On the incompetence of Rozhdestvensky as a naval commander
We'll talk about tactics later, but for now I'll just quote the words of the British historian Westwood:
For coal-fired steam ships of the pre-turbine era, the voyage from Libava to the Sea of Japan in the complete absence of friendly bases along the way was a real feat - an epic that deserves a separate book
At the same time, I would like to note that some of Rozhdestvensky's ships were just off the slipway (they simply did not have time to cure all childhood diseases on them), and the crews were not floated - there were still a lot of newcomers. Nevertheless, not a single ship lagged behind, broke, etc. It would be strange to deny the Commander's credit for this.
About the recall of the squadron - as the admiral of the king could not convince
It seems like a new myth has just been born. Alexander Samsonov writes:
The news of the fall of Port Arthur inspired even Rozhdestvensky with doubts about the expediency of the campaign. True, Rozhestvensky limited himself only to a resignation report and hints about the need to return the ships.
Generally speaking, this was the case. The news of the death of the 1st squadron found Rozhestvensky while staying in Madagascar. The admiral received a telegram from the Admiralty as follows:
"Now that Port Arthur has fallen, the 2nd Squadron must completely restore our position at sea and prevent the enemy's active army from communicating with their country."
In other words, the role of Rozhdestvensky's squadron has drastically changed - instead of serving as a reinforcement for the 1st Pacific, it suddenly became the main striking force, which was charged with the duty of crushing the enemy's fleet at sea. The admiral replied:
"With the forces at my disposal, I have no hope of restoring the prevailing position at sea. My only possible task is to go to Vladivostok with the best ships and, based there, act on the messages of the enemy."
Is this now called a "hint"? I just can't imagine how to put it more clearly here. Nevertheless, the admiral received the order - and as a military man he had to fulfill it or die.
On the "fast wing" of the Russian squadron
A lot of criticism is devoted to the decision of Admiral Rozhdestvensky to tie into a single team "a horse and a quivering doe" - high-speed battleships of the "Borodino" and "Oslyabya" type together with the old slugs "Navarin", "Sisoy", "Nakhimov", etc.
From the testimony of the captain of the 2nd rank to the Swede:
I will say with confidence that, if necessary, the battleship "Oryol" could not have given the speed that it gave during the test of vehicles in Kronstadt, that is, about 18 knots … … I think that the most complete speed, under all favorable conditions, when spending the best screened coal and replacing tired stokers with another shift, they could give, before getting a hole and water on the decks, no more than 15 - 16 knots.
It is known that on the battleship "Borodino" when leaving the Baltic at a speed of 15 knots, eccentrics were inadmissibly heated, but then this defect seemed to have been corrected. However, Captain 2nd Rank V. I. Semenov wrote something else about the tactical performance of the squadron:
"Here are the reviews of mechanics, with whom I had to talk more than once:" Suvorov "and" Alexander III "could count on 15-16 knots; on the“Borodino”already at 12 knots, eccentrics and thrust bearings began to warm up;“Eagle”was not at all sure in my car …"
Rozhestvensky reported to the Investigative Commission about his newest ships:
“On May 14, the new battleships of the squadron could develop up to 13½ knots, and others from 11½ to 12½. The cruiser "Oleg", with a cylinder damaged in Kronstadt, tightened with a clip, could go 18 knots out of need, with alarm, however, for the intactness of the car. The cruisers "Svetlana", "Aurora", "Ural" and "Almaz" could also have an 18-knot speed, and "Almaz", as always, would risk the integrity of its steam pipes. The cruisers Zhemchug and Izumrud could make short transitions of 20 knots at a huge oil consumption. The cruisers Dmitry Donskoy and Vladimir Monomakh had a top speed of 13 knots."
Unfortunately, Rozhdestvensky did not have any "high-speed wing". Yes, his 4 "Borodins" and "Oslyabya" could indeed give a slightly greater speed than the old battleships of the second and third detachments, but their speed would still be inferior to the armored detachments of the Japanese. And Admiral Rozhestvensky, giving explanations to the Investigative Commission, was absolutely right when he said:
Taking into account that in the second squadron of battleships - "Navarin" could not develop more than 12, and the third squad had a maximum speed of 11½ knots, the head battleships, in close formation, had no right to hold more than 10 knots. According to the current opinion, the battle could take a different turn, if the battleships of different mobility did not strive to keep together, but were distributed to separately operating detachments. I disagree with this opinion.
