Reasons for the defeat of the Russian squadron
While writing this section, I found myself in a difficulty, because it is extremely difficult to rank the reasons for the defeat of the Russian squadron according to their significance. Without pretending to be the ultimate truth, I present to you the fruits of my reflections.
I believe that the main reason for the defeat in the Battle of Tsushima is the low speed of the Russian squadron in comparison with the Japanese. Having no more than 9-11 knots against 14-16 for the Heihachiro Togo ships, the line of the 2nd and 3rd Pacific squadrons lost the main thing - the initiative in the battle. As an illustration of this thesis, I would like to talk about a series of the largest British naval exercises that took place shortly before the Russian-Japanese war.
In 1901, Rear Admiral Noel's Reserve Squadron, which consisted of 12 low-speed battleships and Vice Admiral Wilson's Channel squadron (8 modern battleships and 2 armored cruisers), met at joint maneuvers. Wilson had an advantage in speed, his ships, following the 13-knot speed, caught Noel by surprise and gave him a clear "crossing T" at a distance of 30 kbt. At the same time, which does not at all fit in with the brilliant British fleet, Noel did not even have time to turn around for the battle - at the moment when Wilson put his "wand over T" to him. The reserve squadron was marching, i.e. in 4 columns, three battleships each. And this despite the fact that Wilson's squadron was discovered by the cruiser Noel in advance!
Rear Admiral Noel tried to rectify the situation by ordering his ships to go 12-knot speed. But since only 2 of his 12 battleships were capable of such a feat (9 more could hold from 10 to 11 knots, and one could not go even 10 knots), the formation of the Reserve squadron stretched out … and collapsed completely. The mediators awarded Wilson an unconditional victory.
In 1902 the situation repeated itself - Noel with his slugs against Wilson's "runner", and he again delivered "crossing T" to Noel's ships. You can, of course, try to attribute this result to Wilson's skill and impassable … ehhkm … Noel's professional incompetence, but …
The year 1903 came, and with it - great maneuvers, which ended with the final "battle" of the Azores. This time, the "slow" fleet was led by 2 venerable vice admirals - the aforementioned Wilson and Beresford, with 14 battleships and 13 cruisers at their disposal. They were opposed by the "fast" fleet of Vice Admiral Domville of 10 battleships (7 - the most modern type and 3 older) and 4 cruisers. Thus, Domville was clearly inferior in strength to Wilson and Beresford. All his advantage lay in 2 additional speed knots - 7 of Domville's newest battleships could go at 16 knots, while his opponents' armored squadrons could not go faster than 14 knots.
Domville tried 16 knots to overtake Beresford's battleships leading the "enemy" column, but his old battleships could not keep up. Then he left them and led 7 fast battleships into battle (against 14). Wilson, seeing the lagging battleships of Domville, threw his cruisers against them, but he could not do anything with the "fast wing" of his opponent. As a result, Domville fielded the classic "Crossing T" vanguard under the command of Beresford, passing 19 KB in front of his flagship.
According to intermediaries, Domville lost 4 battleships and 1 armored cruiser drowned and damaged, and the Wilson / Beresford squadron - 8 battleships and 3 cruisers. At the same time, several intermediaries noted that even such losses of Domville are considerably overestimated in favor of Wilson.
Three times the "fast" and "slow" fleets of Great Britain met in "battles", and three times the "slow" fleet suffered a crushing defeat. The last time, near the Azores, the "high-speed" fleet, being almost twice the weakest, inflicted twice the losses on the "slow-speed" fleet than it itself suffered. And this despite the fact that the difference in speed was not fatal at all - 14 and 16 knots. But the commander of the defeated fleet was not some clumsy, but Vice-Admiral Wilson, who had twice won joint maneuvers before!
These maneuvers stirred up the naval circles of Europe, there was much discussion of the benefits of high squadron speed and the need for uniformity of ships in the line. They knew about these maneuvers in Russia, although for the first time full documents about these maneuvers got into print only in 1904, after the start of the Russo-Japanese War. But there was another interesting fact - naval officers of a number of European countries were present at the maneuvers, and there were also Japanese. But the Russian sailors were not invited, alas.
