Battle
On May 23, 1905, Rozhdestvensky's squadron made the last loading of coal. The stocks were again taken over the norm, as a result, the battleships were overloaded, deeply immersed in the sea. On May 25, all the extra transports were sent to Shanghai. The squadron was put on full alert. Rozhdestvensky did not organize reconnaissance, so as not to find the squadron.
However, the Japanese already guessed which way the Russian ships would go. The Japanese admiral Togo had been waiting for Russian ships since January 1905. The Japanese command assumed that the Russians would try to break through to Vladivostok or seize some harbor in the Formosa region (modern Taiwan) and from there conduct operations against the Japanese Empire. At the meeting in Tokyo, it was decided to proceed from defense, concentrate forces in the Korea Strait and act according to the situation. In anticipation of the Russian fleet, the Japanese carried out a major overhaul of the ships, replaced all faulty guns with new ones. Previous battles have made the Japanese fleet a single combat unit. Therefore, by the time the Russian squadron appeared, the Japanese fleet was in the best condition, united, with great combat experience, a unit that was inspired by previous successes.
The main forces of the Japanese fleet were divided into 3 squadrons (each with several squadrons). 1st Squadron was commanded by Admiral Togo, who held the flag on the battleship Mikaso. In the 1st combat detachment (the armored core of the fleet) there were 4 squadron battleships of the 1st class, 2 armored cruisers of the 1st class and a mine cruiser. The 1st squadron also included: 3rd combat squadron (4 armored cruisers of the 2nd and 3rd classes), 1st destroyer squadron (5 destroyers), 2nd destroyer squadron (4 units), 3rd destroyer detachment (4 ships), 14th destroyer detachment (4 destroyers). The 2nd squadron was under the flag of Vice Admiral H. Kamimura. It consisted of: 2nd combat squad (6 armored cruisers of the 1st class and advice notes), 4th combat squad (4 armored cruisers), 4th and 5th destroyer squads (4 ships each), 9- 1st and 19th destroyer detachments. 3rd Squadron under the flag of Vice Admiral S. Kataoka. The 3rd squadron consisted of: 5th combat squadron (obsolete battleship, 3 cruisers of the 2nd class, advice note), 6th combat squadron (4 armored cruisers of the 3rd class), 7th combat squad (obsolete battleship, cruiser 3rd class, 4 gunboats), 1st, 5th, 10th, 11th, 15th, 17th, 18th and 20th destroyer detachments (4 units each), 16th destroyer detachment (2 destroyers), a detachment of special-purpose ships (it included auxiliary cruisers).
The Japanese fleet goes to meet the 2nd Pacific squadron
The balance of power was in favor of the Japanese. For armored ships of the line, there was an approximate equality: 12:12. For large-caliber guns of 300 mm (254-305 mm), the advantage was on the side of the Russian squadron - 41:17; on other guns the Japanese had the advantage: 200 mm - 6:30, 150 mm - 52:80. The Japanese had a great advantage in such important indicators as the number of rounds per minute, weight in kg of metal and explosives. For guns of caliber 300-, 250- and 200 mm, the Russian squadron fired 14 rounds per minute, the Japanese - 60; the weight of the metal was 3680 for the Russian guns, 9500 kg for the Japanese; the weight of the explosive for the Russians, for the Japanese - 1330 kg. Russian ships were inferior in the segment of 150 and 120 mm guns. By the number of rounds per minute: Russian ships - 120, Japanese - 300; the weight of metal in kg for Russian guns - 4500, for the Japanese - 12350; explosives for the Russians - 108, for the Japanese - 1670. The Russian squadron was also inferior in armor area: 40% versus 60% and in speed: 12-14 knots versus 12-18 knots.
