The first decades after World War II were marked by a real revolution in naval affairs. The massive appearance of radars in all naval forces, the automation of anti-aircraft fire control, the appearance of anti-aircraft missile systems and anti-ship missiles, the appearance of nuclear submarines with an unlimited range, high speed under water, and the absence of the need to surface during a combat campaign in total changed the sea battle beyond recognition …
A little later, anti-ship missiles launched from aircraft, all-weather deck and base strike aircraft, air refueling, and long-range ground radars became a mass phenomenon.
The world has changed, and the fleets have changed with it. But has the ability of surface ships to resist aircraft attacks changed? Let's repeat, just in case, the main conclusions from the experience of World War II (see article "Surface ships against aircraft. World War II".).
So, an abbreviated quote from the first part:
In cases where a single surface ship or a small group of surface ships collides with large, well-trained aviation forces, which purposefully conduct a large-scale operation aimed at destroying these particular ships, there is no chance. The ship is slow and the planes that did not destroy it the first time will then return again and again, and with each attack, the ship will be less and less able to resist - unless, of course, it will not be sunk at all right away.
But in cases where a single ship or a group operating in the zone of enemy air supremacy, retain the surprise of their actions, they act according to a clear plan that makes it possible to use all the shortcomings of aviation as a combat means (using the time of day and weather, taking into account the reaction time of aviation to a detected warship when planning an operation and choosing the moments to change course, camouflaging when entering bases, high speed during the transition and unpredictable maneuvering, choosing a course unexpected for reconnaissance of the enemy after any contact with his forces, not only with aviation), have strong anti-aircraft weapons and a trained crew, observe discipline when using radio communications, have everything you need on board to fight for damage directly during the battle and after it - then the situation becomes the opposite. Air reconnaissance forces, small in number, are usually powerless to cause harm to such a ship, as are the shock squadrons on duty, raised on alert after its detection.
Even statistics say that in the overwhelming number of cases, when such "prepared" surface ships entered hostile waters, they won battles against aviation. The Black Sea Fleet is quite an example for itself, because every ship, even the one that was killed, first went dozens of times to places where the Luftwaffe could and did act freely.
This is how the correct conclusions sound about what we should learn from the WWII experience. This does not diminish the role of naval aviation, it does not diminish its danger for surface ships, and especially for supply ships, it does not negate its ability to destroy absolutely any ship, if necessary, or a group of ships.
But this shows well that she has a limit of capabilities, firstly, and that for success she needs to create a huge superiority in forces over the enemy, secondly.
This is how the real results of World War II look like in terms of the ability of surface combatants to conduct hostilities in an area where the enemy has the ability to use aviation or, in general, air superiority.
Are these conclusions true for the present? Fortunately, the emergence of nuclear weapons has saved humanity from the nightmare of all-planet full-scale wars. This, however, led to some virtualization of the combat capabilities of the fleets - we simply do not know what a serious naval war would look like with the use of modern technology. No teachings and no mathematical modeling will give such an understanding in full.
However, a number of countries have some combat experience of modern naval warfare. But before analyzing it, it is worth paying attention to military exercises - in that part of them, which would differ little from a real war, had it happened. First of all, this concerns the detection of ships, which in serious maneuvers is always carried out with the same exertion of forces as in a real war.
Let us ask ourselves the question: was it realistic for surface ships to elude aviation in the era of radars with a range of hundreds and sometimes thousands of kilometers? After all, if you turn your attention to the experience of the Second World War, then the key to the success of a surface ship is not only its air defense, but also the ability to be where the enemy does not expect and is not looking for it. No longer looking, or not looking yet, no difference. The sea is big.
Deception of the enemy, counter-tracking and separation
The article “How can a missile ship sink an aircraft carrier? A few examples examples of confrontation between missile ships and aircraft carrier formations were analyzed. Let us briefly list how surface ships that did not have air cover (none at all) managed during the exercises, in a situation as close as possible to combat, to elude the enemy, who used carrier-based aircraft to search for them, including AWACS aircraft.
1. Disguise as merchant ships. The URO ships moved along the trade routes, at the speed of merchant ships, without showing themselves to turn on the radar, in complete, as Vice Admiral Hank Masteen said, "electromagnetic silence." The radar was turned on only at the moment preceding the conditional launch of the missiles. Air reconnaissance, focusing on radar signals, could not classify the detected ships, mistaking them for merchant ships.
2. Dispersion. Admiral Woodward, who later commanded the British naval formation during the war for the Falklands, simply dispersed all his ships so that the American pilots from the aircraft carrier Coral Sea simply would not have time to “melt” (conventionally, of course) them all before dark. And at night the last "surviving" destroyer, the British … disguised as a cruise ship (see point 1, as they say). And in the end we came to the aircraft carrier at the distance of a missile strike.
3. The use of unexpected for the enemy, "wrong", tactical techniques, such for which you can get "scolding". During the conditional strike on the Eisenhower, Mastin commanded the Forrestal AUG. All the doctrinal guidelines of the US Navy, all combat training, all the experience of the exercises indicated that it was Forrestal's carrier-based aircraft that were to become the main striking force in the operation. But Mastin simply left on an aircraft carrier to an area where, from the point of view of performing a combat mission, his finding was completely meaningless, stopped flights, and sent missile escort ships to Eisenhower, which, again, were disguised in civilian traffic, focusing on passive means of detection and intelligence from outside sources.
Aviation lost in all cases, and in the case of the American exercises, it lost dry - the URO ships freely reached the range of a missile strike on an aircraft carrier and fired missiles at it at the moment when its deck was packed with aircraft ready for combat sortie. With bombs, with fuel … They did not wait for their target.
