In this article we will try to understand the question of what was the maximum speed of the Borodino-class battleships in Tsushima after all? Unfortunately, there is not as much data on this matter as we would like. V. P. Kostenko in his memoirs "On the" Eagle "in Tsushima" and in his testimony to the Investigative Commission on the Tsushima battle, but to my deep regret, the use of this data is minimal.
I was repeatedly asked the question: why do I not consider the materials of V. P. Kostenko? Indeed, it would seem that Vladimir Polievktovich is an engineer by profession, which means that mechanisms are his diocese, and he should understand them much better than career officers of the fleet. But the fact is that by education Kostenko was a shipbuilding engineer, not a mechanic who is trained to operate boilers and steam engines, and by no means an engineer-developer of these very machines. Upon graduation, Kostenko received the title of "junior assistant shipbuilder", i.e. a civilian rank of the navy, like a naval doctor. The very same release took place on May 6, 1904, and immediately after that Kostenko was assigned to the completed "Eagle". In other words, by the time the 2nd Pacific Squadron left, yesterday's graduate had only four months of experience working on a single ship under construction and not the slightest experience in operating a ship's suspension. This, frankly, is far from an expert level, but even keeping in mind the lack of experience, it is extremely difficult to explain the constant contradictions that an attentive reader will regularly meet with Vladimir Polievktovich.
To begin with, consider what V. P. Kostenko on the acceptance tests of the battleship "Eagle". In his memoirs "On the" Eagle "in Tsushima" we read:
On the trial of mechanisms on August 26, "Eagle" developed 17, 8 knots with a design task of 18 knots. Considering the overload of the ship, this should be considered a fairly satisfactory result.
It seems that everything is clear: the battleship did not reach the design assignment, the construction overload of the ship is to blame for this, but if it were not there, then … But I wonder, and with what overload did the Oryol go into testing? For this, it would be nice to first find out the normal displacement of the ship, and why not "ask" Vladimir Polievktovich about this? V. P. Kostenko does not speak, but in the testimony of the Investigative Commission he points out:
While on the battleship "Eagle", during the cruise, he monitored the stability and load of the ship. On leaving Libava, at the first parking lot near the island of Langeland, I determined … displacement - 15,300 tons … overload - 1,770 tons.
By simple calculations, we obtain the normal displacement of the battleship at 13,530 tons. Well, with what displacement did the battleship go out for testing? V. P. Kostenko (in the testimony of the Investigative Commission) gives a very clear answer:
On the test, the battleship "Eagle" gave 17, 8 knots at 109 rpm, but then its displacement was equal to 13.300 tons.
But excuse me, if the battleship "Eagle" was tested with a displacement of 13.300 tons, while according to Kostenko its normal displacement was 13.530 tons, then what kind of overload can we talk about? After all, it turns out that the Eagle went out to the measured mile underloaded by 230 tons, and if not for this underload, the speed of the battleship turned out to be even lower, but the reason for this is not overload at all!
This is the first, but far from the last example of how a person reading V. P. Kostenko, will be misled by the author. Here is what V. P. Kostenko on the speed of the "Eagle" in the Nossi-Be Bay (parking in Madagascar, where Rozhestvensky arranged shooting practice):
Today, on the way back to Nossi-Be (January 18), the "Eagle" made 85 revolutions, and the extreme limit for our mechanisms is 109 revolutions. Meanwhile, it was possible to develop a stroke of only 11 ½ knots. An overload of 3 thousand tons and fouling of the underwater part are affecting.
I would like to note that the overload during firing could not have reached 3000 tons, and V. P. himself explains this. Kostenko, there would be a desire to read it carefully. But let's leave the overload and note for ourselves only the fact that as one of the reasons for the decrease in the speed of the "Eagle" in Nossi-Be Kostenko indicates the fouling of the bottom. The reason is no worse than others, but only to the Investigative Commission Vladimir Polievktovich reported something completely different:
The underwater parts of ships were overgrown very little … in Japan, Japanese officers who saw the battleship Eagle docked told me that the underwater part of the battleship was completely clear of shells, which they were surprised, knowing that the ship had been in salt waters for 7½ months. They were very interested in the composition of our paint … Due to this state of the underwater parts it cannot be assumed that vessels could lose their speed, even in part due to fouling.
