Just a couple of days ago, Lockheed Martin published new photos from the workshop of the plant, where the latest F-35 Lightning II fighters are assembled. The wing assemblies of the next aircraft captured on them are notable for the fact that it will already be the hundredth fighter in the series. All in all, almost 90 boards are now at the factories of the company in varying degrees of readiness. Thus, taking into account more than 50 aircraft already built, in the coming months the total number of new fighters will exceed one hundred and fifty. As you can see, despite all the problems and criticism, "Lockheed-Martin" not only completed the development of a promising aircraft, but also established a full-fledged serial production. Nevertheless, even after the deployment of mass production, some problems remained, not as big as before, which are still the object of criticism.
Economy
The main wave of criticism of the F-35 project concerns the economic side of the matter. Despite the promised advantages over existing and promising technology, the aircraft turned out to be very expensive. Currently, the production of one F-35A fighter jet costs more than one hundred million dollars. In the mid-nineties, when work on this project entered an active stage, it was planned to keep the cost of one aircraft, taking into account all preliminary costs, at the level of 30-35 million. As you can see, at the moment there is a threefold excess of the price of the aircraft relative to the planned one. Of course, such "coefficients" could not fail to attract the attention of opponents of the project. At the same time, the authors of the project from the Lockheed-Martin company justify themselves by objective reasons for a significant increase in prices, such as the difficulty of mastering new technologies or creating a unified design.
It is noteworthy that all project costs are directly or indirectly related to the policy adopted at the very beginning. Since the Pentagon wanted three aircraft with different purposes, different characteristics and for three different branches of the military, Lockheed-Martin engineers set a course for maximum simplification of the design. In addition, the issues of simplifying the aircraft maintenance were actively considered. As in the case of the previous super-project - the F-22 Raptor - all the measures to reduce the cost not only did not lead to it, but even increased the cost of the program as a whole and of each individual aircraft in particular. The F-35 project looks especially interesting in the light of the concepts of creation and use. Initially, this fighter was made as a light and cheap aircraft to complement the heavy and expensive F-22. In the end, it turned out to comply with the required price ratio, but one hundred million overboard can be called a small cost only in comparison with 140-145 million F-22s.
Probably, it was possible to maintain the ratio of the cost of aircraft and programs, among other things, thanks to the correct approach to business. The F-35 project goes back to the ASTOLV program, which began in the first half of the eighties, but did not have much success. On the basis of the developments on this project, work was later deployed under the code name CALF, which eventually merged with the JAST program. The tasks of all these programs were noticeably different, but at the stage of combining CALF and JAST, general requirements for a promising fighter were already formed. Perhaps it was the nomenclature points, due to which the costs of one program were not added to the costs of the other, that ultimately significantly reduced the cost of the final F-35 project. At the same time, the latest transformation of the JAST (Joint Advanced Strike Technology) program, which only led to a change in its name to JSF (Joint Strike Fighter), can hardly be considered a reason for any savings.
It is worth noting that much greater savings were achieved through the use of existing developments. For example, when designing the new F-35 fighter, the CATIA automated system and the COMOC test complex were actively used. These systems were created specifically for the F-22 project, which actually "took over" their cost. The situation is similar with some new technologies, for example with several new grades of composite materials.
However, even with this cost sharing, the F-35s came out quite expensive. There is every reason to believe that the main reason for the high cost of these aircraft is the specific idea of creating several independent aircraft based on one design. Such a task is not easy in itself, let alone modern aircraft, which should combine the latest technologies. In addition, the change in customer requirements affected. In the late nineties, the US Navy revised and adjusted its desires several times regarding the characteristics of the future carrier-based F-35C. Because of this, Lockheed Martin designers had to constantly update the project. In the case of a separate development of an independent project, such adjustments would not entail any particularly complex work. But in the case of the JSF program, due to its unification requirements, every noticeable change in the carrier-based fighter or any other modification directly affected the other two variants of the fighter. According to various estimates, about 10-15% of the total design time was spent on additional modifications of the projects. Obviously, the situation was similar with the extra cash costs.