The British did not succeed dry. Of the entire strike group, one ship "survived", and if this attack had happened in reality, it would have been sunk by the escort ships. But - they would have sunk after the Exocets hit the aircraft carrier. Woodward simply did not have room to maneuver in that area, and the only way to get his way was to expose the ships to aircraft attacks, which he did. These teachings turned out to be prophetic - very soon after that Woodward had to expose his ships to real air strikes, incur losses and, in general, conduct a war "on the brink of a foul" …
But the loudest example was given by completely different teachings …
From the memoirs of Rear Admiral V. A. Kareva "Unknown Soviet" Pearl Harbor ":
Thus, we remained in the dark where the AUG "Midway" was located. It was only on Sunday afternoon that a report was received from our coastal radio detachment in Kamchatka that our posts mark the work of ships at the frequencies of the intra-squadron communication of the AUG "Midway".
It was a shock. The results of radio direction showed that the newly formed aircraft carrier strike force (Enterprise and Midway), consisting of more than 30 ships, maneuvers 300 miles southeast of Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky and conducts carrier-based aircraft flights at a distance of 150 km from our coast.
Urgent report to the Main Headquarters of the Navy. Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union S. G. Gorshkov makes a decision immediately. Urgently send the Patrol escort ship, three Project 671 RTM multipurpose nuclear submarines to monitor the AUS, organize continuous aerial reconnaissance, bring all the Pacific Fleet's naval missile aircraft to full readiness, establish close cooperation with the air defense system in the Far East, bring into full combat readiness of all parts and ships of the Pacific Fleet reconnaissance.
In response to such aggressive actions of the Americans, prepare the air division of naval missile-carrying aviation for departure in readiness, on Monday to designate an air-missile strike on the aircraft carrier formation. At the same time, multipurpose nuclear submarines with cruise missiles were also preparing to strike.
September 13, Monday. The Pacific Fleet reconnaissance will have to find the location of the AUS and direct the air division of the naval missile-carrying aviation. But at this time, a radio silence mode was introduced on the ships of the US aircraft carrier. All radar stations are turned off. We are carefully studying the data of the optoelectronic space reconnaissance. There is no reliable data on the whereabouts of aircraft carriers. Nevertheless, the departure of the MRA aviation from Kamchatka took place. To an empty space.
Only a day later, on Tuesday September 14, we learn from data from air defense posts on the Kuril Islands that the carrier strike force is maneuvering east of Paramushir Island (Kuril Islands), conducting carrier-based aircraft flights.
Example exercise NorPac Fleetex Ops'82 to some it may seem not entirely "clean" - after all, firstly, the Americans set up a whole AUG with the aircraft carrier "Enterprise" as bait - without this they would not have been able to hide the AUG "Midway" from our aerial reconnaissance. In a real war, such a trick would only work out during the first surprise strike, which in itself is very unlikely. Secondly, during the operation, the Americans actively used their aviation for misinformation, which by its actions created a distorted picture of what was happening in the Pacific Fleet intelligence.
But a specific episode with the withdrawal of an already united aircraft carrier strike formation with two aircraft carriers from a conditional strike by missile carriers from Kamchatka is exactly what interests us. A ship formation discovered by enemy reconnaissance must be attacked by its aviation. But by the time the aviation arrives, the ship's compound is not in place, and the aircraft radar is nowhere in the detection radius either. This very element, which the Americans showed us, was carried out out of connection with the presence of aviation in the strike formation. It could just as well have been done by connecting rocket ships.
How does this happen?
Those involved in the interpretation of intelligence in the service know how. At present, a ship connection at a great distance from the coast can be detected by optoelectronic space reconnaissance, over-the-horizon radars, aerial reconnaissance, surface ships, electronic and electronic reconnaissance means, in some cases, submarines. At the same time, the boat is extremely limited in the classification of such a contact, its hydroacoustics may simply not understand what they have heard, and the data transmission from the submarine will in any case be carried out with a planned connection, as a result of which the data will become very outdated. The boat, as a rule, cannot chase the "contact", this will mean the loss of stealth. The range at which it detects ships is greater than that of the ship's sonar systems, but much less than that of radar systems.
What can a group of surface ships oppose to such a detection? First, the orbits of satellites and the time of their flight over any part of the world ocean are known in advance. The same Americans widely use cloud cover maneuvers. Secondly, disguise as trade traffic is triggered against satellites and ZGRLS - ships are scattered among merchant ships, their formation does not bear signs of a battle formation, as a result, the enemy simply sees a breakthrough of the same type of signals on the route of intensive merchant shipping, and there is no way to classify them.
Again, the Americans understand that sooner or later their adversary, that is, we, will be able to obtain more accurate data on the reflected radar signal and analyze it, so they have used and are applying various tactical counter-tracking schemes for many years. For example, during the "window" between the passage of satellites, the aircraft carrier and the tanker already leaving the compound change places. The ship signatures are rendered similar by various methods. In a number of cases, it is possible with such methods to deceive not only reconnaissance on the "coast" but also the tracking ships hanging from the Americans "ha tail" - for example, it was in 1986 during the strike of the US Navy on Libya - the Soviet Navy simply lost an aircraft carrier, who participated in the strike, and reconnaissance was unable to track the rise of the aircraft.
Thirdly, against various types of radio reconnaissance, a retreat into the very "electromagnetic silence" described by Admiral Mastin and many others is used - it is impossible to detect the radiation of a target that does not emit anything. Actually, this is what they usually do when they hide.
Air reconnaissance is a much more obvious threat on the one hand - if the planes found a ship or a group of ships, then they found it. But on the other hand, they need to know where to look for the target. A modern combat aircraft, such as the Tu-95, is capable of detecting the signature of an operating shipborne radar more than a thousand kilometers from the ship - the tropospheric refraction of centimeter radio waves contributes to a very wide spread of radiation from the radar. But if the radar does not emit? The ocean is huge, where to look for targets among hundreds, if not thousands of similar to indistinguishable contacts, observed with the help of ZGRLS - is unclear. The sub is a risk - but in any kind of search, its target detection range in the open ocean is still insufficient, and the data quickly becomes outdated. For the effective use of submarines, you need to roughly know where the attacked target will be in the near future. This is not always possible.
If a ship formation is detected at sea, the latter can destroy enemy aircraft or ship, interrupting the transmission of data on the location of the formation to the enemy,after which it will be necessary to get away from the potential airstrike.