They are strange, these shells: in Madagascar, they grabbed onto the bottoms of Russian battleships and slowed down with all their might, and to Tsushima, it seemed, they felt ashamed, they fell away … because there was something, but the Russian battleships didn’t make it on their way.
The speed that our 5 head battleships could develop in battle according to Kostenko is a separate story, but before we start studying it, let's remember what speeds a ship has in general - of course, not in all the variety of naval terminology, but exclusively applying it to our case.
A ship has the highest (or maximum) speed that it develops when forcing mechanisms, and there is a full speed - the maximum speed of the ship that it can develop without forcing. There is also squadron speed - the speed at which ships connect. The squadron speed is selected based on the task of connection, hydrometeorology, etc., and all this is not too important for us, but we are interested in the concept of "The highest squadron speed" - this is the maximum connection speed, and it is defined as follows: the highest speed of the slowest ship of the connection is taken and decreases by the amount necessary to hold its place in the ranks. Why is this amendment necessary?
The fact is that navigation is much more difficult than a computer game, where, by pressing a key, the formation of ships unfolds completely synchronously. In life, unfortunately, this does not happen - even for ships of the same type, the turning radius is not constant, and therefore, for example, the ships of the squadron, following the wake column on the command "turn sequentially", say, 90 degrees, will end this turn not in the wake column, but out of order, the sludge from the place where they are supposed to be at 1-1, 5, or even more cables, to the left or to the right - simply because someone has a greater turning radius, someone has less. In addition, the intervals between the ships are torn, because some have spent more time on the turn than others, and even during the turn, the ship tends to lose speed … In general, the seemingly simple maneuver "turn consecutively by 90 degrees" automatically leads to the fact that that the formation is disrupted a little more than completely, and it is possible to re-assemble into a wake column at equal intervals only due to the additional speed - the ships accelerate and quickly take their place in the column. Obviously, the more this additional speed is, the faster the formation will be restored. If we measure the highest squadron speed by the speed of the slowest ship, then this ship will not have such a reserve and will disrupt the formation without the hope of returning to it.
Understanding this, let us return to the speed of the newest Russian battleships in the battle on May 14 - in his memoirs On the Eagle in Tsushima, Kostenko gives his own report to the Assembly of Officers on the results of the Tsushima battle, where he writes:
… in his column there were five battleships with a stroke of 16 to 18 knots.
And in the same place:
… Only high-speed ships were to enter the squadron for a breakthrough: battleships with a speed of 16 knots … If Rozhestvensky rushed to attack the enemy in this decisive period before opening fire with four new battleships of the same type, going at full speed at 16 knots …
So all the same: what was the full speed of the battleships of the "Borodino" type, 16 or 16-18 knots? But perhaps it was meant that the battleships of the Borodino and Oslyabya type, having a maximum speed of 16 to 18 knots, could have a full speed or the highest squadron speed at 16 knots? Everything would be fine, only in the future Vladimir Polievktovich pleases us with more and more new data. In his report to the Marine Technical Committee "Battleships of the Borodino type in the Tsushima battle" Kostenko says:
Thus, without equalizing the entire squadron for the weakest ships, there was a full opportunity to divide it into the following detachments: 1) five high-speed shock battleships with a course of 15-16 knots.
And in the same report:
The commander did not single out four battleships of the Borodino class, and with them the Oslyabya, into one independent tactical unit, possessed, with proper training, a squadron course of 15-16 knots.
In other words, the declared Kostenko 16-18-knot course of the Russian battleships somehow imperceptibly took and even decreased to 15-16 knots, but even this speed could be achieved only with some special training. And what kind of preparation is this? And with what speed could the 5 head Russian battleships that did not undergo the specified training go? The answer to this question was given by V. P. It's useless to look for Kostenko.
