“The government abolishes secret diplomacy, for its part expressing a firm intention to conduct all negotiations completely openly in front of all the people, proceeding immediately to the full publication of secret treaties confirmed or concluded by the government of landowners and capitalists from February to November 7 (October 25) 1917. The entire content of these secret treaties, since it is aimed, as in most cases, to provide benefits and privileges to Russian landowners and capitalists, to maintain or increase the annexations of the Great Russians, the government declares unconditionally and immediately canceled."
Decree of the Soviet government of November 8 (October 26) 1917
“And everyone who hears these words of Mine and does not fulfill them will be like a foolish man who built his house on the sand; and the rain fell, and the rivers overflowed, and the winds blew, and beat on that house; and he fell, and his fall was great."
Matthew 7:26, 27
Everything secret becomes clear
On May 31, 2019, a very important event took place in our country, namely, on the website of the Historical Memory Foundation, a document of exceptional importance was finally published - a scanned original of the Non-Aggression Pact between the USSR and Germany and, most importantly, an additional secret protocol to it … They were provided by the Historical and Documentary Department of the Russian Foreign Ministry.
At the conclusion of the Soviet-German treaty. In the photo, from left to right, standing: Head of the Legal Department of the German Foreign Ministry Friedrich Gauss, German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop, Secretary of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Joseph Stalin, USSR Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov
Why is this so important? At one time V. I. Lenin said very correct words about the state: "It is strong when the masses know everything, they can judge everything and go for everything consciously" (Lenin, Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets. Vol., Vol. XXII. Pp. 18-19). However, in our history after 1917, we have often encountered (and continue to encounter) such "moments" when the elite of the country endowed with power seemed to follow Lenin's behests in words, but in fact acted secretly from the people and hid a very important information for him. And there is no information - there is no conscious attitude to certain events, there is no adequate conscious reaction to them! For example, the very existence of an additional protocol to the well-known Pact was constantly denied by the Soviet side, even when its German copy was published in the West.
But you can't hide an sewn in a sack. Information about the existence of such a protocol was seeping into society, causing rumors, gossip and speculation and undermining confidence in the authorities. But it has been proven that it is the informational foundation of society that is extremely important for the normal functioning of society, and its loosening leads to grave consequences.
So let's get to know these important documents again and look at them with our own eyes. Now it's finally possible! But I would like to start my story about these documents with a short introduction about the attitude to secret diplomacy of our revolutionaries of 1917, headed by V. I. Lenin at the very, so to speak, dawn of Soviet power.
Bomb of the Soviets
And it so happened that the activities of the Soviet government began not only with decreeing the most important decisions to end the war and solving the agrarian question in Russia, but also with the publication of secret documents of the tsarist and Provisional governments, since the very first peace decree directly spoke of the abolition of secret diplomacy. In just 5-6 weeks, seven collections were published at once, revealing all the behind-the-scenes activities of the former Russian diplomacy. At first, copies of documents were printed in newspapers. This was how the secret agreement between Japan and Tsarist Russia of July 3 (June 20) 1916 was disclosed, according to which both sides agreed to oppose any third power that would try to infiltrate China. As for the collections, they contained the texts of the agreements concluded in 1916 between England, France and the tsarist government … on the partition of Turkey; on the payment of money to Romania for participating in the war with Germany; the military convention between France and Russia in 1892; the Russian-English secret treaty and the convention of 1907, the Russian-German treaty, with the signatures of Nicholas II and Wilhelm II, 1905 on a defensive alliance and much else, just as impartial. In total, more than 100 treaties and various other documents of a diplomatic nature have been published.
In the West, the publication of these classified documents has provoked mixed reactions. The Social Democrats and pacifists welcomed her in every possible way, but the Entente governments remained silent and even tried to accuse the Soviet government of forgery. And how can we not recall the words of the British public figure Arthur Ponsonby, who said: "It would be better not to come out with false declarations, which inevitably led to an accusation of hypocrisy against us." And they summoned another, especially when all these collections of documents came to the West and were republished there.
A very common practice
Nevertheless, as one old Russian proverb says, the body is swollen and the memory is forgotten. Already in 1920-1930, all diplomatic practice returned to normal, although in the USSR the memory of the Leninist principles of diplomacy taken upon itself and the negative attitude towards secret diplomacy undoubtedly remained.