How to do it? A sharp change in course, in some cases dispersal of forces, departure from a dangerous area at maximum speed. When performing such a maneuver, the commander of the formation knows how long it takes the enemy for the formation to be attacked by really large air forces, large enough to destroy it. No Air Force or any naval aviation has the ability to constantly keep whole regiments of aircraft in the air - at all times, the air forces, which had the task of destroying naval formations, were awaiting an order to strike while on duty at the airfield, in "readiness number two." In another way, it is impossible, only individual units can be on duty in the air, in exceptional cases and for a short time - squadrons.
Next comes his majesty calculator. Raising a regiment on alert from readiness number two, its formation in battle formation and entering the desired course is ideally an hour. Next, the range from the airbases is taken, which the commander of the ship formation knows, the speed with which the enemy aircraft, according to past experience, goes to the target, a typical detachment of forces for additional reconnaissance of the target, the detection range of surface targets by the radar of enemy aircraft … and all, in fact, the areas to which it should go the ship group to avoid the impact is easily miscalculated. This is exactly how the Americans in 1982 and many times after that came out of the conditional attacks of the MRA of the USSR Navy. They went out successfully.
The task of the operation commander of the naval strike group ultimately boils down to the fact that at the moment when its location is supposed to be revealed by the enemy (and it will most likely be revealed sooner or later), be at such a distance from his airbases in order to have a reserve of time for getting out of the blow.
What happens if the exit from the blow is successful? Now the ship's strike group gets a head start in time. If the enemy has other air regiments, then now he will have to again throw part of his forces on aerial reconnaissance, find a ship group, raise strike forces, and all over again. If the enemy does not have other aviation forces in the theater of operations, then everything is even worse for him - now all the time that the strike forces of aviation will return to the airfield, re-prepare for a combat mission, wait for air reconnaissance data that are relevant exactly at the moment when the departure again it will be possible to fly out again to strike, the naval group will operate freely. And the only threat to it will be that the enemy's scouts will also be able to attack it upon detection, but then the question arises who will win - the ship is far from defenseless, the group of ships is even more so, and there are excellent examples of this from combat experience, which will be discussed below. This regiment of aircraft can, in theory, "crush" a ship group with a mass of air defense missiles, but a couple or two pairs of aircraft cannot.
Let's say the KUG won eight hours from one massive air strike failed by the enemy to a potential next one. This is at a good speed of about 370-400 kilometers, covered in any direction. This is the distance from Sapporo to Aniva Bay (Sakhalin), taking into account maneuvering. Or from Sevastopol to Constanta. Or from Novorossiysk to any port on the eastern part of the Black Sea coast of Turkey. Or from Baltiysk to the Danish coast.
This is a lot, especially considering that in fact a modern ship does not need to come close to the coast to attack a ground target.
But eight hours is not the limit at all. Another plane will require so much for one flight only. Without taking into account the flight time.
It should be understood that modern ships are armed with cruise missiles and, in principle, such a KUG can attack any airfield or any important radar station from a distance of "a thousand kilometers or more."An unfulfilled air strike for an air regiment may turn out to be the last mistake and after its landing at its home airfield, cruise missiles from ships that could not be destroyed will fall on it. And all kinds of ZGRLS are waiting for this immediately, long before the first rise of strike aircraft.
This is true of the ships of our adversaries; this is true of our ships. They can do all this, we can too. Such actions, of course, require extensive support - above all intelligence. They require excellent training of personnel - apparently superior to that of the personnel in the navies of most countries. But they are possible. No less possible than air strikes.
Of course, all this should not be understood as the guaranteed safety of surface ships from air attacks. Aviation may well "catch" ships by surprise, and then military history will be replenished with another tragedy such as the sinking of the "Prince of Wales". The likelihood of such an option is not at all zero, it is, frankly, high.
But the likelihood of the opposite option is not lower. Contrary to popular belief.
Combat experience. Falklands
But how do modern surface ships behave when attacked from the air? After all, evading a single departure of large enemy aircraft forces is one thing, but aerial reconnaissance can also be armed and can attack a detected target after transmitting information about its location. The duty unit, unlike the regiment, may well be on duty with missiles in the air, and then the strike on the detected ships will be delivered almost instantly. What does recent experience say about the vulnerability of modern warships to air strikes?
The only episode where such events took place in more or less massive numbers is the Falklands War.
It was the largest naval war since the Second World War, and during its course the naval forces of the parties suffered the largest ship losses in post-war history. It is generally accepted that in the Falklands, surface ships suffered unreasonably high losses from aviation, and, as many think, have almost proved that their time is over. Let's deal with this war in more detail.
The history of this conflict and the course of hostilities are set out in a mass of sources and in sufficient detail, but almost all commentators leave out of their consideration the completely obvious features of this war.
A Ship's a Fool to Fight a Fort This phrase is attributed to Nelson, although it was first recorded in one of the letters of Admiral John Fisher. Its meaning is that to rush with ships on a prepared defense (whatever is behind this word) is nonsense. And the British really did that. Their standard scheme was to first achieve supremacy at sea, then completely block the enemy from threatening the British naval forces, and only then land a large and powerful landing.
The war for the Falklands went exactly the opposite. The commander of the British strike force, John Woodward, was expressly prohibited from fighting outside of the zone that the Thatcher government wanted to limit the war to. Britain found itself in a politically difficult position and the entire burden of this situation fell on the Royal Navy.
Woodward had to storm the island in conditions when the enemy had a mass of air forces to protect them. Take with tight time limits, before seasonal storms hit the South Atlantic. Without resorting to blockade actions, or to "offensive mining" from submarines, attacking the enemy "head-on". He had to throw his ships into battle against the whole of Argentina, and not only (and not so much) of its fleet. This required such a specific step as the "Battle of the Bomb Alley" and it was this that largely entailed the losses that the British suffered in the end.