No less leapfrog at V. P. Kostenko is obtained when he tells us about the maximum speed of the battleship "Eagle" after the battle on May 14th. In his memoirs, in chapter # 28 "Analysis of the course of the battle and the reasons for the defeat", in the section "Night battle with Japanese destroyers" Kostenko points out:
"Eagle" all the time precisely kept the wake of "Nikolay" and, keeping a distance of two cables, developed 92 revolutions, a stroke of 13 knots. The mechanics said that there was enough steam, and the machines were working quite well. If necessary, you can develop a full stroke. Judging by the number of revolutions, the ship could easily develop up to 16 knots.
In the same chapter, in the section “Correcting Damage and Preparing to Continue the Battle on May 15,” the following clarification follows:
Due to the consumption of shells, coal, water, oil and objects thrown overboard during the battle, the battleship unloaded up to 800 tons, surfaced 16 inches, and the main armor belt appeared from the water. The mechanisms and the steering wheel are in good working order, 750 tons of fuel remain. Full speed remained up to 15 1 / 2-16 knots.
This is no longer so optimistic, but still, according to Kostenko, one gets the impression that on the morning of May 15, the battleship could easily develop 16 knots or so. However, in the testimony of the Investigative Commission V. P. Kostenko says something completely different:
"Eagle" did not prepare in advance to give full speed. Meanwhile, he could count on 16-16.5 knots only with full exertion of forces. For a full move, it would be necessary to remove from the top most of the people from the supply of shells, from the hold-fire division, to help the stokers and machinists. Consequently, preparing to give full speed, it was necessary to abandon combat objectives in advance, to concentrate all forces and attention on coal, vehicles and boilers. Until the last moment, the Eagle was preparing for battle, correcting damage, patching up holes, throwing out debris, breaking a tree, preparing artillery. The detachment was surrounded by the enemy in a few minutes; there was no time to get ready to give full speed, since the descent of the flag on the br. "Nicholas I" happened already under enemy fire. "Izumrud", being ready to give speed and having 24 knots, immediately managed to rush in the direction where the ring of enemy ships had not yet closed. The Eagle would not have had time to do this. In addition, if he even gave 16 knots and began to leave, it would not have changed matters, since he could not, like "Emerald", leave the enemy without a fight.
So what do we see? In his memoirs, where Vladimir Polievktovich scolds Admiral Rozhestvensky for not using the opportunities that the high speed of the Borodino-class battleships gave him, the Eagle easily develops 16 knots on the morning of May 15th. But when giving testimony to the Investigative Commission on the Tsushima battle and being forced to explain why such a fast battleship did not try its luck and did not attempt to break through after the Emerald, V. P. Kostenko reports that the battleship could probably give these 16 knots, but not immediately, but only with full exertion of forces, driving half a command to help the stokers and thereby abandoning the fight, because carriers of shells and hold-fire divisions would be sent to stokers!
And here big questions arise for Vladimir Polievktovich. Suppose the battleship "Eagle" sailed all night for 13 knots, and then being surrounded by the Japanese fleet for "several minutes" (Admiral Togo had hydrofoils? But why then V. P. Kostenko reproaches Rozhdestvensky for the fact that his high-speed battleships in the outset of the battle on May 14, marching at a speed of 11 knots, did not rush at 16 knots to the Japanese fleet, which was making the "Loop of Togo"? It's kind of strange, isn't it? During the time it took the Japanese to encircle the remnants of the Russian squadron, the "Eagle" was not able to give full speed, but at the beginning of the battle, he not only could give this full speed, but was he obliged? By the pike's behest, Vladimir Polievktovich's will?
And the second question is when V. P. Kostenko said that:
… four battleships of the "Borodino" class, and with them the "Oslyabya", which, with proper preparation, possessed a squadron speed of 15-16 knots.
What is meant here? Also, driving artillerymen and hold-fire battalions into stoker rooms with the abandonment of "combat targets"? And in this form, send 5 battleships to attack a dozen ships of Togo?