Technique
In addition to problems with the implementation of certain requirements, leading to unnecessary costs, the cost of the JSF program was also due to a number of new technical solutions, the development and testing of which also took a lot of money.
The first to catch the eye are the F-35B's short takeoff and vertical landing fighter lifting units. To meet the requirements of the Marine Corps regarding the possibility of basing on universal amphibious ships, Lockheed-Martin employees, together with engine builders from Pratt & Whitney, had to spend a lot of time on creating a lift-sustainer engine that could not only provide the necessary thrust, but also fit into the ideology of maximum unification adopted in the project. If to create a power plant for "land" and carrier-based fighters it was enough to do with the modernization of the existing PW F119 engine, then in the case of a short or vertical takeoff aircraft, a number of special measures had to be taken.
Even according to the results of the old ASTOLV program, several options for lifting and sustaining engines were eliminated. During the JSF work, Lockheed-Martin concluded that the most convenient remaining option would be a turbojet with a swivel nozzle and an additional lift fan driven by the engine. This arrangement provides sufficient traction for vertical take-off and ease of control, although it is not without its drawbacks. First of all, the fact is noted that the aircraft will carry an extra load in the form of a lifting fan most of the time, which is necessary only for vertical / short takeoff or landing. All fan assemblies, from the isolation clutch to the upper and lower flaps, weigh about 1800 kilograms, which is slightly more than the dry mass of the F135-600 engine itself. However, when using a high-temperature turbojet engine, other options did not look very convenient. The fact is that the flow of cold air from the fan, colliding with the jet stream of the engine, partially cools it, and also prevents overheated gases from entering the air intakes. No other layout of the lifting power plant has such an opportunity and therefore excess weight was recognized as an acceptable price for advantages.
An interesting story is connected with another equally complex unit of the power plant of the F-35B fighter - the rotary nozzle. Research on this topic began back in the days of the CALF program, but did not have much success. Having spent a lot of time, effort and money, American scientists and engineers turned to the Russian design bureau named after V. I. A. S. Yakovleva. As a result of lengthy negotiations, the Americans were able to buy part of the documentation for the Yak-141 project and carefully study it. Already using the knowledge gained, a new nozzle for the F135-600 engine was designed, which has a number of common features with the corresponding unit of the Soviet Yak-141 aircraft.
And yet, despite the use of foreign experience, the creation of a power plant for a vertical takeoff aircraft turned out to be a very difficult matter. In particular, shortly before the start of testing the first prototype of the F-35B with the BF-1 index, the risk of cracks in the engine turbine blades was discovered. Because of this, for several months, all tests of the lifting units were carried out with serious power limitations, and after each gas engine, an examination of the engine for damage was required. As a result of long enough work on fine-tuning the power plant, it was still possible to eliminate all its main problems and ensure the required reliability. It is worth noting that these problems are still blamed on the new aircraft from time to time, and a number of sources mention the appearance of new cracks, including on production aircraft.
There were also problems when creating the deck version of the F-35C. Initially, it was supposed to improve its take-off and landing characteristics using an engine with a controlled thrust vector and a boundary layer control system. However, back in the late nineties, the overall complexity and cost of the JSF / F-35 program had grown so much that it was decided to leave only the controlled thrust vector. According to some sources, employees of Lockheed Martin and related enterprises have already begun research and design work on the topic of the boundary layer management system, but they soon stopped. Thus, additional costs were added to the total cost of the program, which, however, had no practical benefit.
Like the previous F-22 fighter, the F-35 was originally supposed to be equipped with a powerful computing system that would provide the ability to work on air and ground targets, navigation, control of all aircraft systems, etc. When creating an avionics complex for the F-35, the developments on the F-22 project were widely used. At the same time, some features of the production of components for electronics were taken into account. It was assumed that the use of the latest components will not only improve the performance of the equipment, but also protect the aircraft from troubles like those that happened with the F-22 in the mid-nineties. Recall that then, shortly after the start of testing the first version of the computing complex, the manufacturer of the used microprocessors announced the end of their release. Employees of several companies involved in the F-22 project had to urgently redo a considerable part of the electronics.