From the above, a simple conclusion follows: a fleet with a lower squadron speed has no chance against a faster enemy. Or, to put it another way: there is no tactic that would allow a slow-moving fleet to successfully resist a fast-moving squadron, unless … unless the admiral of the fast-moving fleet makes gross mistakes.
As you know, Heihachiro Togo had a penchant for such mistakes. Let us recall the battle on July 28 at Shantung. Here, the Russians were also inferior in squadron speed to the Japanese, but during the first stage of the battle, the Japanese admiral managed to let the battleships of Vitgeft forward, and then had to catch up with them. The superior speed of the Japanese ships then played a key role - Togo caught up with the Russian line and fought with it, but was forced to do so in an extremely disadvantageous position for himself. His ships were slowly catching up with the Russians, passing along the Vitgeft line, so that our battleships had an excellent opportunity to concentrate fire on the flagship Togo, while the Russian flagship was poorly accessible even for Mikasa.
The Japanese won the battle at Shantung not thanks to, but contrary to the tactics of Togo. And one cannot even say that the victory for the Japanese was brought by the excellent training of their gunners, although the Japanese responded with five of their own for every Russian hit. But all the same, everything hung literally by a thread, and if not for the death of Vitgeft …
In other words, in the battle in the Yellow Sea, Togo had every conceivable and inconceivable superiority that an admiral could wish for: superior squadron speed, much better training of artillerymen, general superiority in forces (after all, Togo had, but for one known reason he did not put in line "Yakumo" and "Asamu"). But all these advantages were actually canceled by the illiterate maneuver of the Japanese admiral, who let the Russian ships pass him by. And only the intervention of Mrs. Fortuna, who for some unknown reason gave preference to the sons of Yamato throughout the war, prevented the breakthrough of Russian ships from Port Arthur.
As we know, the squadron speed of the 2nd and 3rd Pacific squadrons was much lower than the Japanese. And therefore the tactical task faced by Zinovy Petrovich Rozhestvensky simply did not have a solution - there was only hope for the mistake of the Japanese commander.
If we recall the idea of separating the five best battleships from the squadron into a “high-speed wing”, then such an idea would make sense in one and only case - if a combination of battleships of the “Borodino” and “Oslyabya” type had a squadron speed of at least 1, 5 knots above the Japanese. Then yes, one could take the risk and, following the example of Domiville, try to attack more than twice the enemy's fleet, compensating for the weakness of the forces with a decisive maneuver. However, of course, the squadron speed of our five battleships could not have reached 15, 5-17, 5 knots (even Kostenko did not think of this before) and therefore separating them into a separate detachment did not make any sense.
The commander of the cruiser "Oleg", Captain 1st Rank Dobrotvorsky, showed the Investigative Commission:
“The division of the squadron into slow-moving and fast-moving ships allowed the latter to enter the Japanese rear or head, which, of course, would improve our position, but again for a short time, because one half of the squadron would move away from the other and would still be defeated.
In the end, without the same shells that the Japanese had, and without an advantage in speed over them (we could walk no more than 13 knots), our pogrom was predetermined, which is why the Japanese were waiting for us so confidently. Whoever commanded us and no matter what art we showed, all the same, the terrible fate ahead of us could not be avoided."
The second reason for the defeat of the Russian squadron was the quality of Russian shells. A lot of copies have been broken on this issue. There is a widespread opinion: Russian shells were no good because they were too lightweight, had a low explosive content, a weak explosive (pyroxylin) and bad fuses. Other researchers are trying to take into account other factors:
“Accurate analysis carried out years later revealed a startling picture. So, it turned out that by the weight of explosives thrown out per minute (the main damaging factor), the Japanese outnumbered the Russians not by two, not three, not five, but … fifteen times! If we take into account the relative explosive power of "shimosa" (1, 4 in comparison with pyroxylin), then the ratio in favor of Togo will become quite frightening - more than 20: 1. But this is on condition that every Russian projectile exploded that hit the target. If the corresponding amendment is made, then it will increase to 30: 1”. (V. Chistyakov, "A quarter of an hour for Russian cannons.")
But there is also another point of view. Despite these shortcomings, Russian shells were better than Japanese shells, because, unlike Japanese shells, they still pierced armor, while the latter exploded immediately upon touching even an unarmored side. Russian shells, despite the small number of explosives, still penetrated the armor and had the opportunity to damage the most important mechanisms of enemy ships.