Twelve Japanese battleships operated in close formation, concentrating their fire in the first period of the battle sequentially on the head ones, from among our fastest battleships, which nevertheless received some support from the matelots following them.
If four or five of our battleships, having developed their maximum speed, separated from their weak comrades, then the Japanese battleships, being able to develop a speed greater than our best walkers, would have kept their mode of action and, only in a shorter period of time, would have overcome concentrated forces the color of our squadron, then, jokingly, to catch up and overcome the abandoned.
Why didn't the admiral split the squadron into two squads?
I have repeatedly met such a reconstruction - if the admiral sent the most modern ships along one route (for example, around Japan) and another detachment of old ships to Tsushima, say, the Strait, then the Japanese would not be able to intercept both of these detachments, and as a result, some of the ships still would go to Vladivostok. In fact, this is an extremely controversial issue. If Rozhestvensky had divided the squadron, the Japanese could well have intercepted the weakest part at first, destroyed it, then refueled with coal, ammunition and left for Vladivostok, to meet the strongest part of the squadron. And if Rozhdestvensky ordered the weakest unit to slow down, so that two units crossed the straits - Tsushima and Sangarsky - at the same time, then the Japanese, who had the order to go north, if Rozhdestvensky had not appeared at the estimated time in the Tsushima Strait, they would have caught him without the weakest part. It is quite possible that the weakest would have made it to Vladivostok in this course of events, but …
Rozhestvensky did not have an order "to pass part of the ships to Vladivostok." He had the task of defeating the Japanese fleet in a general engagement. It would be best to try to do this by first going to Vladivostok, and giving the crew rest there, but the fact of the matter is that, dividing the squadron in two, the admiral doomed at least one of the halves to death and could no longer fight the Japanese fleet. Therefore, the admiral preferred to go with the whole squadron - and either go to Vladivostok unnoticed, or give a general battle to the Japanese fleet along the way.
On the passivity of the commander in battle
Let's try to figure out what Rozhestvensky did and did not do in that battle. Let's start with a simple one - the admiral is constantly reproached for the lack of a battle plan communicated to his subordinates.
What did the Russian admiral know?
First, that his squadron, alas, is no match for the Japanese. The admiral believed that the Japanese were faster, better floated and better shooting (despite all the tricks of Rozhdestvensky to improve their gunners). Tellingly, the admiral was right about everything.
Secondly, that geography is clearly against the Russians. The 2nd and 3rd Pacific squadrons had to cross a relatively narrow strait, and they were opposed by a much faster enemy. In those days, the best technique of naval warfare was considered a "stick over T", when the enemy, following the wake column, rests his head right in the center of the enemy line. In this case, the one who put the "stick" could fire with the entire side of all his battleships, taking turns knocking out enemy ships, but the one who fell under the "stick" was in an extremely disadvantageous position. So, Rozhdestvensky did NOT have salvation from the "stick". It is not so easy to put a "stick over T" in the open sea, but if the enemy forces the strait, it is another matter. Rozhdestvensky will go in a wake-up column - and bury himself in the formation of Japanese ships deployed to the front. Will he deploy himself in the front line? Then Togo will rebuild into a wake and fall into the flank of the Russian squadron.
Being in a deliberately disadvantageous tactical situation, Rozhdestvensky, willy-nilly, had to give up the initiative to the Japanese, hoping only that they would make a mistake and give the Russian commander some chance. And Rozhestvensky's task in essence was only one - not to miss this chance, about which the admiral said:
“The goal pursued by the squadron during the breakthrough through the Korea Strait determined the essence of the battle plan: the squadron had to maneuver in such a way that, acting on the enemy, as far as possible, move to the north …
… It was clear that, due to the relative speed of the Japanese battleships, the initiative in choosing the relative location of the main forces, both for the start of the battle and for its various stages, as well as in the choice of distances, would belong to the enemy. It was expected that the enemy would maneuver in battle in line with the wake. It was assumed that he would take advantage of the speed of movement and will seek to concentrate the action of his artillery on our flanks.