Let us clarify the question - how vulnerable to air strikes have surface ships proved to be, on the move in the open sea as a result of this war? We remember that today the main combat missions are from blockade to cruise missile strikes. Ships perform in the open sea, not somewhere under the coast. How was the British vulnerability in these conditions?
Excluding the ships covering the landing, Woodward's surface forces lost two ships to air attacks. One of them was the transport "Atlantic Conveyor" - a civilian ship built without any constructive measures to ensure survivability, had no means of protection against aircraft or missiles and was stuffed to the eyeballs with combustible cargo.
The transport was just out of luck. It was not equipped in a hurry with passive jamming systems, and the missile, diverted by a false cloud of targets from a real warship, deviated precisely to the transport and hit it. This case does not give us anything for assessing the survivability of warships, since the Atlantic Conveyor was not one, although it must be admitted that the British suffered enormous damage, and for the Argentines it was a major victory, which, however, did not save them.
And the British lost a warship on the move at sea … one - the destroyer Sheffield. Moreover, they lost it under circumstances that have not yet been fully clarified. Or rather, not fully disclosed. Therefore, we list the facts that we know about this sinking.
1. The ship's radars have been disabled. According to the official version - in order not to interfere with satellite communications. This version worries us a little, let us restrict ourselves to the fact that the ship's radars were turned off in the combat zone.
2. Command post "Sheffield" received a missile attack warning from EM "Glasgow" in advance - like all British ships at sea at that moment.
3. The officers of the Sheffield on watch did not react to this warning in any way, did not set the LOC, and did not even bother the ship commander. At the same time, there was more than enough time to set a false cloud of targets.
There is a so-called "human factor". It is worth noting that at that time the crews and commanders of the ships were exhausted by false alarms, and many did not believe Glasgow's warning. For example, the duty shift at the command post "Invincible". Perhaps that was the case at Sheffield. But the false targets had to be shot …
Thus, to summarize - the Argentines outside the "bomb alley", where Woodward deliberately framed his fleet "under fire" managed to destroy one warship. Due to the erroneous actions of his crew. And one vehicle that they weren't really aiming at, a missile aimed at it by accident.
Can this be considered proof that surface ships are doomed in air raids?
In total, the Argentine Super-Etandars made five sorties, one of which was jointly with the Skyhawks, fired five Exocet missiles, sank Sheffield and Atlantic Conveyor, in the last sortie a joint group of Super-Etandars and Skyhawks lost two aircraft downed (Skyhawks), and the last missile was shot down. For Argentines, these are more than good results. But they say very little about the vulnerability of ships. None of the ships that managed to set the LOC was hit, and as soon as the Exeter EM appeared on the arena, the attacking side immediately suffered losses. Sheffield would have been guaranteed to have survived if her crew had acted like any other British ship had done in that war. The Atlantic Conveyor would have survived had the British screwed the decoy launchers to it when refining it.
Note that the Argentines acted in very favorable conditions - the British ship radars and air defense systems had continuous technical problems, and the political restrictions imposed on the fleet made its maneuvers extremely predictable and the Argentines knew where to look for the British. It is also important that the Britons could not get the Argentine "Neptune", which provided aircraft guidance until May 15, 1982. They simply had nothing to do with it. It is also indicative how many actual combat missions against ships and vessels outside the Falklands Strait were able to make the Argentines.
All other battles between aircraft and warships took place in the Falklands Strait - a channel between the islands, 10 to 23 kilometers wide, surrounded by mountains and rocks.
These were ideal conditions for the attackers - a small space with a large number of targets, the always known location of enemy ships and the terrain that made it possible to stealthily reach the target - in a matter of tens of seconds before the bombs were dropped.
In contrast to the Argentines, Woodward's surface ships were actually trapped, they could not leave, there was nowhere to maneuver, and as luck would have it, there were massive air defense system failures. In the course of subsequent battles, situations when sailors, when repelling air raids, ran out onto the deck and fired at planes with small arms, were the norm. At the same time, the plan of the operation itself provided for the following. From the memoirs of John Woodward:
… I have invented the simplest plan possible, one that, if not excluding friendly firing, would at least guarantee that it would not happen often. We initially identified an area that covered the eastern part of the Falkland Strait from the northwest of the island to Fanning Point and the area around Carlos Harbor. I knew that within this zone would be basically all British troops, landing ships, ships, transports and warships. Above it was a "ceiling" ten thousand feet high, which formed a kind of massive air "box" about ten miles wide and two miles high. I ordered our "Harriers" not to enter this "box". Inside it, our helicopters could deliver anything from the shore to the ships and vice versa, but they must quickly hide whenever an enemy aircraft enters this area.
Only enemy fighters and bombers will have to fly in the "box" if they want to threaten a landing.
I decided that it would be more expedient to give our troops and ships complete freedom to shoot at any aircraft they found inside the "box", since it should only be Argentine. In the meantime, the Harriers must wait at a higher altitude, knowing that any aircraft flying out of the box must only be Argentine, since our aircraft are not allowed to enter there, and our helicopters are not allowed to take off from it. The most dangerous in this case was the situation when the "Mirage" enters the "box", pursued by the "Harrier".
Moreover, the latter could have been shot down by one of our frigates. Accident or even bad interaction is possible, but poor planning is unforgivable. Keep in mind that it only takes ninety seconds for the Mirage to cross the “box” at a speed of four hundred knots before it flies out on the other side with the Harrier diving like a falcon … I was just hoping for this is.
Thus, according to the battle plan, the surface ships were supposed to take the first blow of the Argentine aviation, inflict the maximum possible losses on the attacking aircraft, at any cost to disrupt the attack on the landing force and transport for it, and only then, when the Argentines, already freed from the bombs, would come out of the attack, the Harriers would come into play. The aiming of aircraft at the enemy was also to be provided by ships. Woodward, in his memoirs, writes in plain text - we fought a war of attrition against Argentine aviation. The ships in the strait were put under firing squad, with the task of preventing the landing of the landing, and if they "ended" faster than the Argentine planes, the war would be lost. A little later, when the British adapted to the situation, the Harriers began to intercept the Argentine aircraft even before they attacked the British ships. But at first it was not like that. On May 21, 1982, in the first half of the day, the British put on a "clean" experiment - they accepted a battle with aviation without air support, and having the Harriers' work to cut off the leaving Argentines - for all its importance, it had zero impact on the safety of ships under attack … Word to Woodward again.