Okay, based on the materials of V. P. Kostenko, we can't figure out the speed of the Russian battleships, but maybe we'll try to find out at least the speed of the battleship "Eagle"? Kostenko has slightly more materials for this. For example, in the testimony of the Investigative Commission V. P. Kostenko reports:
At 78 rpm on the cruise, the "Orel" gave 11-11½ knots, having a displacement of at least 15,500 tons. The mechanical engineers on the "Eagle" during the campaign were of the opinion that, in case of need, the battleship with full tension and selected angle could develop the same number of revolutions as on the trial. With the addition of 6 revolutions, the stroke increased by 1 knot. Therefore, at 108 rpm, you could count on 16-16½ knots. The decrease in travel can be explained by the influence of the overload, which reached 15% of the displacement.
Pay attention - there is not a word about fouling, and this is correct, but now we will ask another question: why V. P. Kostenko believes that when 6 turns are added, the stroke increases by 1 knot? We take data for calculations ONLY according to V. P. Kostenko.
On trials, "Orel" showed, with a displacement of 13.300 tons (underload 230 tons), a speed of 17.8 knots at 109 revolutions, or an average of 6.12 revolutions per speed knot.
In the Nossi-Be Bay "Orel" shows 11.5 knots at 85 rpm with an overload (according to Kostenko) of 3,000 tons. This is 7, 39 revolutions per speed knot, but Vladimir Polievktovich writes ("On the Eagle in Tsushima", chapter "The rainy season. Shooting practice. Messages from Russia"):
Judging by the steam consumption, the "Eagle" will not be able to develop more than 100 revolutions. Since there are 8 revolutions per knot, then its limiting move is not more than 13.5 knots, while in Kronstadt on the trial he developed 18 knots, and "Borodino" gave 16 1/2.
Why, then, in Nossi-Be, the "Eagle" needed 8 revolutions per speed knot, and in the campaign - only 6? Obviously, the heavier the ship, the slower its progress, which means that the more the ship is overloaded, the more revolutions per speed knot will be required. This is logical.
So, in Nossi-Be, according to Kostenko, the overload amounted to as much as 3.000 tons (which is not correct, but oh well), and the battleship at 11.5 knots has 7.39 revolutions per knot. And it takes 8 revolutions to reach each subsequent knot - i.e. MORE than average.
And on the march, with a displacement of 15.500, the overload is almost 2.000 tons, and the battleship for 11-11.5 knots is forced to keep not 85, but only 78 revolutions, respectively, on average, it already has only 6, 78-7, 09 revolutions per node. It would be logical to assume that for each additional node of speed it will need a little more than 6, 78 or 7.09 revolutions, well, or at least an equal value, right? However, V. P. Kostenko leads only 6 revolutions per node, i.e. significantly less than the average 6, 78-7, 09 revolutions per knot. This is even less than 6, 12 revolutions per speed knot, which the underloaded "Eagle" showed on average on tests! What kind of mysticism is this?
If an battleship overloaded by 3 thousand tons needs 8 revolutions per knot at a speed higher than 11 knots, and an battleship overloaded by 2 thousand tons only needs 6 revolutions per knot for the same thing, so if you completely deprive the ship of overload, it comes out and even 3-4 turns for each additional speed knot will be needed? Using this arithmetic, we get that the "Eagle" without overloading during the tests would have to develop a speed … of the order of 21, 1-24, 3 knots ?! “Curiouser and curiouser,” as Alice in Wonderland used to say.
So, if we assume that Vladimir Polievktovich slightly underestimated the required number of revolutions per 1 knot of speed (who is counting them for you?) knot required … no, not large, but at least equal to the average value (that is, all the same 6, 78-7, 09 revolutions per knot), then we get that the battleship "Eagle"
at full tension and selected angle
will show 15, 3-16, 07 knots
And now let us recall the testimony of the senior officer of the "Eagle" Captain 2nd Rank Swede:
I will say with confidence that, if necessary, the battleship "Eagle" could not have given the speed that it gave during the test of vehicles in Kronstadt, that is, about 18 knots … I think that the most complete speed, under all favorable conditions, when spending The best screened coal and replacing tired stokers with another shift, could give, before getting a hole and water on the decks, no more than 15-16 knots.