The main means of obtaining information about the situation from the F-35 aircraft is the AN / APG-81 airborne radar, equipped with an active phased antenna array. Also, six optical-electronic sensors of the AN / AAQ-37 system are distributed over the aircraft structure, monitoring the situation from all angles. For observation and use of weapons, the aircraft is equipped with an AAQ-40 thermal imaging system. Also worth noting is the AN / ASQ-239 active radio jamming station. Over the course of several years of development, testing and fine-tuning, American engineers managed to solve almost all the problems of avionics for the F-35.
However, the protracted epic with a special pilot's helmet has not yet ended. The fact is that in accordance with the requirements of the military and the fabrications of the authors of the general appearance of the F-35, pilots of promising fighters must work with a special helmet, the glass of which is equipped with an information output system. It is planned to display all the data necessary for navigation, target search and attack on the helmet-mounted screen. Initially, Vision Systems International was involved in the development of the helmet, but for several years it did not manage to bring it to mind. Thus, even at the end of 2011, there were delays in displaying information on the helmet-mounted display. In addition, the electronics of the protective headgear did not always correctly determine the position of the pilot's head relative to the aircraft, which led to the issuance of incorrect information. Due to these problems with the VSI helmet and the incomprehensible timing of their fix, Lockheed Martin was forced to order BAE Systems to develop an alternative version of the pilot's helmet. There are already prototypes of it, but the adoption of any of the helmets is still a matter of the future.
Perspectives
If we compare the state of the F-35 and F-22 projects at the time of the start of mass production, the first thing that catches the eye is the degree of overall sophistication of the fighters. It seems that the engineers and managers of Lockheed Martin took into account all the troubles that happened with the previous promising aircraft and tried to avoid the bulk of the problems that had interfered with earlier. Of course, fine-tuning and additional testing of all three modifications of the F-35 took additional time and money, but such a fee, apparently, was considered acceptable in light of possible further problems. Therefore, at present, Lightning-2 has mainly financial problems and, as a result, not entirely clear prospects, concerning, first of all, export supplies.
For many years, the F-35 fighter has been subjected to various criticism from experts from different countries, including those participating in the project. Perhaps the most interesting is the position of the Australian military and experts. This country has long intends to purchase a number of new fighters with great prospects, and it wants to purchase F-22 aircraft. The United States, in turn, just as long ago clearly and clearly denied all foreign countries the possibility of such deliveries and offered "instead" newer F-35s. The Australians, not wanting to be deprived of the opportunity to buy the F-22, in recent years have regularly begun to raise the question of the advisability of buying the F-35 in particular and the prospects for this aircraft in general. There is often an opinion that in pursuit of the more interesting Raptor, the Australians are ready to blame the Lightning 2 for non-existent shortcomings. However, in the current environment, statements from Australia can be used as one of the sources of information that does not cause serious mistrust.
Some of the most famous and scandalous are the statements of analysts at Air Power Australia. After analyzing the available information, experts recognized the F-35 as a 4+ generation fighter a few years ago, although Lockheed Martin positions it as belonging to the fifth. To prove their words, Australian analysts cited the low thrust-to-weight ratio of the aircraft and, as a consequence, the impossibility of supersonic flight without switching on the afterburner, the relatively high visibility for the radar and a number of other factors. A little later, an Australian think tank compared the performance ratios of the F-22 and F-35 fighters to a motorcycle and a scooter. In addition, for many years now, Australian experts have been conducting comparative analyzes of the F-35 and air defense systems of various countries. The result of such calculations constantly becomes the conclusion about the almost guaranteed victory of the anti-aircraft gunners. Finally, a few years ago, the Australian military was present at a virtual exercise of air combat between American F-35 aircraft and Russian Su-35 (generation 4 ++). According to information received from the Australian side, the American planes, at least, did not show everything that they should have. The official Pentagon explained these failures of American technology in "digital form" by some other goals. One way or another, Australia continues to be the most ardent critic of the F-35 project.
