreement was to be valid for ten years.
The agreement was to be accompanied by a secret protocol containing a statement from Germany that, in addition to the territorial revision in Europe, which was to be carried out after the conclusion of the peace, its territorial claims were concentrated around the territory of Central Africa; Italy's statement that, in addition to territorial revision in Europe, its territorial claims are concentrated around the territory of North and North-East Africa; Japan's declaration that its territorial claims are concentrated in the East Asia region south of the Japanese Islands; and the Soviet Union's declaration that its territorial claims are concentrated south of the Soviet national territory in the direction of the Indian Ocean. The four powers declared that, postponing the solution of specific issues, they will mutually respect each other's territorial claims and will not oppose their implementation”(W. Churchill, ibid.).
However, in the end, Hitler, "choosing between the inevitably leading to victory of the coalition of Germany with the USSR and the inevitably ending defeat of Germany in a war on two fronts with Britain and the Soviet Union, … chose the defeat of Germany" (Lebedev S. Soviet strategic planning on the eve of World War II. Part 5. Ibid.). “As noted after the war, its participant, General G. Blumentritt,“having made this fatal decision, Germany lost the war”(MI Meltyukhov, Stalin's Lost Chance. The Soviet Union and the Struggle for Europe: 1939-1941 // https:// militera. lib.ru/research/meltyukhov/12.html). It must be assumed that Hitler's main goal was still "not the creation of Greater Germany and its acquisition of living space, and not even the fight against communism, but the destruction of Germany in the battle with the Soviet Union for the sake of American national interests" (Lebedev S. Soviet strategic planning the day before Of the Great Patriotic War. Part 5. Ibid.). Which is not surprising at all with such curators assigned to him at one time as Ernst Hanfstangl and the Dulles brothers.
On November 26, “in Berlin, Molotov received the first detailed response to Ribbentrop's proposal to create an alliance. As preconditions, demands were put forward for the immediate withdrawal of German troops from Finland, the conclusion of a mutual assistance pact between Bulgaria and the Soviet Union, the provision of bases for Soviet land and naval forces in the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, and the recognition of territories south of Batum and Baku in the direction of the Persian Gulf. sphere of predominant influence of Russians. The secret article assumed a joint military action in case of Turkey's refusal to join the alliance”(F. von Papen, op. Cit. - p. 459).
Since Moscow, having confirmed its demands, refused to follow in the wake of German policy as a junior partner on November 29, December 3 and 7, 1940, the Germans held operational-strategic games on maps, in which “three stages of the future Eastern campaign were worked out respectively: the border battle; the defeat of the second echelon of Soviet troops and entry to the Minsk-Kiev line; the destruction of Soviet troops east of the Dnieper and the capture of Moscow and Leningrad (Lebedev S. Soviet strategic planning on the eve of the Great Patriotic War. Part 5. Ibid). On December 18, Hitler finally approved the Barbarossa plan. The essence of this plan was to destroy the main forces of the Red Army up to the line of the Western Dvina - Dnepr rivers. It was assumed that the largest part of the Red Army grouping in the West would be located in the Bialystok salient north of the Pripyat swamps. The plan was based on an extremely low assessment of the combat capability of the Red Army - the same Hitler on January 9, 1941 compared the Red Army with a decapitated colossus with feet of clay.
According to Hitler's optimistic schedule, “eight weeks were allotted for the defeat of the Soviet Union. In mid-July 1941, the Wehrmacht was supposed to reach Smolensk, and in mid-August to occupy Moscow”(S. Lebedev, The Military and Political Crisis of the Soviet Union in 1941 // https://regnum.ru/news/1545171.html). If the Soviet leadership to conclude peace will not force either the fall of Leningrad with Moscow, or the capture of Ukraine, Hitler was determined to advance "at least only by the forces of motorized corps up to Yekaterinburg" (von Bock F. I stood at the gates of Moscow. - M.: Yauza, Eksmo, 2006.-- P. 14). According to Hitler, "On August 15, 1941, we will be in Moscow, and on October 1, 1941, the war in Russia will end" (von Weizsäcker E. Ambassador of the Third Reich. Memoirs of a German diplomat. 1932-1945 / Translated by FS Kapitsa..: Tsentrpoligraf, 2007.-- S. 272).
