A full-scale baptism of fire in the conflict was received by the Kharkov T-64 vehicle and its numerous modifications in the territory of the South-East of Ukraine. And, as it turned out, in many ways the revolutionary tank was poorly prepared for war. Since the mid-60s of the last century, many defense specialists have expressed doubts about the advisability of putting the tank into production. But the famous Khrushchev's "Let's take!" at the tank range in Kubinka and the authority of the chief designer A. A. Morozov did their job.
In fairness, it is worth noting that the secretary general allegedly spoke approvingly about the tanks that were already fully tested, and there were about 90 of them built. By that time, the decision to release a pilot batch of T-64 had already been made by the Council of Ministers of the USSR (No. 693-291 of 4.07.1962). According to GB Pasternak, a GABTU veteran, the T-64 has a whole bunch of shortcomings, which are extremely problematic to fix. First of all, it is a two-stroke five-cylinder diesel engine 5TDF with two crankshafts, which is characterized by low reliability, as well as high requirements for maintenance and operation. Even in official documents, it was recommended that tanks be transferred only to experienced crews with high qualifications. The motor became a headache for the deputy chiefs of combat units for the technical part. The 5TDF was in many ways a frankly raw engine - sensitive to overheating, the presence of dust in the air, and also had a difficult cold start. For example, in the field, in the event of an emergency leak of antifreeze, it was impossible to simply add water to the cooling system and continue the march. The cooling jacket of the cylinder block had such thin ducts that it quickly became clogged with scale, and the engine jammed. According to the recollections of professional tankers, the serviceability of 5TDF tank diesels in any unit was not even close to 100%. It is known that the tasty target of any "armor-piercing" is the ammunition capacity of the tank, and here the T-64 is not at all up to par. The location of a mechanized cabin-type ammunition rack, when the crew sits surrounded by powder charges (up to the level of the turret ring), can only be justified in a frontal attack, when no anti-tank weapon can hit the vehicle in weakened side projections. This requires at least close interaction with their own infantry, or with light armored vehicles. However, the experience of actually counter-guerrilla actions in the South-East of Ukraine shows that the tank is attacked from all angles, and "photo reports" with the consequences of the battles are eloquent evidence of this. The T-64 hulls were simply collapsed from the detonated BC, the towers were thrown tens of meters away, the crews were destroyed … By the way, one of the names of such a layout solution among tankers was "powder keg".
Destroyed T-64A. Source: lostarmour.info
Destroyed T-64BV. Source: lostarmour.info
Destroyed T-64BV. Source: lostarmour.info
Some experts argue that the destruction of the T-64 can be done with a 30-mm BMP-2 cannon or even a 12, 7-mm "Cliff" - the tank has enough weakened zones. The reason for this was the almost manic desire of Soviet designers (naturally, in accordance with the terms of reference of the Ministry of Defense) to reduce the size and weight of the armored vehicle. Of course, the Nizhniy Tagil T-72 also boasts the ability to throw a turret, but its ammunition rack is still located under the floor in a horizontal position, which reduces the likelihood of being hit. Moreover, in the T-64, some of the shells are located behind the driver's back, blocking his emergency exit. There are known cases when a tank fell into a ditch with water, and the mechanic drive's hatch was locked by a cannon that was not turned to the side, which led to a tragedy - there was no time for the mechanic drive to disassemble the ammunition rack behind the back. And in the event of a fire, it will be extremely difficult for the driver to get out through the fighting compartment. The climate inside the tank also does not improve the lack of a mechanism for ejection of spent cartridges, implemented in the T-72. The next victim of the struggle for weight was the fragile chassis of the Kharkov tank. The lightweight openwork caterpillars of the vehicle are adapted to a greater extent for movement on fairly hard soils; in the event of muddy roads, the mobility of the tank is significantly reduced.
