Having failed in organizing the invasion of England, Hitler decided to "try his luck at war" in the East, deciding thereby to repeat the fatal mistake of Germany during the First World War - to fight on two fronts. He also neglected the behest of his predecessor, the first chancellor of United Germany, Otto von Bismarck - "never to fight with Russia." In January 1941, an accelerated development of a plan for a lightning-fast attack on the USSR, called the "Barbarossa Plan", began. And already in May, the main forces of the Wehrmacht were concentrated on the eastern border of the Reich. The German Air Force - Luftwaffe was ordered to destroy the Soviet aviation as soon as possible, thereby helping the ground units to move forward. The task was extremely difficult, and to accomplish it, of the 4,500 military aircraft available to Germany, almost 3,000 were concentrated on the Soviet border.
Throughout the spring of 1941, special reconnaissance aircraft invaded Soviet airspace to photograph the system of fortifications, bases and airfields. Moreover, due to the actual lack of camouflage at the airfields of the Soviet Air Force, the Germans managed to obtain accurate data on the number of aircraft and their locations. This was very important, since the concept of the Luftwaffe headquarters provided for the conquest of air supremacy by suppressing enemy aircraft and massive strikes on airfields.
At the same time, aviation was not considered as a means for waging an economic war - the Germans did not have strategic bombers designed to destroy objects deep behind enemy lines. And they had to regret this more than once, because practically the entire Soviet industry was evacuated to the Urals in the shortest possible time, from where tanks, planes and guns were flowing to the front from the 42nd.
Having won a quick and rather easy victory in the West, the Germans saw little reason not to repeat this in the East. They were not embarrassed by the 5-fold superiority of the Red Army in tanks, nor the 7-fold superiority in aircraft, nor the huge theater of military operations. The Germans considered only time as their main enemy.
At that time, all fighter and bomber squadrons of the Luftwaffe were armed with aircraft of the latest modifications, which significantly surpassed almost all types of Soviet aircraft in terms of basic combat characteristics. All German pilots were perfectly trained, had real combat experience, and most importantly, they had the psychology of winners. Incredibly, the task of gaining air supremacy was assigned to approximately 1,000 fighters, that is, 250 aircraft to the front. By December 1941, this task was practically completed.
The Soviet pilots of the times of 1941, in their bulk, could oppose the Germans only with a huge number of far from new aircraft and desperate heroism. Combat training in the air units was very bad. The tactics of both fighters and bombers were outdated: the former flew in triplets in a "wedge" formation and simply interfered with each other in battle, while the latter did not know how to interact with their fighters or perform an effective anti-aircraft maneuver. Radio stations on Soviet aircraft were practically absent, and our pilots did not hear about a photo-machine gun synchronized with military weapons and necessary to confirm the number of air victories until 1943-1944.
Moreover, the commanders who tried to establish the proper training of flight personnel were accused of excessive consumption of fuel, ammunition, increased accidents and other "sins", for which they received constant penalties, were demoted in positions and ranks, or even put on trial. In addition, before the start of the war, almost all the leaders of the Red Army Air Force were repressed. Therefore, the moral atmosphere in the Soviet military aviation was not easy.
Shortly before dawn on June 22, 1941, nearly 1,000 bombers from the 1st, 2nd and 4th German air fleets struck powerful strikes against 70 well-known Soviet airfields in the Western, Kiev, Baltic and Odessa military districts. Hundreds of fighters equipped with fragmentation bombs also took part in these raids.
According to Luftwaffe reports, more than 1,800 Soviet aircraft were destroyed both on the ground and in the air on 22 June alone. But even in these conditions there were people who kept a "clear head". So, the commander of the Air Force of the Odessa Military District, Major General F. G. Michugin on the night of June 22 gave the order to disperse practically all the cars in the district at alternate airfields. As a result of the attack, the losses of the Odessa Military District amounted to only 23 aircraft, and the Germans themselves lost about the same amount. The district's aviation retained its combat capability and was able to provide worthy resistance.