It was only after the attack on the USSR, when the Barbarossa plan cracked at the seams, did the Nazis suddenly "become obvious that the Russians were defending themselves more bravely and desperately than Hitler thought, that they had more weapons and much better tanks than we had thought" (von Weizsacker E., op. cit. - p. 274) that the Red Army had significant forces outside the Western Dvina-Dnieper rivers, and the largest part of the Red Army grouping in the West was located in the Lvov ledge south of the Pripyat swamps. At its core, the Barbarossa plan turned out to be based on Hitler's false promises and was more suitable for implementing the principle attributed to Napoleon "On s'engage et puis … on voit" ("Let's start and we'll see") than for the guaranteed defeat of the Soviet Union during lightning blitzkrieg.
In the opinion of Mikhail Meltyukhov, “the entire military planning of the“Eastern campaign”was so adventurous that doubts arise involuntarily whether the German military-political leadership was generally guided by common sense. … The entire “Eastern campaign” cannot be regarded as anything other than a suicidal adventure of the German leadership”(MI Meltyukhov, Stalin's Lost Chance // https://militera.lib.ru/research/meltyukhov/12.html). Meanwhile, the exit of the Wehrmacht to the Urals and even Siberia did not mean the complete defeat and destruction of the Soviet Union. For a complete and unconditional victory, Hitler had to either continue his advance to the East up to Vladivostok, or to seek the inclusion of Japan in the war against the USSR in order to conquer Siberia. However, instead, Hitler, contrary to the interests of Germany and for the benefit of the interests of the United States, merged Japanese expansion southward - essentially into nowhere, into a gaping abyss.
In particular, “the new commander-in-chief of the United Fleet, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, appointed to this post in August 1940, directly pointed out to the then Prime Minister, Prince Konoe:“If I am told to fight, then in the first six to twelve months of the war against the United States and England, I will act swiftly and demonstrate a continuous chain of victories. But I must warn you: if the war lasts two or three years, I am not sure of the final victory. " In the event of a protracted war with the United States, Yamamoto wrote in a private letter, "it is not enough for us to take Guam and the Philippines, even Hawaii and San Francisco. We need to take Washington and sign a peace treaty in the White House." The latter clearly exceeded the capabilities of Japan”(Yakovlev N. N., op. Cit. - pp. 483-484).
“On December 9, FDR received Churchill's message. … Describing the position of England in dramatic tones, he asked the president to help on a large scale with weapons, ships, order the American fleet to escort ships sailing across the Atlantic, and for this to obtain permission from Ireland to establish American bases on its west coast. … By this time, the British government had already spent $ 4.5 billion on purchases in the United States, the country's gold and foreign exchange reserves were only $ 2 billion. and other supplies "(Yakovlev NN Decree. cit. - pp. 319-320). On December 17, 1940, the US Treasury Secretary "Henry Morgenthau testified before the congressional commission that England [indeed - SL] was running out of all its resources." Khoroshchanskaya, G. Gelfand, 2003. - P. 202).
On December 29, 1940, Roosevelt agreed to sell weapons to Britain on credit. "We must," he said, "become the great arsenal of democracy." On January 6, the president “proposed the idea of a“law to help democracies,”known in history as. lend-lease. Lawyers tracked down a suitable law in the archives, passed in 1892, according to which the Minister of War could lease weapons if he considered it "in the interests of the state." The Lend-Lease bill, drawn up on its basis, received number 1776. The President reminded about a significant date in the history of the United States - the beginning of the American Revolution”(Yakovlev N. N., op. Cit. - p. 322). The Lend-Lease Law was passed on March 11, 1941. Churchill, immensely pleased with this course of events, called the new law "the most disinterested act in the history of our people" (GD Hitler's Preparation, Inc. How Britain and the United States Created the Third Reich // https://www.litmir.co/br /? b = 210343 & p = 93). Moreover, at a time when many Americans supported the policy of isolationism and strongly opposed the entry of the United States into the war, Roosevelt, who was re-elected two months earlier for a third term, despite everything, in his annual message to Congress on January 6, 1941, urged America to abandon isolationism and take part in the fight against the Nazi regime in Germany.