The second squadron had to recognize the Japanese initiative in action in battle, and therefore, not only about the advance development of the details of the battle plan in its different periods, as in a previously forged two-way maneuver, but also about the deployment of forces for the first strike could not be. and speech."
But still - how was Rozhdestvensky going to fight the battle? In order to understand this, one must also remember that the Russian commander had information about the battle at Shantung. The reports of the commanders of the ships were a document that was drawn up and passed up to the authorities without fail, for something, but no one accused the Russian imperial fleet in the absence of bureaucracy. Accordingly, the admiral knew:
1) That the Russian squadron with approximately equal forces fought for almost 4 hours with the enemy.
2) That during this very fierce battle, the Japanese failed to disable ANY Russian battleship and even the weakly armored "Peresvet", having received 40 hits, still did not leave the formation and could still hold on
3) That the battleships of the 1st Pacific had every chance of breaking through, and the reason for the failure was the loss of control of the squadron, which followed the death of the admiral and the confusion that arose after that
In other words, the admiral saw that as long as the Arthurian battleships maintained their formation and the will to go forward, the Japanese could not do anything with them. Why then should things be different in Tsushima? Here are the words of Rozhdestvensky to the Investigative Commission:
I expected that the squadron would meet in the Korea Strait or near the concentrated forces of the Japanese fleet, a significant proportion of armored and light cruisers, and the entire mine fleet. I was sure that a general battle would take place in the daytime, and, at night, the ships of the squadron would be attacked by all the presence of the Japanese mine fleet. Nevertheless, I could not admit the thought of the complete extermination of the squadron, and, by analogy with the battle on July 28, 1904, I had reason to consider it possible to reach Vladivostok with the loss of several ships.
Therefore, the admiral did exactly what he did - led his ships to the Tsushima Strait, hoping that, being guided by the situation, he would be able to prevent the "stick over T." heavy guns, the Japanese cannot. And he gave the commanders of the ships the most general instructions - to stay in the ranks and, no matter what, go to Vladivostok.
Entering the Tsushima Strait, Rozhdestvensky did not organize reconnaissance
Let's think about what kind of intelligence information the cruising patrol sent forward could provide to Rozhdestvensky.
Why do we need reconnaissance before a fight? It's very simple - the task of cruisers is to detect AND KEEP CONTACT with the enemy. And if the cruisers are capable of performing this task - excellent, then they will become the eyes of the commander-in-chief, transferring to him the courses / speeds and features of the formation of the enemy. Having received this information, the commander will be able to rebuild and, by the time the enemy appears on the horizon, deploy his forces in such a way as to introduce them into battle in the best possible way.
But Togo outnumbered the Russians in cruisers by about twice. Therefore, the cruising detachment, which Rozhestvensky could have sent forward, had no chance of maintaining contact with the Japanese for any long time - they would have been driven away, and if they tried to fight, they could have defeated, using superiority in forces and having the opportunity to rely on armored cruisers Kamimura. But suppose even the cruisers, at the cost of their own blood, could tell Rozhdestvensky the position, course and speed of the Japanese, and he would go to them in the best way prepared and put the Japanese admiral in an uncomfortable tactical situation for him. Who prevented Togo, taking advantage of the superiority in speed to retreat, so that after half an hour, start all over again?
Sending forward cruisers, with great chances of losing these cruisers, did not give the Russians any advantages. The only benefit that only Heihachiro Togo could derive from this intelligence - having found the Russian cruisers, he would have realized that the Russians were going through the Tsushima Strait a little earlier than it actually happened. No matter how small the Russian squadron had chances to slip through the strait unnoticed, they should have been used, and sending cruisers forward significantly reduced the chances of passing undetected.
The admiral himself stated the following:
I knew exactly the size of the Japanese fleet, which could completely prevent the breakthrough; I went to him because I could not help but go. What benefit could intelligence give me if, in anticipation of the now triumphant opinion of publicists, I decided to insure myself as such? They say, with great luck, I would have known in advance the formation in which the enemy was advancing. But such awareness could not have been used for my relatively slow-moving squadron: the enemy, having come to the sight of my forces, would not have allowed me to start a battle earlier than he would not have positioned himself for the first strike as he pleased.
