Tank battles between Soviet and German tankers in October 1941 near Mtsensk with the use of T-34 tanks, according to the German General Müller-Hillebrand, radically changed the tactics of the German tank forces. What influenced the opinion of the "invincible" German generals so much?
Failures of Soviet tankers at the beginning of the war
T-34 tanks fought from the first days of the war, before the war, 1,227 tanks were fired, and they were primarily equipped with mechanized corps stationed near the western border, and they immediately had to engage in battle with the Germans and incur heavy losses. The Germans were familiar with this car, but they did not hear vaunted reviews about it then. On the contrary, General Guderian wrote:
“The Soviet T-34 tank is a typical example of backward Bolshevik technology. This tank cannot be compared with the best examples of our tanks, made by us and have repeatedly proved their superiority."
The German generals very soon had to admit they were wrong, and the commander of the 4th tank brigade, Colonel Katukov, helped them in this. Building tactics on the indisputable advantages of the T-34, he clearly demonstrated that, in addition to possessing good equipment, one must be able to use it competently.
In the border battles of the first weeks of the war, almost all Soviet mechanized corps and tank divisions were defeated, and the equipment was destroyed by the enemy or abandoned by the retreating troops. This was mainly due to the inept and illiterate use of large mechanized formations, the mistakes of the Soviet command and the use of the blitzkrieg strategy by the Germans, in which large tank formations of the Wehrmacht, having broken through the front, went deep into the rear of the Soviet troops, took them in "pincers" and destroyed in boilers.
Tank brigade Katukov
By the fall of 1941, tank forces were being created practically from scratch and started with tank brigades. At the end of August, Katukov, the commander of the 20th Panzer Division, who lost all tanks in the battles near Dubno, was summoned to Moscow and appointed commander of the 4th Tank Brigade, which was being formed in Stalingrad.
The personnel of the brigade was mainly composed of tankmen from the 15th Panzer Division, who participated in border battles and appreciated the technology and tactics of the Germans. Under the leadership of Katukov, the tankers exchanged views, analyzed the enemy's actions and worked out the tactics of future battles.
Against the tactical techniques of the Germans, which assumed reconnaissance by force of motorized infantry, identifying firing points, inflicting an artillery or air strike and breaking through the destroyed defense with a tank strike, Katukov's tankmen developed tactics of a false forward edge, organizing tank ambushes and delivering unexpected flank attacks on advancing enemy tanks.
In addition, the tankers of the brigade participated in the assembly of T-34 tanks in the shops of the Stalingrad Tractor Plant, knew their design perfectly and objectively assessed the strengths and weaknesses of these machines.
The Katukov brigade arrived at the front with a well-coordinated tank unit, manned by personnel with combat experience, armed with perfect tanks, well mastered by the crews and well-tested tactics of fighting the enemy. So the Germans were taught a lesson by well-trained commanders and tankers who were eager for revenge for the battles lost at the beginning of the war. The brigade had 61 tanks, including 7 KV-1, 22 T-34, 32 BT-7, that is, half of the tanks were light BT-7.
The brigade arrived in Mtsensk on October 3 with the task of moving to defend the Eagle. By this time, Colonel-General Guderian's 2nd Panzer Group broke through the Soviet front on September 30, and on October 3, the Wehrmacht's 4th Panzer Division under the command of General Langerman captured Orel on the move, which there was no one to defend. Further Guderian planned to go to Serpukhov and Moscow, not expecting strong resistance from the Soviet troops. As of September 10, the 4th Panzer Division had 162 tanks, including 8 Pz-I, 34 Pz-II, 83 Pz-III, 16 Pz-IV and 21 command tanks. More than half were medium tanks Pz-III and Pz-IV, which should have competed with the T-34.
Which tanks opposed each other
The Soviet T-34 tank at that time was the most advanced tank, had good protection with 45 mm armor thickness, located at rational angles of inclination, a long-barreled 76, 2-mm cannon and a powerful diesel engine (500 hp). At the same time, the T-34 had a significant drawback, the tank had very poor visibility due to imperfect observation and aiming devices, an unsuccessful layout of the commander's seat and the absence of a commander's cupola.