Roosevelt ended his speech with a statement on the creation of a secure world in the near future ("in our time and throughout the life of our generation"). "He saw the future confrontation as a struggle between good and evil" (Tabolkin D.100 famous Americans // https://www.litmir.co/br/?b=213782&p=117), the clash of “totalitarianism” and “democracy” (Meltyukhov MI Stalin's missed chance // https:// militera. lib.ru/research/meltyukhov/01.html). All over the world, Roosevelt opposed the "tyranny of the so-called new order" with a "more magnificent concept of moral order" based on "four fundamental human freedoms": freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom from want, freedom from fear of external aggression. According to him, “a respectable society is able to look without fear at attempts to conquer world domination or to make a revolution” (Four Freedoms //
"An excursion in the messianic spirit was proposed by the president himself" (Yakovlev NN Decree. Op. - p. 322). Roosevelt deliberately and purposefully repeated many times about the need to affirm freedom "everywhere in the world": freedom of speech and expression - everywhere in the world, freedom of every person to worship God in the way he chooses - everywhere in the world, freedom from want - everywhere in the world, freedom from fear is everywhere in the world. In his words, “freedom means the rule of human rights everywhere. … The implementation of this great concept can continue indefinitely, until victory is achieved”(Four Freedoms. Ibid.). To the remark of his closest associate Hopkins, they say this affects a decent territory, and the Americans, apparently, are not particularly concerned about the situation of the population of Java, the president calmly replied: “I'm afraid, Harry, that one day they will be forced to do this. The world is becoming so tiny that the inhabitants of Java become our neighbors”(NN Yakovlev, op. Cit. - p. 322).
Before Roosevelt's speech on January 6, 1941, US inclinations outside America were quite local and sporadic. While Roosevelt, decisively stepping over the line drawn by the Monroe Doctrine and breaking with isolationism, blamed America for global stability, secured the role of the "world policeman" for the United States and legitimized Washington's interference in the affairs of any country in the world. The so-called defense of countries from potential aggression from their neighbors of the Roosevelt doctrine endowed the United States with the right to dictate its will to other countries and, by organizing coups d'etat in them, invading their territory, only contributed to the implantation of American world hegemony. Appointing the American nation as a standard, leader and defender of democracy, Roosevelt began a struggle that ended in America's total victory over totalitarian regimes, American world domination, the building of an empire of goodness and a secure unipolar world of Pax Americana.
Already on January 29, 1941, secret negotiations between representatives of the American and British headquarters began in Washington, which lasted for two months. … The tasks … of the meetings of the representatives of the headquarters were: a) in working out the most effective measures that were to be taken by the United States and Britain to defeat Germany and its satellites if the United States was forced to enter the war; b) in coordinating plans for the use of American and British armed forces in the event of the United States entering the war; c) in the development of agreements on the main line of military strategy, main points of responsibility and degrees of command, if (or when) the United States enters the war. The meetings were convened daily, either in the order of plenary sessions, or in the form of the work of the commissions”(SE Morison, op. Cit. - pp. 216-217).
“At the end of 1940, the Japanese leadership learned that Germany was preparing for a war against the Soviet Union. … On February 23, 1941, Ribbentrop made it quite transparent to the Japanese Ambassador Oshima that Germany was preparing for a war against the USSR, and expressed his wish for Japan to enter the war "to achieve its goals in the Far East." However, the Japanese were afraid to start a war against the USSR at the same time as Germany. The memories of the Khalkhin-Gol events, sad for Japan, were too fresh. Therefore, they again started talking about a pact with the USSR, which, on the one hand, was supposed to secure Japan from the north, and on the other, could be an excuse for refusing to attack the Soviet Union immediately after the start of German aggression”(Koshkin A. A., op. - S. 103-104).
To clarify the situation, “it was decided to send Matsuoka to Europe in order to find out, during negotiations … with the German leaders, whether Germany is really preparing for an attack on the USSR, and if so, when such an attack could occur” (Koshkin A. A. Op. Cit. - p. 104). In parallel, “since the end of 1940, secret Japanese-American negotiations have been going on. The Konoe government pushed for the United States to recognize Japanese dominance in the Far East and the western Pacific. Tokyo's exorbitant demands from the outset doomed the negotiations to failure. Nevertheless, Roosevelt continued them (Yakovlev NN Decree. Op. - p. 345).