Whose point of view is correct? Let's try to figure it out, but let's go from the end - consider the effect of the impact of Russian and Japanese shells on the battleships "Mikasa" and "Eagle".
The battleship "Eagle" during the battle received from 60 to 76 hits by shells of different calibers. Unfortunately, I do not know the time of hits of this or that shell, but it is obvious that not all of them hit the ship in the first hour of the battle. It will not be a mistake to assume that the total number of hits on the Eagle at the specified time (ie from about 14.05 to 15.10, when the opponents first lost sight of each other) are several or even significantly less than 40 shells, which received the flagship of Togo "Mikasa" for the entire battle.
Let's take artillery as a guideline - it was traditionally well defended on battleships, so disabling it to some extent can serve as a litmus test of the effectiveness of enemy shells. An approximate list of losses incurred by the Eagle's artillery as a result of the impact of Japanese shells in the period from the beginning of the battle to 15.10 is according to the report of the Eagle's senior officer, Captain 2nd Rank Swede:
1) In the bow 75 m / m casemate through the half-ports, two large caliber shells, probably 8 inches, were hit one after the other, rendering both 75 m / m guns of the port side unusable, and some of the fragments, flying through the door, in the longitudinal armor bulkhead, disabled 75 m / m gun No. 18 on the starboard side.
2) 12-in.a projectile hitting the left bow muzzle 12-inch. guns, beat off a piece of the barrel 8 feet from the muzzle and threw it onto the upper nose bridge, where they killed three people below. ranks and jammed him upright there.
3) A large caliber projectile hitting the stern of the armor above the left 12-inch embrasure. of the stern gun, distorted the embrasure frame and, pushing the armor over the gun, limited the elevation angle of the gun, so that the gun could only act on 30 cables.
4) 12-in. a projectile hitting the vertical armor of the table near the embrasure (nose six-inch tower. - Approx. Auth.), moved the plate of armor, raised the roof, tore off the caps, broke the frame of the left gun, warped the tower on the rollers, and jammed it. The tower is completely unusable.
5) Projectile 8-inch. or a large caliber hit in the vertical armor of the table, ricocheted into the light side, turned it around when ruptured, thereby limiting the angle of fire of the turret (middle six-inch. - Author's note) aft from the traverse.
6) An 8-inch projectile, ricocheting from the water, at the end hit from the left side into the slot of the conning tower. The explosion of the shell and its fragments smashed the Barr and Stroud range finder, spoiled the combat indicators and crumpled many communication pipes, damaged the compass and the steering wheel.
So, we see that the losses of the Eagle's artillery are quite sensitive - one 12-inch is completely disabled. gun, another has a limited range of 30 kbt (in addition, according to other sources, after being damaged, this gun could not fire for about 20 minutes, which is also significant). One six-inch tower is completely disabled, another has a limited firing sector (it could not shoot from the traverse to the stern). Also disabled three 75-mm guns.
But the worst thing is that the centralized fire control system has been broken. The range finder, battle markers were destroyed, and the chief artilleryman of the "Eagle" Lieutenant Shamshev was forced to give the order to switch to group fire - now each gun shoots and adjusts its fire independently. Instead of measuring the distance to the enemy with a rangefinder, aiming at (usually a six-inch bow tower was used for zeroing, which is now out of order) and, having accurately determined the sight, unleash all the power of the naval artillery on the enemy, now each weapon shoots using exclusively its own devices observation, i.e. at best, a telescopic sight. In addition, now the fire is not corrected by the best gunner of the ship, i.e. chief art director, and each gunner independently.
The practice of the First and Second World Wars shows that the destruction of centralized fire control reduces the effectiveness of the ship's fire not even several times - by orders of magnitude. For example, the same "Bismarck", having demonstrated good accuracy in the battle against "Hood" and "Prince of Wells", in his last battle quickly enough aimed at the "Rodney", but at that moment the British defeated its command post, depriving the German battleship of the central fire control. And then the "sniper" turned into a "clumsy" - during the battle the German raider did not achieve a single hit on the British ships. Of course, the much more modest distances of the Tsushima battle allowed the gunners not only to shoot, but also to hit somehow, but such accurate fire, which was demonstrated by the Russian battleships in the outset of the battle, was now impossible to expect from the Eagle.
