Sow "Lentils" - reap tragedy

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Sow "Lentils" - reap tragedy
Sow "Lentils" - reap tragedy

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When some hypocrites try to judicially prohibit the mention of real historical facts, this speaks of a serious illness of the society in which such actions are considered permissible. There is no excuse for this! …

Recently, out of the blue, out of the blue, a hysteria began about information that everyone has known for a long time: a certain Commission of the Public Chamber of the Russian Federation on interethnic relations and freedom of conscience raised a cry about the university history textbook, which had already been published 3 th time. In this textbook it is very sparingly written that which is much more accurate and detailed in many completely legal books and articles. The scream raised by Svanidze and the actions he has already committed are much more like a provocation and incitement to hatred of the Russian people, which should be punished in the same way under Article 282, as well as incitement to hatred of other peoples.

As for the meager, but accurate information from the textbook, one can only say that "you can't throw words out of the song": everyone has long known who organized and financed the coup d'etat of 1917, and who after that commanded in Russia, and is still in command. And also no less well-known is the hatred of the Chechens towards the Russians, which General Yermolov had to treat. And during the Great Patriotic War, many Chechens distinguished themselves greatly, deserting thousands and fighting against the Russians. So, this is not a secret at all, but facts that are simply stupid to prohibit in our information age. In addition, these facts have been quite openly on the website of the FSB of the Russian Federation for 10 years. This also confirms that there is not and cannot be any crime in the coverage of the facts! Here, admire …

In February 1944, at the direction of Joseph Stalin, the NKVD of the USSR carried out a special operation under the code name "Lentil", as a result of which all Chechens were hastily evicted from the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Republic to the regions of Central Asia, and the republic itself was abolished. Previously unknown archival documents, only now published figures and facts clarify the reasoning used by the Generalissimo to justify his cruel decision.

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Dodgers

In 1940, law enforcement agencies identified and neutralized the rebel organization of Sheikh Magomet-Khadzhi Kurbanov that existed in the Chechen-Ingush Republic. A total of 1,055 bandits and their accomplices were arrested, and 839 rifles and revolvers with ammunition were seized from them. 846 deserters who evaded service in the Red Army were tried. In January 1941, a large armed uprising was localized in the Itum-Kalinsky region under the leadership of Idris Magomadov.

It is no secret that the leaders of the Chechen separatists, who were in an illegal position, counted on the imminent defeat of the USSR in the war and conducted wide defeatist agitation for desertion from the ranks of the Red Army, disrupting mobilization, and putting together armed formations to fight on the side of Germany.

During the first mobilization from August 29 to September 2, 1941, 8,000 people were to be conscripted into construction battalions. However, only 2,500 arrived at their destination in Rostov-on-Don.

By the decision of the State Defense Committee, in the period from December 1941 to January 1942, the 114th national division was formed from the indigenous population in the ChI ASSR. As of the end of March 1942, 850 people managed to defect from it.

The second mass mobilization in Checheno-Ingushetia began on March 17, 1942 and was supposed to end on March 25. The number of persons to be mobilized was 14,577 people. However, by the appointed date, only 4,887 were mobilized. In this regard, the mobilization period was extended until April 5th. But the number of mobilized people increased only to 5543 people. The reason for the failure of mobilization was the massive evasion of conscripts from conscription and desertion on the way to assembly points.

On March 23, 1942, a deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the Chechen Republic of the ASSR Daga Dadaev, mobilized by the Nadterechny RVK, fled from the Mozdok station. Under the influence of his agitation, another 22 people fled with him.

By the end of March 1942, the total number of deserters and evaders in the republic reached 13,500 people.

In the conditions of mass desertion and the intensification of the insurgent movement on the territory of the Chechen Republic of the ASSR, the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR in April 1942 signed an order to abolish the conscription of Chechens and Ingush into the army.

In January 1943, the regional committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the ChI ASSR nevertheless turned to the NKO of the USSR with a proposal to announce an additional recruitment of volunteer servicemen from among the inhabitants of the republic. The proposal was approved and the local authorities received permission to recruit 3,000 volunteers. According to the order of the NCO, the conscription was ordered to be carried out in the period from January 26 to February 14, 1943. However, the approved plan for the next draft was also a failure this time.

So, as of March 7, 1943, out of those recognized as fit for combat service, 2,986 "volunteers" were sent to the Red Army. Of these, only 1806 people arrived at the unit. Only along the route, 1,075 people managed to defect. In addition, 797 more "volunteers" fled from the district mobilization points and along the route to Grozny. All in all, from January 26 to March 7, 1943, 1872 persons liable for military service from the so-called last "voluntary" conscription in the Chechen Republic of the ASSR deserted.