On this day, the first morning cover flights were flown from the Entrim, located in the eastern part of the Falkland Strait, in the center of the amphibious
groups. Most of the cover planes returned to the aircraft carriers before the Argentines did anything in terms of attacks. For more than two hours after sunrise, the situation remained inexplicably calm. Then it all started.
The Macchi 339, an Italian lightweight two-seater naval attack aircraft (made in Italy), flew at its highest possible speed over the very waves along the northern coast and turned sharply into the narrow entrance of the Falklands Strait. The first ship he saw was Keith Leyman's Argonot frigate, and the pilot fired all of his eight 5-inch missiles at it, and as he flew closer, fired at him with a 30-mm cannon.
One missile hit the Sea Cat launcher and injured three people - one lost an eye, the other, a weapons master, was wounded by a shrapnel in the chest inches above the heart.
The attack was so sudden and swift that the raider safely disappeared in a southeast direction before any Argonot's weapons were aimed at him. As a result, a Blopipe missile was launched at the plane from the deck of the Canberra, the Intrepid launched a Sea Cat missile, and David Pentritt's Plymouth opened fire from a 4.5-inch gun mount. But McCee managed to get away, no doubt to amaze her high command with what she saw in the Carlos Bay area.
The central control center for Captain 2nd Rank West worked quickly. His two young weapons control officers, Lieutenants Mike Knolz and Tom Williams, had to get used to constantly switching from attack to defense in a very vulnerable position, far south of other ships. The ship's commander, who was previously a senior officer of the frigate's combat command, personally trained them. Now they opened fire on the enemy with a 4.5-inch gun mount and fired a Sea Cat missile, which forced the Argentine pilots to leave without harming us.
The first significant attack of the day began about half an hour after that at 12.35 pm. Three Israeli-made supersonic Daggers made their way to West Falkland from behind Mount Rosalia. They sank to a height of only fifty feet above the water and raced across the Falkland Strait between Fanning and Chencho Point, no doubt intending to attack the landing craft behind them.
This time we were ready. Argonot and Intrepid fired their Sea Cat missiles when the attacking Argentines were two miles from Carlos Bay. Plymouth opened the scoring first, shooting down the long-range starboard aircraft from this group with a Sea Cat missile. The pilot had no chance of escape. The second "Dagger" turned to the right of the missiles and was now flying through a gap in the defense. The next ship he saw was Bill Canning's Broadsward. The bomber rushed at him, firing at the frigate from a 30-mm cannon. Twenty-nine shells hit the ship. Fourteen people in the hangar area were wounded, and two Linke helicopters were damaged, but, fortunately, both of the bombs dropped by him did not hit the ship.
The third Dagger turned south and headed straight for Brian Young's Entrim. The ship was less than a mile off the rocky coast of Kota Island and three and a half miles south of Cape Cencho. The Argentine bomb, as it later turned out, was a thousand pounds, hit the flight deck of the Entrim, flew through the hatch into the aft part of the CS lag missile cellar, hitting two large missiles tangentially, and ended its rather long way in the water closet, known in the military - nautical jargon as "latrine". It was a miracle that neither the bomb nor the rockets exploded. An explosion in a rocket cellar would almost certainly have killed the ship. Several fires broke out, however, and the Entrim crew found themselves in a difficult position trying to deal with them. Commander Young set full speed north to get closer to Broadsward for cover and assistance. But he did not have time to get there - after six minutes the next Argentine blow fell on him.
This was another wave of three Duggers, flying in much the same direction as the first wave, heading over West Falkland.
They went directly to the damaged Entrim, where they tried to throw the Sea Slag missiles overboard in case fire came near them. In desperation, Entrim launched a Sea Slug missile, completely uncontrollable, towards the attacking Daggers, hoping to somehow influence them. Their Sea Cat system was disabled, but 4.5-inch gun mounts and all machine guns fired at the attacking aircraft.
One plane broke through and fired at the burning destroyer with its cannons, injuring seven people and causing an even bigger fire. The situation on the Entrim became dire. The second Dagger chose Fort Austin, a large supply vessel, to strike, which was very bad news for us as Fort Austin was completely defenseless against such an attack. Commander Dunlop ordered open fire from two of his submachine guns, and twenty-four other men from the upper deck of the ship spewed heavy fire from rifles and machine guns. But that was not enough, and Sam must have been preparing for the bomb when, to his amazement, the Dagger exploded a thousand yards away, struck by the Sea Wolfe of the Broadsword. The last plane again fired at Broadsward, but the thousand-pound bomb it dropped did not hit the ship.
The first time the "Harriers" worked to disrupt the attack only after 14.00. Before that, the ships had to fight alone, and even then, mainly Argentine planes made their way to the ships with bombs, and the ships mostly had to repulse their attacks themselves.
September 21st was one of the hardest days for the British. Of the seven warships that entered the battle, one - the frigate Ardent - was destroyed by the Argentines, the Entrim was seriously damaged and could not fire, but remained afloat and kept its course, the Argonot was seriously damaged and lost its speed, but could use weapons, two more ships had serious damage reducing their combat effectiveness.
And this despite the fact that the Argentines made fifty sorties against the British forces. In a narrow strait, where everything is in full view and there is no room for maneuver.
It should be understood that the only surface ship that was lost that day, the Ardent, perished due to an inoperative air defense system. The first strike, which did not destroy the ship, but cost it its combat capability, was missed precisely because of this, if the ship's air defense system was serviceable, the Ardent would most likely not have been lost.