A few days ago, the Australian edition of the Sidney Morning Herald published excerpts from the plans of the country's Ministry of Defense that came to it. It directly follows from these quotes that the Australian military intends to break the agreement with the United States for the supply of new F-35s. Instead of a dozen Lightnings, Canberra intends to purchase a number of the latest modifications of F / A-18 fighter-bombers. The actions of the Australian military create a strong impression that the Air Force command considers the F-35 to be significantly inferior in cost-effectiveness to the older F-22 and therefore not worthy of attention and costs. It is for this reason that the Australian Air Force is willing to buy old and proven F / A-18s, but not new and questionable F-35s.
In April last year, a scandal erupted on the sidelines of the Canadian Department of Defense. A few years ago, when Canada entered the F-35 program, it was planned to buy 65 F-35A aircraft with a total value of about $ 10 billion. Taking into account the twenty-year service of the aircraft, all expenses should have been kept within 14-15 billion. A little later, the Canadians recalculated the costs of the contract and it turned out that the total planes would cost 25 billion. Finally, by the end of 2012, as a result of another recalculation, the total cost of purchasing and operating aircraft rose to more than 40 billion. Because of this increase in costs, Ottawa is forced to abandon the purchase of a new fifth generation fighter and consider more modest options. It is noteworthy that due to the delay in the F-35 project, the Canadian Air Force found itself in a not very pleasant situation: the existing equipment is gradually depleting its resource, and the arrival of a new one will not begin today or tomorrow. Therefore, Canada is now considering buying F / A-18 fighters or European Eurofighter Typhoons in order to save money and time.
All of the current export problems of the F-35 are based on a number of reasons. The complexity of the project led to a delay in deadlines and a slow but sure increase in the cost of both the program as a whole and each aircraft in particular. All this could not but affect the export future of the fighter. The United States Air Force, Navy and ILC, being the main customers, must continue to purchase new equipment. In this case, the maximum risk for the program will be a decrease in the amount of purchased equipment. Export deliveries have less clear prospects, because a further shift in terms and an increase in prices will only scare away potential buyers.
Today and tomorrow
Meanwhile, in 2012, a total of three dozen new F-35 aircraft took off, more than double the production rate of 2011. The first fighters received the British Air Force (two) and the Netherlands (one). In addition, the first three F-35B fighters went to serve in the Marine Corps combat squadron. According to the official data of the Lockheed-Martin company, over the past year 1167 test flights were performed (18% more than the plan), during which 9319 points characterizing the progress were scored (the plan was exceeded by 10%). As you can see, the Americans do not even think about stopping the development and production of the latest fighters. For the current 2013, it is planned to test and refine the onboard avionics of the Block 2B version, as well as the first tests of weapons. The first tests of the shortened takeoff modification on the Wasp project universal landing ships are scheduled for the summer.
In general, employees of all companies and enterprises involved in the F-35 project continue to work on it and are not going to abandon it. And the project itself has long passed the point of no return, so the military and engineers have no way back - they need to continue fine-tuning and building new aircraft. All problems with the complexity of one or another part of the project, as well as the resulting delays in implementation, ultimately lead to an increase in the cost of the entire program. But, as already mentioned, there is no turning back, the F-35 will serve at any cost.
It's just not entirely clear how the next update of the American Air Force will look like if the price of the next aircraft is even higher than it is now. In the late nineties, one of the high-ranking executives of Lockheed Martin, N. Augustine, noticed that every ten years the program for developing a new fighter is four times more expensive than the previous one. If this trend continues, then by the middle of the 21st century, one annual US military budget of the late nineties will be equivalent to the development and construction of just one aircraft. As Augustine aptly put it, three and a half days a week, this fighter will serve in the Air Force, the same number in the Navy, and in especially successful years it will occasionally "fall" to the Marine Corps. Will Lightning 2 be able to end this bad tradition? Judging by the current situation, the likelihood of this is not so great.