Yes, of course, Japanese shells could not penetrate armor. But this does not mean that they were useless when firing at an armored target. Japanese hits led to significant damage to the Russian battleships and, as a result, to a decrease in the effectiveness of their fire.
Artillery "Mikasa" also suffered from Russian hits (description taken from Campbell "The battle of Tsushima" from Warship International magazine, 1978, Part 3).
1) 12-in. the shell pierced the roof of casemate No. 3, wounded almost all the servants of the gun and caused an explosion of 10 3 "cartridges in the vicinity. 6 "the gun in the casemate retained the ability to fire.
2) 6-in. the shell exploded upon hitting the lower coaming of casemate No. 5, displacing the armored joint and incapacitating the servants, although the gun itself was not damaged.
3) 6-in. the shell pierced the roof of casemate No. 11, without damaging the weapon.
4) 6-in. the projectile hit the embrasure of casemate No. 10 and exploded on the 6 gun frame, knocking this gun out of action.
So, 4 Russian shells went through the embrasures / pierced the armor of the Japanese casemates and … only in ONE case the Japanese six-inch was disabled. Moreover, to achieve this result, the projectile had to hit not just the casemate, but the gun itself!
The shell … exploded on the bed of the 6 gun, knocking it out of action.
Rangefinders "Mikasa" did not suffer any damage, and the Japanese flagship was able to control fire in all the power of its available technical means.
One of the respected "regulars" of the Tsushima forums, writing under the pseudonym "realswat", using the reports of the commanders "Mikasa", "Tokiwa", "Azuma", "Yakumo", as well as the "Medical description of the Tsushima battle" and other sources, compiled a chronology of hits to the Japanese ships Togo and Kamimura. This chronology, of course, did not include all the hits of the Russians, but only those whose time was recorded by the Japanese. There were 85 of them, with:
1) From the beginning of the battle (from 13.50) to 15.10, i.e. in the first one hour and twenty minutes of the battle, 63 hits of all calibers in Japanese ships were recorded.
2) From 15.40 to 17.00 i.e. over the next hour and twenty battles - only 13 hits.
3) And finally, from 17.42 until the end of the battle, i.e. until 19.12, an hour and a half - another 9 hits.
In other words, the effectiveness of Russian fire was constantly decreasing. You can, of course, object and say that this statistic would change drastically if the time of other Russian hits were known. But I don't think so, and I believe that taking such hits into account will change the picture, if only in the direction of even greater effectiveness of fire in the first hour of the battle. After all, when there are many hits, it is more difficult to count them and fix the exact time, too.
Why did the quality of fire of the Russian artillerymen drop so dramatically?
Of the five newest battleships in the first hour of the battle, Oslyabya died, Suvorov went out of action, and Oryol lost centralized fire control. It is quite possible to assume that the heavily damaged Alexander III also lost its centralized fire control, but then … then it turns out that out of the five modern battleships with which the Russian squadron began the battle, full fire control remained on only one battleship - Borodino ! And that is not a fact …
Not a single Japanese ship had a fire control system disabled.
Thus, we can draw some conclusions - the Russian squadron at the beginning of the battle conducted very accurate fire. However, a significant number of hits on Japanese ships did not lead to serious damage to the latter. At the same time, Japanese fire led to a rapid decline in the combat capability of the Russian battleships. As a result, the high accuracy of Russian fire rapidly declined, while the accuracy and effectiveness of Japanese fire remained at the same level.
What is the reason for the effectiveness of the Japanese fire? I would highlight four main factors:
1) Excellent training of Japanese gunners. They fired excellently in the July 28 battle at Shantung, but they fired even better at Tsushima.
2) Favorable tactical position of the Japanese ships - for most of the battle the Japanese pressed on the lead ships of the Russian squadron, thereby creating the most favorable conditions for the operation of their artillery.
3) The extraordinary power of the Japanese high-explosive projectile. The content of explosives in Japanese suitcases was … and now, dear readers, you will laugh. For in the scales of explosive shells during the Russo-Japanese War, there is a complete discrepancy and misunderstanding. Various sources (Titushkin, Belov), with the same weight of the Japanese high-explosive shell (385.6 kg), do not agree at all in its filling and give either 36, 3, or as much as 48 kilograms of "shimosa". But the third number came across - 39 kg.