Thus, the Russian squadron was 2-3 times inferior in rate of fire; in the amount of metal thrown out per minute, the Japanese ships outnumbered the Russians by 2 1/2 times; the stock of explosives in the Japanese shells was 5-6 times more than in the Russians. Russian thick-walled armor-piercing shells with an extremely low explosive charge pierced Japanese armor and did not explode. The Japanese shells produced severe destruction and fires, literally destroying all non-metallic parts of the ship (there was an excess of wood on the Russian ships).
In addition, the Japanese fleet had a noticeable advantage in light cruising forces. In a direct cruising battle, the Russian ships were threatened with complete defeat. They were inferior in the number of ships and guns, and were also bound by the guard of transports. The Japanese had a huge superiority in the destroyer forces: 9 Russian 350-ton destroyers against 21 destroyers and 44 destroyers of the Japanese fleet.
After the appearance of Russian ships in the Strait of Malacca, the Japanese command received accurate information about the movement of the 2nd Pacific squadron. In mid-May, the cruisers of the Vladivostok detachment went out to sea, which indicated that the Russian squadron was approaching. The Japanese fleet prepared to meet the enemy. 1st and 2nd squadrons (the armored core of the fleet of 4 class 1 battleships and 8 class 1 armored cruisers, almost equal in power to battleships) were located on the western coast of the Korea Strait, in Mozampo; 3rd Squadron - off Tsushima Island. The auxiliary cruisers of the merchant steamers formed a 100-mile guard line, spread out 120 miles south of the main force. Behind the guard line were light cruisers and patrol ships of the main force. All forces were connected by radiotelegraph and guarded the entrance to the Korean Gulf.
Japanese Admiral Togo Heihachiro
Squadron battleship Mikasa, July 1904
Squadron battleship "Mikasa", repair of the aft tower. Reid Elliot, August 12-16, 1904
Squadron battleship "Sikishima", July 6, 1906
Squadron battleship "Asahi"
On the morning of May 25, Rozhdestvensky's squadron headed for the Tsushima Strait. The ships went in two columns with transports in the middle. On the night of May 27, the Russian squadron passed the Japanese guard chain. The ships went without lights and were not noticed by the Japanese. But, following the squadron, 2 hospital ships were illuminated. At 2 o'clock. 25 minutes they were spotted by a Japanese cruiser, itself remaining undetected. At dawn, first one, and then several enemy cruisers went out to the Russian squadron, which followed at a distance and at times disappeared in the morning fog. At about 10 o'clock Rozhestvensky's squadron reorganized into one wake column. Behind them, transports and auxiliary vessels were moving under the cover of 3 cruisers.
At 11 o'clock. 10 min. because of the fog, Japanese cruisers appeared, some Russian ships opened fire on them. Rozhestvensky ordered to stop firing. At noon, the squadron headed north-east 23 ° - to Vladivostok. Then the Russian admiral tried to rebuild the right column of the squadron into the front line, but, seeing the enemy again, abandoned this idea. As a result, the battleships were in two columns.
Togo, having received a message in the morning about the appearance of the Russian fleet, immediately moved from Mozampo to the eastern side of the Korea Strait (Okinoshima Island). From the intelligence reports, the Japanese admiral knew perfectly well the deployment of the Russian squadron. When at about noon the distance between the fleets was reduced to 30 miles, Togo moved towards the Russians with the main armored forces (12 squadron battleships and armored cruisers) plus 4 light cruisers and 12 destroyers. The main forces of the Japanese fleet were to attack the head of the Russian column, and Togo sent the cruising forces around the Russian rear in order to seize the transports.
At 13 o'clock. 30 minutes.the right column of the Russian battleships increased its speed to 11 knots and began to deviate to the left in order to reach the head of the left column and form a common column. The cruisers and transports were instructed to retreat to the right. At that moment, the ships of Togo appeared from the northeast. The Japanese ships, with a course of 15 knots, went across the Russian squadron and, finding themselves in front and somewhat to the left of our ships, began sequentially (one after the other at one point) to turn in the opposite direction - the so-called "Togo loop". With such a maneuver, Togo took a position in front of the Russian squadron.
