Interest in the history of the war has always been great, and so much has been written on the topic of its beginning that the question involuntarily arises: what new can be said about this? Meanwhile, there are still questions that, for various reasons, have not received a clear explanation. For example, there is still debate about whether the Soviet Union was ready for war or whether the German attack took it by surprise.
It would seem that the question is clear, and V. M. Molotov, in his historic speech at noon on June 22, 1941, stated that the attack was unparalleled treachery. On this basis, the belief of historians has grown that the attack, of course, was sudden and even for some time caused some confusion among the leadership.
True, in recent years they no longer talk about the confusion of the leadership, but the thesis of surprise is still widespread.
Only you cannot agree with him. The point here is not even that the USSR was preparing for war, that the inevitability of war was in the air, that intelligence reports were coming in, etc. Numerous facts indicate that the beginning of the war was not entirely unexpected, not only for the military in the border districts, but even for the rear areas located far from the borders. There, already in the first days of the war, a vigorous mobilization activity unfolded.
In the literature, the reaction of the people to the announcement of the beginning of the war on June 22, 1941 is depicted in exactly the same way: a silent meeting at the loudspeakers, then a short rally, after which the people massively go to besiege military enlistment offices, demonstrating a great patriotic impulse.
So the metallurgist of the Kuznetsk Metallurgical Plant, Alexander Yakovlevich Chalkov, recalls how he was going to go fishing on a Sunday, but this peaceful occupation was interrupted by a message about the war. After listening to Molotov's statement, the following happened: “And the first thing that we, steelmakers, did was a continuous avalanche moved to the party committee to enroll in volunteers. Hundreds of my comrades have already drawn up documents at the military registration and enlistment office to be sent to the front. I was among them. Further, Chalkov recalls that his application was wrapped up and left at the open-hearth furnace, because steel for war, as you know, is extremely important.
But if we add a few important details to these memories, then the whole picture of the spontaneous mobilization of Kuznetsk metallurgists changes dramatically. Firstly, Molotov's statement was broadcast throughout the country without recording, and if in Moscow it sounded at noon, then in Stalinsk (as Novokuznetsk was called then) it was listened to at 16:00 local time. Since they usually go fishing in the morning, the message about the beginning of the war clearly could not prevent Chalkov from fishing, and then listening to Molotov's speech.
Secondly, a crowded spontaneous meeting of metallurgists only at first glance seems to be a common thing. But at a second glance, it is clear that he had a different background.
Then the law of June 26, 1940 on the transition to an eight-hour working day and a seven-day working week was in force, which promised for absenteeism without a valid reason 6 months of corrective labor at the place of work with a deduction of 25% of the salary.
They were also severely punished for being late for work. KMK, as a continuous cycle enterprise, worked around the clock. So metallurgists could not give up their work spontaneously. In addition, at a metallurgical plant, you cannot leave furnaces and blast furnaces unattended, which is fraught with an accident with all the ensuing consequences. Hence, it is quite obvious that the meeting of the metallurgists was prepared in advance so that the people would gather and the equipment would be left with the minimum necessary supervision.
But if this meeting and registration in the army was organized by the party committee, then everything falls into place. It is clear that this was not an improvisation, but a prepared action in advance, even before the start of the war. The metallurgists, who did not work in shift that day, were warned in advance not to disperse about their business and to come to the plant at the first request. That is why Chalkov did not go on the planned fishing trip.
The city committee of Stalinsk and the party committee of the KMK could learn about the start of the war after about 10 a.m. local time (in Moscow it was 6 a.m. when information about the start of the war arrived; undoubtedly, the military and party leadership immediately began to notify local authorities throughout the country by telephone). The plant's party organizer had time to gather the workers and organize a meeting by the time of Molotov's speech.
There are dozens and hundreds of similar facts. In Vladivostok, for example, people listened to Molotov's speech at 19 o'clock local time at a loudspeaker hung on the building of the regional party committee. At this time, the film was shown at the Ussuri cinema. The session was interrupted by the announcement: “Men! All to the exit. First of all, the military. Five hours later, at midnight local time, a radio meeting began.
A powerful wave of mobilization began across the country. And on June 22, and in the following days, many people, primarily workers of large enterprises, for some reason quit their jobs en masse, not at all afraid of the punishment prescribed by the current laws, went to the military registration and enlistment offices and applied to the front. Hundreds and even thousands of skilled workers left factories, although the law was strictly forbidden to voluntarily leave factories and institutions, and in spite of the fact that production was threatened with stoppage. This could take place only if this mass mobilization was in advance, even before the war, prepared in every detail, and was carried out at the direction of the party organizers. If you carefully read the reports about the mass filing of applications to the front in the first days of the war, you can clearly see the firm, organizing hand of the party.
And also about the strange behavior of metallurgists in the first days of the war. On the night of June 23-24, 1941, the People's Commissar of Ferrous Metallurgy of the USSR I. T. Tevosyan called the chief engineer of the Kuznetsk Metallurgical Plant L. E. Weisberg and proposed to urgently organize the production of armor steel in conventional open-hearth furnaces, motivating this decision by the fact that the factories that produced it were in a combat zone. Weisberg promised to think it over, and by the morning he called Tevosyan, saying that it was possible in principle. And he immediately received permission to re-equip open-hearth furnaces.
This conversation is mentioned in a number of books, but none of the authors asked the simple question: how could this be? How did the quality steel factories end up in the war zone on June 23? At that time, battles took place practically along the border, on the territory of former Poland, where there were no metallurgical plants. For example, the Stalingrad plant "Red October" - one of the main enterprises for the production of high-quality steel, was located more than 1400 km from the front line. It was also not close to Stalino (Donetsk), about 800 km. At a rate of advance of 50 km a day, it would take the Germans 16 days to reach it. Leningrad on June 23, too, was still far from the front line. Why was there such a rush?