At this time, various countries concluded a number of pacts aimed at preventing a new war. It:
• Soviet-French non-aggression pact (1935).
• Non-aggression pact between Poland and the Soviet Union (1932).
• Anglo-German Declaration (1938).
• Franco-German Declaration (1938).
• Non-aggression pact between Germany and Poland (1934).
• Non-aggression pact between Germany and Estonia (1939).
• Non-aggression pact between Germany and Latvia (1939).
• Non-aggression pact between Germany and the Soviet Union (1939).
• Pact of neutrality between the USSR and Japan (1941).
• Treaty on non-aggression and on the peaceful settlement of conflicts between Finland and the Soviet Union (1932).
Germany on April 28, 1939 also proposed to conclude similar non-aggression treaties for Finland, Denmark, Norway and Sweden. But Sweden, Norway and Finland refused this offer. Thus, it hardly makes sense to speak of the Soviet-German pact as something out of the ordinary: it is obvious that in those years it was a widespread practice.
So the Non-Aggression Pact between Germany and the Soviet Union, called the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact (after the names of its main signers), signed on August 23, 1939, fits well into the general scheme of these agreements. With one single exception … The fact is that a secret additional protocol was attached to it, affecting the interests of a third party without its appropriate notification. It is clear that for a long time its existence and content remained a secret behind seven seals, although rumors about the existence of some additional secret agreements between Germany and the USSR appeared very soon after the signing of this treaty. This was followed by the publication of its text in 1948 based on photocopies, and in 1993 - according to its discovered originals. The USSR denied the very existence of such a document until 1989.
Whoever gives cheaper, so the best bargaining goes
In Soviet historiography, including the memoirs of Marshal Zhukov and aircraft designer Yakovlev, the negotiations between the USSR, England and France, which began in April 1939 and in fact preceded the signing of the Soviet-German pact, were for a long time viewed only as a “smoke screen”, behind which “the bad West And, above all, the malevolent British, sought to confront Germany and the USSR. However, it is known that already on May 24, it was Great Britain that was the first to make the decision to go to an alliance with the USSR, and on May 27, Chamberlain, fearing that Germany would be able to win the USSR over to its side, sent an instruction to Moscow to the British ambassador, in which he was instructed to agree to discussion of a mutual assistance pact, as well as discussion of a military convention and possible guarantees for those from states that might be attacked by Germany. At the same time, the Soviet proposals made at the negotiations on April 17 were taken into account in the Anglo-French project.
However, on May 31, at a session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Molotov criticized Great Britain and France, which seem to make concessions, but do not want to give guarantees to the Baltic states. Therefore, Molotov said that "we do not at all consider it necessary to abandon business ties" with Germany and Italy. That is, a signal was given to all interested parties: whoever gives more will sign an agreement.
The draft agreement of May 27 (with new Soviet amendments as early as June 2) provided for its entry into force under the following circumstances:
- when one of the European states attacked (of course, Germany was meant) on one of the parties that signed the treaty;
- in the event of a German attack on Belgium, Greece, Turkey, Romania, Poland, Latvia, Estonia or Finland;
- and also if one of the contracting parties is involved in a war due to assistance provided at the request of a third country.
On July 1, Great Britain and France agreed to give guarantees to the Baltic states as well (as the Soviet representatives insisted on in the negotiations), and on July 8, they considered that the treaty with the USSR had basically been agreed upon. Here again new proposals from the USSR followed, but on July 19 the British government decided to agree to any negotiations, just to hinder the Soviet-German rapprochement. It was hoped to drag out the negotiations until autumn, so that Germany, due to weather conditions alone, would not dare to start a war. On July 23, it was decided to start negotiations between the military missions before the signing of a political agreement. But even these negotiations were slow due to the lack of trust of the participants in each other.