4) And, as the British say, the last but not least factor is the enchanting luck of the Japanese.
Honestly, when you try to analyze the distribution of hits from Russian and Japanese shells, you get a strong feeling that someone up there was extremely interested in the victory of Japanese weapons.
In the first hour of the battle (when the number of hits on Russian and Japanese ships was still comparable), the Russian artillerymen managed to get into the Fuji tower-like installation once during the first hour of the battle, while, as Campbell writes:
“The shell pierced 6” armor… and exploded… just before the upper position of the charger… The half-charge in the gun flared up, the 8 quarter-charges in the upper charger also caught fire, but the fire did not affect six high-explosive shells (PO-CHE-MU? - approx..) … The pressure pipe of the hydraulic drive of the right upper rammer was broken, and, as they say, the water that gushed out of it under high pressure helped a lot to extinguish the fire. on this basis, they no longer fired from it … After 40 minutes, the left gun was again put into action and by the end of the battle fired 23 more shells.
And what about the Russian squadron? At the very beginning of the battle, the bow tower "Oslyabya" was knocked out, the aft twelve-inch tower of the battleship "Prince Suvorov" was blown up (although, perhaps, it nevertheless exploded itself), on the "Eagle", as it was said above, a gun was broken in the bow tower (at the second had problems with the supply of ammunition) and hitting the aft tower limited the firing range of another twelve-inch gun. At the same time, the Suvorov tower had at least one hit before it exploded, and the Oslyabya tower may have been hit more than once.
Change the fortune of the hit - and the Japanese in less than an hour of battle would have lost 5-6 of their 16 large-caliber guns, and taking into account the fact (and there is no mysticism here anymore) that Japanese shells often exploded in the barrels of guns, knocking the latter out of action, in In the future, the number of "suitcases" inherited by the Russian ships would have been significantly reduced.
"Oslyabya" died in less than an hour, which is explained by the extremely "successful" places where the Japanese shells hit. The battleship of the same type "Peresvet" underwent 35 hits in the battle at Shantung, of which 11 or 12 were 305-mm, but the ship survived and returned to Port Arthur on its own. Probably, "Oslyabya" received a comparable number of shells, but "suitcases" hit it a little - according to some sources, no more than three. However, they got to the right place so that one is simply amazed.
Well, what is the reason for the low efficiency (I repeat - with a fairly decent number of hits) of Russian fire? The main reason is the extremely low high-explosive effect of shells, both armor-piercing and high-explosive. But why?
The version of Novikov-Priboy is considered canonical.
“Why didn't our shells explode? … Here is the explanation given by an expert in naval affairs, our famous academician A. N. Krylov:
“Someone from the artillery commanders came up with the idea that for the shells of the 2nd squadron it was necessary to increase the percentage of pyroxylin moisture. The normal moisture content of pyroxylin in the shells was considered to be ten to twelve percent. For the shells of the 2nd squadron, thirty percent was set … in the shell itself, it didn’t explode because of its thirty percent moisture”.
First, Novikov refers to the words of the respected academician, but without reference to the work in which A. N. Krylov makes this statement. Personally, I cannot boast that I have read all the works of A. N. Krylov, however, I have never met this phrase otherwise than with reference to Novikov-Pryboy, but never to the specific work of A. N. Krylov. Among the much more knowledgeable than me, "regulars" of the Tsushima forums, there is an opinion that the academician never said anything like that. Secondly, the minimal educational program on pyroxylin reveals absolutely amazing news - it turns out that pyroxylin may well have a 25-30% moisture content!
"Wet pyroxylin, which can be used as an explosive, should have a moisture content of 10 to 30%. With increasing humidity, its sensitivity decreases. At a moisture content of about 50% or more, it completely loses its explosive properties. When pyroxylin is used as a blasting explosive, then it is advisable for safety reasons in handling to use wet (10-25%) pyroxylin, while it is required to use dry pyroxylin (5%) with such a charge as an intermediate detonator."
Thirdly, the fact is that pyroxylin in Russian shells was placed exclusively in a sealed brass package, so there can be no question of any kind of check (remember - "there will be no time to check the shells!").