And yet the Germans managed to almost completely destroy the small fleet of modern Soviet fighters concentrated on the border. And although organized resistance was not met by the Luftwaffe, on the first day of the war, Soviet fighters still managed to shoot down about 150 German aircraft. At the same time, the Germans were amazed at the number of rams used by Soviet pilots. Among others, two famous aces of that time were shot down: the commander of JG-27 Wolfgang Schellmann (26 victories) and the commander of the II group of JG-53 Heinz Bretnütz (37 victories). Both of these pilots were knight's cross. The death of such people on the very first day of the war led many German pilots to the idea that the march to the East did not promise to be easy at all. And yet, while the Luftwaffe went from victory to victory.
On July 15, 41, Werner Melders was the first of the German aces to reach 100 victories. The same result was achieved by Gunther Lutzow and Walter Oesau - on October 24 and October 26, respectively. They met almost no serious resistance, but carelessness often led to disastrous results. The fact is that the outdated I-16 and I-153 possessed, albeit one, but significant advantage - a smaller bend radius, the time of which was 11 seconds versus 18 - 19 seconds for the Messerschmit. And if the Soviet pilot possessed strong nerves and skill, he let the enemy go into his tail, let him get closer, and then immediately turned around, immediately meeting him "head to head" with fire from his cannons and machine guns. He himself, of course, also came under fire, but the chances in this case were approximately equal.
It was possible to defend effectively only by standing in a defensive circle, where each plane covered the tail of the next one in front. Here is how the Soviet ace, twice Hero of the Soviet Union, Arseny Vorozheikin, who fought in 1941 on the I-16, describes this tactical technique: “Our circle was like a rapidly rotating circular saw: you can't take it wherever you go. The planes, changing position, stretching in the right direction, sprayed machine-gun fire, and even rockets, in jets. "Messers", like pikes, rushed very close at high speeds and, each time bumping into the sharp teeth of the saw, bounced."
The I-16 had no other options for success. He could not impose a battle "on verticals" on the enemy and even simply break away from him due to lack of speed and low engine power. And yet aircraft of new types continued to arrive at the front.
The fighters I-16 and I-153 "Chaika" may have been the best in the world in 1935-1936, but by the beginning of the war, their time had irrevocably gone. With a maximum speed of 450 km / h, they simply could not compete with the Messerschmitts Bf-109E and F, which gained from 570 to 600 km / h. The main bombers DB-3, SB, TV-3 were also slow-moving, had weak defensive armament and low "survivability" and suffered huge losses from the very beginning of the war.
I-153 "Chaika"
The Yak-1, LaGG-3 and MiG-3 fighters had a completely modern design and good armament, but, developed before the war itself, were "unfinished" and by the summer of 1941 did not even pass the full range of factory tests, but nevertheless they were adopted for service.
Fighter LaGG-3
The Yak-1, for example, was adopted with 120 flaws. The same was the case with the LaGG-3, and only the MiG stood out favorably against this background. By the winter of 1941, almost all MiGs, as the most combat-ready, were sent to the armed formations of the Moscow air defense.
Fighter Yak-1
A fighter designed by Mikoyan and Gurevich could reach a speed of 640 km / h, but only at an altitude of 6-7 thousand meters. At low and medium altitudes, he was by no means so fast. Its armament was clearly insufficient: 3 machine guns and only one of them was a large-caliber one. The MiG was also extremely "strict" in management and did not forgive mistakes. Apparently, therefore, his "career" was short-lived and ended already in 1942. After all, the main criterion for Soviet fighters of that time was ease of control - there were few trained pilots, and even less time for study.
Fighter MiG-3
This requirement was met by the Yak-1 and partially the LaGG-3, which forgave the pilots for mistakes, but gave little chance of success in battle. LaGG-3 had an all-wood (!) Construction, and the spars - the main power elements - were also made of wood. The rate of climb and maneuverability were small, but the armament is quite at the level: one 20-mm cannon and two machine guns of 12.7 mm in the forward fuselage. However, he clearly lacked the power, and therefore in the aviation units he received the nickname "lacquered aviation guaranteed coffin."
Perhaps the most successful Soviet fighter at the beginning of the war was the Yak-1.
Although the skin of this aircraft was made of plywood and rag, the fuselage frame was made of welded steel pipes, which gave the entire structure a certain rigidity. The spars were still wooden, and the instructions for use contained a noteworthy prescription not to develop a dive speed in excess of 630 km / h, so as not to destroy the aircraft. However, this often happened simply because of overloads during the battle.