The turning point was very risky for the Japanese. Rozhestvensky got a good chance to turn the tide in his favor. Having accelerated the progress of the 1st detachment to the maximum, approached the usual distance of 15 cables for the Russian gunners and concentrated fire on the turning point of the Togo squadron, the Russian squadron battleships could shoot the enemy. According to a number of military researchers, such a maneuver could cause serious damage to the armored core of the Japanese fleet and allow the 2nd Pacific Squadron, if not to win this battle, then at least fulfill the task of breaking through the main forces to Vladivostok. In addition, the newest Russian battleships of the Borodino class could try to "squeeze" the Japanese ships to the convoy of older Russian battleships, slow, but with powerful guns. However, Rozhestvensky either did not notice this, or did not dare to take such a step, not believing in the ability of his squadron. And he had very little time to make such a decision.
At the time of the turn of the Japanese squadron at 13 o'clock. 49 minutes Russian ships opened fire from a distance of about 8 km (45 cables). At the same time, only the head battleships could effectively hit the enemy, for the rest the distance was too great, and the ships in front were in the way. The Japanese immediately responded by concentrating their fire on two flagships - "Prince Suvorov" and "Oslyab". The Russian commander turned the squadron to the right in order to take a position parallel to the course of the Japanese fleet, but the enemy, using greater speed, continued to cover the head of the Russian squadron, blocking the path to Vladivostok.
About 10 minutes later, the Japanese gunners took aim and their powerful high-explosive shells began to produce great destruction on the Russian ships, causing severe fires. In addition, fire and heavy smoke made it difficult for the Russians to fire and disrupted ship control. "Oslyabya" were badly damaged and at about 14:00. 30 minutes. Burying his nose to the very haws, he rolled out of order to the right, after about 10 minutes the battleship capsized and sank. Commander 1st-Class Captain Vladimir Baer was wounded at the beginning of the battle and refused to leave the ship; more than 500 people died with him. The torpedo boats and a tug lifted 376 people out of the water. Around the same time, Suvorov was severely damaged. The shell fragments hit the wheelhouse, killing and wounding almost everyone who was there. Rozhdestvensky was wounded. Having lost control, the battleship rolled to the right, and then dangled between the squadrons, trying to regain control. In the course of the further battle, the battleship was repeatedly fired upon and attacked with torpedoes. At the beginning of 18 hours. The destroyer "Buyny" removed from the ship part of the headquarters, led by the seriously wounded Rozhdestvensky. Soon, Japanese cruisers and destroyers finished off the crippled flagship. The entire crew was killed. When the battleship "Suvorov" was killed, Admiral Nebogatov took command, holding the flag on the battleship "Emperor Nicholas I".
I. A. Vladimirov. The heroic death of the battleship "Prince Suvorov" in the Battle of Tsushima
I. V. Slavinsky. The last hour of the battleship "Prince Suvorov" in the Battle of Tsushima
The squadron was headed by the next battleship - "Emperor Alexander III". But soon he received severe damage and moved to the center of the squadron, yielding to "Borodino" the lead. They finished off the battleship "Alexander" at 18:50. concentrated fire from the armored cruisers Nissin and Kassuga. None of the crew (857 people) survived.
The Russian squadron continued to move in relative order, trying to escape from the Japanese ticks. But, the Japanese ships, without serious damage, still closed the way. About 15 hours. Japanese cruisers went to the rear of the Russian squadron, captured two hospital ships, engaged in a battle with cruisers, knocking down cruisers and transports in one heap.