German tanks were inferior to the T-34 in all characteristics. All of them were equipped with gasoline engines. Light tanks Pz-I and Pz-II had weak armor, only 13, 0-14, 5 mm, on the Pz-I the armament consisted of two machine guns, and on the Pz-II from a small-caliber 20-mm cannon. The Pz-III and Pz-IV medium tanks were also weakly armored. The armor was only 15 mm thick, on the Pz-III the armament consisted of a 37 mm cannon, and on the Pz-IV there was a short-barreled 75 mm cannon with low muzzle energy. All German tanks were not designed to fight enemy tanks, the T-34 was head and shoulders above the German tanks and, if used correctly, easily hit them from great distances. These advantages were used by the tankers of Katukov.
Tank battles near Mtsensk
The brigade commander in the afternoon of October 3 sent six T-34 tanks and two KV-1 tanks for reconnaissance to Oryol, which disappeared there. After the capture of Orel by the Germans, Katukov was ordered to prevent the breakthrough of the Germans to Mtsensk until the arrival of the corps of General Lelyushenko. Without entering into combat contact with the enemy, he lost eight tanks in Orel and ordered the brigade to take up defenses along the Optukha River five kilometers northeast of Orel, equipping a false front line of defense.
On the night of October 3, the brigade defeated German columns moving towards Moscow on the highway near the village of Ivanovskoye, destroying 14 light and medium tanks of the Germans.
Due to the autumn muddy roads and mud on the roads, Langerman's 4th Panzer Division, deprived of the ability to maneuver, moved on October 5 along the highway to Mtsensk in anticipation of a collision with the prepared defense of the Soviet troops.
Finding a false front edge, the Germans unleashed all the might of their artillery and aviation on it, and then let the tanks go. At Katukov's command, our tankers launched a flank attack on the advancing tanks, working in groups and concentrating their fire on one target. German tankers were not trained for tank duels, their tanks were destroyed one after another by the aimed fire of the thirty-fours. The light German tanks Pz-I and P-II were especially defenseless against the T-34. Having lost 18 tanks, the Germans retreated from the battlefield.
On the evening of October 5, the brigade changed the positions discovered by the Germans and retreated to the village of First Voin. The village had a good position for tanks, a number of heights provided a good view from the side of the German offensive, and the rugged terrain with ravines, groves and bushes provided good camouflage for tanks.
On the morning of October 6, German tanks began to advance on one of the heights and practically took it, but suddenly four T-34s of Senior Lieutenant Lavrinenko emerged from the grove and struck the flank of the advancing German tanks. Then they hid in a ravine and went out to the rear of the Germans and inflicted a concentrated blow on the tanks. Having lost 15 tanks in a few minutes, the Germans retreated back.
Lavrinenko's group showed the Germans a new type of tank-versus-tank battle, when tanks strike from an ambush and quickly hide in the folds of the terrain. This was a complete surprise for the Germans, for them tanks were a means of deep breakthroughs and actions in the rear of the enemy. Their armament and protection were not designed to fight enemy tanks, and for such battles, German tankers were not technically and tactically ready and suffered significant losses.
On the morning of October 9, German attack aircraft ironed out the empty trenches of the false forward edge of Katukov, and then attacked Sheino, trying to bypass the brigade's defenses from the flank. A group of T-34s under the command of Lavrinenko and a company of BT-7 tanks under the command of Lieutenant Samokhin were in ambush near Shein.
To help them, Katukov sent an additional group of tanks, they quietly bypassed the Germans from the flank and hit the German tanks. Caught in crossfire, the Germans lost 11 tanks and retreated again.
Without taking Sheino, the Germans bypassed the tankers on the right and broke through to the Bolkhov highway, creating a threat to encircle the defending troops. In the evening, Katukov gave the order to occupy a new line of defense already on the southern outskirts of Mtsensk.