Messerschmitt Bf-109F
For comparison: "Messerschmitt" Bf-109F in the same situation "gave out" almost 100 km / h more. So the new Soviet fighters still could not provide the pilot with freedom of action in combat conditions, but now they could not only defend themselves, but also attack under certain conditions, using their only advantage over the Messerschmitt - better horizontal maneuverability in combat. " on bends ".
Meanwhile, 1941, a successful year for the Luftwaffe, was over. They did not manage to "wipe Moscow off the face of the earth". The Germans were able to allocate only 270 bombers to attack the Soviet capital, and this was not enough for effective action. In addition, they were opposed by air defense troops, which consisted of 600 fighters with the best pilots and more than 1,000 anti-aircraft guns. Those German aircraft that broke through the Soviet air defense system could not cause serious damage to the capital.
In 1942, the opposition of the Red Army Air Force, which had acquired a certain degree of organization, began to intensify. Much attention began to be paid to the construction of camouflaged airfields and the creation of false ones. The number of small-caliber anti-aircraft artillery has increased significantly. By the spring of 1942, Soviet industry was able to produce 1,000 aircraft a month, and this rate did not decrease until the very end of the war, although the quality of their manufacture remained low.
Due to the poor quality of the glazing of the aircraft cockpit, as well as due to the fact that it was jammed in combat during overloads, many pilots flew with open cockpits, or even removed the moving part of the "lantern" altogether. This innovation “ate up” from 30 to 40 km of the maximum speed, which was already low. But at least there was at least something to be seen around.
There have also been changes in tactics. The best commanders, such as Lev Shestakov, renowned hero of the Spanish War and an outstanding fighter pilot, introduced new tactics of battle formation. Shestakov arranged his aircraft in several tiers in height.
This formation allowed Soviet aircraft, which were inferior to the German ones in the rate of climb, not to allow the Messerschmitts to calmly make a combat turn after climb in order to dive for an attack. Then Shestakov successfully used this tactic in the battles over Stalingrad and on the Kursk Bulge.
In 1942, the main problem of the Soviet Air Force was the poor quality of pilot training. Young sergeants - graduates of accelerated courses of flight schools, who had no more than 5-10 hours of flight time on a combat fighter, died, as a rule, not having time to live up to the 10th sortie. Fighter air regiments, having barely arrived at the front, were immediately sent to re-form in view of the actual destruction.
The Germans had their own difficulties: the front was stretched as much as possible, and the number of pilots did not increase. And although there were no problems with the combat training of pilots, already in 1942 every German fighter pilot was forced to make 3 - 5 sorties per day against 1 - 2 for Soviet pilots. The main principle of the Luftwaffe was: "The better the pilot, the more he should fly." In addition, the Fuhrer ordered the capture of Stalingrad at any cost. And the price was high.
Wilhelm Crinius, the best performance expert of the JG-53 As Peak fighter unit of that period, with a total of 114 victories, recalled Stalingrad: “The enormous tension in the battles did not pass without consequences. In summer, the temperature often jumped to 38 - 39 °, severe exhaustion, loss of strength. There was no time for treatment or basic rest. In battle, overloads often made me sick, so I always took a uniform cap with me, which I used as a bag, after putting torn paper there. One of the sorties in those days stands before my eyes. We are escorting Ju-88s to Stalingrad, they are attacked by Russian fighters. The fight went on for a long time, I don't remember how it went. I remember later: I look at the ground and cannot find my bearings, even jump with a parachute. I remember this flight. Other pilots did not feel better."
The Germans did not manage to take Stalingrad, moreover, they suffered a crushing defeat, having lost about 200 thousand people in the "cauldron" of the encirclement.
The total losses of the Soviet Air Force in 1942 still significantly exceeded the German ones - 15,000 aircraft versus 5,000, but for the Germans even such losses were already difficult to bear. Moreover, instead of a "blitzkrieg" they got an all-out war of destruction. Soviet aircraft were gradually changing for the better. In the fall of 1942, and especially in the spring of 1943, new fighters Yak-9, La-5 and "Lendleus" American Bell P-39 Aircobra fighters began to arrive at the front. The new technology gave the Soviet pilots who had already gained experience much more opportunities.