And finally, fourth. Novikov ascribes the following words to the Honorable Academician:
“All this became clear in 1906 during the shelling of the rebellious fortress of Sveaborg from the battleship Slava. The battleship Slava … was supplied with shells made for this squadron. During the shelling from the "Slava" fortress on the battleship did not see the explosions of their shells. When the fortress was still taken and the gunners went ashore, they found their shells in the fortress almost completely intact. Only some of them were bottomless, while others were slightly torn up."
What can I say here? It would be extremely strange if on the battleship "Slava" they saw the explosions of their shells in Sveaborg. For one simple reason - the battleship Slava at the time of the suppression of the uprising was not considered reliable, therefore, although it was sent to join other ships of the fleet, it did not take part in the shelling of Sveaborg. Sveaborg was shelled by "Tsesarevich" and "Bogatyr". But there are also "fifths" …
Could the famous A. N. Krylov, a world-class star, known for his scrupulous attitude to work, to make such gross and numerous mistakes? It's up to you, dear readers.
Of course, defects in the Brink tubes and fuse failures, which led to the fact that a significant part of Russian shells did not explode at all, played a negative role. But alas, the action of those shells that nevertheless exploded, with rare exceptions, did not cause any significant damage to the Japanese. Therefore, if our fuses were of a different design, it would still not be worth expecting a significant increase in the effectiveness of Russian fire in the Tsushima battle. But then what is the matter?
First, let me remind you of the instructions of Z. P. Rozhestvensky on the use of different types of shells:
“At distances over 20 cab. all cannons are fired at armored ships by high-explosive shells. At distances of 20 cables. and less than 10- and 12-inch. guns switch to armor-piercing shells, and 6-in., 120-mm cannons begin to fire armor-piercing shells only when the distance is reduced to 10 kbt."
It is difficult to say to what extent the artillerymen of the Russian ships carried out this order, but the battleship "Eagle" in the daytime battle on May 14 (not counting the reflection of night attacks) used up two armor-piercing and 48 high-explosive 305-mm shells, 23 armor-piercing and 322 high-explosive 152-mm shells. It is possible that the rest of the newest battleships - "Borodino", "Alexander III" and "Prince Suvorov" fought in the same way.
What was the Russian heavy 305-mm high-explosive projectile? This is described in detail in the "Relationship of the Naval Technical Committee to the Chairman of the Investigative Commission on the Tsushima battle case" (dated February 1, 1907, No. 234 to No. 34). I will not quote this material in full, I will give only the very essence:
Establishing in 1889 the classification of shells required for the fleet, the Marine Technical Committee believed that in order to destroy ships unprotected by armor, it should have … also shells with the largest possible explosive charge, since the use of them seemed obvious, meanwhile, as "hardened (armor-piercing) steel shells will ", in this case," pierce the sides of the enemy without much harm "…
A steel 6-inch test carried out at the same time. bombs of the Rudyitskiy plant … showed that for these purposes it is possible to have thin-walled shells … with … a very large weight of the explosive charge - from 18% to 22% of the total weight of the equipped shell … Such shells, called "high-explosive", the Committee thought to be introduced for supply ships. But in the further development of the case, it turned out that our factories, both state-owned and private, due to the state of their shell technology, find it difficult to manufacture steel of such high qualities …, reducing the explosive charge … On this basis, the Committee designed high-explosive projectiles with an explosive charge of 7, 7% of the total weight (With a projectile mass of 331, 7 kg, we get 25, 5 kg of explosives.) … But even this requirement turned out to be beyond the power of our factories … Therefore, the drawings of the shells were reworked, with a decrease in the weight of the explosive charge to 3.5% … The committee reported to the head of the ministry that it considered it possible to approve these drawings only temporarily, that such shells would certainly be worse in high-explosive action than the previously designed ones, although they will be better than cast iron ones, because they can be equipped not with simple gunpowder, but with pyroxylin …
Pyroxylin is great, but, as I wrote above, it requires that very brass cover (otherwise, some kind of chemical reaction begins with the steel of the projectile). So, 3.5% of the mass of the projectile is the mass of the explosive and the BRASS CASE. And the mass of the explosive without a cover was much more modest - 2, 4-2, 9% of the mass of the projectile for a 6-inch. and 10-inch. shells, respectively, and only 1.8% for a twelve-inch shell. 5 kilograms 987 grams! Of course, it is no longer necessary to talk about any high-explosive charge, with such and such a mass of explosives. They understood this in MTK:
In the absence of a strong blasting action … there was no reason to assign a particularly sensitive tube to these shells, and they were equipped with double shock tubes.