Meanwhile, on July 1, Moscow proposed to Germany to prove the seriousness of its approach to improving relations with the USSR by signing an appropriate treaty. On July 3, Hitler said yes, so now all that remained was to balance the interests of the parties. On July 18, Germany received a list of possible deliveries of products from the USSR, but a month later (August 17) Germany announced that it accepts all the proposals of the USSR and, in turn, offered to speed up negotiations, for which Ribbentrop had to come to Moscow. As a result, on August 23, a seven-point non-aggression pact was signed at two in the morning in the Kremlin. There was also a meeting between Ribbentrop and Stalin, at which the latter, according to his personal translator V. Pavlov, said that this agreement needed additional agreements, about which we would not publish anything anywhere, after which he told him his vision of the future secret protocol on division of spheres of mutual interests of the USSR and Germany.
This was followed by a reception with abundant libations in the best traditions of Russian hospitality with numerous toasts, which lasted until five in the morning. They drank for Hitler, for the German people, in a word, everything was as usual in Russia, when the riding boyars and princes thought that their little business had burned out. Well, Hitler was extremely pleased with the message about the signing of the treaty, since he had long ago decided to attack Poland and his hands for this act of aggression were now completely untied for him. Well, he gave more, and in the end he received more. In addition, he knew in advance that all this was “not for long,” and if so, whatever he did after the signing of the USSR Pact was just a small temporary “difficulty”. Well, the Soviet-French-British negotiations were automatically curtailed after that. The USSR found itself an understandable and creditworthy ally, at least for a while. The Supreme Soviet of the USSR ratified the treaty a week after signing, while the presence of a "secret additional protocol" was also hidden from the deputies. And the very next day after its ratification, September 1, 1939, Nazi Germany committed an act of aggression against Poland.
Discussion of the consequences
Well, there were a lot of all the consequences of signing the Pact, and they were all different, and at different times different consequences played different roles, which makes it difficult to assess them. There are several points of view on the consequences of this Pact, both among domestic Soviet-Russian researchers and foreign ones. However, it makes sense for the time being to confine ourselves to a purely external review of the events that followed after its signing.
Let's start with a statement about him by M. I. Kalinin, who said: "At the moment when it seemed that the hand of the aggressor, as the Chamberlains thought, was already raised over the Soviet Union … we concluded a pact with Germany," which "was one of the most brilliant … acts of our leadership, especially Comrade. Stalin ". This statement characterizes our All-Union headman not from the best side, but what else could he say? It would be even strange … The fact is that there could be no talk of any aggression from Germany against the USSR, even in an alliance with Poland, the military potential of these two countries was not comparable to that of the Soviet Union. They could not attack the USSR even after the defeat of Poland, or rather, after him, since the autumn thaw and the Russian winter awaited him ahead. After the Polish campaign, Germany had only two weeks of bombs left, and the T-IV tanks in the Wehrmacht were counted almost by the piece. Here it is important to understand the following: it is beneficial (and possible) to frighten your people with the threat of war, since it is easier to control frightened people, but the country's leadership itself has no right to fall under the hook of its own propaganda!
Meanwhile, the USSR began not only trade deliveries to Germany, but also tried to demonstrate to her its "good attitude" in the cultural field. The film "Alexander Nevsky", which was released, was removed from the box office, articles about the horrors of the Gestapo were no longer printed in the newspapers, and the "cannibal", "bloody maniac" and "half-educated Hitler", as if by magic, became the "Fuhrer of the German nation" and " Chancellor of the German people. " Naturally, the cartoons of him disappeared immediately, and Pravda began to accuse France and England of fomenting the war and to publish articles about the starving British workers. Such a 180-degree turn, of course, did not go unnoticed by a certain part of Soviet citizens, but the vigilance of the "authorities" quickly sent "everyone who chatted" "where necessary." But on the other hand, the Soviet people clearly breathed more freely, and this is an indisputable fact.
But on the other side of Eurasia, the signing of the Pact led … to the fall of the Japanese government cabinet! Indeed, just at that time there were battles on the Khalkhin-Gol River, and the Japanese hoped for Germany as their ally and partner on the Rome-Berlin-Tokyo axis. And suddenly Hitler signs a treaty with the Russians, without even warning the Japanese! As a result, on August 25, 1939, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Empire of Japan, Arita Hachiro, protest against the German ambassador in Tokyo regarding the signing of this treaty. It said that "the treaty in … spirit contradicts the anti-Comintern agreement."But all these were empty words, because already on August 28, 1939, the Japanese government, which was striving for a war against the USSR, resigned.