On the morning of October 10, the Germans inflicted a diversionary blow on the southern outskirts of the city, and the main attack on the left flank, and by midday they broke into the city. Katukov's tankmen had to leave Mtsensk, but all the bridges, except for the railway, were captured. Katukov organized, with the help of sappers, laying the sleepers on the rails, and by morning all the tanks of the brigade had successfully left the city.
The skillful actions of the Katukov brigade thwarted the rapid advance of Langerman's 4th Panzer Division towards Moscow. In order to pass 60 kilometers from Orel to Mtsensk, the division took nine days, and during this time it lost in battles, according to Soviet data, 133 tanks and up to an infantry regiment. According to German data, it is much less, but it should be borne in mind that Katukov's brigade was retreating all the time and went to new lines of defense. The battlefield remained with the Germans, they restored the damaged equipment and returned it to service.
The brigade's own losses amounted to 28 tanks and 555 people killed, wounded and missing. As of October 16, the brigade had 33 tanks, 3 KV-1, 7 T-34, 23 BT-7.
The opinion of German generals about the October battles
Based on the results of the battles near Mtsensk, Guderian will write a report on the Soviet tank to Berlin, in which he will demand to change all German tank building.
“I described in understandable terms the clear advantage of the T-34 over our T-IV and gave the appropriate conclusions that were supposed to affect our future tank building. I concluded with an appeal to immediately send a commission to my sector of the front, which would consist of representatives of the Artillery and Technical Directorate, the Ministry of Armaments, tank designers and tank manufacturers … They would be able to inspect the wrecked tanks on the battlefield … and listen to advice … what should be taken into account in the design of new tanks.
In November, Guderian convened a meeting of German designers near Orel, which was also attended by Ferdinand Porsche. Guderian brought him to the battlefield at the First Warrior and offered to talk about Soviet tanks with the tankers of the 4th division. Those clearly said: make us a thirty-four.
In his memoirs, Guderian wrote about the events of October 6:
“The 4th Panzer Division was stopped by Russian tanks. And she had to go through a difficult moment. For the first time, the significant superiority of the Russian T-34 tanks was manifested. The division suffered significant losses. The planned rapid attack on Tula had to be postponed."
After the war, German General Schneider wrote:
“… German tanks fully justified themselves in the first years of the war, until at the beginning of October 1941 Russian T-34 tanks appeared in front of the German 4th Panzer Division east of Orel in front of the German 4th Panzer Division and showed our tankers, who were accustomed to victories, their superiority in armament, armor and maneuverability. The Russian tank was armed with a 76, 2-mm cannon, the shells of which pierced the armor of German tanks from 1500-2000 m, while German tanks could hit the Russians from a distance of no more than 500 m, and even then only if the shells hit the side and the stern part of the T-34 tank”.
German General Müller-Hillebrand emphasized:
“The appearance of the T-34 tanks radically changed the tactics of the tank forces. If until now requirements were made to the tank and its armament to suppress the infantry and the means supporting the infantry, now the main task was the requirement to hit enemy tanks at the maximum distance."
General Langerman left a rather detailed report on the October battles, in which he emphasized the absolute superiority of the T-34 and KV-1 over the Pz-III and Pz-IV medium tanks, noted the effective tactics of combat by Soviet tankers and the monstrous penetrating power of the T-34 cannon. He also rightly noted that the visibility from the tank on German tanks is better than on the T-34, thanks to the commander's cupola.
It's not the tanks that win, it's the people
Tank battles near Mtsensk forced the Germans to reconsider the tactics of using tanks and develop more advanced tanks. Already in 1942, a long-barreled 75-mm cannon was installed on the Pz-IV, the Pz-V "Panther" tank with a powerful 75-mm cannon was developed, in which many ideas from the T-34 were laid, and the heavy tank Pz-VI "Tiger "With an 88-mm cannon, superior to all tanks of that period in terms of firepower and protection.
So the skillful actions of the tankers of the Katukov brigade in the battles near Mtsensk made it possible to maximize the advantages of the T-34 tank and once again proved that technology does not solve everything, it manifests itself in the hands of real soldiers who know and know how to use it with dignity.
