According to popular belief, the Third World War has not yet begun due to the presence of nuclear weapons in the world's leading countries. The conflict between such powers may develop into a full-scale nuclear war, which will have quite understandable consequences for both sides and a number of other states, including neutral ones. Perhaps a number of consequences of a major conflict with the massive use of nuclear weapons were exaggerated at one time: for example, the concept of the so-called. nuclear winter sometimes raises questions and doubts. However, after the American bombing of the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, there was not a single case of the combat use of nuclear or thermonuclear weapons. At the same time, it should be noted that the concept of nuclear deterrence and guaranteed mutual destruction was formed only a few years after those events.
Until a certain time, all ensuring nuclear deterrence was reduced to a banal buildup of the number of weapons. However, this method of ensuring parity has two characteristic drawbacks. First, the production of large quantities of nuclear warheads and their delivery vehicles is a complex and expensive process. Secondly, a large number of missiles and bombers with nuclear warheads does not guarantee protection against enemy weapons. In other words, even if the entire nuclear potential of one country is fired at the territory of another, this will not protect it from a retaliatory strike of one or another power. In this case, the only way to somehow defend against a retaliatory strike is a massive attack of enemy missile and air bases, as well as the destruction of submarines with strategic missiles. Obviously, this approach to self-defense directly borders on the first problem of nuclear deterrence described above by increasing the number of nuclear weapons. In fact, the inevitability of a retaliatory strike has become the very essence of the concept of containment. However, in this case, none of the countries with nuclear weapons can no longer use them as a universal political argument, which is a guarantee of the fulfillment of any ultimatum conditions. Naturally, any country wants to receive such a serious argument.
Strategic missile defense was to become a means of providing protection against retaliation. The creation of such systems began shortly after the appearance of the first intercontinental missiles. Quite quickly, anti-missile systems reached the level at which they began to threaten the international nuclear balance. As a result, without taking into account the relatively low perfection of existing and future missile defense systems, in 1972 the USSR and the United States signed an agreement on the limitation of anti-missile defense. Two years later, an additional protocol defined the final terms of the agreement. Both countries now had the right to only one area, covered from a nuclear missile strike. By decision of the leadership of the countries, anti-missile defense areas were created around the Soviet capital and around the American military base Grand Forks. At the end of the last century, the American government initiated several research and development programs aimed at building a large-scale strategic missile defense system. A little later, in December 2001, the United States announced its withdrawal from the treaty, after which work on the creation of missile defense began in full. This fact has become the cause of lengthy disputes and proceedings.
At the moment, in addition to strategic missile defense systems, only anti-submarine defense has certain chances to change the balance of nuclear weapons. The reasons for the high potential of anti-submarine defense lie in the structure of the nuclear forces. For example, about half of the nuclear warheads deployed by the United States are based on strategic nuclear submarines. In the Russian nuclear triad, submarines also occupy an important position, but the bulk of the warheads are "assigned" to strategic missile forces. A rather interesting situation turns out here: to reduce the combat potential of the US nuclear forces, it is necessary to develop anti-submarine weapons. For the same actions in relation to Russia, in turn, anti-missile systems are required. In the context of the search and destruction of enemy submarines, it is worth recalling the recent news about the competition for the creation of a new anti-submarine aircraft, which should replace the outdated Il-38 and Tu-142. At the same time, the fight against submarine-based ballistic missiles can also be carried out using "standard" methods - land-based and sea-based anti-missiles.
In this case, the development by the Americans of a certain unified missile defense system, which can be manufactured both in the ground version and installed on ships, looks like a logical decision. However, the further development of the American missile defense system is still unclear. So, in early September, the National Research Council at the US National Academy of Sciences presented to Congress a report on the prospects for the anti-missile direction. This report examined several general concepts of a promising strategic missile defense system. In particular, the analysis of various methods of attacking enemy missiles was carried out. As a result, it turned out that both main methods of destroying enemy delivery vehicles and warheads have both pros and cons. The simplest, as it seems, interception of a ballistic missile in the initial phase of flight requires a short reaction time of anti-missile systems and is quite complicated due to the need for a relatively small distance between the point of launching a ballistic missile and the launch site of an interceptor missile. The defeat of the warhead at the final sections of the trajectory, in turn, does not require such a quick response, but it needs a quick and accurate aiming of the anti-missile at the target. At the same time, experts from the National Research Council did not give any recommendations. The final decision remained with the Pentagon, but it has not yet clarified its plans.
Thus, so far it is possible to speak for sure about only one direction in the development of the American strategic missile defense system - the political one. In recent years, the United States administration has been constantly negotiating and signing agreements on cooperation in the field of missile defense with foreign states, primarily European ones. In addition, since 2010, the Yokota command post has been operating in Japan, which is jointly used by the Japanese and the Americans. Together with the command post, Japan has several over-the-horizon radars. The military leadership of the Land of the Rising Sun is pushing for the need to protect against North Korean missiles, but the facts suggest otherwise. Most of the stations are aimed at Russia and China, and their range allows them to survey the space almost to the Barents Sea. Obviously, with such opportunities, it is possible to follow not only North Korea. Also, Japan has a number of American SM-2 interceptor missiles and, under certain conditions, can launch attacks on a number of missiles, including successful ones.