Remains of T-64BV. Source: lostarmour.info
Some specialized publications mention another drawback of the chassis - the impossibility of towing an emergency tank with lost tracks. In their opinion, the tank will, like a plow, plow the soil with its miniature rollers, into which it will eventually bury itself. At the same time, no one will ever evacuate tanks without tracks - with such an absurdity, both the T-72, the T-90, and the Leopards will firmly enter the ground. In comparison with the T-72, the small-sized lightweight rollers of the Kharkov vehicle made of aluminum alloy practically do not protect the side of the tank from attacks from side projections. Another "elegant" solution of the Morozov T-64 was short torsion bars, located coaxially, for which a special alloy of increased ductility had to be developed. The end of the torsion bar is sealed in the middle of a relatively thin armor plate of the bottom - this, after all, with prolonged operation, can lead to fatigue destruction (cracks) of the lower part of the tank hull. There were frequent cases during the tests of the "Object 172", when the torsion bar was simply pulled out, and the deformed suspension elements destroyed the engine. In addition, such a lightweight design practically did not allow upgrading the tank, increasing the weight of its armor protection. The solution with short torsion bars has never been used anywhere in the tank industry - A. A. Morozov borrowed the idea from agricultural technology and the automotive world. The second weak point of the suspension is the roller balancers, which often do not withstand prolonged movement over rough terrain and shock loads. And after the collapse of the USSR, such fundamental flaws in the T-64 were not corrected and almost unchanged migrated to such a machine as the Bulat. In this regard, it would be useful to mention that the chief designer of the Nizhny Tagil design bureau L. N. Kartsev, through whose efforts the T-72 got into the series, did a lot to make his car better than the Kharkov one. Perhaps the main trump card of the T-64 was the 125-mm cannon 2A46 (later 2A46-1 and -2), which, together with the guided weapons complex, really surpassed NATO tank main calibers in all respects. But they managed to slander her in some Russian media, indicating that the design headquarters of the Kharkov plant equipped the T-64 with a unique cannon, not interchangeable with the T-72 gun.
At the moment, the irrecoverable losses of the T-64 of the Ukrainian army cannot be called anything other than gigantic - only official Kiev mentions more than 400 destroyed vehicles. For example, about 120 tanks were lost in Debaltseve, of which 20 were transferred to the militia. However, according to experts, in Ukraine before the hostilities there was a large tank stock - about 1,750 T-64s of all modifications and 85 T-64BM "Bulat" tanks. Also, the Armed Forces have 160-170 T-80 and T-84U tanks. There were also "seventy-two" cars in storage in the amount of about 600 cars, but this equipment was actively sold, so it is difficult to give an exact value. In general, Ukraine made good money on the vast Soviet tank legacy - since 1992, at least 1,238 vehicles have been sold to African and Asian countries, and these were obviously not T-64s at all. Therefore, they had to fight with what they left for themselves. And the beginning of hostilities indicated the insufficient protection of the Kharkov tank of all modifications, even in the frontal projection. So, in February 2016, a dug-out T-64BV received a direct hit with an anti-tank missile in the front of the tower. Dynamic protection did not help, the crew, fortunately, escaped with only wounds, and the tank went for a long repair.
Destroyed T-64BM "Bulat" equipped with DZ "Knife". Source: lostarmour.info
By the way, it would be useful to mention the dynamic protection "Knife" for modifications of the T-64, which caused serious controversy in the expert environment, both in print media and on forums in Runet. The principle of operation of the DZ "Knife" is the formation of a flat cumulative jet, which, like a knife, cuts the attacking ammunition, or its cumulative jet. Moreover, an additional effect has an armor plate (front screen) thrown towards the projectile. The developers of the Ukrainian GPBTsK Mikrotech are even confident in the effectiveness of the Knife even against the cores of sub-caliber projectiles. However, among the shortcomings of the development, I single out a large mass of explosives, detonated at the same time during an attack - up to 2.5 kg, as well as the need to pre-cut with a cumulative jet of its own front armor plate before striking the ammunition. The latter circumstance sharply reduces the effectiveness of protection, especially against BPS. For reference: these conclusions were made on the basis of mathematical calculations of the Russian JSC "Research Institute of Steel".
The principle of operation of the DZ "Knife" on the BPS. Source: alternathistory.com
Of course, the nature of the battles in the south-east of Ukraine for the most part is not intended for tank units at all. For such punitive or police operations, other vehicles are needed, and not a tank designed for a nuclear war with NATO countries. But this only emphasizes the shortcomings of the Kharkov T-64 and the unjustified steps of the command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