In subsequent battles, the role of the Harriers grew steadily, and it was they who provided most of the losses of the attacking aircraft. If we single out from the general list of downed Argentine attack aircraft and fighters only those that died when the British repulsed attacks on their ships, it turns out that the Harriers shot down a little more than half of all these aircraft, and the ships - a little more than a third. The role of the Harriers in the depletion of the Argentine forces was thus extremely important, but it must be understood that they overtook most of their victims after they dropped bombs on British ships. Yes, and guided them to targets from ships.
Woodward's book is full of emotions and doubts that the British will be able to hold out, but the fact remains - they did not just hold out, they won, and won in a theoretically hopeless situation - a water area with a large lake in size, the enemy's numerical superiority in aviation and plainly inoperative air defense systems … And as a result, out of 23 URO ships that took part in the war on the British side, lost … 4. Less than 20%. Somehow this does not fit with the crushing role of aviation. At the same time, the performance of the Harriers should not deceive anyone.
Could the British have won ONLY with URO ships, without the support of the Harriers? With the existing plan of operation, they could not. Although the ships were successful in repelling attacks, the losses they inflicted were insufficient for the Argentine forces to dry up so quickly. They would have continued their attacks and it is not a fact that the British would not have run out of ships earlier. But this was provided that the plan of the operation would be the same, and that the landing zones would be in the same place, and that the landing pattern, in which it continued not only at night, but also during the day, would not change …
Generally speaking, such a plan, which would allow a landing operation without using the Harriers to protect the ships of the URO, was quite possible, simply not needed.
And of course, fantasizing about how things would go if the bombs of the Argentines were normally triggered, it is worthwhile to fantasize for the other side, and assume that the British had air defense systems and radars. It's more honest.
What did the Falklands War show? She showed that surface forces can fight against aircraft and win. And also that it is very difficult to sink a ship that is in the open sea on the move and is ready to repel an attack. The Argentines did not succeed. Never.
Persian Gulf
Air missile enthusiasts love to recall the American defeat of the Stark frigate by an Iraqi missile launched from an Iraqi plane, presumably converted into an ersatz missile carrier of the Falcon 50 business jet.
But you need to understand one simple thing - the US Navy's operational formation, which included the frigate, did not conduct military operations against Iraq or Iran. For this reason, the frigate did not open fire on the Iraqi aircraft when it was discovered.
Stark spotted an Iraqi plane at 20.55. In a real combat situation, at this moment the ship would open fire on the aircraft, and most likely the incident would have been exhausted at this - at the cost of either fleeing or shooting down the aircraft. But Stark was not in the war.
But the next year, another American ship turned out to be in the war - the missile cruiser Wainwright, the same one on which Vice Admiral Mastin practiced the use of anti-ship Tomahawks. Operation Praying Mantis, conducted by the US Navy against Iran in 1988, is mentioned in the article The Malicious Mosquito Fleet Myth … We are specifically interested in the following moment.
In the morning of April 18, 1988, the Americans, following the order to destroy the Iranian platform-bases in the Persian Gulf, which were used by the Iranians in raids on tankers, carried out the successive destruction of two platforms. In the morning, two Iranian Phantoms tried to approach the American destroyer McCromic. However, this time the Americans had the order to shoot. The destroyer took the fighters to escort the air defense missile system and they turned it away. The Americans did not launch missiles.
A few hours later, another American naval group consisting of the cruiser Wainwright, the frigates Badley and the Simpson came across the corvette Joshan. The latter launched the Harpoon anti-ship missile system on the cruiser, which the Americans safely deflected by interference and, in response to this attack, was sunk by missile strikes from the cruiser and the Simpson. And here the ship group was attacked from the air by a pair of Iranian Phantoms. It must be understood that the Iranians had a successful experience of attacking surface targets and guided missiles "Maverick". It is not known exactly what the planes were actually armed with, but they had the opportunity to cause serious damage to the ships.
But the American ships were not the same as the British ones. The cruiser took the aircraft for escort, one of the pilots was smart enough to turn it off, the second continued to fly to the target and received two anti-aircraft missiles. The pilot was lucky, his heavily damaged plane was able to reach Iranian territory.
What does this example show? First, that one should not draw far-reaching conclusions from the situation with "Stark". In a real combat situation, aircraft attempts to approach the ships look like this.
Secondly, the result of the collision of Iranian fighters with US Navy ships is an excellent illustration of what awaits both armed aerial reconnaissance and strike aviation units on duty in the air when attempting to attack surface ships.
It is also worth noting that the Americans were not at all afraid of a massive air raid from Iranian territory. And not only because of the aircraft carrier, but also because of the very perfect shipborne air defense systems for the late eighties.
Today the air defense system is much more dangerous.
TFR "Watchdog". Forgotten Soviet example
There is one now slightly forgotten, but incredibly instructive example of a real attack by Soviet bombers of a warship. This example is specific, because this ship was also Soviet. We are talking about the TFR "watchdog" project 1135, on which on November 8, 1975 there was a mutiny.
Most likely, everyone has heard the story of the communist mutiny on the "Watchdog", which was raised by the ship's political officer, 3rd rank captain Valery Sablin. Less is known about the details of the bombing that stopped the ship's departure from Soviet territorial waters and enabled the ship's commander to regain control of it. On the night of November 9, Sablin, who took control of the ship, took him to the exit from the Gulf of Riga. To stop the ship, it was decided to bombard it, for which one of the most combat-ready bomber units in the USSR Air Force, the 668th Bomber Aviation Regiment, armed with Yak-28 aircraft, was raised on alert.
Subsequent events perfectly show how difficult it is to attack a surface ship. Even when he doesn't resist. Even when it happens in their territorial waters.
From articles by Major General A. G. Tsymbalova:
The commander of the second (non-standard reconnaissance) squadron flew out for weather reconnaissance and additional reconnaissance of the target …
The target reconnaissance officer, as decided by the commander, took off on a Yak-28L aircraft, the sighting and navigation system of which made it possible, when a target was detected, to determine its coordinates with an accuracy of several hundred meters. But this is on detection. And the crew of the reconnaissance aircraft, having arrived at the calculated point of the ship's location, did not find it there and began to visually search for the ship in the direction of its probable movement.