La-5: the best fighter of its time
So at the beginning of 1943, the situation began to take shape not too comforting for the Luftwaffe. The new modifications of the Messerschmit Bf-109G and the very “fresh” Fokke-Wulf FW-190 multipurpose attack aircraft no longer had an absolute superiority over the last Soviet aircraft, and the losses among experienced pilots continued to grow. The quality of recruiting also began to decline due to the curtailment of the curriculum, and the front was an extremely brutal teacher. And yet, despite all the alarming tendencies, the Luftwaffe continued to be a formidable fighting force, and this was fully manifested in the famous air battles of 1943 over the Kuban and Kursk Bulge. The moment of truth was dawning for the Luftwaffe and the Soviet Air Force.
Focke-Wulf Fw 190-D9
The undeniable truth for a fighter pilot, which says that the best pilot in the worst car has more chances in battle against the worst pilot in the best car, led to the fact that in the hands of a real professional, the Yak-1 was capable of miracles.
The famous German "expert" (as the Germans called their aces) Herman Graf, who ended the war with 212 victories, recalled his most difficult battle on the Eastern Front, which took place on October 14, 1941 in the Kharkov region: his wingman Fulgrabbe. - Approx. author.) was given the task of blocking the enemy airfield. On the way to it, we noticed four Yak-1. Using the advantage in height, we quickly attacked the enemy …"
Three “Yaks” were shot down quickly, but that was not all: “Then the circus began. The Russian had a slight excess and was in control of the situation. So he abruptly fell onto the wing and began to cut off my corner - it was very dangerous, and I climbed up. But then the Russian went into an oblique noose and began to go into my tail. Sweat rolled down my body. I make a coup and, trying to break away, I fall down, the speed grows madly. The maneuvers follow one after the other, but all are unsuccessful. The fight reaches its climax.
The Russian lagged behind a little, and I, using the advantage in height, flipped over the wing to go into his forehead. He gives a short line and rolls aside. It all starts all over again. Deadly tired. Thought is frantically looking for a way out of this situation. The arms and legs are automatic. In another wild whirlwind, another 10 minutes pass. I mentally praise myself for paying a lot of attention to aerobatics, otherwise I would have been in the next world. A few minutes later, a red light comes on - the gasoline is running out. Time to go home! But this is easier said than done, we still have to break away from the Russian. With an energetic coup I tumble down and at full speed I go towards the front. The Russian pursues me, but soon falls behind.
On the last drops of fuel, I land at my airfield, stalling on the run. Lucky. I don't get out of the cab for a long time - I have no strength. Pictures of the recent fight are constantly flashing through my head. It was the enemy! I come to the conclusion that on the whole I lost the battle, although I cannot reproach myself for gross mistakes. The Russian turned out to be stronger than me."
Liberators. Fighters
It was the spring of 1943. Soviet troops seized a bridgehead on "Malaya Zemlya" near Novorossiysk. In the Caucasus, the Red Army is confidently moving forward, preparing to break through the Blue Line, a powerful system of German fortifications in the lower reaches of the Kuban. In the upcoming operation, a special role is assigned to Soviet fighter pilots. It was they who had to put an end to the domination of German aviation in the skies of the Kuban.
Before the war in the USSR, only film actors could compete with the popularity of pilots. Young people were literally eager to conquer the sky, practicing in flying clubs. The air force grew in size. But the first blow of German aircraft on June 22, 1941, most of the Soviet airfields and aircraft were disabled. The pilots lacked not only machines, but also experience in air combat. It was especially hard for the Soviet fighters in the skies of the Battle of Rzhev, where they clashed with the German aces of Melders' squadron. The turning point in the situation was outlined only by the end of 1942. Soviet pilots began to switch to German combat tactics, to master new types of aircraft - Yaki, LaGGi, MiGi.
The series details the various types of German and Soviet fighters during the war. Veterans will share their memories of the everyday life of this kind of troops: what they flew in and how, about "free hunting", about rewards for the downed enemy plane, about the battle in the air of Taman.
A separate part of the film is devoted to the history of the Order of Lenin.