Among those who fled were representatives of the regional and regional party and Soviet assets: secretary of the Gudermes RK VKP (b) Arsanukaev, head of the department of the Vedensky RK VKP (b) Magomayev, secretary of the Komsomol regional committee for military work Martazaliev, second secretary of the Gudermes RK Komsomol Taymaskhanov, chairman of the Galanchaozhsky district executive office …

UNDERGROUND

The leading role in disrupting the mobilization was played by the underground Chechen political organizations - the National Socialist Party of the Caucasian Brothers and the Chechen-Gorsk National Socialist Underground Organization. The first was led by its organizer and ideologist Khasan Israilov. With the outbreak of the war, Israilov went into an illegal position and until 1944 led a number of large bandit formations, while maintaining close ties with German intelligence agencies.

The other was headed by the brother of the well-known revolutionary in Chechnya A. Sheripov - Mayrbek Sheripov. In October 1941, he also went into an illegal position and amassed a number of bandit detachments around him, into which deserters poured. In August 1942, Sheripov raised an armed uprising in Chechnya, during which the administrative center of the Sharoevsky district, the village of Khimoy, was defeated.

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In November 1942, Mayrbek Sheripov was killed as a result of a conflict with accomplices. Some of the members of his bandit groups joined Kh. Israilov, and some surrendered to the authorities.

All in all, the pro-fascist parties formed by Israilov and Sheripov had over 4,000 members, and the total number of their insurgent detachments reached 15,000. In any case, these are the figures that Israilov reported to the German command in March 1942.

They patrolled in the NCO of the USSR with a proposal to announce an additional recruitment of military volunteers from among the inhabitants of the republic. The proposal was approved and the local authorities received permission to recruit 3,000 volunteers. According to the order of the NCO, the conscription was ordered to be carried out in the period from January 26 to February 14, 1943. However, the approved plan for the next draft was also a failure this time.

So, as of March 7, 1943, out of those recognized as fit for combat service, 2,986 "volunteers" were sent to the Red Army. Of these, only 1806 people arrived at the unit. Only along the route, 1,075 people managed to defect. In addition, 797 more "volunteers" fled from the district mobilization points and along the route to Grozny. All in all, from January 26 to March 7, 1943, 1872 persons liable for military service from the so-called last "voluntary" conscription in the Chechen Republic of the ASSR deserted.

Among those who fled were representatives of the regional and regional party and Soviet assets: secretary of the Gudermes RK VKP (b) Arsanukaev, head of the department of the Vedensky RK VKP (b) Magomayev, secretary of the Komsomol regional committee for military work Martazaliev, second secretary of the Gudermes RK Komsomol Taymaskhanov, chairman of the Galanchaozhsky district executive office …

UNDERGROUND

The leading role in disrupting the mobilization was played by the underground Chechen political organizations - the National Socialist Party of the Caucasian Brothers and the Chechen-Gorsk National Socialist Underground Organization. The first was led by its organizer and ideologist Khasan Israilov. With the outbreak of the war, Israilov went into an illegal position and until 1944 led a number of large bandit formations, while maintaining close ties with German intelligence agencies.

The other was headed by the brother of the well-known revolutionary in Chechnya A. Sheripov - Mayrbek Sheripov. In October 1941, he also went into an illegal position and amassed a number of bandit detachments around him, into which deserters poured. In August 1942, Sheripov raised an armed uprising in Chechnya, during which the administrative center of the Sharoevsky district, the village of Khimoy, was defeated.

In November 1942, Mayrbek Sheripov was killed as a result of a conflict with accomplices. Some of the members of his bandit groups joined Kh. Israilov, and some surrendered to the authorities.

All in all, the pro-fascist parties formed by Israilov and Sheripov had over 4,000 members, and the total number of their insurgent detachments reached 15,000. In any case, these are the figures that Israilov reported to the German command in March 1942.

THE AMBASSADORS OF ABVER

Having assessed the potential of the Chechen rebel movement, the German special services set out to unite all the bandit formations.

The 804th regiment of the Brandenburg-800 special purpose division was aimed at solving this problem, directed to the North Caucasian sector of the Soviet-German front.

It included the Sonderkommando of Ober-Lieutenant Gerhard Lange, conventionally called "Enterprise Lange" or "Enterprise Shamil". The team was staffed by agents from among the former prisoners of war and emigrants of Caucasian origin. Before being sent to the rear of the Red Army for subversive activities, the saboteurs underwent nine months of training. The direct transfer of agents was carried out by Abwehrkommando-201.