After 15 o'clock. the sea was suddenly obscured by fog. Under his protection, the Russian ships turned southeast and parted with the enemy. The battle was interrupted, and the Russian squadron again lay down on the course northeast 23 °, towards Vladivostok. However, the enemy cruisers discovered the Russian squadron and the battle continued. An hour later, when the fog appeared again, the Russian squadron turned south and drove away the Japanese cruisers. At 17 o'clock, obeying the instructions of Rear Admiral Nebogatov, "Borodino" again led the column to the northeast, towards Vladivostok. Then the main forces of Togo approached again, after a short skirmish, the fog divided the main forces. About 6 pm Togo again caught up with the main Russian forces, focusing fire on the Borodino and Orel. Borodino was badly damaged and burned. At the beginning of 19 hours. "Borodino" received the last critical damage, was all on fire. The battleship capsized and sank with its entire crew. Only one sailor was saved (Semyon Yushchin). "Alexander III" died a little earlier.
At sunset, the Japanese commander withdrew the ships from battle. By the morning of May 28, all the detachments were to assemble north of Dazhelet Island (in the northern part of the Korea Strait). The torpedo detachments received the task of continuing the battle, surrounding the Russian squadron and completing the rout with night attacks.
Thus, on May 27, 1905, the Russian squadron suffered a heavy defeat. The 2nd Pacific Squadron lost 4 of the best squadron battleships out of 5. The newest battleship Eagle, which remained afloat, was badly damaged. Other ships of the squadron were also heavily damaged. Many Japanese ships received several holes each, but retained their combat effectiveness.
The passivity of the Russian command, which did not even try to defeat the enemy, went into battle without any hope of success, surrendering to the will of fate, led to tragedy. The squadron only tried to break through towards Vladivostok, and did not conduct a decisive and fierce battle. If the captains fought decisively, maneuvered, tried to get close to the enemy for effective shooting, the Japanese suffered much more serious losses. However, the passivity of the leadership paralyzed almost all the commanders, the squadron, like a herd of bulls, stupidly and stubbornly, broke through in the direction of Vladivostok, not trying to crush the formation of Japanese ships
Squadron battleship "Prince Suvorov"
Squadron battleship "Oslyabya" in the campaign to the Far East as part of the 2nd Pacific squadron
Squadron battleship "Oslyabya" in front of the Korea Strait, May 1905
Ships of the 2nd squadron during one of the stops. From left to right: battleships Navarin, Emperor Alexander III and Borodino
Squadron battleship "Emperor Alexander III"
Completion of the pogrom
At night, numerous Japanese destroyers surrounded the Russian fleet from the north, east and south. Nebogatov on his flagship overtook the squadron, stood in his head and moved to Vladivostok. Cruisers and destroyers, as well as the surviving transports, having not received their missions, headed in different directions. Remaining at Nebogatov 4 battleships ("Nikolai", "Eagle", "Admiral Senyavin", "General-Admiral Apraksin") in the morning were surrounded by superior enemy forces and capitulated. The crews were ready to take the last battle and die with honor, but they followed the admiral's order.
Only the cruiser "Izumrud" caught in the encirclement, the only cruiser remaining in the squadron after the battle and guarding the remnants of the 2nd Pacific Squadron from destroyer attacks at night, did not obey the order to surrender to the Japanese. "Emerald" at full speed broke through the encirclement and went to Vladivostok. The commander of the ship, Captain 2nd Rank Vasily Ferzen, who showed himself excellently during this tragic battle and breaking through the encirclement ring, made a number of serious mistakes on the way to Vladivostok. Apparently, the psychological stress of the battle affected. When entering the Gulf of Vladimir, the ship sat on the stones and was blown up by the crew, fearing the appearance of the enemy. Although at high tide it was possible to remove the ship from the shallows.
