The armed forces are one of the key elements of any state. At the same time, it is a very important social institution of society, which in one way or another embraces practically every person, every family, every collective. Someone serves or served himself, someone is a member of the family of a soldier, someone will serve (sometimes voluntarily, and sometimes without much desire). But the whole society worries about its soldiers, who shed blood where the government sent them. Many state, public, educational and medical institutions "work" for the armed forces. The whole sphere of the economy is called the military-industrial complex. Science "serves" the needs of the military for new technologies.
In any society, there is what in the United States is called "military culture" or "military environment", which means the socio-cultural environment in which people in military uniform live, serve and work and all those who are closely associated with them in life or for work.
This environment has its own principles and norms of relationships, its own language and jargon, its own customs and traditions, its own incomparable humor. So, any fighter from the "green berets" forces knows three playful rules of special forces: “First, always look cool; secondly, always know where you are; thirdly, if you can't remember where you are, try to look cool at least."
It is hardly possible to get to know and understand the army environment from reference books or military regulations. Army humor is most often oral creativity, which is not always recorded in print media.
What does all this have to do with the development of military theory in the modern United States?
New ideas and concepts are born in the minds of people - colonels and majors, generals and privates, civilian professors and military experts who live and work in a military environment, communicate and exchange opinions with each other, and get their inspiration from it.
But no matter how deep and serious the creative pursuits of military geniuses and prophets are, they cannot do without army humor. Sometimes more thoughts are contained in a catch phrase or aphorism than in a thick military manual …
Many of these thoughts entered the so-called unwritten set of Murphy's Laws of War. Most of these "laws" are universal in nature, operating not only in the US military, but also in other armies and other countries. This once again confirms the idea that regardless of the socio-political system, the degree of economic development of the country, the army is everywhere an army. In any military system, somewhere in jest, but somewhere seriously, they traditionally scold the intendants, speak unflatteringly about the generals and do not believe in the talents and abilities of their own command. There are many Murphy's Laws of War, but perhaps the most striking of them are the following:
· If there is nothing around you except the enemy, you are at war.
· When you have achieved air superiority - do not forget to notify the enemy about it.
· If something seems stupid, but works, then it is not stupidity.
· Keep your head down - it attracts fire.
· If our attack goes smoothly, then it is an ambush.
· No battle plan survives the first combat encounter.
· Units with combat experience, as a rule, do not pass inspections.
· Units that successfully pass the inspection usually lose the battle.
· If the enemy is within the reach of your fire, it means that you are also in his zone of fire.
· The distracting actions of the enemy, which you ignore, are precisely his main attack.
· Whatever you do, can lead you to death, including nothing.
· The professional is predictable, but the world is full of amateurs.
· Try not to look important; the enemy may have a lack of ammunition and he will not waste a bullet on you.
· The enemy always attacks in two cases: when he is ready and when you are not ready.
A fuse that lasts 5 seconds always detonates after 3.
· Important things are always simple, and simple things are always difficult to understand.
· The easy path is always mined.
· Group actions are necessary: they expose others as targets for the enemy.
· More precisely the enemy's fire can only be friendly fire.
· Parts that need to work together cannot be delivered to the front line together.
· The radio station breaks down when you need fire support.
· The radar usually fails at night or in poor visibility conditions, but especially at night in bad weather.
· Military intelligence is a contradictory phrase.
· The weather is never neutral.
· Air defense motto: shoot them all down, and sort yours and the enemy on the ground.
· Mines are a weapon of equal opportunity.
· The B-52 strategic bomber is the ultimate close support weapon.
· What you need now is just missing.
· When you don't know what to do, empty the entire rifle magazine.
· The battle always takes place on the terrain located between two adjacent map sheets.
· If you are able to keep your head in a situation when everyone around you has lost their heads, you are likely to misjudge the situation.
· If you have lost contact with the enemy, look back.
· There is nothing scarier in a war zone than an officer with a map.
· The garment service has only two sizes: very small and very large.
· There is no greater thrill when someone shoots at you, but misses.
Are Murphy's "laws" so abstract in relation to the military sphere?
After the end of hostilities in Iraq in 2003, some combat and reporting documents of the American command became public, which once again confirmed the depth of the army's humor.
On November 28, 2003, the Associated Press published an article entitled "The whole situation turned into total chaos …". It argued that the logistical support system of the American 3rd Infantry Division, both during the period of hostilities and after their end, could not function normally. So, the division was put into battle in conditions when it had an incomplete ammunition load. The combat units did not receive the requested ammunition either during the operation, which lasted 21 days, or after it. Requests for replenishment of ammunition stocks went through all instances, were approved by the command, but were not executed.
A similar situation developed in the 3rd Infantry Division and with spare parts for armored vehicles. Within a month after the end of the military operation, the rear services of the division could not provide the necessary spare parts for the Abrams tanks and Bradley infantry fighting vehicles.
Commenting on this, V. Oreilly writes: “The fact that the richest and most powerful power in the world cannot provide its combat units properly, despite the presence of its bases in friendly neighboring countries, is more than a shame. This is an accusation of indifference and incompetence. This deserves the most severe military punishment. But those who were responsible for this were promoted …”.
Murphy's logistics principles worked …
The experience of the war in Iraq once again convinced the American command of the correctness of the "Murphy laws" that the enemy should not be underestimated. In this regard, for example, in his report to the US Congress, V. Oreilly writes:
“Despite the unprecedented number of electronic reconnaissance devices, the ability to achieve tactical surprise is not very different from what it was two centuries ago. Enemies are still jumping out from behind bushes or from behind rocks … Our enemies are not only inventive, but, apparently, learn and adapt to new realities much faster than us. This becomes all the more obvious at the tactical level.
Our opponents, on the whole, are not fools. In close combat, especially in small groups, they retain the ability to ambush, act suddenly, kill and maim, and generally do anything unexpected."
The famous dictum that the phrase "military intelligence" itself contains a contradiction was also confirmed during the war in Iraq. “You have spent so much and received so little,” one of the Israeli generals commented on the successes of American intelligence. As V. Oreilly writes, the USA "spends more on exploration than the gross national product of many countries of the world." The exact figures of the costs for these purposes are secret, but even according to conservative American estimates, they amount to at least 35 billion dollars. For all that, according to Oreilly, "Iraq II can hardly be considered an intelligence success."
As an analogy, he cites an old English joke about a priest staying overnight at a friend's house. For breakfast, the host gave the priest a rotten egg and asked if it had been cooked well. The well-bred priest replied: "It's good in some places." This is how, according to the American expert, one can characterize the success of intelligence activities on the eve and during the military operation in the Persian Gulf zone. “Iraq,” Oreilly notes, “is a place where we shouldn't have any problems with intelligence. But we had them. Ironically, but Iraq, like no other place in the world, we could and should have known from an intelligence point of view like the back of my hand before the invasion."
P. S. In my opinion, the Russian proverb fits perfectly: "make the fool pray to God - he will break his forehead."