In fact, even accepting the assessment of V. P. Kostenko that "Eagle" "at full tension and a selected angle could count on 16-16, 5 knots" without any additional corrective calculations, we see that it does not differ too much from the Shvede estimate, since we do not know what exactly meant V. P. Kostenko is under "full tension." The Swede's statement is much more specific - for 15-16 knots of maximum speed, a fresh change of stokers and the best screened coal are needed, or maybe it meant normal, non-stormy weather? Well, and if, according to the method of Vladimir Polievktovich, also the gunners and firefighters into the boiler rooms and the machine rooms to catch up - you see, 16-16, 5 knots will come out. True, it will no longer be possible to fight at this speed due to the lack of supply of shells to the guns and the fight against fires, but the Eagle will certainly be able to develop 16-16.5 knots.
In this case, it becomes quite easy to determine the squadron speed: if with a fresh shift and the best angle, the battleship could count on 15-16 knots of the "full speed", then under not the most ideal conditions, the "fullest speed" of the "Eagle" will tend to 15, rather than 16 knots, if not less. At the same time, the "Eagle", obviously, is not the slowest of the newest Russian battleships. Even V. P. Kostenko wrote about him:
From observations of the displacement of all battleships in the campaign, it turned out that the "Eagle" is less overloaded than others.
And you shouldn't forget about "Borodino" with its delivery 16.5 knots. Although in the future it was repaired, but still, nevertheless … In general, even if we consider the maximum speed of the slowest battleship of the Borodino type to be about 15 knots (which, in my opinion, is still overestimated), the maximum squadron speed from five newest Russian battleships does not exceed 13, 5-14 knots.
The data obtained are quite consistent with the opinion of Admiral Rozhestvensky himself:
On May 14, the new battleships of the squadron could develop up to 13½ knots.
And even somewhat surpasses the testimony of the flagship navigator of the corps of naval navigators, Colonel Filippovsky, who informed the Investigative Commission:
The speed of the battleships of the new type could develop no more than 13 knots, especially the "Borodino" and "Orel" were in great doubt.
It is also worth recalling the opinion of Captain 2nd Rank V. I. Semenov:
Here are the reviews of mechanics, with whom I had to talk more than once: "Suvorov" and "Alexander III" could count on 15-16 knots; on "Borodino" already at 12 nodes the eccentrics and thrust bearings began to warm up; "Eagle" was not at all sure about his car …
Is the issue resolved?
However, there is one, but very authoritative opinion, which categorically does not fit into all our reasoning, since it is extremely contrary to all the above evidence. The flagship mechanic of the 2nd Pacific Squadron, Colonel K. I. M. of the Obnorsky fleet, showed the following:
By the day of the battle on May 14, 1905, the main mechanisms of all ships of the squadron were in satisfactory condition and battleships of the "Suvorov" type could freely have 17 knots in motion without harm to the mechanisms … Battleship "Oslyabya", I think, would give, probably, 17 knots.
It is certainly strange to hear such a statement, because one does not need to be seven spans in the forehead to figure out: if the same "Eagle" showed 17.6 knots with an underload of 230 tons, then with an overload of 1670-1720 tons (according to V. P. Kostenko) “Freely give 17 knots” he could not at all.
However, the validity of the statements of the flagship mechanic can be verified. The fact is that we have at our disposal a report from the chief ship engineer Colonel Parfenov 1st to the commander of the battleship "Eagle", which begins like this:
On the basis of orders for the Naval Department, so that senior mechanics submit to the Technical Committee through the ship's commanders the most detailed information about all accidents in mechanisms and boilers, I have the following to report …
And then follows the most detailed description of various features, including malfunctions of the vehicles of the battleship "Eagle", filled with so many technical details that you rarely find in eyewitness accounts of the Tsushima battle. And this certainly speaks in favor of the colonel. Well, in section B "Machine and boilers during the battle on May 14 and 15" Parfenov 1st testifies:
During the battle, they had from 75 to 98 revolutions. An average of 85 revolutions.