The battleship "Navarin" did not receive severe damage in the daytime battle, the losses were small. But at night he betrayed himself by the light of searchlights, and the attack of the Japanese destroyers led to the death of the ship. Of the 681 crew members, only three managed to escape. The battleship Sisoy the Great was severely damaged during the day's battle. At night she was attacked by torpedo boats and was fatally damaged. In the morning, the battleship reached Tsushima Island, where it collided with Japanese cruisers and a destroyer. The commander of the ship M. V. Ozerov, seeing the hopelessness of the situation, agreed to surrender. The Japanese evacuated the crew and the ship sank. The armored cruiser "Admiral Nakhimov" was seriously damaged during the day, torpedoed at night and in the morning it was flooded so as not to surrender to the enemy. The battleship "Admiral Ushakov" was seriously damaged in the day's battle. The ship's speed dropped and it lagged behind the main forces. On May 28, the ship refused to surrender and took an unequal battle with the Japanese armored cruisers Iwate and Yakumo. Having received severe damage, the ship was sunk by the crew. The badly damaged cruiser Vladimir Monomakh was sunk by the crew in a hopeless position. Of all the ships of the 1st rank, the cruiser Dmitry Donskoy was the closest to approaching Vladivostok. The cruiser was overtaken by the Japanese. "Donskoy" took a battle with the superior forces of the Japanese. The cruiser died without lowering the flag.
V. S. Ermyshev Battleship "Admiral Ushakov"
"Dmitry Donskoy"
Only the II rank cruiser Almaz and the destroyers Bravy and Grozny were able to leave for Vladivostok. In addition, the transport "Anadyr" went to Madagascar, and then to the Baltic. Three cruisers (Zhemchug, Oleg and Aurora) left for Manila in the Philippines and were interned there. The destroyer "Bedovy", on board which was the wounded Rozhdestvensky, was overtaken by Japanese destroyers and surrendered.
Captured Russian sailors aboard the Japanese battleship "Asahi"
The main causes of the disaster
From the very beginning, the campaign of the 2nd Pacific Squadron was adventurous. The ships had to be sent to the Pacific Ocean before the war. Finally, the meaning of the campaign was lost after the fall of Port Arthur and the death of the 1st Pacific Squadron. The squadron had to be returned from Madagascar. However, due to political ambitions, the desire to somehow raise the prestige of Russia, the fleet was sent to death.
The campaign itself from Libava to Tsushima became an unparalleled feat of Russian sailors in overcoming enormous difficulties, but the battle at Tsushima showed the entire rottenness of the Romanov empire. The battle showed the backwardness of the shipbuilding and armament of the Russian fleet in comparison with the advanced powers (the Japanese fleet was created by the efforts of the leading world powers, especially England). The Russian naval force in the Far East was crushed. Tsushima became a decisive precondition for concluding peace with Japan, although in the military-strategic respect, the outcome of the war was decided on land.
Tsushima became a kind of terrible landmark event for the Russian Empire, showing the need for fundamental changes in the country, the disastrousness of the war for Russia in its current state. Unfortunately, he was not understood, and the Russian Empire perished as the 2nd Pacific Squadron - bloody and terrible
One of the main reasons for the death of the squadron was the lack of initiative and indecision of the Russian command (the scourge of the Russian army and navy during the Russian-Japanese war). Rozhestvensky did not dare to harshly raise the question of sending the squadron back after the fall of Port Arthur. The admiral led the squadron with no hope of success and remained passive, giving up the initiative to the enemy. There was no specific battle plan. Long-range reconnaissance was not organized, a convenient opportunity to defeat the Japanese cruisers, which for a considerable time were separated from the main forces, were not used. At the beginning of the battle, they did not use the chance to deliver a strong blow to the main forces of the enemy. The squadron did not complete the combat formation and fought on unfavorable conditions, only the lead ships could conduct normal fire. The unsuccessful formation of the squadron allowed the Japanese to focus their fire on the best battleships of the Russian squadron and quickly disable them, after which the outcome of the battle was decided. During the battle, when the head battleships were out of order, the squadron actually fought without command. Nebogatov took command only in the evening and in the morning handed over the ships to the Japanese.