The meteorological conditions of the autumn Baltic, of course, were not very suitable for conducting aerial visual reconnaissance: morning twilight, broken clouds of 5-6 points with a lower edge at an altitude of 600-700 m and thick haze with horizontal visibility no more than 3-4 km. It was unlikely to find the ship visually in such conditions, to identify it by its silhouette and tail number. Those who have flown over the autumn sea know that the horizon line is absent, the gray sky in the haze merges with lead-colored water, flight at an altitude of 500 m with poor visibility is possible only by instruments. And the crew of the reconnaissance aircraft did not fulfill the main task - the ship did not find it, the bombers with the task of warning bombing along the course of the ship, following it at 5- and 6-minute intervals, did not aim at it.
ERROR
So, the crews of the first two bombers went into the area of the alleged location of the ship and, having not received information from the reconnaissance aircraft, were forced to look for the target on their own using the RBP in the survey mode. By the decision of the regiment commander, the crew of the deputy commander for flight training began to search for the ship, starting from the area of its intended location, and the crew of the chief of fire and tactical training of the regiment (navigator - secretary of the regiment's party committee) - from the Baltic Sea adjacent to the Swedish island of Gotland. At the same time, the distance to the island was determined using the RBP, so that the state border of Sweden was not violated.
The crew conducting a search in the estimated area of the ship's location, almost immediately found a large surface target within the boundaries of the search area, approached it at a given height of 500 m, visually identified it in the haze as a warship of the size of a destroyer, and bombed ahead of the ship's course. trying to put a series of bombs closer to the ship. If the bombing had been carried out at the test site, it would have been assessed as excellent - the bombs fall points did not go beyond the mark of a circle with a radius of 80 m. But the series of bombs did not land in front of the ship's course, but with an undershoot along the line exactly through its hull. Assault bombs, when the rods hit the water, exploded almost above its surface, and a sheaf of debris ricocheted (water is incompressible) right into the side of the ship, which turned out to be Soviet dry cargo ship, which left the port of Ventspils just a few hours ago.
ORDER: PUNCH
The crew of the chief of fire and tactical training of the regiment, searching for the ship from the side of the island of Gotland, consistently detected several groups of surface targets. But, remembering the failure of his comrade, he descended to a height of 200 m and examined them visually. Fortunately, the weather has improved somewhat: the haze has slightly dissipated and the visibility has become 5-6 km. In the absolute majority, these were the vessels of fishermen who went out to sea after the holidays to fish. Time passed, but the ship could not be found, and the commander of the regiment, with the consent of the acting director. The commander of the air army decided to increase the efforts of the regiment control crews in the air with two crews of the first squadron, who started the engines and began taxiing to the launch site.
And at this time in the situation, something has changed dramatically. I think that the ship under the control of Sablin approached the border of the territorial waters of the Soviet Union, which the pursuit ships reported to the command. Why these ships and the headquarters of the Baltic Fleet did not carry out target designation for the Air Force aircraft during the first sorties, I can only speculate until now. Apparently, until this time, the 668th bap was not considered as the main force capable of stopping the rebel ship. And when the ship approached neutral waters and the final decision was made to destroy it by any combat-ready forces, the regiment found itself in the center of the events.
Be that as it may, the acting the commander of the air army suddenly ordered the entire regiment to be raised as soon as possible to strike at the ship (we still did not know the exact location of the ship).
One clarification needs to be made here. At that time, the Air Force adopted three options for the departure of regiments on a combat alert: to perform a combat mission within the tactical range of the aircraft (in accordance with the developed planned flight schedule, what happened that day); with redeployment to operational airfields (GSVG) and recovery from a sudden enemy attack on the airfield (takeoff without a suspension of ammunition, in staggered fashion, from different directions to watch zones in the air, followed by landing at its own airfield). When exiting from under the impact, the first to take off was the squadron whose parking was closest to either end of the runway (runway), in the 668th bap it was the third squadron. Behind it, the first squadron should take off from the opposite direction (just from the direction from which the flights were carried out that ill-fated morning) and in the third turn the second squadron of jammers (non-standard reconnaissance squadron) should take off.
The commander of the third squadron, having received the order to take off the squadron according to the option of getting out of the strike, taxied to the runway as soon as possible, lining up another 9 aircraft in front of the runway, and immediately began takeoff when the runway was occupied by two planes of the first squadron. A collision and a plane crash right on the runway did not happen only because the commander of the first squadron and his wingman managed to stop the takeoff at the initial stage and clear the runway.
The head of the flight at the control tower (KDP), being the first to understand the absurdity and danger of the current situation, forbade anyone to take off without his permission, thereby incurring a storm of negative emotions from the regiment commander. To the credit of the old and experienced lieutenant colonel (who was no longer afraid of anyone or anything in his life), who showed firmness, the takeoff of the regiment to perform a combat mission acquired a manageable character. But it was no longer possible to build the regiment's battle order developed in advance in the air, and the planes went to the strike area interspersed on two echelons with a minute interval on each. In fact, it was already a flock, not controlled by squadron commanders in the air, and an ideal target for two shipborne missile defense systems with a 40-second firing cycle. It can be argued with a high degree of probability that if the ship had really repelled this air strike, then all 18 aircraft of this "order of battle" would have been shot down.
ATTACK
And the plane, searching for the ship from the side of the island of Gotland, finally found a group of ships, two of which on the RBP screen looked larger, and the rest lined up like a front. Having violated all the prohibitions not to descend below 500 m, the crew passed between two warships at an altitude of 50 m, which he defined as large anti-submarine ships (BOD). There was 5-6 km between the ships, on board one of them the desired side number was clearly visible. The regiment's command post immediately received a report on the azimuth and distance of the ship from the Tukums airfield, as well as a confirmation request for its attack. Having received permission to attack, the crew performed a maneuver and attacked the ship from a height of 200 m in front of the side at an angle of 20-25 degrees from its axis. Sablin, controlling the ship, competently thwarted the attack, vigorously maneuvering towards the attacking aircraft to a heading angle equal to 0 degrees.