If we assume that at 109 revolutions (the limit for the Eagle steam engine), the battleship could develop 17 knots and take V. P. Kostenko - 6 revolutions per knot, it turns out that developing 98 revolutions, "Eagle" should have reached a speed of over 15 knots. However, such a speed for the Russian battleships in battle, no one observed either from our ships, or from the Japanese. And vice versa, if we take into account that during the battle the average speed of the battleship did not exceed 10, maximum 11 knots, and the minimum was about 8-9 knots, then, correlating the minimum and average speeds with the minimum and average revolutions that the Eagle vehicles produced, we get:
At a minimum speed of 8-9 knots at 75 revolutions, an average of 8, 3-9, 4 revolutions per knot is obtained, and even if you count 6 revolutions for each subsequent knot, it turns out the maximum speed of the battleship at 109 rpm 13, 6-14, 6 knots.
At an average speed of 10-11 knots at 85 rpm, an average of 7, 7-8, 5 rpm per knot is obtained, and even if we count 6 rpm for each subsequent knot, it turns out the maximum speed of the battleship at 109 rpm is 14-15 knots.
Parfenov 1st also indicates the revolutions that the battleship held on the night of May 14-15:
From ½ 8th in the evening on May 14 all night and morning they kept from 85 to 95 revolutions - an average of 90 revolutions.
This evidence is very close to the data of Kostenko, who reports that at the indicated time, the "Oryol" had 92 revolutions and went at a speed of 13 knots. But there are nuances here. The fact is that it is still unclear at what speed the remnants of the squadron marched that night, but in general, opinions fluctuate between 11 and 13 knots. As an example, I cite the testimony of the midshipman, Baron G. Ungern-Sternberg ("Nicholas I"):
At night we were sailing from 11½ to 12½ knots, heading NO 23 °.
But in any case, the speed of at least 11, at least 13 knots at 85-95 rpm does not allow counting on 17 knots at 109 rpm. A very sad conclusion can be drawn from this: during the battle the battleship Orel was unable to go faster than 15 knots, it is even more likely that her maximum speed was somewhere between 14 and 15 knots.
The statement of the flagship mechanic Obnorsky does not fit so much either into the testimony of the other ranks of the squadron, or within the limits of elementary logic that I have to assume either Obnorsky's incompetence as a specialist, or else …
It should be borne in mind that one of the main reasons for the defeat of the Russian fleet in Tsushima was called the low speed of the Russian battleships. Could it be that Obnorsky … insured himself, relieving himself as a flagship mechanic of responsibility for the low speed of battleships of the "Borodino" type? Here, of course, one can argue that if Obnorsky had a motive to overestimate the speed of these battleships, then Admiral Rozhestvensky and Shvede had exactly the opposite reasons - to try to underestimate the speed of the newest Russian ships. It can also be assumed that the head of the naval department, Cavtorang Semenov, fell under the personal charm of Rozhestvensky and decided to shield his admiral.
But the flagship navigator, Colonel Filippovsky, obviously did not have such reasons - why should he? In the same way, the chief mechanic of the "Eagle" Parfenov 1st did not have the slightest sense to exaggerate and deliberately lower the speed of the "Eagle": due to the low rank he could not be blamed for the delivery of the ship, so why sign for the poor work of his management? And V. P. Kostenko was very interested in showing the speed of the five newest battleships of Rozhdestvensky. Nevertheless, Kostenko indicates 16-16, 5 knots of maximum speed for the Eagle, and informs the Investigative Commission about the battleship Borodino:
The chief mechanic of the battleship Borodino Ryabinin and the ship engineer Shangin told me in Kamrang that the rumors circulating around the squadron about the poor condition of the Borodino mechanisms were extremely exaggerated and even unfounded. If necessary br. "Borodino" could give 15-16 knots and would not lag behind others.
It is obvious that there is some reason in Obnorsky's words, V. P. Kostenko would not fail to describe "armadillos easily reaching 17 knots" in his memoirs - nevertheless, this is not the case. And so I think the flagship mechanic's statement is completely untrustworthy. But this, of course, is just my opinion.
This concludes my series of articles "Myths of Tsushima". From what I promised a respected audience, only a detailed analysis of the beginning of the battle and the "Loop of Togo" remained unfinished. Perhaps I will still be able to lay out this analysis in a separate article.
Thank you for the attention!
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The author is especially grateful to a colleague of "Zemlyak" for his series of articles "On the issue of shooting accuracy in the Russo-Japanese War", without which these materials would never have seen the light of day.