The admiral did not take the opportunity to destroy the Japanese cruisers
In my opinion, Rozhdestvensky really should have tried to drown the Izumi by attacking it with Oleg, Aurora, and perhaps other cruisers. Of course, there was no strategic sense in this, but victory would have raised the morale of the crews, which is not the last thing in battle. Refusal to attack "Izumi" I tend to interpret as a mistake of the admiral.
But the refusal to attack other Japanese cruisers (the 5th and 6th combat units) I think is absolutely correct. The commander did not have enough cruising forces to destroy both of these detachments, and there was no way to attack them with the main forces. Firstly, given the fact that even 4 battleships of the Borodino class could hardly go more than 13, 5-14 knots, there could be no question of any attack - our battleships simply could not catch up with the enemy … And secondly, if at the moment when the Russians broke the formation, sending part of their battleships to chase Japanese ships, Togo suddenly appeared with his 1st and 2nd armored detachments … it would have turned out quite badly.
The famous "Togo loop". Now, if Rozhestvensky had attacked the Japanese fleet that was deployed "consistently" with his high-speed battleships, then …
There is an interesting version of Chistyakov ("A quarter of a hour for Russian cannons") that Rozhdestvensky misled Heihachiro Togo with a number of unobvious maneuvers. According to Chistyakov, Togo saw that the Russians were marching in two columns and instead of putting a "stick over the T" he turned towards our squadron. As a result of the actions of Rozhdestvensky Heihachiro Togo, it seemed that the 1st detachment, consisting of the newest battleships, was late in rebuilding and would not have time to take a place at the head of the column. In this case, Togo, diverging from the Russian squadron on counter-courses, would have crushed the old ships of the 2nd and 3rd Russian detachments without any problems, and the battle would have been won by him. However, due to the fact that Rozhestvensky had brought his 1st detachment forward in advance, the rebuilding took much less time than it seemed, and it would have been necessary to diverge on the countercourses with the newest Russian battleships, which was extremely fraught - especially for the Japanese armored cruisers, whose armor in no way could not withstand 305-mm shells. As a result, Togo was forced to urgently turn to the opposite course - Rozhdestvensky caught him. Now the Japanese ships, turning sequentially, passed the same place, having taken aim at which, the Russians had the opportunity to unleash a hail of shells on the enemy ships.
So it was or not - we will never know. Rozhestvensky himself did not speak of the "Loop of Togo" as a consequence of his tactics, which, again, does not mean anything at all - there is no point in talking about the brilliant implementation of his tactical plans if your squadron is destroyed.
However, absolutely all analysts agree that in the outset of the battle H. Togo put his squadron in a very dangerous position. And here I am forced to repeat myself and say what I wrote earlier - the task of Admiral Togo was to realize his tactical advantages and put a "stick over the T" of the Russian squadron. The task of Admiral Rozhestvensky was, if possible, to prevent the Japanese from realizing their tactical advantage and to avoid the "stick over the T". And, although we do not know to what extent this is Rozhdestvensky's merit, in the outset of the battle, the task of the Russian admiral was successfully solved, but the Japanese admiral still failed … One can argue for a long time about why this happened, but I do not understand how the obvious tactical success of the Russians can be recorded in the passivity of the Russian command.
But then the Japanese flagship "Mikasa", raising fountains of water, turned around and lay down on the return course. And here, in the opinion of most analysts, Rozhdestvensky missed a brilliant opportunity to attack the enemy. Instead of following the previous course, he should have commanded "all of a sudden," and attack the enemy with the force of his fast battleships, that is, 1st detachment and "Oslyabi". And then, getting close to the Japanese for a pistol shot, it would be possible to turn the battle into a dump at a short distance, which, if it did not bring us victory, would certainly make the Japanese pay the real price for it.
Let's take a closer look at this feature.
The problem is that to this day there are no reliable schemes for maneuvering squadrons in the outset of a battle. For example, it is still unclear where exactly this most famous "Loop" was located in relation to the Russian battleships, since here the Japanese and Russian sources differ in their testimony. Various sources show different heading angles for the Japanese, with the range ranging from 8 to 45 degrees. We will not find out the exact relative position of the squadrons at the time of the start of the battle, this is a topic for a large and separate study that does not belong here. The fact is that regardless of whether the angle to the Japanese ships was equal to 4 points (45 degrees) or two, or less, the problem of "dashing at the enemy" lies … in its obvious meaninglessness.