On August 25, 1942, from Armavir, a group of Ober-Lieutenant Lange in the amount of 30 people, staffed mainly by Chechens, Ingush and Ossetians, was parachuted into the area of the villages of Chishki, Dachu-Borzoy and Duba-Yurt of the Ataginsky region of the Chechen Republic of the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic to commit sabotage and terrorist acts and organizational form. A few months later, Osman Guba, arrested by the NKVD, described his impressions of the first days of his stay on Chechen territory during interrogation: “… who we are, but when we took an oath in the Koran that we were indeed sent to the rear of the Red Army by the German command, they believed us. They told us that it was dangerous for us to stay here, so they recommended leaving for the mountains of Ingushetia, since it would be easier to hide there. After spending 3-4 days in the forest near the village of Berezhki, we, accompanied by Ali-Mahomet, went to the mountains to the village of Hai, where Ali-Mahomet had good friends. One of his acquaintances turned out to be a certain Ilaev Kasum, who took us to his place, and we stayed overnight with him. Ilaev introduced us to his son-in-law Ichaev Soslanbek, who took us to the mountains …

The Abwehr agents received sympathy and support not only from ordinary peasants. Collective farm chairmen and leaders of the party and Soviet apparatus willingly offered their cooperation. "The first person with whom I spoke directly about the deployment of anti-Soviet work on the instructions of the German command," Osman Guba told at the investigation, "was the chairman of the Dattykh village council, a member of the CPSU (b) Ibragim Pshegurov. I told him that we were dropped by parachutes from the German aircraft and that our goal is to help the German army in the liberation of the Caucasus from the Bolsheviks and to carry out further struggle for the independence of the Caucasus. Pshegurov recommended to establish contacts with the right people, but to speak openly only when the Germans take the city of Ordzhonikidze."

A little later, the chairman of the Akshi village council, Duda Ferzauli, came to the Abwehr envoy. According to Osman, "Ferzauli himself approached me and in every possible way proved that he was not a communist, that he undertakes to fulfill any of my tasks … At the same time, he asked me to take him under my protection after their area was occupied by the Germans."

Osman's testimony to Guba describes an episode when a local resident Musa Keloev came to his group. "I agreed with him that it would be necessary to blow up a bridge on this road. To carry out the explosion, I sent a member of my parachute group, Salman Aguev, with him. When they returned, they reported that they had blown up an unguarded wooden railway bridge."

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UNDER THE GERMAN HARMONY

The Abwehr groups thrown into the territory of Chechnya came into contact with the leaders of the rebels Kh. Israilov and M. Sheripov, and a number of other field commanders and began to fulfill their main task - organizing uprisings.

Already in October 1942, German paratrooper non-commissioned officer Gert Reckert, abandoned a month earlier in the mountainous part of Chechnya as part of a group of 12 people, together with the leader of one of the gangs, Rasul Sakhabov, provoked a massive armed uprising of the residents of the villages of the Vedensky district of Selmentauzen and Makhkety. To localize the uprising, significant forces of the regular units of the Red Army, which were defending the North Caucasus at that time, were pulled together. This uprising took about a month to prepare. According to the testimony of captured German paratroopers, enemy aircraft dropped 10 large batches of weapons (over 500 small arms, 10 machine guns and ammunition for them) into the area of the village of Makhkety, which were immediately distributed to the rebels.

During this period, active actions of armed militants were noted everywhere in the republic. The scale of banditry in general is evidenced by the following documentary statistics. During September - October 1942, the NKVD authorities liquidated 41 armed groups with a total number of over 400 bandits. Another 60 bandits voluntarily surrendered and were captured. The Hitlerites had a powerful base of support in the Khasavyurt district of Dagestan, inhabited mainly by the Chechens-Akkins. So, for example, in September 1942, the inhabitants of the village of Mozhgar brutally killed the first secretary of the Khasavyurt district committee of the CPSU (b) Lukin and the whole village went to the mountains.

At the same time, the Abwehr sabotage group of 6 people under the leadership of Sainutdin Magomedov was thrown into this area with the task of organizing uprisings in the regions of Dagestan bordering Chechnya. However, the entire group was detained by the state security authorities.

Victims of Treason

In August 1943, the Abwehr threw three more groups of saboteurs into the ChI ASSR. As of July 1, 1943, 34 enemy paratroopers were listed on the territory of the republic on the territory of the republic, including 4 Germans, 13 Chechens and Ingush, the rest represented other nationalities of the Caucasus.

In total, in 1942-1943, the Abwehr threw about 80 paratroopers into Chechen-Ingushetia to communicate with the local bandit underground, of which more than 50 were traitors to the Motherland from among the former Soviet military personnel.

And yet, at the end of 1943 - beginning of 1944, some of the peoples of the North Caucasus, including the Chechens, as those who provided and could provide the greatest assistance to the Nazis in the future, were deported to the deep rear.

However, the effectiveness of this action, the victims of which were mainly innocent old people, women and children, turned out to be illusory. The main forces of the armed bandit formations, as always, took refuge in the remote mountainous part of Chechnya, from where they continued to carry out bandit sorties for several years.

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