“On March 12, 1941, Matsuoka left for Europe. Going to Moscow, he had the authority to conclude a non-aggression or neutrality pact with the Soviet government, but on Japanese terms. … As can be seen from the content of the conversation, Matsuoka, in the form of transparent allusions, tried to probe Stalin's position on the prospect of the USSR joining in one form or another to the Triple Pact. At the same time, the Japanese minister openly proposed, in the interests of "destroying the Anglo-Saxons" - "to go hand in hand" with the Soviet Union. Developing the idea of involving the USSR in this bloc, Matsuoka relied on information about Molotov's negotiations with Hitler and Ribbentrop held in November 1940 in Berlin”(AA Koshkin, op. Cit. - pp. 105, 109).
During the Berlin negotiations from March 27 to March 29, Hitler misled his Far Eastern ally about his future plans and diligently persuaded Matsuoka to attack England in Southeast Asia (Yakovlev N. N., op. Cit. - p. 586; Koshkin A. A.. Op. Cit. - pp. 111-112; Schmidt P. Hitler's translator // https://militera.lib.ru/memo/german/schmidt/07.html). “Subsequently, Matsuoka admits that as a result of his visit to Berlin, he estimated the likelihood of the start of a German-Soviet war as 50/50. a pact of neutrality (with the USSR),”he announced on June 25, 1941 at a meeting of the coordinating council of the government and the imperial headquarters. But it will be later. In the meantime, there were negotiations in Moscow”(A. Koshkin, op. Cit. - p. 114).
Matsuoka returned to Moscow from Berlin on April 7. Meanwhile, in America, Hell on April 9 received Japanese proposals for the withdrawal of Japanese troops from China, China's recognition of Japan's seizure of Manchuria, the application of the "open door" doctrine in the Japanese-American interpretation to China, the restoration of trade relations between the United States and Japan, and the provision of free access for Japan to sources of raw materials and providing it with a loan. “Actually, there was nothing to negotiate about. Acceptance of these proposals would mean the consent of the United States to Japanese domination in the Far East”(Yakovlev NN Decree, op. P. 606). “On April 13, 1941, a Neutrality Pact between Japan and the Soviet Union was signed in the Kremlin. At the same time, a Declaration on mutual respect for the territorial integrity and inviolability of the borders of the Mongolian People's Republic and Manchukuo was signed”(AA Koshkin, op. Cit. - p. 124). The Soviet-Japanese treaty was ratified on April 25, 1941. Despite the vigorous protests of their foreign minister, "the Japanese decided to continue negotiations in Washington, as well as to hide them from the Germans" (W. Churchill. World War II // https://www.litmir.info/br/?b=6061&p= 28).
“The reaction of the US government to the conclusion of this Pact was painful and comparable to the impression that Washington had on the 1939 Non-Aggression Pact between Germany and the USSR. In 1939 g. The United States introduced economic sanctions against Russia, in April 1941 - they were strengthened so that by June of this year. trade turnover between both states was reduced to zero”(A. Mitrofanov, A. Zheltukhin, ibid.). “On April 15, 1941, President Roosevelt formally authorized American servicemen to volunteer in the war in China. Formally, the volunteers entered into an agreement with the Chinese company CAMCO (Central Aircraft Manufacturing Company), and the servicemen received leave for the duration of the contract in their unit in the United States. … Officially, a new unit, consisting of three fighter squadrons, entered service on August 1, 1941 (Flying Tigers //
“But Roosevelt didn't stop there. China has become another country that began to receive military aid under the Lend-Lease "(How Roosevelt provoked the Japanese attack. Ibid). In particular, for the American pilots, the Chiang Kai-shek government bought 100 R-40C Tomahawk (Flying Tigers. Ibid.) R-40C Tomahawk airplanes in the United States with an American loan (under Lend-Lease). "On April 19 … Chiang Kai-shek made a public condemnation of the Covenant, arguing that it creates convenience for Japanese aggression against England and America and worsens the situation in China" (A. Mitrofanov, A. Zheltukhin, ibid.).
Thus, Hitler deprived Germany of Japan's support in the war with the Soviet Union, allowing the Allies to take turns destroying their opponents, thereby dooming Japan to perish after Germany. In particular, on March 27, 1941, secret negotiations between England and the United States ended with the conclusion of the ABC-1 agreement, “which reflected the basic principles of Anglo-American cooperation during the war. … At the same time, an agreement was signed in Washington with Canada "ABC-22" on the joint defense of Canada and the United States. This agreement was included in the ABC-1 agreement. A characteristic feature of these agreements was the main strategic concept of the Second World War, which consisted in the decision to defeat Hitler in the first place”(SE Morison, op. Cit. - pp. 217-218).