The “Liberation Campaign” of September 17, 1939, which completely liquidated (and for the umpteenth time!) Polish statehood and caused in the West direct accusations of the USSR of an alliance with Hitler and of military aggression, was also perceived extremely ambiguously. On the other hand, the fact that our troops stopped at the Curzon Line, and the annexed territories were previously part of the Russian Empire, to a certain extent corresponded to the understanding of the situation by the governments of England and France, and therefore, in general, remained without any special consequences. The consequences of the Winter War with Finland were more serious: here we should mention the American embargo, the freezing of Soviet assets in US banks, and the exclusion of the USSR from the League of Nations. And nevertheless, even in this there was a certain positive moment, not obvious at that time, but then played into our hands after the German attack on the USSR.
The fact is that Western propaganda poured such a tub of dirt on the USSR after that, trying to present him as Hitler's ally in all his vile deeds, that after June 22, 1941, Germany's attack on "yesterday's ally" turned out to be the last stage of moral degradation. In the eyes of the peoples of the whole world, the USSR immediately turned into a victim of "the most heinous aggression", and the Pact … immediately became a comprehensible and necessary compulsory measure for everyone. That is, world public opinion first turned its back on us, and then abruptly turned its back on us! But, we emphasize that this all took place even before the "Secret Additional Protocol" became public …
Do not bring prices to the temple with a dog
As for the "protocol", it described the "boundaries of the spheres of interest" of the contracting parties "in the event of a territorial and political reorganization" of the Baltics and Poland. At the same time, Latvia and Estonia were included in the sphere of interests of the USSR, and the city of Vilnius (which at that time belonged to Poland) passed over to Lithuania, but in Poland the border of interests of the parties passed along the Narew, Vistula and San rivers. That is, although it was not said directly there, it was clear what was meant by the phrase "territorial-political reorganization" and it is clear that it could only be realized through war. The same was true of the very important issue of Poland's independence, according to the text of the protocol, by agreement of the parties, it could “be finally clarified” later. The USSR declared its interest in Bessarabia, while Germany declared its lack of such interest. That is, the two countries behind the backs of third countries agreed, bashfully avoiding details, on the annexation of the territories of several independent countries at once, and this could only be achieved through war. The document did not specify who will start this war and who will end it. It was only about where the victorious armies of "brothers in arms" would eventually have to stop.
It turns out that the USSR, which had previously proclaimed its rejection of annexations and secret diplomacy in public, out of necessity … returned to this "tsarist" policy again, which was in clear contradiction with the theory and practice of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine, that is, with the ideology proclaimed from high tribune, and from the pages of the newspaper "Pravda". That is, if we do not have an ideology as such, and we proclaim only, so to speak, the primacy of universal human values, then this is one thing, and why not grab on the occasion of a foreign land? But if we put the primacy of building a society of social justice at the forefront, then we should really be an example in everything and … "do not bring prices to the temple with a dog!"
It is clear that at that time our country probably had no other choice. Had it not been for this protocol, Hitler would not have started a war with Poland, we would not have entered Western Ukraine and Belarus, we would not have started a war with Finland, and as a result … world public opinion might not have turned in our direction, and so and would be left alone with Germany. But … this document should have been disavowed immediately after Stalin's death. And after all, the same Khrushchev had a convenient moment for this: the 20th Congress of the CPSU, the condemnation of the "cult of personality", well, what was it worth to weave here this ill-fated protocol? And everyone, both in the country and abroad, would see in this a worthy return to Lenin's principles of foreign policy, that is, a condemnation of secret diplomacy. But this was not done, and it became a serious foreign policy mistake of the Soviet leadership for many years!
References:
1. The Soviet original of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was published for the first time // Lenta.ru. June 2, 2019.
2. Pronin A. A. Soviet-German agreements of 1939: origins and consequences (monograph) // International historical journal, No. 11, September-October 2000.
3. Khavkin B. On the history of the publication of Soviet texts of Soviet-German secret documents of 1939-1941. Forum of Contemporary Eastern European History and Culture. - Russian edition. No. 1, 2007.
4. Doroshenko V. L., Pavlova I. V., Raak R. Ch. Not a myth: Stalin's speech on August 19, 1939 // Questions of history, 2005, no.