The bomber was forced to stop the attack (it was unlikely to hit a narrow target when bombing from the horizon) and with a decrease to 50 m (the crew always remembered about two OSA-type air defense systems) slipped right over the ship. With a small climb to an altitude of 200 m, he performed a maneuver called in the Air Force tactics "a standard 270-degree turn", and attacked the ship again from the side from behind. Quite reasonably assuming that the ship would exit the attack by maneuvering in the opposite direction from the attacking aircraft, the crew attacked at such an angle that the ship did not have time to turn around to the aircraft's heading angle equal to 180 degrees before dropping the bombs.
It happened exactly as the crew expected. Sablin, of course, tried not to substitute the side of the ship, fearing top-mast bombing (but he did not know that the bomber did not have the bombs that are needed for this method of bombing). The first bomb of the series hit right in the middle of the deck on the ship's quarterboard, destroyed the deck covering during the explosion and jammed the rudder of the ship in the position in which it was. Other bombs of the series fell with a flight at a slight angle from the axis of the ship and did not cause any damage to the ship. The ship began to describe wide circulation and stalled.
The crew, having carried out the attack, began to climb sharply, keeping the ship in sight and trying to determine the result of the impact, when they saw a series of signal flares fired from the attacked ship. The report at the command post of the regiment sounded very briefly: it was launching missiles. On the air and on the command post of the regiment, a dead silence was instantly established, because everyone was waiting for the launches of the missile defense system and did not forget about it for a minute. Who got them? After all, the convoy of our single planes had already approached the point where the ship was located. These moments of absolute silence seemed to me personally a long hour. After some time, a clarification followed: signal flares, and the ether literally exploded with a discordant hubbub of crews trying to clarify their combat mission. And at this moment again the emotional cry of the crew commander, who is above the ship: but not because it worked!
What can you do, in war, as in war. It was the first crew of the regiment's column that jumped out onto one of the pursuit ships and immediately attacked it, mistaking it for a rebellious ship. The attacked ship dodged the falling bombs, but responded with fire from all its automatic anti-aircraft guns. The ship fired a lot, but by, and this is understandable. Border guards hardly ever fired at a "live", skillfully maneuvering plane.
It was only the first bomber of 18 in the regiment's column that attacked, and who will be attacked by the rest? At this point in time, no one doubted the pilots' determination: both the rebels and the pursuers. Apparently, the naval command asked itself this question in time, and found the right answer to it, realizing that it was time to stop this bacchanal of strikes, in fact, "organized" by them.
Once again, the ship did not resist and was in the territorial waters of the USSR. Its coordinates, course and speed were transmitted to the strike aircraft without delay. At the same time, the mere fact of an emergency departure of the regiment to strike in a real combat situation and several mistakes in organizing the departure almost ended in disasters both on takeoff and over the sea. Miraculously, "their" ships were not sunk. Miraculously, not a single plane was shot down by the fire of the border guards. This, by the way, is the usual military chaos, an inevitable companion of a sudden outbreak of hostilities. Then everyone has a “hand”, and he disappears, regiments and divisions begin to work with the precision of a well-oiled mechanism.
If the enemy gives time.
You have to understand - in a real combat situation, if necessary, to ensure a strike on real enemy ships, it would be the same - both a failure during takeoff, and a consistent approach to the target by separate units and squadrons, with the shooting of attacking aircraft by the ship's air defense system, and the loss of the target, and strikes against to their own. Only the losses from the ship's air defense systems would be real - the enemy would definitely not feel sorry for anyone. At the same time, the hypothetical presence of anti-ship missiles on the taken off planes in itself would not do anything - the aviation anti-ship missile system captures the target on the carrier, in order to launch it, the carrier must find the attacked object and correctly identify it. And this did not work out in the described combat episode, and for objective reasons.
This is how strikes on surface ships look like in the "inside" of the real world.
Conclusion
Russia, in terms of its naval power, is entering a very dangerous situation. On the one hand, the Syrian operation, the confrontation with the United States in Venezuela, and the intensification of Russian foreign policy in general, show that Russia has a rather aggressive foreign policy. At the same time, the navy is an extremely important and often irreplaceable tool. So, without the intensive combat work of the Navy in 2012-2015, there would be no operation in Syria.
But by conducting such actions, the Russian leadership allowed a critical-scale disorganization of naval development, from shipbuilding to the collapse of adequate organizational and staff structures. In such conditions, the rapid development of the Navy is impossible, and demands from the Russian fleet will soon begin as from the present. So, there are no guarantees that the Navy will not have to conduct full-scale combat operations outside the zone of action of coastal fighter aircraft. And since the Navy has one aircraft carrier, and with unclear prospects, we must prepare to fight with what we have.
And there are "different-caliber" ships with guided missile weapons.
Examples from the combat practice of both World War II (including domestic experience) and wars and combat operations of the second half of the last century tell us that in some cases, basic aviation is powerless over surface ships. But in order for the enemy aircraft to repeatedly be unable to harm our ships, the latter must act flawlessly, maneuver so that many times faster, but heavily limited in fuel aircraft over and over again miss the ship's group, giving it a head start in time and the ability to hit airfields and other objects with your cruise missiles.
We need reconnaissance that can warn ships in advance about the rise of enemy aircraft, we need super-powerful naval air defense systems that can enable ships to repel at least one massive air raid, we need AWACS helicopters that could be based on frigates and cruisers, we need real, without "show-off" training to this kind of action. Finally, we need a psychological readiness to undertake such risky operations, and we need the ability to cut off unnecessarily risky and hopeless options for actions from just moderately risky ones. It is necessary to learn how to deceive the enemy who has perfect intelligence and communications systems and dominates the sea. Not having an aircraft carrier fleet, not being able to quickly create it, not having bases all over the world from where the base aircraft could cover the ships, we will have to learn to do without all these (important and necessary, in general) things.
And sometimes it will be quite possible, although it is always very difficult.