Among the technical reasons, one can single out the "fatigue" of ships after a long voyage, when for a long time they were separated from the normal repair base. The ships were overloaded with coal and other cargo, which reduced their seaworthiness. Russian ships were inferior to Japanese ships in the total number of guns, armor area, speed, rate of fire, weight and explosive power of the squadron's shot. There was a strong lag in the cruising and destroyer forces. The naval composition of the squadron was varied in armament, protection and maneuverability, which affected its combat effectiveness. The new battleships, as the battle showed, had weak armor and low stability.
The Russian squadron, unlike the Japanese fleet, was not a single combat organism. The personnel, both commanders and privates, were diverse. There were only enough personnel commanders to fill the main responsible positions. The shortage of command personnel was compensated by the early release of the naval corps, the call from the stock of "old men" (who had no experience of sailing on armored ships) and transfer from the merchant fleet (warrant officers). As a result, a strong gap was formed between young people who did not have the necessary experience and sufficient knowledge, "old people" who needed updating of knowledge and "civilians" who did not have normal military training. There were also not enough conscript sailors, so about a third of the crews consisted of storekeepers and recruits. There were many "penalties" whom the commanders "exiled" on a long voyage, which did not improve the discipline on the ships. The situation was no better with the non-commissioned officers. Most of the personnel were assigned to the new ships only in the summer of 1904, and could not study the ships well. Due to the fact that it was necessary to urgently complete, repair and prepare ships, the squadron did not go together in the summer of 1904, did not study. In August alone, a 10-day voyage was made. During the cruise, due to a number of reasons, the crews were unable to learn how to maneuver ships and shoot well.
Thus, the 2nd Pacific Squadron was ill-prepared, in fact, did not receive combat training. It is clear that the Russian sailors and commanders entered the battle bravely, fought bravely, but their heroism could not rectify the situation.
V. S. Ermyshev. Battleship Oslyabya
A. Throne The death of the battleship "Emperor Alexander III"
Alexey Novikov, a sailor on the Orel (the future Soviet writer-marine painter), described the situation well. He was arrested in 1903 for revolutionary propaganda and, as "unreliable", was transferred to the 2nd Pacific Squadron. Novikov wrote: “Many sailors were called up from the reserve. These elderly people, clearly weaned from the naval service, lived with memories of their homeland, were sick of separation from home, from children, from wife. The war fell on them unexpectedly, like a terrible calamity, and they, preparing for an unprecedented campaign, performed work with a gloomy look of strangled people. The team included many recruits. Stricken and pitiful, they looked at everything with frozen horror in their eyes. They were frightened by the sea, on which they came for the first time, and even more - by the unknown future. Even among the career sailors who graduated from various special schools, there was no usual fun. Only the penalty kicks, in contrast to the others, were more or less cheerful. The coastal authorities, in order to get rid of them as a harmful element, came up with the easiest way for this: to write them off to ships going to war. Thus, to the dismay of the senior officer, we have accumulated up to seven percent of them."
Another good image explaining the death of the squadron was conveyed by Novikov (under the pseudonym "sailor A. Zaterty"). This is what he saw: “We were extremely amazed that this ship did not suffer in the least from our artillery. He looked as if he was now taken out of repair. Even the paint on the guns didn't burn. Our sailors, having examined the Asahi, were ready to swear that on May 14 we fought not with the Japanese, but … what good, the British. Inside the battleship, we were amazed at the cleanliness, neatness, practicality and expediency of the device. On our new battleships of the Borodino class, a whole half of the ship was assigned for some thirty officers; it was cluttered with cabins, and during the battle they only increased the fires; and in the other half of the ship, we squeezed not only up to 900 sailors, but also artillery and lifts. And our enemy on the ship used everything mainly for cannons. Then we were struck by the absence between officers and sailors of the discord that you meet at every step in our country; there, on the contrary, there was a sense of solidarity, kindred spirit and common interests between them. It was only here for the first time that we really learned who we were dealing with in battle and what the Japanese were."