On April 18, the United States government announced the establishment of a demarcation line between the Eastern and Western Hemispheres. “This line, which ran along the 26th meridian of west longitude, then became the de facto maritime border of the United States. It included in the United States zone all British territories on or near the American continent, Greenland and the Azores, and was soon continued to the east, including Iceland. In accordance with this declaration, American warships were to patrol the waters of the Western Hemisphere and, incidentally, inform England about the enemy's activities in the area. However, the United States remained a non-belligerent party and at this stage could not yet provide direct protection … to the caravans. This responsibility lay entirely on the British ships, which were supposed to provide protection … ships along the entire route "(Churchill W. World War II // https://www.litmir.co/br/?b=73575&ShowDeleted=1&p=27) …
On May 10, 1941, Hitler's deputy for the leadership of the Nazi Party, R. Hess, flew to England. On May 12, 1941, the British government informed the world about the Hess mission. As Churchill admitted, Stalin saw during the flight of Hess "some secret negotiations or conspiracy about joint actions of England and Germany during the invasion of Russia, which ended in failure" (W. Churchill. World War II //. Http://www.litmir.co / br /? b = 73575 & ShowDeleted = 1 & p = 13). “Even before the start of the Soviet-German war, on June 5, 1941, the American government began negotiations with the new Japanese ambassador to the United States, K. Nomura, to reach a compromise in China and the countries of East Asia. These negotiations continued during the summer and fall of 1941; their duration testifies to the intention of Prime Minister Konoe to peacefully agree with Hull on the non-intervention of the United States on the alienation of the French and Dutch colonies in the South Seas”(A. Mitrofanov, A. Zheltukhin, ibid.).
"On June 10, the leadership of the Japanese Ministry of War developed a document" A course of action to resolve current problems. " It provided for: taking advantage of the opportunity to use armed forces both in the South and in the North; while maintaining adherence to the Triple Pact, in any case, the issue of the use of the armed forces should be decided independently, to continue the hostilities in mainland China”(AA Koshkin, op. cit. - p. 133). On June 11, 1941, the Army, Air Force and Navy were sent a draft directive number 32 on "Preparing for the period after the implementation of the Barbarossa plan." "The final version of Directive No. 32 was adopted already during the war of Germany against the USSR - June 30, 1941" (History of the Second World War. Decree. Op. - p. 242). On June 22, 1941, Nazi Germany attacked the Soviet Union.
Thus, after the defeat of France, Japan decided to seize the Pacific colonies of the overthrown European empires. To legitimize its claims, Japan began negotiations with Germany and Italy on the division of spheres of influence, and to eliminate the threat from the Soviet Union, it first began to normalize relations with the USSR. Soon, Japan did raise the issue of allocating its sphere of influence to the Soviet Union. In words, Hitler agreed with the Japanese, but in fact, putting forward conditions unacceptable for Moscow in negotiations with Molotov and giving instructions to prepare for war with the Soviet Union without notifying the Japanese, for the triumph of American national interests, he torpedoed the USSR's accession to the Pact of Three. After that America finally broke with isolationism, announced the Roosevelt doctrine aimed at building under the pretext of fighting all good against all bad Pax Americana, decided to enter the war and began to coordinate its efforts with England, agreeing to make every effort to defeat Germany first, and then Japan.
To prevent the defeat of the Soviet Union in the course of a lightning blitzkrieg and protraction of hostilities, Hitler based a plan for a war with the USSR on his false promises. When the Japanese nevertheless heard about Hitler's plans, he, like fire, afraid of helping the Kwantung Army to the Wehrmacht from the East, misled the Japanese about his attack on the USSR and assured them of the urgent need to attack Britain and the United States. Thus allowing Japan to conclude a treaty of neutrality with the USSR and giving an excuse, after Germany's attack on the USSR, not to immediately declare war on the USSR. Moreover, Japan was now free not only not to make hasty decisions, but also to make a choice regarding the direction of its aggression to the North or South, and based on the military successes or failures of Germany.
