Chinese manufacturers of weapons and military equipment admitted that they are taking the best Russian weapons as the basis for their developments. In particular, in the latest issue of the Chinese special edition "Tanks and armored vehicles", the chief designer of the modern Chinese BMP ZBD04 claims that he not only copied the Russian BMP-3, but introduced a number of improvements in its parameters, as an example he called a change in the fire control system. The Russian Defense Ministry believes that our state will not sue Chinese gunsmiths, although copyright protection for all exported military equipment is provided for by state documents. It's just that, despite a slight decline, China is still our largest and most promising partner in the future in terms of the purchase of weapons, and it is not profitable to enter into legal proceedings with it.
Military-technical cooperation between Russia and China ten years ago was a core part of the profits from all Russian exports of arms and military equipment, today none of the existing supplies can boast of this volume. At the same time, as a result of this partnership, China has made a technological leap in the last 20 years, comparable only to the progress in the 50s. In the late 80s, the Chinese army was equipped with either direct copies of Soviet special technologies developed in the 40-50s, or equipment and weapons made on the basis of Soviet systems with minor changes. At the same time, the Chinese continued to comprehend and copy Soviet military production even later, after the actual breakdown of relations between the two states by the beginning of the 60s. They obtained the necessary examples of modern equipment and weapons in a roundabout way, through the third world countries, which bought weapons from Moscow.
The PRC in the process of military-technical cooperation with Russia, like forty years ago, was extremely pragmatic: providing key industries with modern special technologies through supplies from Russia, copying examples of equipment, systems and devices for their serial production in China, establishing its own military school. design through close cooperation with Russian educational and research institutions of the required profile.
It is this logic that can be traced in all arms contacts between China and Russia over the past 20 years. And in the actions of the Russian side, a systematic approach to cooperation is not visible. He was certainly present in the 50s, when, transferring absolutely modern equipment to Beijing, the USSR established limited access for its ally to fundamentally new technologies. These restrictions, together with its internal turmoil of the 1960s, were the main reason for the sharp decline in the growth of the military industry in China after the end of Soviet aid. Now, several decades later, China is actively making up for lost time.
A particularly difficult situation in China has developed in the aviation industry. In the early 90s, the air force of the People's Liberation Army of China was armed mainly with equipment of the 1st and 2nd generation. These were fighters that appeared in the Chinese Air Force under the J-1 brands, as well as J-6, analogs of the Soviet MiG-17 and MiG-19. They formed the basis of the Chinese front-line aviation, and the serial production of the J-6 in China was interrupted only in the early 1980s, more than 20 years later than in the USSR. At that time, the J-7 aircraft remained in production for the PLA Air Force - a copy of the MiG-21. They were also exported. To date, the best Chinese fighter, the J-8, is an exact copy of the MiG-21 design solution. In addition to the fact that the Chinese Air Force was equipped with outdated equipment, they actually did not have the skill of combat use both at the strategic and tactical levels, and also experienced difficulties due to extremely disgusting personnel training, weak infrastructure, and poor quality of management. The Air Force did not actively participate either in the Korean War or in the hostilities in the confrontation with Vietnam in 1979.
In solving this problem, China plans to rely on two main programs. The first was the purchase of a heavy Su-27 fighter in Russia with the further establishment of its licensed production. 2nd - in the production of light J-10 fighters based on the Israeli Lavi acquired in the late 1980s. This task, however, also could not be solved by China without outside help.
Until 1995, the PRC bought two batches of Su-27 from Russia. During the period from 1992 to 1996, 36 single-seat Su-27SK fighters and 12 twin Su-27UBK fighters were received from Russia. At the end of 1996, an agreement was signed to establish licensed production of the Su-27 in China, including the production of 200 combat aircraft at a plant in Shenyang. In the Chinese Air Force, this aircraft received the designation J-11. The development of licensed production by Chinese designers and illegal copying of other similar aircraft allowed China by the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century to make a breakthrough in the field of aircraft construction - the launch of serial production of the J-11 without the use of Russian equipment.
However, by the second half of the 90s, the main Su-27s, prepared primarily for gaining air supremacy, did not suit the Chinese Air Force at all, given that they needed a multipurpose aircraft to fight both targets in the air. and on earth. In August 1999, the contract for the supply of 40 Su-30MKK was completed, which, unlike the Su-27SK, could use the latest air-to-air missiles at that time, as well as fire from various types of air-to-ground weapons. Another contract for the supply of 43 of these machines was signed in 2001. Today, the Su-30 form the backbone of the PLA's air force.
In parallel with the delivery of the Su-30 from Russia and the production of the J-11, China continued to develop its own promising machines, of which three are the J-10 medium fighter based on the Israeli Lavi, the light FC-1 based on the MiG-21 technological platform, and a long-time secret, the fifth-generation J-20 fighter. According to the Chinese designers, the J-20 created by them is unique and has no analogues in the world. But, despite this statement, you can be sure that the main base is copied, but it is not yet known from which aircraft and which country.
By copying foreign technology, China was able, in the end, to create its own world-class military-industrial complex, as well as independent design schools. It is practically impossible to stop the growth rate of the military-technical and scientific potential of the PRC, which means that world states should take this into account and use it in their own interests. For the most part, this applies to Russia, which, despite its enormous military-technical potential, has a lot to learn from its Far Eastern neighbors.