Let's take a look at one of the many schemes for setting up the Tsushima battle - it is not entirely correct, but for our purposes it is still quite suitable.
Interestingly, continuing to move the way Rozhestvensky did, more and more of our battleships had the opportunity to connect to the shelling of the turning point - simply because as the Russian column moved forward, its ships very quickly approached the enemy. In other words, the course of the Russian squadron maximized the strength of our fire.
Now let's see what would have happened in the event of a turn of the Russian forward battleships "all of a sudden" on the enemy. In this case, four or five Russian battleships would rapidly approach the enemy, but!
Firstly - their fire would have been weakened - twelve-inch aft towers could not shoot at the enemy.
Secondly, battleships moving to the “turning point” would have blocked the firing sectors with their corps to the slower ships of the 2nd and 3rd detachments following the same course, and thus, in the outset of the battle, Russian fire would be reduced to a minimum.
Thirdly, let's imagine for a second that Heihachiro Togo, seeing the Russian battleships rushing at him, commands … a turn to the right. In this case, the first Japanese armored detachment will consistently put a "wand over T" first to the attacking battleships of the "Borodino" type, and then to the column of the 2nd and 3rd Russian detachments! The cost of convergence for our ships would be truly brilliant.
And finally, fourthly. It is undoubtedly fair to say that Togo "substituted himself" with his "noose" and found himself in a very unprofitable tactical position. But it is absolutely true that at the end of this ill-fated reversal, the tactical advantage again returned to the Japanese - in fact, turning to the right and putting Rozhdestvensky the very "stick over the T" to which they were striving. In other words, if the Russians really possessed a "fast wing", they could attack the Japanese, but the gain from this would be minimal. Too few guns could hit the Japanese during a rapprochement, and then the advanced Russian detachment would be under fire at point-blank range from 12 Japanese armored ships, and the newest Russian battleships would become easy prey for the main forces of Togo.
Of course, if the Russian battleships had the opportunity to quickly rush forward (and they did not have it) and concentrated their fire on the enemy's armored cruisers, then perhaps one or two of these cruisers would have been drowned. Perhaps. But the payment for this was the rapid death of the newest battleships of Rozhdestvensky and the no less rapid defeat of the rest of the forces. In fact, this is precisely why the variant of the "cavalry attack" seems so attractive to today's analysts - to lose, at least not dry!
But such analysts forget that they have an afterthought. They know that the Russian squadron has lost almost dry. But they forget that Rozhdestvensky had nowhere to know about it!
The Japanese were unable to knock out a single battleship of Vitgeft at Shantung during an almost four-hour battle - how could Rozhestvensky, even before the start of the battle, have guessed that both Suvorov and Oslyabya would lose their combat capability in just three quarters of an hour? Throwing the latest Russian battleships at the Japanese pivot point would at best mean exchanging the main force of the squadron for one or two Japanese armored cruisers. This could be done only if there was a firm conviction that otherwise the color of the Russian fleet would perish without any benefit at all. But how and who could have such confidence at the very beginning of the fight?
Based on the experience and understanding of the situation that only the Russian admiral could have, he made a completely reasonable decision, which looked AT THAT MOMENT the only correct one - he continued to move in a column, focusing fire on the flagship, while other ships, unable to shoot on "Mikasa" because of the range or unfavorable course angles, they hit the pivot point. The result - 25 hits on Japanese ships in 15 minutes - three quarters of what the Vitgeft squadron achieved in almost 4 hours.