And now - attention!
in 1896, it was planned, according to the head of the ministry, Adjutant General Chikhachev, to carry out extensive experiments … on all kinds of shells adopted in our country, including high-explosive, to determine their destructive action … The program of preliminary experiments was presented … Admiral Tyrtov, who submitted the resolution: “I agree, but in accordance with the funds available for this. Report to the Main Directorate."
The Main Directorate of Shipbuilding and Supplies informed the committee that the proposed experiments would cause an expense of up to 70,000 rubles; that from the economic point of view, the experiments themselves are no longer of great importance, since the shells required for ships have been made or ordered almost to a full combat set; that it considers it possible to allow the production of experiments only incidentally when testing projectiles, plates … and that these considerations have been approved by the governing ministry.
Such a decision, in essence, was tantamount to a complete refusal of experiments
The Russian Empire is going to defend its interests in the ocean and in the Far East. For this, a powerful fleet is created and huge funds are spent - a battleship from the time of the Russo-Japanese War cost about 12-14 million rubles. But due to the fact that some ciliate-shoe, with the permission of the Lord, served the appropriate uniform, 70 thousand were regretted.state funds, the fleet receives shells of a new type … not tested by tests! This is surrealism of the highest category, where is Salvador Dali! And MTK? Another appeal entailed an indefinite visa for Avelan, but they were able to test segmental shells for it, and then …
"The Marine Technical Committee did not make any further submissions about high-explosive shells."
Bravo! What else can you talk about ?! But the most interesting is yet to come. I am quoting the same "Attitude of the Marine Technical Committee". To the question "What explosive charges did the high-explosive shells of large calibers - 6", 8 ", 10" and 12 "possess, which constituted the combat stock on the ships of our 2nd Pacific squadron when it left the Baltic Sea?" the following answer was given:
“High-explosive shells 6-inch., 8-inch. and 10-inch. calibers were loaded with pyroxylin, having double percussion pyroxylin tubes, and 12-inch. high-explosive shells, due to the unavailability of pyroxylin charges, had equipment made of smokeless powder with ordinary shock tubes of the 1894 model”.
A curtain.
Thus, the 2nd Pacific Squadron was sent into battle with high-explosive shells of the main caliber, which had ALMOST 6 KILO OF SMOKELESS GUNPOWDER as an explosive!
Of course, smokeless powder, yielding to pyroxylin in terms of blasting, still surpasses black powder, which was equipped with 305-mm shells of Admiral Sturdy's ships. But on the other hand, the content of explosives in the British shells was higher - even armor-piercing shells were equipped with 11, 9 kg of black powder, so our Tsushima smoke-free shells were unlikely to reach the British black-powder shells in terms of their impact on the enemy. What am I doing? Moreover, to destroy the armored cruisers "Gneisenau" and "Scharnhorst", which neither in size nor in terms of armor were equal to the Japanese battleships, it took 29 and (approximately) from 30 to 40 British 305-mm shells, respectively.
And finally: what if the Russian artillerymen in Tsushima used not high-explosive, but mainly armor-piercing shells? Alas - nothing good, although there is again no clarity about the content of explosives in Russian armor-piercing ones. Some sources (the same Titushkin) give 4, 3 kg of explosive, which is 1.3% of the mass of the projectile, but there is another opinion - that in the Russian armor-piercing 12-inch projectile there was not 1, 3 PERCENT, but 1, 3 KILOGRAMS of pyroxylin. Replacing high-explosive 305-mm shells with such armor-piercing, obviously, could not give any significant increase in the effectiveness of their use.
Thus, the main reason for the low efficiency of Russian shells is the low blasting action caused by the low content of explosives.
On this I was going to end the series of articles about Tsushima, but … in the discussion of the previous materials, several issues were raised, which are worth dwelling on in more detail than I did before. There are three such questions: the speed of the Borodino-class battleships in Tsushima, the analysis of the possibility of throwing the 5 best battleships at the enemy at the moment the battle starts (on Togo's Loop) and the reasons why you should not overly trust Kostenko's memoirs. And therefore the continuation (more precisely, the postscript) follows!