As you can see, the United States, simultaneously with the creation of new detection systems and anti-missile missiles, is carrying out political activities, the task of which is to expand the network of anti-missile weapons. In addition, a large number of anti-missile systems, distributed over a large area, makes it possible to some extent compensate for the insufficient characteristics of existing missile defense systems. It is quite obvious that the anti-missile missiles available to the United States will not be able to ensure the guaranteed defeat of all enemy ballistic missiles. For this reason, it is necessary to find alternative ways to maximize the likelihood of a successful attack, for example, dispersing anti-missiles over a large area. Another obvious fact of the further development of the American missile defense system is the concept of the destruction of enemy missiles in the initial phases of flight. Firstly, a large number of destroyers with the appropriate equipment and weapons "scattered" across the world's oceans will be useful for this. Secondly, only this method of defense against missiles makes it relatively easy to avoid a strike on its territory. Moreover, in the event that the enemy uses maneuvering combat units, early interception is the only reliable way to defend its territory.
However, the dispersion of interceptor missiles across areas has one unpleasant feature. The existing launch detection systems do not provide adequate quality to record missile launches from submarines. This requires the involvement of a large satellite constellation, etc. Thus, in order to avoid a retaliatory strike with missiles installed on submarines, the United States should also have systems for tracking the movements of submarine missile carriers as part of its missile defense system. Recently, the Pentagon's advanced development agency DARPA announced the AAA - Assured Arctic Awareness program, which aims to create a tracking network in the Arctic Ocean. Unlike previous submarine tracking systems, AAA implies placing sensors and system equipment right in the ice of the Arctic. The positive aspects of this approach to tracking systems are already being noted. Due to the relatively simple installation, the AAA magnetic and hydroacoustic sensors will have a relatively simple design, and the transfer of the collected information will be greatly simplified due to the location of the equipment above the water surface. In addition, it is much cheaper and more convenient to produce and operate such automation, including in large quantities, than to regularly send hunting submarines to the bases of a potential enemy.
In total, no one doubts the intentions of the United States to complete the construction of its strategic missile defense system. One of the goals of this system, as already mentioned, is to reduce the likelihood of a potential enemy hitting targets on the territory of the United States and its allies. However, a hypothetical ideal or almost ideal missile defense system, at least, has a strong impact on strategic nuclear deterrence. Accordingly, some means are required to maintain the current state of affairs. The easiest way to maintain balance is to disable missile defense systems. A few years ago, the Russian leadership transparently hinted to the European countries that if they agreed to host elements of the American missile defense system, Russia would be forced to send its missiles to their territory. As subsequent events showed, these hints did not find understanding in the Eastern European countries. Nevertheless, the new operational-tactical missile systems "Iskander", which appeared in the statements about the retargeting, first of all went to serve in the western regions of Russia. Coincidence? Unlikely.
The second way to protect Russian nuclear forces from US missile defense systems can be called "active counteraction." For this, it is necessary to continue work on the warheads of missiles with warheads of individual guidance. In addition, maneuvering warheads should be improved. All these measures will have two positive consequences. The first is the difficulty of countering a MIRV attack. The second concerns the interception technology. Since "catching" warheads one at a time is a very difficult task, a missile with such a payload must be shot down even during the first stages of flight. However, in the case of Russian intercontinental missiles, this, among other things, requires long-range interceptor missiles to be destroyed even before they leave the space over the country's territory. As for the Arctic submarine search system, we still need to wait for its creation. Based on drifting ice floes, and even in areas with a specific natural electromagnetic environment, "provide" American engineers with many problems and tasks, the solution of which may eventually become even more costly than the usual coverage of the bottom of the water area with tracking systems. But even if AAA is created, it will remain exposed to electronic countermeasures.
On the whole, now Russia, using and developing the existing developments, is quite capable, if not negating, then at least significantly reducing the real capabilities of the American missile defense system. In addition, since the US withdrawn from the ABM Treaty, there have been regular rumors about the plans of the Russian leadership to also create a missile defense system for the entire country, which, however, have not yet received official confirmation. Perhaps the promising S-500 anti-aircraft systems and further representatives of this line will be able to work on high-speed ballistic targets. At the moment, however, Russian actions speak of an emphasis on ways to counter missile defense based on its breakthrough. Of course, breaking through the defenses is the most logical and simple way to ensure a guaranteed retaliatory strike. However, for this it is necessary to protect your objects from the first attack of the enemy. One way or another, the further development of nuclear forces and means of defense against them will entail a number of changes in the face of international politics and diplomacy, as well as affect nuclear deterrence. If a potential adversary has missile defense systems to provide guarantees of non-aggression, it will have to develop its own nuclear forces, which ultimately may turn into a new round of the arms race and new tensions in the international situation.