However, it should be understood that all this reasoning is purely speculative - Rozhestvensky, in principle, did not have the opportunity to throw his ships to the “turning point”. He did not have a "fast wing", since battleships of the "Borodino" type to Tsushima could not develop their passport speed. By the time "Mikasa" turned around, lay down on the opposite course, the Russian squadron had not yet completed the rebuilding - "Oslyabya" was forced out of order so as not to ram the ships of the 1st detachment, and they had not yet completed the turn. If Rozhestvensky tried to command "all of a sudden" to the enemy from this position, it would have turned out to be an enchanting mess completely breaking the squadron's formation - even if Rozhestvensky had 18-knot battleships, he should have waited until the detachment had finished rebuilding. And there is no need to talk about the lack of fusion of Russian ships. Theoretically, the same Togo, instead of his famous "loop", could easily have commanded "turn everything suddenly" and quickly break the distance with the Russian ships. This would solve all the problems he had and would not force him to substitute his ships at the turning point. However, the Japanese admiral did not dare - he was afraid to lose control of the squadron, because in this case his flagship would be the end of the convoy. The Russians, nevertheless, had worse maneuvering than the Japanese, and an attempt to rebuild from an unfinished maneuver would most likely have led to the fact that the front line would attack "Suvorov" and "Alexander", and not completed the U-turn "Borodino" and "Eagle" would go to the wake of "Alexandru". As for the "Oslyabi", due to the fact that this battleship was forced to stop the vehicles, letting the 1st armored detachment go forward, it would have to catch up with its place in the ranks.
Admiral Rozhestvensky in the outset of the battle acted reasonably and competently, and further actions of the Russian squadron also do not indicate the passivity of its command.
Soon after his turn, which marked the beginning of the "loop of Togo", "Mikasa" turned back again, going across the course of the Russian squadron. In other words, Admiral Togo still received his "stick over T", now his flagship and the battleships following him, being on sharp course corners from the Russians, could concentrate fire on the Suvorov with almost impunity. The only way out of this situation would be to turn the Russian squadron to the right in order to lie on a course parallel to the Japanese, but … Rozhestvensky does not do this. His task is to squeeze every drop out of the initial advantage that the "Togo loop" gave him and the Russian admiral leads his squadron, not paying attention to the fire concentrating on his flagship. But now the Japanese are completing the turn, their end ships are leaving the Russian firing sectors and it makes no sense to stay on the same course - then and only then at 14.10 the Suvorov turns to the right. Now the Russian squadron is in a losing position, the battleships of Togo, having gone ahead, can uncheckedly hit the "head" of the Russian column, but nothing can be done about this so far - this is a payment for the opportunity to "work" on the "turning point" of the "loop of Togo" for 15 minutes. So Rozhestvensky used his chance to the end, in spite of the most powerful fire that fell on his flagship, and where is the "passivity"? For a while, the battle goes on in parallel columns, and the Japanese are gradually overtaking the Russian squadron, but at 14.32, almost simultaneously, three tragic events take place. The Oslyabya breaks down, loses control and leaves the Suvorov formation, and Admiral Rozhestvensky is seriously wounded and loses the ability to command the squadron.
There are, of course, different opinions on this matter. For example, the famous writer Novikov-Priboy writes in his science fiction novel Tsushima that the admiral's injury was insignificant and did not prevent him from leading the battle. However, given the fact that subsequently the Japanese doctors in Sasebo did not dare to remove the fragments of the skull that had gone deep into the admiral's cranium for TWO MONTHS - let us doubt this. At 14.32, all Rozhdestvensky's participation in the Tsushima battle came to an end, but what happened next? Confusion? Reel? The complete passivity of the commanders, as the "Folks-history" teaches us? Analysts usually refer to the time following the failure of "Prince Suvorov" as "the period of anonymous command." Well, it may be so, but let's see how the "anonymous" commanded.
The commander of the battleship "Emperor Alexander III" following the "Suvorov" directs his ship after the flagship, but quickly realizing that he could no longer lead the squadron, he took command. I write - "commander", not "life guard captain 1st rank Nikolai Mikhailovich Bukhvostov", because this battleship died with the entire crew and we will never know who led the ship at one time or another. I believe that it was N. M. Bukhvostov, but I cannot know for sure.
It would seem that the situation is critical - both flagships are beaten and out of order, and what should the commander feel? The enemy seems to be unharmed, his position is better and more advantageous, Japanese guns spew an ocean of flaming steel, and it seems that the horizon is breathing fire on you. The fate of your ship is predetermined, you are next after the flagship and now a fiery hell will fall on you, which has just crushed the one who walked in front of you. The overwhelming burden of responsibility for the squadron suddenly falls on your shoulders, but human flesh is weak … And, probably, you really want to break out of all this, turn away, get out of the battle even for a little bit, give at least a little respite to the torn nerves, gather strength …
The commander of "Alexander" saw Togo's mistake - he pushed his first armored detachment too far and the Russian ships had a chance to slip under the stern of his battleships. But this requires - what a little! Turn around and lead the squadron directly to the enemy. Substitute yourself under the "stick over T". Then a hail of shells from all 12 Japanese ships will fall on you, and you, of course, will perish. But the squadron led by you, having passed the path laid by you, will itself supply the "crossing T" to both units of the Japanese - Togo and Kamimura!