This remarkable case lifts the veil of silence about the reasons for such an early and massive mobilization in the very first days of the war. This could only happen if the party leadership, that is, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) and Stalin personally, believed that a German attack could lead to a very quick defeat.
This conclusion may seem controversial to many. However, if you do not include the afterthoughts and do not evaluate the beginning of the war in terms of subsequent victories (about which, of course, nothing was known on June 22, 1941), then such a calculation was quite reasonable.
The Soviet leadership carefully studied the actions of the German army in Poland in 1939, in Denmark, Norway and France in 1940. It was clear that in the very first hours of the war the Germans would collapse with all their might and would rush forward.
Even the French army, which before the war was considered the strongest in Europe and relied on a powerful system of long-term defense, could not withstand the Germans. The Red Army, which was going through a large-scale and painful process of reorganization, occupying a theater of military operations with weak communication routes, which was very poorly prepared for war, could also not withstand this first, strong blow. This option, as can be seen from the actions on the first day of the war, was considered the most probable and, at the same time, the worst.
It should be noted here that the whole nature of the mobilization begun on June 22 was as if the Red Army had already been defeated, and the Germans were marching towards Moscow. At the same time, the situation at the front on June 22 and even on June 23 was still far from clear even for the General Staff. There was no communication with many armies, on June 22 the Germans broke through 40-50 km deep into Soviet territory only in the main directions, and the next day counter-attacks were planned. Based on the current situation on the first day of the war, it was too early to draw such far-reaching conclusions. A threatening situation developed only a few days later, when it became clear that the counterattacks had failed and the Germans were advancing. So the mobilization begun by the party organs on June 22 was definitely based on the firm conviction, developed even before the war, that if the Germans attacked, there would inevitably be a big retreat.
But, unlike the French government, Stalin and his associates were not going to surrender.
If the Red Army cannot stop the enemy onslaught, then it is necessary, without swinging, in the very first hours and days of the war, to begin a general mobilization in order to create a new army, begin the evacuation and transfer of industry to war production. In this spirit, apparently, instructions were prepared for all party bodies and local committees, with an order to start acting immediately after the first announcement of the start of the war, without waiting for the official announcement of mobilization.
Moreover, as can be seen from many facts, the volunteer impulse covered mainly the communists and Komsomol members of large enterprises. It should be noted here that no one canceled the class approach at that time. The workers were considered the most reliable and staunch pillar of the party, and if the Red Army were beaten, then it was the workers who were to form the core of the new armed force. The workers must arm themselves and stop the enemy's onslaught even at the cost of a sharp drop in production. The main thing, as the Politburo apparently believed, was to stop the Germans at any cost in the first days and weeks of the war, and then - how it goes. For the sake of this, they were even ready to call under arms the most skilled workers, whose cultivation took many years and which there would be no one to replace.
In addition, apparently, there were certain doubts about the reliability and resilience of the Red Army, at least many of its formations, created by a common call, since in the first days of the war they decided to create separate formations and even militia armies, the core of which was as once the workers of large enterprises with a powerful party stratum. In principle, these doubts were not unfounded. There were enough units and formations with weak discipline in the Red Army, and sometimes serious problems arose from this. On the contrary, units and formations created from workers were distinguished by high stamina and excellent fighting qualities, like the famous "division of black knives" - the 30th Ural Volunteer Tank Corps, a select detachment of workers in the Urals, formed in 1943.
Deeds are sometimes much more eloquent than words. Party mobilization, which began on June 22, 1941, in the very first hours of the war, is an outstanding organizational achievement. True, the point of view that the enemy attacked unexpectedly and treacherously prevented the widespread announcement of this. It was of great political importance. People had to explain in a simple and intelligible way why the enemy turned out to be stronger and achieved such great success. It is now possible to write a plump monograph, and put everything on the shelves. In the course of the war, short explanations were needed, accessible to everyone's understanding.
If they said that the party organized a mobilization, very carefully and comprehensively thought out, then this would contradict the thesis of a surprise attack. Notifying party committees, gathering people, organizing rallies with incendiary speeches and oaths, creating many assembly points and even preparing paper for thousands of applications to the front - all this required at least preliminary discussion and drawing up at least the most minimal plan. And this wave of mobilization swept across the country, to the very outskirts, swept decisively, uniformly and without any particular disruptions.
Whatever one may say, this planning discussion took place before the start of the war, which was not expected. The result would be an absurdity: the war was not expected, and the party already had a plan for a large mobilization. Therefore, the thesis of the patriotic impulse of the masses came to the fore, while the party modestly receded into the shadows.
Today, when passions have subsided somewhat, we can pay tribute to this party plan. He, of course, made a significant contribution to the victory. The Germans could not even imagine that the mobilization in the USSR would spin so quickly and so decisively. Major General Georg Thomas, head of the economic department of the Wehrmacht High Command, writes in his memoirs that they seriously planned that they would be able to seize the Caucasian oil a month after the start of the war. At least it was very desirable for them. This is how low they rated the fighting efficiency of the Red Army, although, I must say, they had some grounds for this in the form of the experience of the French campaign. The whole plan of the war against the USSR was based on the fact that the Wehrmacht would defeat the Red Army in the first week or two of the war, and then go almost on a marching order, almost without encountering resistance. Party mobilization came as an unpleasant surprise to them, as it turned the French-style blitzkrieg into a stubborn, protracted, and ultimately Germany-losing war.