"Emperor Alexander III" turns … ON THE ENEMY!
Tell me, O Connoisseurs of naval wars, how often in the history of mankind has it happened that a squadron fought fiercely, but to no avail for almost an hour, suffered losses and suddenly, suddenly lost its flagships, but did not retreat, did not become numb in despair, but instead rushed into a furious, suicidal attack on a triumphant enemy ?!
What a spectacle it was … A huge, black leviathan with a golden two-headed eagle on the stem, pushing a lead wave in foam and spray, suddenly turns to the left, and mercilessly smoking both pipes, rushes directly to the enemy formation, to its very center! Through the fountains of water, raised by enemy shells, through a whirlwind of fierce fire, the Russian battleship is attacking, like an ancient knight to slaughter the mortal, not asking for mercy, but not giving it to anyone. And guns are beating from both sides, and the sooty superstructures, marked with the fury of enemy fire, are illuminated by the bursts of their own volleys and the fire of flaring fires. Ave, Neptune, doomed to death greet you!
But in the wake of him, stretching out in a strict line, the ships of the squadron led by him turn and the lights of the shots run along their dark silhouettes …
Indeed, that was their glorious hour!
An almost hopeless - but still undertaken attempt to turn the tide of the battle. Tactically, by 14.35 the position of the Russian squadron was completely losing, it was necessary to change something. "Emperor Alexander III" went on the attack, exchanging himself for a better position for the rest of the Russian ships, from which they could inflict serious losses on the Japanese. Admiral Rozhestvensky had no right and could not do this in the outset of the battle - he did not yet know the true balance of forces between the Russian and Japanese squadrons. But the commander of the "Emperor Alexander III", after forty-five minutes of the battle, knew, and did not hesitate for a second in his suicidal decision.
He almost did it. Of course, Heihachiro Togo could not allow the Russians to put a "stick over the T" to his squad. And so he turns "all of a sudden" - now he is leaving the Russian ships. This, of course, is the right decision, but now the ships of Togo are turned stern to the Russian formation and the situation, albeit for a short time, is again changing in our favor. The effectiveness of Russian fire increases - it was at this time that a 305-mm projectile, breaking through the armor of the tower-like installation of the battleship "Fuji", explodes inside, and the armored cruiser "Asama", having received two shells, sits aft one and a half meters and is forced to stop for a while, and then until 17.10 cannot take his place in the line.
Indeed, if the theory of probability, this venal wench of the young Japanese imperialism, would show justice to the Russian sailors even for a second, the Japanese would have lost these two ships. Alas, history does not know the subjunctive mood … And then, "Emperor Alexander III", who received severe injuries, was forced to leave the system. The honor and the right to lead the squadron passed to Borodino.
As a result of the heroic attack of the guards battleship, supported by the entire Russian squadron, our soldiers nevertheless managed to temporarily knock out one Japanese ship - the Asama, but by that time the three newest battleships of the squadron: Prince Suvorov, Oslyabya and Emperor Alexander III "were practically incapable of combat. All hope of winning the battle was lost. Nevertheless, in the future, the Russian ships fought with dignity, following the order of their admiral: "Go to Vladivostok!"
It was. But the "grateful" descendants, on the next anniversary of the battle that had died down, will not find other words except:
The passivity of the Russian command, which did not even try to defeat the enemy, went into battle without any hope of success, surrendering to the will of fate, led to tragedy. The squadron only tried to break through towards Vladivostok, and did not conduct a decisive and fierce battle. If the captains fought decisively, maneuvered, tried to get close to the enemy for effective shooting, the Japanese suffered much more serious losses. However, the passivity of the leadership paralyzed almost all the commanders, the squadron, like a herd of bulls, stupidly and stubbornly, broke through in the direction of Vladivostok, not trying to crush the formation of Japanese ships (Alexander Samsonov)
The paper will endure everything, because the dead don't care anymore.
And what about us?
